From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Nikola Ciprich <nikola.ciprich@linuxbox.cz>,
David Laight <david.laight.linux@gmail.com>,
Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>,
ljs@kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, david@kernel.org,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Pedro Falcato <pfalcato@suse.de>,
Kiryl Shutsemau <kas@kernel.org>,
luizcap@redhat.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
Tal Zussman <tz2294@columbia.edu>,
Matt Fleming <matt@readmodwrite.com>
Subject: Re: hunting memory corruption bug in 6.18.x
Date: Fri, 16 Oct 2026 08:16:26 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <atI_yuCc4BiweBQP@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261016054954.GEatG7AgMNFRkiTo1H@fat_crate.local>
On Thu, Oct 15, 2026, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 15, 2026 at 09:18:32PM -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> > The corruption patterns strongly resemble AMD VMCB state, particularly
> > FS/GS segment data appearing at the expected VMCB offsets in unrelated
> > host memory.
>
> Aha, ok.
>
> > This suggests that a VMSAVE operation may have written to
> > an incorrect physical address. Ordinary KVM performs VMLOAD/VMSAVE
> > without nested virtualization, so Boris's objection doesn't eliminate
> > this possibility. However, the relevant assembly is essentially
> > unchanged between 6.18.55 and 7.3-rc6, and I haven't identified a newer
> > commit that convincingly explains why the corruption apparently stopped
> > reproducing. The earlier candidate 55780d8a1dcc remains poorly
> > motivated without evidence of nested virtualization.
> >
> > Two investigations look worthwhile. First, test 6.18.55 with both the
> > KVM TLB-flush fix (26505e1b5b54)
>
> Pff, we've been looking at that one recently too, trying to figure out whether
> it was really necessary.
>
> > and tlbi=ipi;
>
> Yeah, we checked that, it ain't that.
>
> > the existing results don't conclusively establish whether that combination
> > was tested. Second, examine the vmcore to determine whether the corrupted
> > host pages contain complete FS/GS state matching a legitimate VMCB, rather
> > than merely a few matching values. If they do, inspect the VMCB's
> > VMLOAD/VMSAVE interception and virtualization-enable bits. That could
> > establish whether a hardware VMSAVE was allowed to write to an unintended
> > physical page. The successful 7.3-rc6/rc7 testing is encouraging, but it
> > doesn't yet prove that all the reported corruption symptoms share one cause
> > or have been fixed.
>
> Hmm. I guess looking at and around VMSAVE handling wouldn't hurt...
@Nikola, as very long long-shot, can you try running with the below? I don't
expect it to help or flag anything, but this is eerily similar to a known bug[*]
where KVM writes to user memory in the wrong address space (wrong process) when
tearing down a VM after migrating the VM. But that bug (well, bugs) only affects
Intel, and I don't see any similar patterns on the AMD side.
[*] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261001202234.3794060-1-seanjc@google.com
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c
index df1d0cf769475..fc0ae4727793b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static void sgx_handle_emulation_failure(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr,
static int sgx_read_hva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long hva, void *data,
unsigned int size)
{
- if (__copy_from_user(data, (void __user *)hva, size)) {
+ if (kvm_copy_from_user(vcpu->kvm, data, (void __user *)hva, size)) {
sgx_handle_emulation_failure(vcpu, hva, size);
return -EFAULT;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index f65081330c8a4..2dec1463b596c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -3902,16 +3902,16 @@ static int init_rmode_tss(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *ua)
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
- if (__copy_to_user(ua + PAGE_SIZE * i, zero_page, PAGE_SIZE))
+ if (kvm_copy_to_user(kvm, ua + PAGE_SIZE * i, zero_page, PAGE_SIZE))
return -EFAULT;
}
data = TSS_BASE_SIZE + TSS_REDIRECTION_SIZE;
- if (__copy_to_user(ua + TSS_IOPB_BASE_OFFSET, &data, sizeof(u16)))
+ if (kvm_copy_to_user(kvm, ua + TSS_IOPB_BASE_OFFSET, &data, sizeof(u16)))
return -EFAULT;
data = ~0;
- if (__copy_to_user(ua + RMODE_TSS_SIZE - 1, &data, sizeof(u8)))
+ if (kvm_copy_to_user(kvm, ua + RMODE_TSS_SIZE - 1, &data, sizeof(u8)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
@@ -3946,7 +3946,7 @@ static int init_rmode_identity_map(struct kvm *kvm)
for (i = 0; i < (PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(tmp)); i++) {
tmp = (i << 22) + (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER |
_PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PSE);
- if (__copy_to_user(uaddr + i * sizeof(tmp), &tmp, sizeof(tmp))) {
+ if (kvm_copy_to_user(kvm, uaddr + i * sizeof(tmp), &tmp, sizeof(tmp))) {
r = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index 3c4e2401de072..13f44961e6e7d 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -1341,13 +1341,35 @@ int kvm_write_guest_offset_cached(struct kvm *kvm, struct gfn_to_hva_cache *ghc,
int kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct gfn_to_hva_cache *ghc,
gpa_t gpa, unsigned long len);
+static __always_inline __must_check bool kvm_can_do_uaccess(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ return !WARN_ON_ONCE(current->mm != kvm->mm ||
+ !refcount_read(&kvm->users_count));
+}
+
+#define BUILD_KVM_COPY_USER_WRAPPER(fn, to_user, from_user) \
+static __always_inline __must_check unsigned long kvm_##fn(struct kvm *kvm, \
+ void to_user *to, \
+ const void from_user *from, \
+ unsigned long n) \
+{ \
+ if (!kvm_can_do_uaccess(kvm)) \
+ return n; \
+ \
+ return __##fn(to, from, n); \
+}
+BUILD_KVM_COPY_USER_WRAPPER(copy_from_user, , __user)
+BUILD_KVM_COPY_USER_WRAPPER(copy_from_user_inatomic, , __user)
+BUILD_KVM_COPY_USER_WRAPPER(copy_to_user, __user, )
+BUILD_KVM_COPY_USER_WRAPPER(copy_to_user_inatomic, __user, )
+
#define __kvm_get_guest(kvm, gfn, offset, v) \
({ \
unsigned long __addr = gfn_to_hva(kvm, gfn); \
typeof(v) __user *__uaddr = (typeof(__uaddr))(__addr + offset); \
int __ret = -EFAULT; \
\
- if (!kvm_is_error_hva(__addr)) \
+ if (!kvm_is_error_hva(__addr) && kvm_can_do_uaccess(kvm)) \
__ret = get_user(v, __uaddr); \
__ret; \
})
@@ -1367,7 +1389,7 @@ int kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct gfn_to_hva_cache *ghc,
typeof(v) __user *__uaddr = (typeof(__uaddr))(__addr + offset); \
int __ret = -EFAULT; \
\
- if (!kvm_is_error_hva(__addr)) \
+ if (!kvm_is_error_hva(__addr) && kvm_can_do_uaccess(kvm)) \
__ret = put_user(v, __uaddr); \
if (!__ret) \
mark_page_dirty(kvm, gfn); \
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
index ba09b1dabc4b7..aa1564d41e7ff 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -3207,8 +3207,8 @@ static int next_segment(unsigned long len, int offset)
}
/* Copy @len bytes from guest memory at '(@gfn * PAGE_SIZE) + @offset' to @data */
-static int __kvm_read_guest_page(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
- void *data, int offset, int len)
+static int __kvm_read_guest_page(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+ gfn_t gfn, void *data, int offset, int len)
{
int r;
unsigned long addr;
@@ -3219,7 +3219,7 @@ static int __kvm_read_guest_page(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
addr = gfn_to_hva_memslot_prot(slot, gfn, NULL);
if (kvm_is_error_hva(addr))
return -EFAULT;
- r = __copy_from_user(data, (void __user *)addr + offset, len);
+ r = kvm_copy_from_user(kvm, data, (void __user *)addr + offset, len);
if (r)
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
@@ -3230,7 +3230,7 @@ int kvm_read_guest_page(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, void *data, int offset,
{
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn);
- return __kvm_read_guest_page(slot, gfn, data, offset, len);
+ return __kvm_read_guest_page(kvm, slot, gfn, data, offset, len);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM_INTERNAL(kvm_read_guest_page);
@@ -3239,7 +3239,7 @@ int kvm_vcpu_read_guest_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, void *data,
{
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, gfn);
- return __kvm_read_guest_page(slot, gfn, data, offset, len);
+ return __kvm_read_guest_page(vcpu->kvm, slot, gfn, data, offset, len);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM_INTERNAL(kvm_vcpu_read_guest_page);
@@ -3283,8 +3283,8 @@ int kvm_vcpu_read_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, void *data, unsigned l
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM_INTERNAL(kvm_vcpu_read_guest);
-static int __kvm_read_guest_atomic(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
- void *data, int offset, unsigned long len)
+static int __kvm_read_guest_atomic(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+ gfn_t gfn, void *data, int offset, unsigned long len)
{
int r;
unsigned long addr;
@@ -3296,7 +3296,7 @@ static int __kvm_read_guest_atomic(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
if (kvm_is_error_hva(addr))
return -EFAULT;
pagefault_disable();
- r = __copy_from_user_inatomic(data, (void __user *)addr + offset, len);
+ r = kvm_copy_from_user_inatomic(kvm, data, (void __user *)addr + offset, len);
pagefault_enable();
if (r)
return -EFAULT;
@@ -3310,7 +3310,7 @@ int kvm_vcpu_read_guest_atomic(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa,
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, gfn);
int offset = offset_in_page(gpa);
- return __kvm_read_guest_atomic(slot, gfn, data, offset, len);
+ return __kvm_read_guest_atomic(vcpu->kvm, slot, gfn, data, offset, len);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM_INTERNAL(kvm_vcpu_read_guest_atomic);
@@ -3328,7 +3328,7 @@ static int __kvm_write_guest_page(struct kvm *kvm,
addr = gfn_to_hva_memslot(memslot, gfn);
if (kvm_is_error_hva(addr))
return -EFAULT;
- r = __copy_to_user((void __user *)addr + offset, data, len);
+ r = kvm_copy_to_user(kvm, (void __user *)addr + offset, data, len);
if (r)
return -EFAULT;
mark_page_dirty_in_slot(kvm, memslot, gfn);
@@ -3466,7 +3466,7 @@ int kvm_write_guest_offset_cached(struct kvm *kvm, struct gfn_to_hva_cache *ghc,
if (unlikely(!ghc->memslot))
return kvm_write_guest(kvm, gpa, data, len);
- r = __copy_to_user((void __user *)ghc->hva + offset, data, len);
+ r = kvm_copy_to_user(kvm, (void __user *)ghc->hva + offset, data, len);
if (r)
return -EFAULT;
mark_page_dirty_in_slot(kvm, ghc->memslot, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT);
@@ -3504,7 +3504,7 @@ int kvm_read_guest_offset_cached(struct kvm *kvm, struct gfn_to_hva_cache *ghc,
if (unlikely(!ghc->memslot))
return kvm_read_guest(kvm, gpa, data, len);
- r = __copy_from_user(data, (void __user *)ghc->hva + offset, len);
+ r = kvm_copy_from_user(kvm, data, (void __user *)ghc->hva + offset, len);
if (r)
return -EFAULT;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-16 15:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-25 8:48 hunting memory corruption bug in 6.18.x Nikola Ciprich
2026-09-25 10:05 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-09-25 12:13 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-09-26 5:58 ` Nikola Ciprich
2026-09-26 9:32 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-09-28 9:05 ` Nikola Ciprich
2026-09-29 19:11 ` Nikola Ciprich
2026-09-30 9:07 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-09-30 18:40 ` Nikola Ciprich
2026-10-01 19:40 ` Nikola Ciprich
2026-10-01 22:21 ` David Laight
2026-10-02 9:50 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-10-02 14:55 ` Nikola Ciprich
2026-10-02 19:27 ` Lorenzo Stoakes (ARM)
2026-10-04 18:40 ` Nikola Ciprich
2026-10-05 11:25 ` Rik van Riel
2026-10-05 19:02 ` Nikola Ciprich
[not found] ` <20261005132113.43548696@pumpkin>
2026-10-05 19:25 ` Nikola Ciprich
2026-10-08 12:29 ` Nikola Ciprich
2026-10-08 18:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-10-08 20:48 ` Nikola Ciprich
2026-10-09 8:00 ` David Laight
2026-10-12 11:43 ` Nikola Ciprich
2026-10-14 23:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-10-15 9:10 ` Nikola Ciprich
2026-10-15 22:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-10-14 23:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-10-15 9:14 ` Nikola Ciprich
2026-10-15 22:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-10-16 0:28 ` Andrew Morton
2026-10-16 3:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-10-16 4:18 ` Andrew Morton
2026-10-16 5:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-10-16 15:16 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2026-10-02 22:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-10-04 18:45 ` Nikola Ciprich
2026-10-05 10:58 ` Rik van Riel
2026-10-05 18:05 ` Nikola Ciprich
2026-09-26 16:02 ` Luiz Capitulino
2026-09-28 8:47 ` Nikola Ciprich
2026-10-04 22:20 ` Rik van Riel
2026-10-05 9:31 ` Nikola Ciprich
2026-10-05 8:31 ` Lance Yang
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