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Thu, 24 Sep 2020 19:39:28 +0000 (UTC) IronPort-SDR: rouht0BH+rXZPwVus+3oBejJv8EC5NLERksTKzBiDQ0FDk6KyL583YKjuWxsdpQe8ciSh3qcwu wd79fIHSaqAA== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6000,8403,9754"; a="222918067" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.77,299,1596524400"; d="scan'208";a="222918067" X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga005.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.41]) by orsmga104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 24 Sep 2020 12:39:27 -0700 IronPort-SDR: 46tkQ1ZzYGZkhuvkz0f1Q+/CS+IrnsBsphTDvcEc8nDko/7nUDVpxJQ4FqZTB6CflWsmTG5+Z2 +BclWgoTCeFQ== X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.77,299,1596524400"; d="scan'208";a="487066218" Received: from ejarlos-mobl.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO [10.212.15.103]) ([10.212.15.103]) by orsmga005-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 24 Sep 2020 12:39:25 -0700 Subject: Re: [PATCH v38 10/24] mm: Add vm_ops->mprotect() To: Sean Christopherson , Haitao Huang Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , Andy Lutomirski , X86 ML , linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, LKML , Linux-MM , Andrew Morton , Matthew Wilcox , Jethro Beekman , Darren Kenny , Andy Shevchenko , asapek@google.com, Borislav Petkov , "Xing, Cedric" , chenalexchen@google.com, Conrad Parker , cyhanish@google.com, "Huang, Haitao" , Josh Triplett , "Huang, Kai" , "Svahn, Kai" , Keith Moyer , Christian Ludloff , Neil Horman , Nathaniel McCallum , Patrick Uiterwijk , David Rientjes , Thomas Gleixner , yaozhangx@google.com References: <20200918235337.GA21189@sjchrist-ice> <20200921124946.GF6038@linux.intel.com> <20200921165758.GA24156@linux.intel.com> <20200921210736.GB58176@linux.intel.com> <20200921211849.GA25403@linux.intel.com> <20200922052957.GA97272@linux.intel.com> <20200922053515.GA97687@linux.intel.com> <20200922164301.GB30874@linux.intel.com> <20200923135056.GD5160@linux.intel.com> <20200924192853.GA18826@linux.intel.com> From: Dave Hansen Autocrypt: addr=dave.hansen@intel.com; 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Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.10.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20200924192853.GA18826@linux.intel.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: On 9/24/20 12:28 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote: > On Thu, Sep 24, 2020 at 02:11:37PM -0500, Haitao Huang wrote: >> On Wed, 23 Sep 2020 08:50:56 -0500, Jarkko Sakkinen >> wrote: >>> I'll categorically deny noexec in the next patch set version. >>> >>> /Jarkko >> There are use cases supported currently in which enclave binary is rec= eived >> via IPC/RPC and held in buffers before EADD. Denying noexec altogether= would >> break those, right? > No. noexec only applies to file-backed VMAs, what you're describing is= loading > an enclave from an anon VMA, which will still have VM_MAYEXEC. Maybe I'm just stupid, but I still don't get the scenario that's being thwarted or why it is valuable. The SDM is worthless on what EMODPE does or what its restrictions are. In pseudo-C, it's something logically like this for the "nice" case: ptr =3D mmap("/some/executable", PROT_EXEC); ioctl(sgx_fd, ADD_ENCLAVE_PAGE, SGX_PROT_EXEC, ptr, size); mmap(sgx_fd); EENTER; And we're trying to thwart: ptr =3D mmap("/mnt/noexec/file", PROT_READ); ioctl(sgx_fd, ADD_ENCLAVE_PAGE, SGX_PROT_EXEC, ptr, size); mmap(sgx_fd); EENTER; because that loads data into the enclave which is executable but which was not executable normally. But, we're allowing this from anonymous memory, so this would seem to work: ptr =3D mmap("/mnt/noexec/file", PROT_READ); buffer =3D malloc(PAGE_SIZE); memcpy(buffer, ptr, PAGE_SIZE); // need mprotect(buf, PROT_EXEC)??? ioctl(sgx_fd, ADD_ENCLAVE_PAGE, SGX_PROT_EXEC, buffer, size); mmap(sgx_fd); EENTER; and give the same result. What am I missing?