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From: "Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>
To: "isaku.yamahata@gmail.com" <isaku.yamahata@gmail.com>,
	"michael.roth@amd.com" <michael.roth@amd.com>
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Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v9 04/51] KVM: x86: Determine shared/private faults using a configurable mask
Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2023 09:55:22 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <c116b7ab8ca02116f2b8d19a8214161c3b30576c.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230621230031.37hdnymbjzwjgbo2@amd.com>


> 
> So if we were to straight-forwardly implement that based on how TDX
> currently handles checking for the shared bit in GPA, paired with how
> SEV-SNP handles checking for private bit in fault flags, it would look
> something like:
> 
>   bool kvm_fault_is_private(kvm, gpa, err)
>   {
>     /* SEV-SNP handling */
>     if (kvm->arch.mmu_private_fault_mask)
>       return !!(err & arch.mmu_private_fault_mask);
> 
>     /* TDX handling */
>     if (kvm->arch.gfn_shared_mask)
>       return !!(gpa & arch.gfn_shared_mask);

The logic of the two are identical.  I think they need to be converged.

Either SEV-SNP should convert the error code private bit to the gfn_shared_mask,
or TDX's shared bit should be converted to some private error bit.

Perhaps converting SEV-SNP makes more sense because if I recall correctly SEV
guest also has a C-bit, correct?

Or, ...

> 
>     return false;
>   }
> 
>   kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, err, ...)
>   {
>     struct kvm_page_fault fault = {
>       ...
>       .is_private = kvm_fault_is_private(vcpu->kvm, gpa, err)

... should we do something like:

	.is_private = static_call(kvm_x86_fault_is_private)(vcpu->kvm, gpa, 
							    err);

?

>     };
> 
>     ...
>   }
> 
> And then arch.mmu_private_fault_mask and arch.gfn_shared_mask would be
> set per-KVM-instance, just like they are now with current SNP and TDX
> patchsets, since stuff like KVM self-test wouldn't be setting those
> masks, so it makes sense to do it per-instance in that regard.
> 
> But that still gets a little awkward for the KVM self-test use-case where
> .is_private should sort of be ignored in favor of whatever the xarray
> reports via kvm_mem_is_private(). 
> 

I must have missed something.  Why does KVM self-test have impact to how does
KVM handles private fault? 

> In your Misc. series I believe you
> handled this by introducing a PFERR_HASATTR_MASK bit so we can determine
> whether existing value of fault->is_private should be
> ignored/overwritten or not.
> 
> So maybe kvm_fault_is_private() needs to return an integer value
> instead, like:
> 
>   enum {
>     KVM_FAULT_VMM_DEFINED,
>     KVM_FAULT_SHARED,
>     KVM_FAULT_PRIVATE,
>   }
> 
>   bool kvm_fault_is_private(kvm, gpa, err)
>   {
>     /* SEV-SNP handling */
>     if (kvm->arch.mmu_private_fault_mask)
>       (err & arch.mmu_private_fault_mask) ? KVM_FAULT_PRIVATE : KVM_FAULT_SHARED
> 
>     /* TDX handling */
>     if (kvm->arch.gfn_shared_mask)
>       (gpa & arch.gfn_shared_mask) ? KVM_FAULT_SHARED : KVM_FAULT_PRIVATE
> 
>     return KVM_FAULT_VMM_DEFINED;
>   }
> 
> And then down in __kvm_faultin_pfn() we do:
> 
>   if (fault->is_private == KVM_FAULT_VMM_DEFINED)
>     fault->is_private = kvm_mem_is_private(vcpu->kvm, fault->gfn);
>   else if (fault->is_private != kvm_mem_is_private(vcpu->kvm, fault->gfn))
>     return kvm_do_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault);
> 
>   if (fault->is_private)
>     return kvm_faultin_pfn_private(vcpu, fault);


What does KVM_FAULT_VMM_DEFINED mean, exactly?

Shouldn't the fault type come from _hardware_?

  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-06-22  9:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 102+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-06-12  4:25 [PATCH RFC v9 00/51] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 01/51] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for initializing private memory Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 02/51] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for invalidating " Michael Roth
2023-06-12 10:49   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-19 13:39     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 03/51] KVM: x86: Use full 64-bit error code for kvm_mmu_do_page_fault Michael Roth
2023-06-14 14:24   ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 04/51] KVM: x86: Determine shared/private faults using a configurable mask Michael Roth
2023-06-14 16:47   ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-06-20 20:28     ` Michael Roth
2023-06-20 21:18       ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-06-21 23:00         ` Michael Roth
2023-06-22  8:01           ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-06-22  9:55           ` Huang, Kai [this message]
2023-06-22 15:32             ` Michael Roth
2023-06-22 22:31               ` Huang, Kai
2023-06-22 23:39                 ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-06-22 23:52                   ` Huang, Kai
2023-06-23 14:43                     ` Isaku Yamahata
2023-06-19 16:27   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-20 20:36     ` Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 05/51] x86/coco: move CONFIG_HAS_CC_PLATFORM check down into coco/Makefile Michael Roth
2023-06-12  7:07   ` Kirill A . Shutemov
2023-06-20 12:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-20 20:43     ` Michael Roth
2023-06-21  8:54       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-29 21:02         ` Michael Roth
2023-07-10  3:05   ` Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy
2023-07-10 13:11     ` Tom Lendacky
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 06/51] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 07/51] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Michael Roth
2023-06-12 15:34   ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-21  9:15     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-21 14:31       ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-21 15:59         ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-21  9:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-06-21 14:36     ` Tom Lendacky
2023-06-21 19:15     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-08-09 13:03   ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 08/51] x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-06-12 15:39   ` Dave Hansen
2023-07-18 22:34     ` Kim Phillips
2023-07-18 23:17       ` Dave Hansen
2023-07-20 19:11         ` Kim Phillips
2023-07-20 22:24           ` Dave Hansen
2023-07-21 16:56             ` Kim Phillips
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 09/51] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Michael Roth
2023-06-12 16:08   ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-30 21:57     ` Michael Roth
2023-06-30 22:29       ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 10/51] x86/fault: Add helper for dumping RMP entries Michael Roth
2023-06-12 16:12   ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 11/51] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Michael Roth
2023-06-12 16:26   ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 12/51] x86/fault: Report RMP page faults for kernel addresses Michael Roth
2023-06-12 16:30   ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 13/51] x86/fault: Handle RMP page faults for user addresses Michael Roth
2023-06-12 16:40   ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 14/51] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Michael Roth
2023-06-12 17:00   ` Dave Hansen
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 15/51] x86/sev: Invalidate pages from the direct map when adding them to the RMP table Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 16/51] crypto: ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 17/51] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 18/51] crypto: ccp: Provide API to issue SEV and SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 19/51] x86/sev: Introduce snp leaked pages list Michael Roth
2023-08-09 12:46   ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 20/51] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 21/51] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy SEV command " Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 22/51] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 23/51] KVM: SEV: Select CONFIG_KVM_PROTECTED_VM when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 24/51] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 25/51] KVM: SVM: Add GHCB handling for Hypervisor Feature Support requests Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 26/51] KVM: SVM: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 27/51] KVM: SVM: Add initial SEV-SNP support Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 28/51] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SNP_INIT command Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 29/51] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Michael Roth
2023-06-12 17:08   ` Peter Gonda
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 30/51] KVM: Add HVA range operator Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 31/51] KVM: Split out memory attribute xarray updates to helper function Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 32/51] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 33/51] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 34/51] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 35/51] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 36/51] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 37/51] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle " Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 38/51] KVM: x86: Export the kvm_zap_gfn_range() for the SNP use Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 39/51] KVM: x86: Define RMP page fault error bits for #NPF Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 40/51] KVM: SVM: Add support to handle RMP nested page faults Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 41/51] KVM: SVM: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 42/51] KVM: SVM: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Michael Roth
2023-08-15 16:00   ` Peter Gonda
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 43/51] KVM: SEV: Configure MMU to check for private fault flags Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 44/51] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for initializing private pages Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 45/51] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for invalidating " Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 46/51] KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable the SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 47/51] iommu/amd: Add IOMMU_SNP_SHUTDOWN support Michael Roth
2023-09-07 10:31   ` Suthikulpanit, Suravee
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 48/51] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_{SET,GET}_EXT_CONFIG command Michael Roth
2023-06-13  6:24   ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 49/51] x86/sev: Add KVM commands for per-instance certs Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 50/51] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Michael Roth
2023-06-12  4:25 ` [PATCH RFC v9 51/51] crypto: ccp: Add debug support for decrypting pages Michael Roth

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