From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>,
Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>,
Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>,
Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
Taras Madan <tarasmadan@google.com>,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
"H . J . Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Bharata B Rao <bharata@amd.com>,
Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>,
Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv11 04/16] x86/mm: Handle LAM on context switch
Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2022 06:58:59 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b38f15de-436e-489c-b8db-9beff4466748@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221025001722.17466-5-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
On 10/24/22 17:17, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> Linear Address Masking mode for userspace pointers encoded in CR3 bits.
> The mode is selected per-process and stored in mm_context_t.
>
> switch_mm_irqs_off() now respects selected LAM mode and constructs CR3
> accordingly.
>
> The active LAM mode gets recorded in the tlb_state.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h | 3 ++
> arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 24 +++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++----------
> 4 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
> index 5d7494631ea9..002889ca8978 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu.h
> @@ -40,6 +40,9 @@ typedef struct {
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> unsigned short flags;
> +
> + /* Active LAM mode: X86_CR3_LAM_U48 or X86_CR3_LAM_U57 or 0 (disabled) */
> + unsigned long lam_cr3_mask;
> #endif
>
> struct mutex lock;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
> index b8d40ddeab00..69c943b2ae90 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
> @@ -91,6 +91,29 @@ static inline void switch_ldt(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next)
> }
> #endif
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> +static inline unsigned long mm_lam_cr3_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
> +{
> + return mm->context.lam_cr3_mask;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void dup_lam(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
> +{
> + mm->context.lam_cr3_mask = oldmm->context.lam_cr3_mask;
> +}
> +
> +#else
> +
> +static inline unsigned long mm_lam_cr3_mask(struct mm_struct *mm)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void dup_lam(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
> +{
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> #define enter_lazy_tlb enter_lazy_tlb
> extern void enter_lazy_tlb(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *tsk);
>
> @@ -168,6 +191,7 @@ static inline int arch_dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
> {
> arch_dup_pkeys(oldmm, mm);
> paravirt_arch_dup_mmap(oldmm, mm);
> + dup_lam(oldmm, mm);
> return ldt_dup_context(oldmm, mm);
> }
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
> index cda3118f3b27..662598dea937 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
> @@ -101,6 +101,16 @@ struct tlb_state {
> */
> bool invalidate_other;
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> + /*
> + * Active LAM mode.
> + *
> + * X86_CR3_LAM_U57/U48 shifted right by X86_CR3_LAM_U57_BIT or 0 if LAM
> + * disabled.
> + */
> + u8 lam;
> +#endif
> +
> /*
> * Mask that contains TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS+1 bits to indicate
> * the corresponding user PCID needs a flush next time we
> @@ -357,6 +367,30 @@ static inline bool huge_pmd_needs_flush(pmd_t oldpmd, pmd_t newpmd)
> }
> #define huge_pmd_needs_flush huge_pmd_needs_flush
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> +static inline unsigned long tlbstate_lam_cr3_mask(void)
> +{
> + unsigned long lam = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.lam);
> +
> + return lam << X86_CR3_LAM_U57_BIT;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void set_tlbstate_cr3_lam_mask(unsigned long mask)
> +{
> + this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.lam, mask >> X86_CR3_LAM_U57_BIT);
> +}
> +
> +#else
> +
> +static inline unsigned long tlbstate_lam_cr3_mask(void)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void set_tlbstate_cr3_lam_mask(u64 mask)
> +{
> +}
> +#endif
> #endif /* !MODULE */
>
> static inline void __native_tlb_flush_global(unsigned long cr4)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
> index c1e31e9a85d7..d6c9c15d2ad2 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
> @@ -154,26 +154,30 @@ static inline u16 user_pcid(u16 asid)
> return ret;
> }
>
> -static inline unsigned long build_cr3(pgd_t *pgd, u16 asid)
> +static inline unsigned long build_cr3(pgd_t *pgd, u16 asid, unsigned long lam)
> {
> + unsigned long cr3 = __sme_pa(pgd) | lam;
> +
> if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID)) {
> - return __sme_pa(pgd) | kern_pcid(asid);
> + VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(asid > MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE);
> + cr3 |= kern_pcid(asid);
> } else {
> VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(asid != 0);
> - return __sme_pa(pgd);
> }
> +
> + return cr3;
> }
>
> -static inline unsigned long build_cr3_noflush(pgd_t *pgd, u16 asid)
> +static inline unsigned long build_cr3_noflush(pgd_t *pgd, u16 asid,
> + unsigned long lam)
> {
> - VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(asid > MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE);
> /*
> * Use boot_cpu_has() instead of this_cpu_has() as this function
> * might be called during early boot. This should work even after
> * boot because all CPU's the have same capabilities:
> */
> VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID));
> - return __sme_pa(pgd) | kern_pcid(asid) | CR3_NOFLUSH;
> + return build_cr3(pgd, asid, lam) | CR3_NOFLUSH;
> }
>
> /*
> @@ -274,15 +278,16 @@ static inline void invalidate_user_asid(u16 asid)
> (unsigned long *)this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_tlbstate.user_pcid_flush_mask));
> }
>
> -static void load_new_mm_cr3(pgd_t *pgdir, u16 new_asid, bool need_flush)
> +static void load_new_mm_cr3(pgd_t *pgdir, u16 new_asid, unsigned long lam,
> + bool need_flush)
> {
> unsigned long new_mm_cr3;
>
> if (need_flush) {
> invalidate_user_asid(new_asid);
> - new_mm_cr3 = build_cr3(pgdir, new_asid);
> + new_mm_cr3 = build_cr3(pgdir, new_asid, lam);
> } else {
> - new_mm_cr3 = build_cr3_noflush(pgdir, new_asid);
> + new_mm_cr3 = build_cr3_noflush(pgdir, new_asid, lam);
> }
>
> /*
> @@ -491,6 +496,8 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
> {
> struct mm_struct *real_prev = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm);
> u16 prev_asid = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid);
> + unsigned long prev_lam = tlbstate_lam_cr3_mask();
> + unsigned long new_lam = mm_lam_cr3_mask(next);
> bool was_lazy = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate_shared.is_lazy);
> unsigned cpu = smp_processor_id();
> u64 next_tlb_gen;
> @@ -520,7 +527,7 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
> * isn't free.
> */
> #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VM
> - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(__read_cr3() != build_cr3(real_prev->pgd, prev_asid))) {
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(__read_cr3() != build_cr3(real_prev->pgd, prev_asid, prev_lam))) {
> /*
> * If we were to BUG here, we'd be very likely to kill
> * the system so hard that we don't see the call trace.
> @@ -554,6 +561,7 @@ void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
> if (real_prev == next) {
> VM_WARN_ON(this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[prev_asid].ctx_id) !=
> next->context.ctx_id);
> + VM_WARN_ON(prev_lam != new_lam);
What prevents this warning from firing if a remote cpu does
prctl_enable_tagged_addr() and this cpu hits this code path before
getting the LAM-enabling IPI? Conceptually this would be like if we
asserted that LDTR matched the mm_context's ldt setting in this code path.
I think (haven't really verified) that you can fix this by removing the
warning and adding a comment explaining that CR3 can be out of sync due
to a race against changes to LAM settings. I don't think there's any
way to eliminate the race -- there is no lock you can take while
changing lam that prevents a remote CPU from switching mm or scheduling.
--Andy
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-11-07 14:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-25 0:17 [PATCHv11 00/16] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 01/16] x86/mm: Fix CR3_ADDR_MASK Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 02/16] x86: CPUID and CR3/CR4 flags for Linear Address Masking Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 03/16] mm: Pass down mm_struct to untagged_addr() Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 04/16] x86/mm: Handle LAM on context switch Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-11-07 14:58 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2022-11-07 17:14 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-11-07 18:02 ` Dave Hansen
2022-11-07 21:35 ` [PATCHv11.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-11-09 3:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-11-09 9:17 ` kirill
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 05/16] x86/uaccess: Provide untagged_addr() and remove tags before address check Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-11-07 14:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-11-07 17:33 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 06/16] KVM: Serialize tagged address check against tagging enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 07/16] x86/mm: Provide arch_prctl() interface for LAM Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-11-07 21:37 ` [PATCHv11.1 " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 08/16] x86/mm: Reduce untagged_addr() overhead until the first LAM user Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 09/16] mm: Expose untagging mask in /proc/$PID/status Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-28 14:02 ` Catalin Marinas
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 10/16] iommu/sva: Replace pasid_valid() helper with mm_valid_pasid() Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 11/16] x86/mm, iommu/sva: Make LAM and SVA mutually exclusive Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 12/16] selftests/x86/lam: Add malloc and tag-bits test cases for linear-address masking Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 13/16] selftests/x86/lam: Add mmap and SYSCALL " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 14/16] selftests/x86/lam: Add io_uring " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 15/16] selftests/x86/lam: Add inherit " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-10-25 0:17 ` [PATCHv11 16/16] selftests/x86/lam: Add ARCH_FORCE_TAGGED_SVA " Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-11-07 11:25 ` [PATCHv11 00/16] Linear Address Masking enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2022-11-07 14:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
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