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From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Alexander Mikhalitsyn <alex@amutable.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>, Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>,
	Neal Gompa <neal@gompa.dev>, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <sergeh@kernel.org>,
	Zygmunt Krynicki <zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v5 20/25] security: Add rootns LSM hooks
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2026 13:47:36 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <awGE2FTQ6kpWEMJh@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261121000844.1863324-21-jarkko@kernel.org>

On Sat, Nov 21, 2026 at 02:08:39AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> Security modules need visibility into root namespace creation, teardown,
> process entry, and container-wide signal delivery so policies can attach
> per-rootns security state and mediate operations on rootns file
> descriptors.
> 
> Add lbs_rootns and rootns->security blob management alongside
> security_rootns_alloc(), security_rootns_free(), security_rootns_clone(),
> and security_rootns_kill().
> 
> Co-developed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  7 +++
>  include/linux/lsm_hooks.h     |  3 ++
>  include/linux/rootns.h        |  3 ++
>  include/linux/security.h      | 30 ++++++++++++
>  kernel/rootns.c               | 44 +++++++++++++-----
>  security/lsm_init.c           |  6 +++
>  security/security.c           | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  7 files changed, 167 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index 87d9d06710cb..2cb90ddedc14 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -480,3 +480,10 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bdev_alloc_security, struct block_device *bdev)
>  LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bdev_free_security, struct block_device *bdev)
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bdev_setintegrity, struct block_device *bdev,
>  	 enum lsm_integrity_type type, const void *value, size_t size)
> +
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ROOTNS
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, rootns_alloc, struct rootns *rootns, unsigned int flags)
> +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, rootns_free, struct rootns *rootns)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, rootns_clone, struct rootns *rootns)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, rootns_kill, struct rootns *rootns, int sig)


Rootns objects have a security model:

1. No embryonic state by design. Especially staircase initialization
   contributes to this property.
2. Unshare logic is inverted. Right now ROOTNS_SHARE ioctl does not
   exist right now but it is (obviously) doable.
3. Dead obvious and transparent LSM hooks. Really hard to get them
   wrong.
4. We already know by experience that opaque fd-bound objects with
   two-phase state machine (build, live) works. It's what make this
   secure and policy-free implementatiion.

The choices how to do things with closures used in SGX driver are
translatable and they are also pretty well reviewed choices, given all
those years... I would put some weight on this too.

Br, Jarkko


  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-21 11:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-21  0:08 [RFC PATCH v5 00/25] rootns: fd-bound process closures Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 01/25] userns: Factor out idmap validation and commit helpers Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 02/25] userns: Add userns_set_idmap() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 03/25] arch: Wire up " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 04/25] mount: Add mnt_ns_get_root() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 05/25] mount: Enforce mount_too_revealing() for foreign mntns Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 06/25] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS in move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 07/25] mount: Support MOVE_MOUNT_CLONE with MOVE_MOUNT_T_MNTNS Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 08/25] userns: Factor out install_user_ns_cred() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 09/25] nsfs: Add nsproxy_open_namespace() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 10/25] nsproxy: Pass nsproxy to create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 11/25] rootns: Add core infrastructure for root namespaces Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 12/25] rootns: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  1:32   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 13/25] rootns: Add rootns() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 14/25] rootns: Add ROOTNS_WAIT ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:17   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:18     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  1:09       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 15/25] rootns: Add ROOTNS_KILL ioctl Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  1:19   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 11:24     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 16/25] fork: Support CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS in clone3() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 17/25] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 18/25] proc: Implement ->set_rootns() fs_context operation Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 19/25] ipc/mqueue: " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 20/25] security: Add rootns LSM hooks Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21 11:47   ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 21/25] bpf: Register " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 22/25] arch: Wire up rootns() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 23/25] docs: Document root namespace uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 24/25] selftests/rootns: Add root namespace test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-21  0:08 ` [RFC PATCH v5 25/25] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for ROOT NAMESPACE Jarkko Sakkinen

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