[PATCH v14 00/21] KVM: Enable host userspace mapping for guest_memfd-backed memory for non-CoCo VMs

[PATCH v14 00/21] KVM: Enable host userspace mapping for guest_memfd-backed memory for non-CoCo VMs

[Fuad Tabba]

Main changes since v13 [1]:
* Fixed handling of guest faults in case of invalidation in arm64
* Handle VNCR_EL2-triggered faults backed by guest_memfd (arm64 nested
  virt)
* Applied suggestions from latest feedback
* Rebase on Linux 6.16-rc6

This patch series enables host userspace mapping of guest_memfd-backed
memory for non-CoCo VMs. This is required for several evolving KVM use
cases:

* Allows VMMs like Firecracker to run guests entirely backed by
  guest_memfd [2]. This provides a unified memory management model for
  both confidential and non-confidential guests, simplifying VMM design.

* Enhanced Security via direct map removal: When combined with Patrick's
  series for direct map removal [3], this provides additional hardening
  against Spectre-like transient execution attacks by eliminating the
  need for host kernel direct maps of guest memory.

* Lays the groundwork for *restricted* mmap() support for
  guest_memfd-backed memory on CoCo platforms [4] that permit in-place
  sharing of guest memory with the host.

Patch breakdown:

Patches 1-7: Primarily infrastructure refactorings and renames to decouple
guest_memfd from the concept of "private" memory.

Patches 8-9: Add support for the host to map guest_memfd backed memory
for non-CoCo VMs, which includes support for mmap() and fault handling.
This is gated by a new configuration option, toggled by a new flag, and
advertised to userspace by a new capability (introduced in patch 18).

Patches 10-14: Implement x86 guest_memfd mmap support.

Patches 15-18: Implement arm64 guest_memfd mmap support.

Patch 19: Introduce the new capability to advertise this support and
update the documentation.

Patches 20-21: Update and expand selftests for guest_memfd to include
mmap functionality and improve portability.

To test this patch series and boot a guest utilizing the new features,
please refer to the instructions in v8 of the series [5]. Note that
kvmtool for Linux 6.16 (available at [6]) is required, as the
KVM_CAP_GMEM_MMAP capability number has changed, additionally, drop the
--sw_protected kvmtool parameter to test with the default VM type.

Cheers,
/fuad

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250709105946.4009897-1-tabba@google.com/
[2] https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/tree/feature/secret-hiding
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250221160728.1584559-1-roypat@amazon.co.uk/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250328153133.3504118-1-tabba@google.com/
[5] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250430165655.605595-1-tabba@google.com/
[6] https://android-kvm.googlesource.com/kvmtool/+/refs/heads/tabba/guestmem-basic-6.16

Ackerley Tng (4):
  KVM: x86/mmu: Generalize private_max_mapping_level x86 op to
    max_mapping_level
  KVM: x86/mmu: Allow NULL-able fault in kvm_max_private_mapping_level
  KVM: x86/mmu: Consult guest_memfd when computing max_mapping_level
  KVM: x86/mmu: Handle guest page faults for guest_memfd with shared
    memory

Fuad Tabba (17):
  KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_KVM_GMEM
  KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to
    CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
  KVM: Introduce kvm_arch_supports_gmem()
  KVM: x86: Introduce kvm->arch.supports_gmem
  KVM: Rename kvm_slot_can_be_private() to kvm_slot_has_gmem()
  KVM: Fix comments that refer to slots_lock
  KVM: Fix comment that refers to kvm uapi header path
  KVM: guest_memfd: Allow host to map guest_memfd pages
  KVM: guest_memfd: Track guest_memfd mmap support in memslot
  KVM: x86: Enable guest_memfd mmap for default VM type
  KVM: arm64: Refactor user_mem_abort()
  KVM: arm64: Handle guest_memfd-backed guest page faults
  KVM: arm64: nv: Handle VNCR_EL2-triggered faults backed by guest_memfd
  KVM: arm64: Enable host mapping of shared guest_memfd memory
  KVM: Introduce the KVM capability KVM_CAP_GMEM_MMAP
  KVM: selftests: Do not use hardcoded page sizes in guest_memfd test
  KVM: selftests: guest_memfd mmap() test when mmap is supported

 Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst                |   9 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h             |   4 +
 arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig                        |   2 +
 arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c                          | 203 ++++++++++++-----
 arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c                       |  41 +++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h            |   2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h               |  18 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig                          |   7 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c                        | 114 ++++++----
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c                        |  12 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c                        |   3 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h                        |   4 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c                       |   6 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c                        |   6 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h                    |   2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                            |   5 +-
 include/linux/kvm_host.h                      |  64 +++++-
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h                      |   2 +
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm      |   1 +
 .../testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c  | 208 +++++++++++++++---
 virt/kvm/Kconfig                              |  14 +-
 virt/kvm/Makefile.kvm                         |   2 +-
 virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c                        |  96 +++++++-
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c                           |  14 +-
 virt/kvm/kvm_mm.h                             |   4 +-
 25 files changed, 664 insertions(+), 179 deletions(-)


base-commit: 347e9f5043c89695b01e66b3ed111755afcf1911
-- 
2.50.0.727.gbf7dc18ff4-goog

[PATCH v14 01/21] KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_KVM_GMEM

[Fuad Tabba]

Rename the Kconfig option CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_KVM_GMEM. The
original name implied that the feature only supported "private" memory.
However, CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM enables guest_memfd in general, which is
not exclusively for private memory. Subsequent patches in this series
will add guest_memfd support for non-CoCo VMs, whose memory is not
private.

Renaming the Kconfig option to CONFIG_KVM_GMEM more accurately reflects
its broader scope as the main Kconfig option for all guest_memfd-backed
memory. This provides clearer semantics for the option and avoids
confusion as new features are introduced.

Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  2 +-
 include/linux/kvm_host.h        | 14 +++++++-------
 virt/kvm/Kconfig                |  8 ++++----
 virt/kvm/Makefile.kvm           |  2 +-
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c             |  4 ++--
 virt/kvm/kvm_mm.h               |  4 ++--
 6 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index f7af967aa16f..acb25f935d84 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -2275,7 +2275,7 @@ void kvm_configure_mmu(bool enable_tdp, int tdp_forced_root_level,
 		       int tdp_max_root_level, int tdp_huge_page_level);
 
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GMEM
 #define kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm) ((kvm)->arch.has_private_mem)
 #else
 #define kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm) false
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index 3bde4fb5c6aa..755b09dcafce 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -601,7 +601,7 @@ struct kvm_memory_slot {
 	short id;
 	u16 as_id;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GMEM
 	struct {
 		/*
 		 * Writes protected by kvm->slots_lock.  Acquiring a
@@ -719,10 +719,10 @@ static inline int kvm_arch_vcpu_memslots_id(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 #endif
 
 /*
- * Arch code must define kvm_arch_has_private_mem if support for private memory
- * is enabled.
+ * Arch code must define kvm_arch_has_private_mem if support for guest_memfd is
+ * enabled.
  */
-#if !defined(kvm_arch_has_private_mem) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM)
+#if !defined(kvm_arch_has_private_mem) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_GMEM)
 static inline bool kvm_arch_has_private_mem(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
 	return false;
@@ -2527,7 +2527,7 @@ bool kvm_arch_post_set_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm,
 
 static inline bool kvm_mem_is_private(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
 {
-	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM) &&
+	return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_GMEM) &&
 	       kvm_get_memory_attributes(kvm, gfn) & KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE;
 }
 #else
@@ -2537,7 +2537,7 @@ static inline bool kvm_mem_is_private(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GMEM
 int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
 		     gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t *pfn, struct page **page,
 		     int *max_order);
@@ -2550,7 +2550,7 @@ static inline int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm,
 	KVM_BUG_ON(1, kvm);
 	return -EIO;
 }
-#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM */
+#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_GMEM */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE
 int kvm_arch_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn, int max_order);
diff --git a/virt/kvm/Kconfig b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
index 727b542074e7..49df4e32bff7 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -112,19 +112,19 @@ config KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
        depends on KVM_GENERIC_MMU_NOTIFIER
        bool
 
-config KVM_PRIVATE_MEM
+config KVM_GMEM
        select XARRAY_MULTI
        bool
 
 config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
        select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
-       select KVM_PRIVATE_MEM
+       select KVM_GMEM
        bool
 
 config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE
        bool
-       depends on KVM_PRIVATE_MEM
+       depends on KVM_GMEM
 
 config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE
        bool
-       depends on KVM_PRIVATE_MEM
+       depends on KVM_GMEM
diff --git a/virt/kvm/Makefile.kvm b/virt/kvm/Makefile.kvm
index 724c89af78af..8d00918d4c8b 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/Makefile.kvm
+++ b/virt/kvm/Makefile.kvm
@@ -12,4 +12,4 @@ kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_ASYNC_PF) += $(KVM)/async_pf.o
 kvm-$(CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_IRQ_ROUTING) += $(KVM)/irqchip.o
 kvm-$(CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_DIRTY_RING) += $(KVM)/dirty_ring.o
 kvm-$(CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_PFNCACHE) += $(KVM)/pfncache.o
-kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM) += $(KVM)/guest_memfd.o
+kvm-$(CONFIG_KVM_GMEM) += $(KVM)/guest_memfd.o
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
index 222f0e894a0c..d5f0ec2d321f 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -4913,7 +4913,7 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension_generic(struct kvm *kvm, long arg)
 	case KVM_CAP_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES:
 		return kvm_supported_mem_attributes(kvm);
 #endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GMEM
 	case KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD:
 		return !kvm || kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm);
 #endif
@@ -5347,7 +5347,7 @@ static long kvm_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 	case KVM_GET_STATS_FD:
 		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_stats_fd(kvm);
 		break;
-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GMEM
 	case KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD: {
 		struct kvm_create_guest_memfd guest_memfd;
 
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_mm.h b/virt/kvm/kvm_mm.h
index acef3f5c582a..ec311c0d6718 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_mm.h
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_mm.h
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static inline void gfn_to_pfn_cache_invalidate_start(struct kvm *kvm,
 }
 #endif /* HAVE_KVM_PFNCACHE */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GMEM
 void kvm_gmem_init(struct module *module);
 int kvm_gmem_create(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_create_guest_memfd *args);
 int kvm_gmem_bind(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
@@ -91,6 +91,6 @@ static inline void kvm_gmem_unbind(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
 {
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
 }
-#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM */
+#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_GMEM */
 
 #endif /* __KVM_MM_H__ */
-- 
2.50.0.727.gbf7dc18ff4-goog

Re: [PATCH v14 01/21] KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_KVM_GMEM

[Xiaoyao Li]

On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> Rename the Kconfig option CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_KVM_GMEM. The
> original name implied that the feature only supported "private" memory.
> However, CONFIG_KVM_PRIVATE_MEM enables guest_memfd in general, which is
> not exclusively for private memory. Subsequent patches in this series
> will add guest_memfd support for non-CoCo VMs, whose memory is not
> private.
> 
> Renaming the Kconfig option to CONFIG_KVM_GMEM more accurately reflects
> its broader scope as the main Kconfig option for all guest_memfd-backed
> memory. This provides clearer semantics for the option and avoids
> confusion as new features are introduced.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny<ira.weiny@intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan<gshan@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg<shivankg@amd.com>
> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka<vbabka@suse.cz>
> Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand<david@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand<david@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba<tabba@google.com>

Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>

[PATCH v14 02/21] KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE

[Fuad Tabba]

The original name was vague regarding its functionality. This Kconfig
option specifically enables and gates the kvm_gmem_populate() function,
which is responsible for populating a GPA range with guest data.

The new name, KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE, describes the purpose of the
option: to enable generic guest_memfd population mechanisms. This
improves clarity for developers and ensures the name accurately reflects
the functionality it controls, especially as guest_memfd support expands
beyond purely "private" memory scenarios.

Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig     | 6 +++---
 include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +-
 virt/kvm/Kconfig         | 2 +-
 virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c   | 2 +-
 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
index 2eeffcec5382..df1fdbb4024b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ config KVM_X86
 	select HAVE_KVM_PM_NOTIFIER if PM
 	select KVM_GENERIC_HARDWARE_ENABLING
 	select KVM_GENERIC_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY
-	select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
+	select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE if KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
 	select KVM_WERROR if WERROR
 
 config KVM
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ config KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
 config KVM_INTEL
 	tristate "KVM for Intel (and compatible) processors support"
 	depends on KVM && IA32_FEAT_CTL
-	select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if INTEL_TDX_HOST
+	select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE if INTEL_TDX_HOST
 	select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES if INTEL_TDX_HOST
 	help
 	  Provides support for KVM on processors equipped with Intel's VT
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ config KVM_AMD_SEV
 	depends on KVM_AMD && X86_64
 	depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP && !(KVM_AMD=y && CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD=m)
 	select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
-	select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
+	select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
 	select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE
 	select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE
 	help
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index 755b09dcafce..359baaae5e9f 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -2556,7 +2556,7 @@ static inline int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm,
 int kvm_arch_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn, int max_order);
 #endif
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
 /**
  * kvm_gmem_populate() - Populate/prepare a GPA range with guest data
  *
diff --git a/virt/kvm/Kconfig b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
index 49df4e32bff7..559c93ad90be 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ config KVM_GMEM
        select XARRAY_MULTI
        bool
 
-config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
+config KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
        select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
        select KVM_GMEM
        bool
diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
index b2aa6bf24d3a..befea51bbc75 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gmem_get_pfn);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
 long kvm_gmem_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start_gfn, void __user *src, long npages,
 		       kvm_gmem_populate_cb post_populate, void *opaque)
 {
-- 
2.50.0.727.gbf7dc18ff4-goog

Re: [PATCH v14 02/21] KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE

[Xiaoyao Li]

On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> The original name was vague regarding its functionality. This Kconfig
> option specifically enables and gates the kvm_gmem_populate() function,
> which is responsible for populating a GPA range with guest data.

Well, I disagree.

The config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM was introduced by commit 89ea60c2c7b5 
("KVM: x86: Add support for "protected VMs" that can utilize private 
memory"), which is a convenient config for vm types that requires 
private memory support, e.g., SNP, TDX, and KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM.

It was commit e4ee54479273 ("KVM: guest_memfd: let kvm_gmem_populate() 
operate only on private gfns") that started to use 
CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM gates kvm_gmem_populate() function. But 
CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is not for kvm_gmem_populate() only.

If using CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to gate kvm_gmem_populate() is 
vague and confusing, we can introduce KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE to gate 
kvm_gmem_populate() and select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE under 
CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM.

Directly replace CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM with 
KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE doesn't look correct to me.

> The new name, KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE, describes the purpose of the
> option: to enable generic guest_memfd population mechanisms. This
> improves clarity for developers and ensures the name accurately reflects
> the functionality it controls, especially as guest_memfd support expands
> beyond purely "private" memory scenarios.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
> Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig     | 6 +++---
>   include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +-
>   virt/kvm/Kconfig         | 2 +-
>   virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c   | 2 +-
>   4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> index 2eeffcec5382..df1fdbb4024b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ config KVM_X86
>   	select HAVE_KVM_PM_NOTIFIER if PM
>   	select KVM_GENERIC_HARDWARE_ENABLING
>   	select KVM_GENERIC_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY
> -	select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
> +	select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE if KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
>   	select KVM_WERROR if WERROR
>   
>   config KVM
> @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ config KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
>   config KVM_INTEL
>   	tristate "KVM for Intel (and compatible) processors support"
>   	depends on KVM && IA32_FEAT_CTL
> -	select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if INTEL_TDX_HOST
> +	select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE if INTEL_TDX_HOST
>   	select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES if INTEL_TDX_HOST
>   	help
>   	  Provides support for KVM on processors equipped with Intel's VT
> @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ config KVM_AMD_SEV
>   	depends on KVM_AMD && X86_64
>   	depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP && !(KVM_AMD=y && CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD=m)
>   	select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
> -	select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
> +	select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
>   	select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE
>   	select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE
>   	help
> diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> index 755b09dcafce..359baaae5e9f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> @@ -2556,7 +2556,7 @@ static inline int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm,
>   int kvm_arch_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn, int max_order);
>   #endif
>   
> -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
>   /**
>    * kvm_gmem_populate() - Populate/prepare a GPA range with guest data
>    *
> diff --git a/virt/kvm/Kconfig b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
> index 49df4e32bff7..559c93ad90be 100644
> --- a/virt/kvm/Kconfig
> +++ b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
> @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ config KVM_GMEM
>          select XARRAY_MULTI
>          bool
>   
> -config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
> +config KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
>          select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
>          select KVM_GMEM
>          bool
> diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> index b2aa6bf24d3a..befea51bbc75 100644
> --- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> +++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> @@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
>   }
>   EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gmem_get_pfn);
>   
> -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
>   long kvm_gmem_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start_gfn, void __user *src, long npages,
>   		       kvm_gmem_populate_cb post_populate, void *opaque)
>   {

Re: [PATCH v14 02/21] KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE

[Fuad Tabba]

Hi Xiaoyao,

On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 05:09, Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
>
> On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> > The original name was vague regarding its functionality. This Kconfig
> > option specifically enables and gates the kvm_gmem_populate() function,
> > which is responsible for populating a GPA range with guest data.
>
> Well, I disagree.
>
> The config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM was introduced by commit 89ea60c2c7b5
> ("KVM: x86: Add support for "protected VMs" that can utilize private
> memory"), which is a convenient config for vm types that requires
> private memory support, e.g., SNP, TDX, and KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM.
>
> It was commit e4ee54479273 ("KVM: guest_memfd: let kvm_gmem_populate()
> operate only on private gfns") that started to use
> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM gates kvm_gmem_populate() function. But
> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is not for kvm_gmem_populate() only.
>
> If using CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to gate kvm_gmem_populate() is
> vague and confusing, we can introduce KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE to gate
> kvm_gmem_populate() and select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE under
> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM.
>
> Directly replace CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM with
> KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE doesn't look correct to me.

I'll quote David's reply to an earlier version of this patch [*]:

> > I'm curious what generic means in this name?
>
> That an architecture wants to use the generic version and not provide
> it's own alternative implementation.
>
> We frequently use that term in this context, see GENERIC_IOREMAP as one
> example.

[*] https://lore.kernel.org/all/b6355951-5f9d-4ca9-850f-79e767d8caa2@redhat.com/

Thanks,
/fuad

> > The new name, KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE, describes the purpose of the
> > option: to enable generic guest_memfd population mechanisms. This
> > improves clarity for developers and ensures the name accurately reflects
> > the functionality it controls, especially as guest_memfd support expands
> > beyond purely "private" memory scenarios.
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
> > Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
> > Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
> > ---
> >   arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig     | 6 +++---
> >   include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +-
> >   virt/kvm/Kconfig         | 2 +-
> >   virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c   | 2 +-
> >   4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> > index 2eeffcec5382..df1fdbb4024b 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> > @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ config KVM_X86
> >       select HAVE_KVM_PM_NOTIFIER if PM
> >       select KVM_GENERIC_HARDWARE_ENABLING
> >       select KVM_GENERIC_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY
> > -     select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
> > +     select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE if KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
> >       select KVM_WERROR if WERROR
> >
> >   config KVM
> > @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ config KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
> >   config KVM_INTEL
> >       tristate "KVM for Intel (and compatible) processors support"
> >       depends on KVM && IA32_FEAT_CTL
> > -     select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if INTEL_TDX_HOST
> > +     select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE if INTEL_TDX_HOST
> >       select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES if INTEL_TDX_HOST
> >       help
> >         Provides support for KVM on processors equipped with Intel's VT
> > @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ config KVM_AMD_SEV
> >       depends on KVM_AMD && X86_64
> >       depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP && !(KVM_AMD=y && CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD=m)
> >       select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
> > -     select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
> > +     select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
> >       select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE
> >       select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE
> >       help
> > diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> > index 755b09dcafce..359baaae5e9f 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> > @@ -2556,7 +2556,7 @@ static inline int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm,
> >   int kvm_arch_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn, int max_order);
> >   #endif
> >
> > -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
> >   /**
> >    * kvm_gmem_populate() - Populate/prepare a GPA range with guest data
> >    *
> > diff --git a/virt/kvm/Kconfig b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
> > index 49df4e32bff7..559c93ad90be 100644
> > --- a/virt/kvm/Kconfig
> > +++ b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
> > @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ config KVM_GMEM
> >          select XARRAY_MULTI
> >          bool
> >
> > -config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
> > +config KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
> >          select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
> >          select KVM_GMEM
> >          bool
> > diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> > index b2aa6bf24d3a..befea51bbc75 100644
> > --- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> > +++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> > @@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
> >   }
> >   EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gmem_get_pfn);
> >
> > -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
> >   long kvm_gmem_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start_gfn, void __user *src, long npages,
> >                      kvm_gmem_populate_cb post_populate, void *opaque)
> >   {
>
>

Re: [PATCH v14 02/21] KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE

[Xiaoyao Li]

On 7/16/2025 4:11 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 05:09, Xiaoyao Li<xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
>> On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
>>> The original name was vague regarding its functionality. This Kconfig
>>> option specifically enables and gates the kvm_gmem_populate() function,
>>> which is responsible for populating a GPA range with guest data.
>> Well, I disagree.
>>
>> The config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM was introduced by commit 89ea60c2c7b5
>> ("KVM: x86: Add support for "protected VMs" that can utilize private
>> memory"), which is a convenient config for vm types that requires
>> private memory support, e.g., SNP, TDX, and KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM.
>>
>> It was commit e4ee54479273 ("KVM: guest_memfd: let kvm_gmem_populate()
>> operate only on private gfns") that started to use
>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM gates kvm_gmem_populate() function. But
>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is not for kvm_gmem_populate() only.
>>
>> If using CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to gate kvm_gmem_populate() is
>> vague and confusing, we can introduce KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE to gate
>> kvm_gmem_populate() and select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE under
>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM.
>>
>> Directly replace CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM with
>> KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE doesn't look correct to me.
> I'll quote David's reply to an earlier version of this patch [*]:

It's not related to my concern.

My point is that CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is used for selecting 
the private memory support. Rename it to KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE is 
not correct.

Current code uses CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to gate 
kvm_gmem_populate() because kvm_gmem_populate() requires both gmem and 
memory attributes support and CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM can ensure 
it. But CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM was not only for gating 
kvm_gmem_populate().

>>> I'm curious what generic means in this name?
>> That an architecture wants to use the generic version and not provide
>> it's own alternative implementation.
>>
>> We frequently use that term in this context, see GENERIC_IOREMAP as one
>> example.
> [*]https://lore.kernel.org/all/b6355951-5f9d-4ca9-850f-79e767d8caa2@redhat.com/
> 
> Thanks,
> /fuad

Re: [PATCH v14 02/21] KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE

[David Hildenbrand]

On 16.07.25 10:31, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
> On 7/16/2025 4:11 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
>> On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 05:09, Xiaoyao Li<xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
>>> On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
>>>> The original name was vague regarding its functionality. This Kconfig
>>>> option specifically enables and gates the kvm_gmem_populate() function,
>>>> which is responsible for populating a GPA range with guest data.
>>> Well, I disagree.
>>>
>>> The config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM was introduced by commit 89ea60c2c7b5
>>> ("KVM: x86: Add support for "protected VMs" that can utilize private
>>> memory"), which is a convenient config for vm types that requires
>>> private memory support, e.g., SNP, TDX, and KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM.
>>>
>>> It was commit e4ee54479273 ("KVM: guest_memfd: let kvm_gmem_populate()
>>> operate only on private gfns") that started to use
>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM gates kvm_gmem_populate() function. But
>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is not for kvm_gmem_populate() only.
>>>
>>> If using CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to gate kvm_gmem_populate() is
>>> vague and confusing, we can introduce KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE to gate
>>> kvm_gmem_populate() and select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE under
>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM.
>>>
>>> Directly replace CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM with
>>> KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE doesn't look correct to me.
>> I'll quote David's reply to an earlier version of this patch [*]:
> 
> It's not related to my concern.
> 
> My point is that CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is used for selecting
> the private memory support. Rename it to KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE is
> not correct.

It protects a function that is called kvm_gmem_populate().

Can we stop the nitpicking?

-- 
Cheers,

David / dhildenb

Re: [PATCH v14 02/21] KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE

[Xiaoyao Li]

On 7/16/2025 6:25 PM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 16.07.25 10:31, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
>> On 7/16/2025 4:11 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
>>> On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 05:09, Xiaoyao Li<xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
>>>> On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
>>>>> The original name was vague regarding its functionality. This Kconfig
>>>>> option specifically enables and gates the kvm_gmem_populate() 
>>>>> function,
>>>>> which is responsible for populating a GPA range with guest data.
>>>> Well, I disagree.
>>>>
>>>> The config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM was introduced by commit 
>>>> 89ea60c2c7b5
>>>> ("KVM: x86: Add support for "protected VMs" that can utilize private
>>>> memory"), which is a convenient config for vm types that requires
>>>> private memory support, e.g., SNP, TDX, and KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM.
>>>>
>>>> It was commit e4ee54479273 ("KVM: guest_memfd: let kvm_gmem_populate()
>>>> operate only on private gfns") that started to use
>>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM gates kvm_gmem_populate() function. But
>>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is not for kvm_gmem_populate() only.
>>>>
>>>> If using CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to gate kvm_gmem_populate() is
>>>> vague and confusing, we can introduce KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE to gate
>>>> kvm_gmem_populate() and select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE under
>>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM.
>>>>
>>>> Directly replace CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM with
>>>> KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE doesn't look correct to me.
>>> I'll quote David's reply to an earlier version of this patch [*]:
>>
>> It's not related to my concern.
>>
>> My point is that CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is used for selecting
>> the private memory support. Rename it to KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE is
>> not correct.
> 
> It protects a function that is called kvm_gmem_populate().
> 
> Can we stop the nitpicking?

I don't think it's nitpicking.

Could you loot into why it was named as KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM in the 
first place, and why it was picked to protect kvm_gmem_populate()?

Re: [PATCH v14 02/21] KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE

[Fuad Tabba]

On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 12:02, Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
>
> On 7/16/2025 6:25 PM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> > On 16.07.25 10:31, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
> >> On 7/16/2025 4:11 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> >>> On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 05:09, Xiaoyao Li<xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
> >>>> On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> >>>>> The original name was vague regarding its functionality. This Kconfig
> >>>>> option specifically enables and gates the kvm_gmem_populate()
> >>>>> function,
> >>>>> which is responsible for populating a GPA range with guest data.
> >>>> Well, I disagree.
> >>>>
> >>>> The config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM was introduced by commit
> >>>> 89ea60c2c7b5
> >>>> ("KVM: x86: Add support for "protected VMs" that can utilize private
> >>>> memory"), which is a convenient config for vm types that requires
> >>>> private memory support, e.g., SNP, TDX, and KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM.
> >>>>
> >>>> It was commit e4ee54479273 ("KVM: guest_memfd: let kvm_gmem_populate()
> >>>> operate only on private gfns") that started to use
> >>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM gates kvm_gmem_populate() function. But
> >>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is not for kvm_gmem_populate() only.
> >>>>
> >>>> If using CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to gate kvm_gmem_populate() is
> >>>> vague and confusing, we can introduce KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE to gate
> >>>> kvm_gmem_populate() and select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE under
> >>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM.
> >>>>
> >>>> Directly replace CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM with
> >>>> KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE doesn't look correct to me.
> >>> I'll quote David's reply to an earlier version of this patch [*]:
> >>
> >> It's not related to my concern.
> >>
> >> My point is that CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is used for selecting
> >> the private memory support. Rename it to KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE is
> >> not correct.
> >
> > It protects a function that is called kvm_gmem_populate().
> >
> > Can we stop the nitpicking?
>
> I don't think it's nitpicking.
>
> Could you loot into why it was named as KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM in the
> first place, and why it was picked to protect kvm_gmem_populate()?

That is, in part, the point of this patch. This flag protects
kvm_gmem_populate(), and the name didn't reflect that. Now it does. It
is the only thing it protects.

Cheers,
/fuad

Re: [PATCH v14 02/21] KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE

[David Hildenbrand]

On 16.07.25 13:05, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 12:02, Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 7/16/2025 6:25 PM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>>> On 16.07.25 10:31, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
>>>> On 7/16/2025 4:11 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
>>>>> On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 05:09, Xiaoyao Li<xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
>>>>>> On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
>>>>>>> The original name was vague regarding its functionality. This Kconfig
>>>>>>> option specifically enables and gates the kvm_gmem_populate()
>>>>>>> function,
>>>>>>> which is responsible for populating a GPA range with guest data.
>>>>>> Well, I disagree.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM was introduced by commit
>>>>>> 89ea60c2c7b5
>>>>>> ("KVM: x86: Add support for "protected VMs" that can utilize private
>>>>>> memory"), which is a convenient config for vm types that requires
>>>>>> private memory support, e.g., SNP, TDX, and KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It was commit e4ee54479273 ("KVM: guest_memfd: let kvm_gmem_populate()
>>>>>> operate only on private gfns") that started to use
>>>>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM gates kvm_gmem_populate() function. But
>>>>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is not for kvm_gmem_populate() only.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If using CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to gate kvm_gmem_populate() is
>>>>>> vague and confusing, we can introduce KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE to gate
>>>>>> kvm_gmem_populate() and select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE under
>>>>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Directly replace CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM with
>>>>>> KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE doesn't look correct to me.
>>>>> I'll quote David's reply to an earlier version of this patch [*]:
>>>>
>>>> It's not related to my concern.
>>>>
>>>> My point is that CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is used for selecting
>>>> the private memory support. Rename it to KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE is
>>>> not correct.
>>>
>>> It protects a function that is called kvm_gmem_populate().
>>>
>>> Can we stop the nitpicking?
>>
>> I don't think it's nitpicking.
>>
>> Could you loot into why it was named as KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM in the
>> first place, and why it was picked to protect kvm_gmem_populate()?
> 
> That is, in part, the point of this patch. This flag protects
> kvm_gmem_populate(), and the name didn't reflect that. Now it does. It
> is the only thing it protects.

I'll note that the kconfig makes it clear that it depends on 
KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES -- having support for private memory.

In any case, CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is a bad name: what on earth 
is generic private memory.

If CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE is for some reason I don't 
understand yet not the right name, can we have something that better 
expresses that is is about KVM .. GMEM ... and POPULATE?

-- 
Cheers,

David / dhildenb

Re: [PATCH v14 02/21] KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE

[Xiaoyao Li]

On 7/16/2025 7:15 PM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> On 16.07.25 13:05, Fuad Tabba wrote:
>> On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 12:02, Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> On 7/16/2025 6:25 PM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>>>> On 16.07.25 10:31, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
>>>>> On 7/16/2025 4:11 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
>>>>>> On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 05:09, Xiaoyao Li<xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
>>>>>>> On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
>>>>>>>> The original name was vague regarding its functionality. This 
>>>>>>>> Kconfig
>>>>>>>> option specifically enables and gates the kvm_gmem_populate()
>>>>>>>> function,
>>>>>>>> which is responsible for populating a GPA range with guest data.
>>>>>>> Well, I disagree.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM was introduced by commit
>>>>>>> 89ea60c2c7b5
>>>>>>> ("KVM: x86: Add support for "protected VMs" that can utilize private
>>>>>>> memory"), which is a convenient config for vm types that requires
>>>>>>> private memory support, e.g., SNP, TDX, and KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It was commit e4ee54479273 ("KVM: guest_memfd: let 
>>>>>>> kvm_gmem_populate()
>>>>>>> operate only on private gfns") that started to use
>>>>>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM gates kvm_gmem_populate() 
>>>>>>> function. But
>>>>>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is not for kvm_gmem_populate() only.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If using CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to gate 
>>>>>>> kvm_gmem_populate() is
>>>>>>> vague and confusing, we can introduce KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE 
>>>>>>> to gate
>>>>>>> kvm_gmem_populate() and select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE under
>>>>>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Directly replace CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM with
>>>>>>> KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE doesn't look correct to me.
>>>>>> I'll quote David's reply to an earlier version of this patch [*]:
>>>>>
>>>>> It's not related to my concern.
>>>>>
>>>>> My point is that CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is used for selecting
>>>>> the private memory support. Rename it to KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE is
>>>>> not correct.
>>>>
>>>> It protects a function that is called kvm_gmem_populate().
>>>>
>>>> Can we stop the nitpicking?
>>>
>>> I don't think it's nitpicking.
>>>
>>> Could you loot into why it was named as KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM in the
>>> first place, and why it was picked to protect kvm_gmem_populate()?
>>
>> That is, in part, the point of this patch. This flag protects
>> kvm_gmem_populate(), and the name didn't reflect that. Now it does. It
>> is the only thing it protects.
> 
> I'll note that the kconfig makes it clear that it depends on 
> KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES -- having support for private memory.
> 
> In any case, CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is a bad name: what on earth 
> is generic private memory.

"gmem" + "memory_attribute" is the generic private memory.

If KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is a bad name, we can drop it, but not rename 
it to CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE.

> If CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE is for some reason I don't 
> understand yet not the right name, can we have something that better 
> expresses that is is about KVM .. GMEM ... and POPULATE?

I'm not objecting the name of CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE, but 
objecting the simple rename. Does something below look reasonable?

---
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
index 2eeffcec5382..3f87dcaaae83 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ config KVM_INTEL_TDX
         bool "Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) support"
         default y
         depends on INTEL_TDX_HOST
+       select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
         help
           Provides support for launching Intel Trust Domain Extensions 
(TDX)
           confidential VMs on Intel processors.
@@ -158,6 +159,7 @@ config KVM_AMD_SEV
         depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP && !(KVM_AMD=y && CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD=m)
         select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
         select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
+       select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
         select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE
         select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE
         help
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index 755b09dcafce..359baaae5e9f 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -2556,7 +2556,7 @@ static inline int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm,
  int kvm_arch_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn, 
int max_order);
  #endif

-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
  /**
   * kvm_gmem_populate() - Populate/prepare a GPA range with guest data
   *
diff --git a/virt/kvm/Kconfig b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
index 49df4e32bff7..9b37ca009a22 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -121,6 +121,10 @@ config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
         select KVM_GMEM
         bool

+config KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
+       bool
+       depends on KVM_GMEM && KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
+
  config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE
         bool
         depends on KVM_GMEM
diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
index b2aa6bf24d3a..befea51bbc75 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct 
kvm_memory_slot *slot,
  }
  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gmem_get_pfn);

-#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
  long kvm_gmem_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start_gfn, void __user 
*src, long npages,
                        kvm_gmem_populate_cb post_populate, void *opaque)
  {

Re: [PATCH v14 02/21] KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE

[Fuad Tabba]

Hi Xiaoyao,

On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 13:02, Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
>
> On 7/16/2025 7:15 PM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> > On 16.07.25 13:05, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> >> On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 12:02, Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> On 7/16/2025 6:25 PM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> >>>> On 16.07.25 10:31, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
> >>>>> On 7/16/2025 4:11 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> >>>>>> On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 05:09, Xiaoyao Li<xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
> >>>>>>> On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> >>>>>>>> The original name was vague regarding its functionality. This
> >>>>>>>> Kconfig
> >>>>>>>> option specifically enables and gates the kvm_gmem_populate()
> >>>>>>>> function,
> >>>>>>>> which is responsible for populating a GPA range with guest data.
> >>>>>>> Well, I disagree.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> The config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM was introduced by commit
> >>>>>>> 89ea60c2c7b5
> >>>>>>> ("KVM: x86: Add support for "protected VMs" that can utilize private
> >>>>>>> memory"), which is a convenient config for vm types that requires
> >>>>>>> private memory support, e.g., SNP, TDX, and KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> It was commit e4ee54479273 ("KVM: guest_memfd: let
> >>>>>>> kvm_gmem_populate()
> >>>>>>> operate only on private gfns") that started to use
> >>>>>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM gates kvm_gmem_populate()
> >>>>>>> function. But
> >>>>>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is not for kvm_gmem_populate() only.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> If using CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to gate
> >>>>>>> kvm_gmem_populate() is
> >>>>>>> vague and confusing, we can introduce KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
> >>>>>>> to gate
> >>>>>>> kvm_gmem_populate() and select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE under
> >>>>>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Directly replace CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM with
> >>>>>>> KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE doesn't look correct to me.
> >>>>>> I'll quote David's reply to an earlier version of this patch [*]:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> It's not related to my concern.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> My point is that CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is used for selecting
> >>>>> the private memory support. Rename it to KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE is
> >>>>> not correct.
> >>>>
> >>>> It protects a function that is called kvm_gmem_populate().
> >>>>
> >>>> Can we stop the nitpicking?
> >>>
> >>> I don't think it's nitpicking.
> >>>
> >>> Could you loot into why it was named as KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM in the
> >>> first place, and why it was picked to protect kvm_gmem_populate()?
> >>
> >> That is, in part, the point of this patch. This flag protects
> >> kvm_gmem_populate(), and the name didn't reflect that. Now it does. It
> >> is the only thing it protects.
> >
> > I'll note that the kconfig makes it clear that it depends on
> > KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES -- having support for private memory.
> >
> > In any case, CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is a bad name: what on earth
> > is generic private memory.
>
> "gmem" + "memory_attribute" is the generic private memory.
>
> If KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is a bad name, we can drop it, but not rename
> it to CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE.
>
> > If CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE is for some reason I don't
> > understand yet not the right name, can we have something that better
> > expresses that is is about KVM .. GMEM ... and POPULATE?
>
> I'm not objecting the name of CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE, but
> objecting the simple rename. Does something below look reasonable?

Isn't the below practically the same as having one patch that adds
KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE, followed by a patch that drops
KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM?

Cheers,
/fuad


> ---
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> index 2eeffcec5382..3f87dcaaae83 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> @@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ config KVM_INTEL_TDX
>          bool "Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) support"
>          default y
>          depends on INTEL_TDX_HOST
> +       select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
>          help
>            Provides support for launching Intel Trust Domain Extensions
> (TDX)
>            confidential VMs on Intel processors.
> @@ -158,6 +159,7 @@ config KVM_AMD_SEV
>          depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP && !(KVM_AMD=y && CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD=m)
>          select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
>          select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
> +       select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
>          select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE
>          select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE
>          help
> diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> index 755b09dcafce..359baaae5e9f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> @@ -2556,7 +2556,7 @@ static inline int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm,
>   int kvm_arch_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
> int max_order);
>   #endif
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
>   /**
>    * kvm_gmem_populate() - Populate/prepare a GPA range with guest data
>    *
> diff --git a/virt/kvm/Kconfig b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
> index 49df4e32bff7..9b37ca009a22 100644
> --- a/virt/kvm/Kconfig
> +++ b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
> @@ -121,6 +121,10 @@ config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
>          select KVM_GMEM
>          bool
>
> +config KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
> +       bool
> +       depends on KVM_GMEM && KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
> +
>   config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE
>          bool
>          depends on KVM_GMEM
> diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> index b2aa6bf24d3a..befea51bbc75 100644
> --- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> +++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> @@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct
> kvm_memory_slot *slot,
>   }
>   EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gmem_get_pfn);
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
>   long kvm_gmem_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start_gfn, void __user
> *src, long npages,
>                         kvm_gmem_populate_cb post_populate, void *opaque)
>   {
>
>

Re: [PATCH v14 02/21] KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE

[David Hildenbrand]

On 16.07.25 14:01, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
> On 7/16/2025 7:15 PM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>> On 16.07.25 13:05, Fuad Tabba wrote:
>>> On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 12:02, Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 7/16/2025 6:25 PM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>>>>> On 16.07.25 10:31, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
>>>>>> On 7/16/2025 4:11 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
>>>>>>> On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 05:09, Xiaoyao Li<xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
>>>>>>>>> The original name was vague regarding its functionality. This
>>>>>>>>> Kconfig
>>>>>>>>> option specifically enables and gates the kvm_gmem_populate()
>>>>>>>>> function,
>>>>>>>>> which is responsible for populating a GPA range with guest data.
>>>>>>>> Well, I disagree.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM was introduced by commit
>>>>>>>> 89ea60c2c7b5
>>>>>>>> ("KVM: x86: Add support for "protected VMs" that can utilize private
>>>>>>>> memory"), which is a convenient config for vm types that requires
>>>>>>>> private memory support, e.g., SNP, TDX, and KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It was commit e4ee54479273 ("KVM: guest_memfd: let
>>>>>>>> kvm_gmem_populate()
>>>>>>>> operate only on private gfns") that started to use
>>>>>>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM gates kvm_gmem_populate()
>>>>>>>> function. But
>>>>>>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is not for kvm_gmem_populate() only.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If using CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to gate
>>>>>>>> kvm_gmem_populate() is
>>>>>>>> vague and confusing, we can introduce KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
>>>>>>>> to gate
>>>>>>>> kvm_gmem_populate() and select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE under
>>>>>>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Directly replace CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM with
>>>>>>>> KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE doesn't look correct to me.
>>>>>>> I'll quote David's reply to an earlier version of this patch [*]:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It's not related to my concern.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> My point is that CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is used for selecting
>>>>>> the private memory support. Rename it to KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE is
>>>>>> not correct.
>>>>>
>>>>> It protects a function that is called kvm_gmem_populate().
>>>>>
>>>>> Can we stop the nitpicking?
>>>>
>>>> I don't think it's nitpicking.
>>>>
>>>> Could you loot into why it was named as KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM in the
>>>> first place, and why it was picked to protect kvm_gmem_populate()?
>>>
>>> That is, in part, the point of this patch. This flag protects
>>> kvm_gmem_populate(), and the name didn't reflect that. Now it does. It
>>> is the only thing it protects.
>>
>> I'll note that the kconfig makes it clear that it depends on
>> KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES -- having support for private memory.
>>
>> In any case, CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is a bad name: what on earth
>> is generic private memory.
> 
> "gmem" + "memory_attribute" is the generic private memory.
> 
> If KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is a bad name, we can drop it, but not rename
> it to CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE.
> 
>> If CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE is for some reason I don't
>> understand yet not the right name, can we have something that better
>> expresses that is is about KVM .. GMEM ... and POPULATE?
> 
> I'm not objecting the name of CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE, but
> objecting the simple rename. Does something below look reasonable?
> > ---
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> index 2eeffcec5382..3f87dcaaae83 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> @@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ config KVM_INTEL_TDX
>           bool "Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) support"
>           default y
>           depends on INTEL_TDX_HOST
> +       select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
>           help
>             Provides support for launching Intel Trust Domain Extensions
> (TDX)
>             confidential VMs on Intel processors.
> @@ -158,6 +159,7 @@ config KVM_AMD_SEV
>           depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP && !(KVM_AMD=y && CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD=m)
>           select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
>           select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
> +       select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
>           select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE
>           select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE
>           help
> diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> index 755b09dcafce..359baaae5e9f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> @@ -2556,7 +2556,7 @@ static inline int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm,
>    int kvm_arch_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
> int max_order);
>    #endif
> 
> -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
>    /**
>     * kvm_gmem_populate() - Populate/prepare a GPA range with guest data
>     *
> diff --git a/virt/kvm/Kconfig b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
> index 49df4e32bff7..9b37ca009a22 100644
> --- a/virt/kvm/Kconfig
> +++ b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
> @@ -121,6 +121,10 @@ config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
>           select KVM_GMEM
>           bool
> 
> +config KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
> +       bool
> +       depends on KVM_GMEM && KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
> +
>    config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE
>           bool
>           depends on KVM_GMEM
> diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> index b2aa6bf24d3a..befea51bbc75 100644
> --- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> +++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> @@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct
> kvm_memory_slot *slot,
>    }
>    EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gmem_get_pfn);
> 
> -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
> +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
>    long kvm_gmem_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start_gfn, void __user
> *src, long npages,
>                          kvm_gmem_populate_cb post_populate, void *opaque)
>    {
> 
> 

$ git grep KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:   select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:   select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if INTEL_TDX_HOST
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:   select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
include/linux/kvm_host.h:#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
virt/kvm/Kconfig:config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c:#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM


Why should we leave KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM around when there are no other users?

@fuad help me out, what am I missing?

-- 
Cheers,

David / dhildenb

Re: [PATCH v14 02/21] KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE

[Fuad Tabba]

On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 13:14, David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> On 16.07.25 14:01, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
> > On 7/16/2025 7:15 PM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> >> On 16.07.25 13:05, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> >>> On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 12:02, Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>> On 7/16/2025 6:25 PM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
> >>>>> On 16.07.25 10:31, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
> >>>>>> On 7/16/2025 4:11 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> >>>>>>> On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 05:09, Xiaoyao Li<xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
> >>>>>>>> On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> >>>>>>>>> The original name was vague regarding its functionality. This
> >>>>>>>>> Kconfig
> >>>>>>>>> option specifically enables and gates the kvm_gmem_populate()
> >>>>>>>>> function,
> >>>>>>>>> which is responsible for populating a GPA range with guest data.
> >>>>>>>> Well, I disagree.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> The config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM was introduced by commit
> >>>>>>>> 89ea60c2c7b5
> >>>>>>>> ("KVM: x86: Add support for "protected VMs" that can utilize private
> >>>>>>>> memory"), which is a convenient config for vm types that requires
> >>>>>>>> private memory support, e.g., SNP, TDX, and KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> It was commit e4ee54479273 ("KVM: guest_memfd: let
> >>>>>>>> kvm_gmem_populate()
> >>>>>>>> operate only on private gfns") that started to use
> >>>>>>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM gates kvm_gmem_populate()
> >>>>>>>> function. But
> >>>>>>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is not for kvm_gmem_populate() only.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> If using CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to gate
> >>>>>>>> kvm_gmem_populate() is
> >>>>>>>> vague and confusing, we can introduce KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
> >>>>>>>> to gate
> >>>>>>>> kvm_gmem_populate() and select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE under
> >>>>>>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Directly replace CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM with
> >>>>>>>> KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE doesn't look correct to me.
> >>>>>>> I'll quote David's reply to an earlier version of this patch [*]:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> It's not related to my concern.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> My point is that CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is used for selecting
> >>>>>> the private memory support. Rename it to KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE is
> >>>>>> not correct.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> It protects a function that is called kvm_gmem_populate().
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Can we stop the nitpicking?
> >>>>
> >>>> I don't think it's nitpicking.
> >>>>
> >>>> Could you loot into why it was named as KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM in the
> >>>> first place, and why it was picked to protect kvm_gmem_populate()?
> >>>
> >>> That is, in part, the point of this patch. This flag protects
> >>> kvm_gmem_populate(), and the name didn't reflect that. Now it does. It
> >>> is the only thing it protects.
> >>
> >> I'll note that the kconfig makes it clear that it depends on
> >> KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES -- having support for private memory.
> >>
> >> In any case, CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is a bad name: what on earth
> >> is generic private memory.
> >
> > "gmem" + "memory_attribute" is the generic private memory.
> >
> > If KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is a bad name, we can drop it, but not rename
> > it to CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE.
> >
> >> If CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE is for some reason I don't
> >> understand yet not the right name, can we have something that better
> >> expresses that is is about KVM .. GMEM ... and POPULATE?
> >
> > I'm not objecting the name of CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE, but
> > objecting the simple rename. Does something below look reasonable?
> > > ---
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> > index 2eeffcec5382..3f87dcaaae83 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
> > @@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ config KVM_INTEL_TDX
> >           bool "Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) support"
> >           default y
> >           depends on INTEL_TDX_HOST
> > +       select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
> >           help
> >             Provides support for launching Intel Trust Domain Extensions
> > (TDX)
> >             confidential VMs on Intel processors.
> > @@ -158,6 +159,7 @@ config KVM_AMD_SEV
> >           depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP && !(KVM_AMD=y && CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD=m)
> >           select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
> >           select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
> > +       select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
> >           select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE
> >           select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE
> >           help
> > diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> > index 755b09dcafce..359baaae5e9f 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> > @@ -2556,7 +2556,7 @@ static inline int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm,
> >    int kvm_arch_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
> > int max_order);
> >    #endif
> >
> > -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
> >    /**
> >     * kvm_gmem_populate() - Populate/prepare a GPA range with guest data
> >     *
> > diff --git a/virt/kvm/Kconfig b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
> > index 49df4e32bff7..9b37ca009a22 100644
> > --- a/virt/kvm/Kconfig
> > +++ b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
> > @@ -121,6 +121,10 @@ config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
> >           select KVM_GMEM
> >           bool
> >
> > +config KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
> > +       bool
> > +       depends on KVM_GMEM && KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
> > +
> >    config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE
> >           bool
> >           depends on KVM_GMEM
> > diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> > index b2aa6bf24d3a..befea51bbc75 100644
> > --- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> > +++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> > @@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct
> > kvm_memory_slot *slot,
> >    }
> >    EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gmem_get_pfn);
> >
> > -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
> >    long kvm_gmem_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start_gfn, void __user
> > *src, long npages,
> >                          kvm_gmem_populate_cb post_populate, void *opaque)
> >    {
> >
> >
>
> $ git grep KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
> arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:   select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
> arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:   select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if INTEL_TDX_HOST
> arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:   select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
> include/linux/kvm_host.h:#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
> virt/kvm/Kconfig:config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
> virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c:#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
>
>
> Why should we leave KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM around when there are no other users?
>
> @fuad help me out, what am I missing?

I'm not sure. Splitting it into two patches, one that introduces
CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE followed by one that drops
CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM ends up with the same result.

Cheers,
/fuad


> --
> Cheers,
>
> David / dhildenb
>

Re: [PATCH v14 02/21] KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE

[Xiaoyao Li]

On 7/16/2025 8:24 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 13:14, David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 16.07.25 14:01, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
>>> On 7/16/2025 7:15 PM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>>>> On 16.07.25 13:05, Fuad Tabba wrote:
>>>>> On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 12:02, Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 7/16/2025 6:25 PM, David Hildenbrand wrote:
>>>>>>> On 16.07.25 10:31, Xiaoyao Li wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 7/16/2025 4:11 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 05:09, Xiaoyao Li<xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> The original name was vague regarding its functionality. This
>>>>>>>>>>> Kconfig
>>>>>>>>>>> option specifically enables and gates the kvm_gmem_populate()
>>>>>>>>>>> function,
>>>>>>>>>>> which is responsible for populating a GPA range with guest data.
>>>>>>>>>> Well, I disagree.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM was introduced by commit
>>>>>>>>>> 89ea60c2c7b5
>>>>>>>>>> ("KVM: x86: Add support for "protected VMs" that can utilize private
>>>>>>>>>> memory"), which is a convenient config for vm types that requires
>>>>>>>>>> private memory support, e.g., SNP, TDX, and KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It was commit e4ee54479273 ("KVM: guest_memfd: let
>>>>>>>>>> kvm_gmem_populate()
>>>>>>>>>> operate only on private gfns") that started to use
>>>>>>>>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM gates kvm_gmem_populate()
>>>>>>>>>> function. But
>>>>>>>>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is not for kvm_gmem_populate() only.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If using CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to gate
>>>>>>>>>> kvm_gmem_populate() is
>>>>>>>>>> vague and confusing, we can introduce KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
>>>>>>>>>> to gate
>>>>>>>>>> kvm_gmem_populate() and select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE under
>>>>>>>>>> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Directly replace CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM with
>>>>>>>>>> KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE doesn't look correct to me.
>>>>>>>>> I'll quote David's reply to an earlier version of this patch [*]:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It's not related to my concern.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> My point is that CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is used for selecting
>>>>>>>> the private memory support. Rename it to KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE is
>>>>>>>> not correct.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It protects a function that is called kvm_gmem_populate().
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Can we stop the nitpicking?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don't think it's nitpicking.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Could you loot into why it was named as KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM in the
>>>>>> first place, and why it was picked to protect kvm_gmem_populate()?
>>>>>
>>>>> That is, in part, the point of this patch. This flag protects
>>>>> kvm_gmem_populate(), and the name didn't reflect that. Now it does. It
>>>>> is the only thing it protects.
>>>>
>>>> I'll note that the kconfig makes it clear that it depends on
>>>> KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES -- having support for private memory.
>>>>
>>>> In any case, CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is a bad name: what on earth
>>>> is generic private memory.
>>>
>>> "gmem" + "memory_attribute" is the generic private memory.
>>>
>>> If KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM is a bad name, we can drop it, but not rename
>>> it to CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE.
>>>
>>>> If CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE is for some reason I don't
>>>> understand yet not the right name, can we have something that better
>>>> expresses that is is about KVM .. GMEM ... and POPULATE?
>>>
>>> I'm not objecting the name of CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE, but
>>> objecting the simple rename. Does something below look reasonable?
>>>> ---
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
>>> index 2eeffcec5382..3f87dcaaae83 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
>>> @@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ config KVM_INTEL_TDX
>>>            bool "Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) support"
>>>            default y
>>>            depends on INTEL_TDX_HOST
>>> +       select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
>>>            help
>>>              Provides support for launching Intel Trust Domain Extensions
>>> (TDX)
>>>              confidential VMs on Intel processors.
>>> @@ -158,6 +159,7 @@ config KVM_AMD_SEV
>>>            depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP && !(KVM_AMD=y && CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD=m)
>>>            select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
>>>            select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
>>> +       select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
>>>            select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE
>>>            select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE
>>>            help
>>> diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
>>> index 755b09dcafce..359baaae5e9f 100644
>>> --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
>>> +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
>>> @@ -2556,7 +2556,7 @@ static inline int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm,
>>>     int kvm_arch_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
>>> int max_order);
>>>     #endif
>>>
>>> -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
>>>     /**
>>>      * kvm_gmem_populate() - Populate/prepare a GPA range with guest data
>>>      *
>>> diff --git a/virt/kvm/Kconfig b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
>>> index 49df4e32bff7..9b37ca009a22 100644
>>> --- a/virt/kvm/Kconfig
>>> +++ b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
>>> @@ -121,6 +121,10 @@ config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
>>>            select KVM_GMEM
>>>            bool
>>>
>>> +config KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
>>> +       bool
>>> +       depends on KVM_GMEM && KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
>>> +
>>>     config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE
>>>            bool
>>>            depends on KVM_GMEM
>>> diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
>>> index b2aa6bf24d3a..befea51bbc75 100644
>>> --- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
>>> +++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
>>> @@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct
>>> kvm_memory_slot *slot,
>>>     }
>>>     EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gmem_get_pfn);
>>>
>>> -#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
>>>     long kvm_gmem_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start_gfn, void __user
>>> *src, long npages,
>>>                           kvm_gmem_populate_cb post_populate, void *opaque)
>>>     {
>>>
>>>
>>
>> $ git grep KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
>> arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:   select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
>> arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:   select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if INTEL_TDX_HOST
>> arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:   select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
>> include/linux/kvm_host.h:#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
>> virt/kvm/Kconfig:config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
>> virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c:#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
>>
>>
>> Why should we leave KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM around when there are no other users?
>>

If we don't want KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM, we can further clean it up 
with another patch:

------8<-----------
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
index 3f87dcaaae83..12afc877c677 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ config KVM_X86
         select HAVE_KVM_PM_NOTIFIER if PM
         select KVM_GENERIC_HARDWARE_ENABLING
         select KVM_GENERIC_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY
-       select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
+       select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES if KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
+       select KVM_GMEM if KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
         select KVM_WERROR if WERROR

  config KVM
@@ -95,7 +96,7 @@ config KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
  config KVM_INTEL
         tristate "KVM for Intel (and compatible) processors support"
         depends on KVM && IA32_FEAT_CTL
-       select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if INTEL_TDX_HOST
+       select KVM_GMEM if INTEL_TDX_HOST
         select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES if INTEL_TDX_HOST
         help
           Provides support for KVM on processors equipped with Intel's VT
@@ -158,7 +159,8 @@ config KVM_AMD_SEV
         depends on KVM_AMD && X86_64
         depends on CRYPTO_DEV_SP_PSP && !(KVM_AMD=y && CRYPTO_DEV_CCP_DD=m)
         select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
-       select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
+       select KVM_GMEM
+       select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
         select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
         select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE
         select HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE
diff --git a/virt/kvm/Kconfig b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
index 9b37ca009a22..67c626b1a637 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -116,11 +116,6 @@ config KVM_GMEM
         select XARRAY_MULTI
         bool

-config KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM
-       select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
-       select KVM_GMEM
-       bool
-
  config KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
         bool
         depends on KVM_GMEM && KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES

>> @fuad help me out, what am I missing?
> 
> I'm not sure. Splitting it into two patches, one that introduces
> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE followed by one that drops
> CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM ends up with the same result.

Not really the same result.

The two-step patches I proposed doesn't produce the below thing of this 
original patch. It doesn't make sense to select 
KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE for KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM from the name.

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
index 2eeffcec5382..df1fdbb4024b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ config KVM_X86
  	select HAVE_KVM_PM_NOTIFIER if PM
  	select KVM_GENERIC_HARDWARE_ENABLING
  	select KVM_GENERIC_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY
-	select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
+	select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE if KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
  	select KVM_WERROR if WERROR

> Cheers,
> /fuad
> 
> 
>> --
>> Cheers,
>>
>> David / dhildenb
>>

Re: [PATCH v14 02/21] KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE

[Fuad Tabba]

Hi Xiaoyao,

<snip>
> Not really the same result.
>
> The two-step patches I proposed doesn't produce the below thing of this
> original patch. It doesn't make sense to select
> KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE for KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM from the name.

I think I see where you're going. That said, other than in the
configuration files, in all the actual code, the purpose of
KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEMis to guard  kvm_gmem_populate(). So
I disagree with you, and I think that this should be one patch that
fixes the name. That said, I agree with you regarding:

-       select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
+       select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES if KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
+       select KVM_GMEM if KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM

Cheers,
/fuad

Re: [PATCH v14 02/21] KVM: Rename CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM to CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE

[David Hildenbrand]

On 16.07.25 14:54, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> Hi Xiaoyao,
> 
> <snip>
>> Not really the same result.
>>
>> The two-step patches I proposed doesn't produce the below thing of this
>> original patch. It doesn't make sense to select
>> KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE for KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM from the name.
> 
> I think I see where you're going. That said, other than in the
> configuration files, in all the actual code, the purpose of
> KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEMis to guard  kvm_gmem_populate(). So
> I disagree with you, and I think that this should be one patch that
> fixes the name. That said, I agree with you regarding:
> 
> -       select KVM_GENERIC_PRIVATE_MEM if KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
> +       select KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES if KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
> +       select KVM_GMEM if KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM

Yeah, KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM doesn't need the populate function.

-- 
Cheers,

David / dhildenb

[PATCH v14 03/21] KVM: Introduce kvm_arch_supports_gmem()

[Fuad Tabba]

Introduce kvm_arch_supports_gmem() to explicitly indicate whether an
architecture supports guest_memfd.

Previously, kvm_arch_has_private_mem() was used to check for guest_memfd
support. However, this conflated guest_memfd with "private" memory,
implying that guest_memfd was exclusively for CoCo VMs or other private
memory use cases.

With the expansion of guest_memfd to support non-private memory, such as
shared host mappings, it is necessary to decouple these concepts. The
new kvm_arch_supports_gmem() function provides a clear way to check for
guest_memfd support.

Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  4 +++-
 include/linux/kvm_host.h        | 11 +++++++++++
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c             |  4 ++--
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index acb25f935d84..bde811b2d303 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -2277,8 +2277,10 @@ void kvm_configure_mmu(bool enable_tdp, int tdp_forced_root_level,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GMEM
 #define kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm) ((kvm)->arch.has_private_mem)
+#define kvm_arch_supports_gmem(kvm) kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm)
 #else
 #define kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm) false
+#define kvm_arch_supports_gmem(kvm) false
 #endif
 
 #define kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem(kvm) (!(kvm)->arch.has_protected_state)
@@ -2331,7 +2333,7 @@ enum {
 #define HF_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK	(1 << 2)
 
 # define KVM_MAX_NR_ADDRESS_SPACES	2
-/* SMM is currently unsupported for guests with private memory. */
+/* SMM is currently unsupported for guests with guest_memfd private memory. */
 # define kvm_arch_nr_memslot_as_ids(kvm) (kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm) ? 1 : 2)
 # define kvm_arch_vcpu_memslots_id(vcpu) ((vcpu)->arch.hflags & HF_SMM_MASK ? 1 : 0)
 # define kvm_memslots_for_spte_role(kvm, role) __kvm_memslots(kvm, (role).smm)
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index 359baaae5e9f..ab1bde048034 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -729,6 +729,17 @@ static inline bool kvm_arch_has_private_mem(struct kvm *kvm)
 }
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * Arch code must define kvm_arch_supports_gmem if support for guest_memfd is
+ * enabled.
+ */
+#if !defined(kvm_arch_supports_gmem) && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_GMEM)
+static inline bool kvm_arch_supports_gmem(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+#endif
+
 #ifndef kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem
 static inline bool kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
index d5f0ec2d321f..162e2a69cc49 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -1588,7 +1588,7 @@ static int check_memory_region_flags(struct kvm *kvm,
 {
 	u32 valid_flags = KVM_MEM_LOG_DIRTY_PAGES;
 
-	if (kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm))
+	if (kvm_arch_supports_gmem(kvm))
 		valid_flags |= KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD;
 
 	/* Dirty logging private memory is not currently supported. */
@@ -4915,7 +4915,7 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension_generic(struct kvm *kvm, long arg)
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GMEM
 	case KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD:
-		return !kvm || kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm);
+		return !kvm || kvm_arch_supports_gmem(kvm);
 #endif
 	default:
 		break;
-- 
2.50.0.727.gbf7dc18ff4-goog

Re: [PATCH v14 03/21] KVM: Introduce kvm_arch_supports_gmem()

[Xiaoyao Li]

On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> Introduce kvm_arch_supports_gmem() to explicitly indicate whether an
> architecture supports guest_memfd.
> 
> Previously, kvm_arch_has_private_mem() was used to check for guest_memfd
> support. However, this conflated guest_memfd with "private" memory,
> implying that guest_memfd was exclusively for CoCo VMs or other private
> memory use cases.
> 
> With the expansion of guest_memfd to support non-private memory, such as
> shared host mappings, it is necessary to decouple these concepts. The
> new kvm_arch_supports_gmem() function provides a clear way to check for
> guest_memfd support.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
> Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |  4 +++-
>   include/linux/kvm_host.h        | 11 +++++++++++
>   virt/kvm/kvm_main.c             |  4 ++--
>   3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> index acb25f935d84..bde811b2d303 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> @@ -2277,8 +2277,10 @@ void kvm_configure_mmu(bool enable_tdp, int tdp_forced_root_level,
>   
>   #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GMEM
>   #define kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm) ((kvm)->arch.has_private_mem)
> +#define kvm_arch_supports_gmem(kvm) kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm)
>   #else
>   #define kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm) false
> +#define kvm_arch_supports_gmem(kvm) false
>   #endif
>   
>   #define kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem(kvm) (!(kvm)->arch.has_protected_state)
> @@ -2331,7 +2333,7 @@ enum {
>   #define HF_SMM_INSIDE_NMI_MASK	(1 << 2)
>   
>   # define KVM_MAX_NR_ADDRESS_SPACES	2
> -/* SMM is currently unsupported for guests with private memory. */
> +/* SMM is currently unsupported for guests with guest_memfd private memory. */

Please don't change the comment.

As below, it checks kvm_arch_has_private_mem(). Nothing to do with 
guest_memfd.

Otherwise,

Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>

>   # define kvm_arch_nr_memslot_as_ids(kvm) (kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm) ? 1 : 2)
>   # define kvm_arch_vcpu_memslots_id(vcpu) ((vcpu)->arch.hflags & HF_SMM_MASK ? 1 : 0)
>   # define kvm_memslots_for_spte_role(kvm, role) __kvm_memslots(kvm, (role).smm)

[PATCH v14 04/21] KVM: x86: Introduce kvm->arch.supports_gmem

[Fuad Tabba]

Introduce a new boolean member, supports_gmem, to kvm->arch.

Previously, the has_private_mem boolean within kvm->arch was implicitly
used to indicate whether guest_memfd was supported for a KVM instance.
However, with the broader support for guest_memfd, it's not exclusively
for private or confidential memory. Therefore, it's necessary to
distinguish between a VM's general guest_memfd capabilities and its
support for private memory.

This new supports_gmem member will now explicitly indicate guest_memfd
support for a given VM, allowing has_private_mem to represent only
support for private memory.

Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 3 ++-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c          | 1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c          | 1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              | 4 ++--
 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index bde811b2d303..938b5be03d33 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1348,6 +1348,7 @@ struct kvm_arch {
 	u8 mmu_valid_gen;
 	u8 vm_type;
 	bool has_private_mem;
+	bool supports_gmem;
 	bool has_protected_state;
 	bool pre_fault_allowed;
 	struct hlist_head mmu_page_hash[KVM_NUM_MMU_PAGES];
@@ -2277,7 +2278,7 @@ void kvm_configure_mmu(bool enable_tdp, int tdp_forced_root_level,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GMEM
 #define kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm) ((kvm)->arch.has_private_mem)
-#define kvm_arch_supports_gmem(kvm) kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm)
+#define kvm_arch_supports_gmem(kvm)  ((kvm)->arch.supports_gmem)
 #else
 #define kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm) false
 #define kvm_arch_supports_gmem(kvm) false
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index ab9b947dbf4f..d1c484eaa8ad 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -5181,6 +5181,7 @@ static int svm_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
 		to_kvm_sev_info(kvm)->need_init = true;
 
 		kvm->arch.has_private_mem = (type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM);
+		kvm->arch.supports_gmem = (type == KVM_X86_SNP_VM);
 		kvm->arch.pre_fault_allowed = !kvm->arch.has_private_mem;
 	}
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index f31ccdeb905b..a3db6df245ee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -632,6 +632,7 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
 
 	kvm->arch.has_protected_state = true;
 	kvm->arch.has_private_mem = true;
+	kvm->arch.supports_gmem = true;
 	kvm->arch.disabled_quirks |= KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT;
 
 	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 357b9e3a6cef..adbdc2cc97d4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -12780,8 +12780,8 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	kvm->arch.vm_type = type;
-	kvm->arch.has_private_mem =
-		(type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM);
+	kvm->arch.has_private_mem = (type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM);
+	kvm->arch.supports_gmem = (type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM);
 	/* Decided by the vendor code for other VM types.  */
 	kvm->arch.pre_fault_allowed =
 		type == KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM || type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM;
-- 
2.50.0.727.gbf7dc18ff4-goog

Re: [PATCH v14 04/21] KVM: x86: Introduce kvm->arch.supports_gmem

[Xiaoyao Li]

On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> Introduce a new boolean member, supports_gmem, to kvm->arch.
> 
> Previously, the has_private_mem boolean within kvm->arch was implicitly
> used to indicate whether guest_memfd was supported for a KVM instance.
> However, with the broader support for guest_memfd, it's not exclusively
> for private or confidential memory. Therefore, it's necessary to
> distinguish between a VM's general guest_memfd capabilities and its
> support for private memory.
> 
> This new supports_gmem member will now explicitly indicate guest_memfd
> support for a given VM, allowing has_private_mem to represent only
> support for private memory.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
> Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>

Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>

Btw, it seems that supports_gmem can be enabled for all the types of VM?

Even without mmap support, allow all the types of VM to create 
guest_memfd seems not something wrong. It's just that the guest_memfd 
allocated might not be used, e.g., for KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM.

Re: [PATCH v14 04/21] KVM: x86: Introduce kvm->arch.supports_gmem

[Ackerley Tng]

Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> writes:

> On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
>> Introduce a new boolean member, supports_gmem, to kvm->arch.
>> 
>> Previously, the has_private_mem boolean within kvm->arch was implicitly
>> used to indicate whether guest_memfd was supported for a KVM instance.
>> However, with the broader support for guest_memfd, it's not exclusively
>> for private or confidential memory. Therefore, it's necessary to
>> distinguish between a VM's general guest_memfd capabilities and its
>> support for private memory.
>> 
>> This new supports_gmem member will now explicitly indicate guest_memfd
>> support for a given VM, allowing has_private_mem to represent only
>> support for private memory.
>> 
>> Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
>> Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
>> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
>
> Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
>
> Btw, it seems that supports_gmem can be enabled for all the types of VM?
>

For now, not really, because supports_gmem allows mmap support, and mmap
support enables KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY, and KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY will
mean that shared faults also get faulted from guest_memfd.

A TDX VM that wants to use guest_memfd for private memory and some other
backing memory for shared memory (let's call this use case "legacy CoCo
VMs") will not work if supports_gmem is just enabled for all types of
VMs, because then shared faults will also go to kvm_gmem_get_pfn().

This will be cleaned up when guest_memfd supports conversion
(guest_memfd stage 2). There, a TDX VM will have .supports_gmem = true.

With guest_memfd stage-2 there will also be a
KVM_CAP_DISABLE_LEGACY_PRIVATE_TRACKING.
KVM_CAP_DISABLE_LEGACY_PRIVATE_TRACKING defaults to false, so for legacy
CoCo VMs, shared faults will go to the other non-guest_memfd memory
source that is configured in userspace_addr as before.

With guest_memfd stage-2, KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY will direct all EPT
faults to kvm_gmem_get_pfn(), but KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY will only be
allowed if KVM_CAP_DISABLE_LEGACY_PRIVATE_TRACKING is true. TDX VMs
wishing to use guest_memfd as the only source of memory for the guest
should set KVM_CAP_DISABLE_LEGACY_PRIVATE_TRACKING to true before
creating the guest_memfd.

> Even without mmap support, allow all the types of VM to create 
> guest_memfd seems not something wrong. It's just that the guest_memfd 
> allocated might not be used, e.g., for KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM.


































































p

Re: [PATCH v14 04/21] KVM: x86: Introduce kvm->arch.supports_gmem

[Xiaoyao Li]

On 7/17/2025 8:12 AM, Ackerley Tng wrote:
> Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> writes:
> 
>> On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
>>> Introduce a new boolean member, supports_gmem, to kvm->arch.
>>>
>>> Previously, the has_private_mem boolean within kvm->arch was implicitly
>>> used to indicate whether guest_memfd was supported for a KVM instance.
>>> However, with the broader support for guest_memfd, it's not exclusively
>>> for private or confidential memory. Therefore, it's necessary to
>>> distinguish between a VM's general guest_memfd capabilities and its
>>> support for private memory.
>>>
>>> This new supports_gmem member will now explicitly indicate guest_memfd
>>> support for a given VM, allowing has_private_mem to represent only
>>> support for private memory.
>>>
>>> Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
>>> Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
>>> Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
>>> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
>>> Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
>>
>> Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
>>
>> Btw, it seems that supports_gmem can be enabled for all the types of VM?
>>
> 
> For now, not really, because supports_gmem allows mmap support, and mmap
> support enables KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY, and KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY will
> mean that shared faults also get faulted from guest_memfd.

No, mmap support is checked by kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap() which is 
independent to whether gmem is supported.

> A TDX VM that wants to use guest_memfd for private memory and some other
> backing memory for shared memory (let's call this use case "legacy CoCo
> VMs") will not work if supports_gmem is just enabled for all types of
> VMs, because then shared faults will also go to kvm_gmem_get_pfn().

This is not what this patch does. Please go back read this patch.

This patch sets kvm->arch.supports_gmem to true for 
KVM_X86_SNP_VM/tdx/KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM.

Further in patch 14, it sets kvm->arch.supports_gmem for KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM.

After this series, supports_gmem remains false only for KVM_X86_SEV_VM 
and KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM. And I don't see why cannot enable supports_gmem 
for them.

> This will be cleaned up when guest_memfd supports conversion
> (guest_memfd stage 2). There, a TDX VM will have .supports_gmem = true.
> 
> With guest_memfd stage-2 there will also be a
> KVM_CAP_DISABLE_LEGACY_PRIVATE_TRACKING.
> KVM_CAP_DISABLE_LEGACY_PRIVATE_TRACKING defaults to false, so for legacy
> CoCo VMs, shared faults will go to the other non-guest_memfd memory
> source that is configured in userspace_addr as before.
> 
> With guest_memfd stage-2, KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY will direct all EPT
> faults to kvm_gmem_get_pfn(), but KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY will only be
> allowed if KVM_CAP_DISABLE_LEGACY_PRIVATE_TRACKING is true. TDX VMs
> wishing to use guest_memfd as the only source of memory for the guest
> should set KVM_CAP_DISABLE_LEGACY_PRIVATE_TRACKING to true before
> creating the guest_memfd.
> 
>> Even without mmap support, allow all the types of VM to create
>> guest_memfd seems not something wrong. It's just that the guest_memfd
>> allocated might not be used, e.g., for KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM.
> 
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> p

Re: [PATCH v14 04/21] KVM: x86: Introduce kvm->arch.supports_gmem

[Fuad Tabba]

Hi Xiaoyao,

On Thu, 17 Jul 2025 at 02:48, Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
>
> On 7/17/2025 8:12 AM, Ackerley Tng wrote:
> > Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> writes:
> >
> >> On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> >>> Introduce a new boolean member, supports_gmem, to kvm->arch.
> >>>
> >>> Previously, the has_private_mem boolean within kvm->arch was implicitly
> >>> used to indicate whether guest_memfd was supported for a KVM instance.
> >>> However, with the broader support for guest_memfd, it's not exclusively
> >>> for private or confidential memory. Therefore, it's necessary to
> >>> distinguish between a VM's general guest_memfd capabilities and its
> >>> support for private memory.
> >>>
> >>> This new supports_gmem member will now explicitly indicate guest_memfd
> >>> support for a given VM, allowing has_private_mem to represent only
> >>> support for private memory.
> >>>
> >>> Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
> >>> Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
> >>> Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
> >>> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
> >>> Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
> >>> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
> >>> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
> >>
> >> Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
> >>
> >> Btw, it seems that supports_gmem can be enabled for all the types of VM?
> >>
> >
> > For now, not really, because supports_gmem allows mmap support, and mmap
> > support enables KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY, and KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY will
> > mean that shared faults also get faulted from guest_memfd.
>
> No, mmap support is checked by kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap() which is
> independent to whether gmem is supported.

It is dependent on gmem support:

kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap(kvm) depends on
CONFIG_KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP, which in turn selects KVM_GMEM.


> > A TDX VM that wants to use guest_memfd for private memory and some other
> > backing memory for shared memory (let's call this use case "legacy CoCo
> > VMs") will not work if supports_gmem is just enabled for all types of
> > VMs, because then shared faults will also go to kvm_gmem_get_pfn().
>
> This is not what this patch does. Please go back read this patch.
>
> This patch sets kvm->arch.supports_gmem to true for
> KVM_X86_SNP_VM/tdx/KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM.
>
> Further in patch 14, it sets kvm->arch.supports_gmem for KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM.
>
> After this series, supports_gmem remains false only for KVM_X86_SEV_VM
> and KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM. And I don't see why cannot enable supports_gmem
> for them.

It's not that we can't, it's just that we had no reason to enable it.
When the time comes, it's just a matter of setting a boolean.

Thanks,
/fuad

> > This will be cleaned up when guest_memfd supports conversion
> > (guest_memfd stage 2). There, a TDX VM will have .supports_gmem = true.
> >
> > With guest_memfd stage-2 there will also be a
> > KVM_CAP_DISABLE_LEGACY_PRIVATE_TRACKING.
> > KVM_CAP_DISABLE_LEGACY_PRIVATE_TRACKING defaults to false, so for legacy
> > CoCo VMs, shared faults will go to the other non-guest_memfd memory
> > source that is configured in userspace_addr as before.
> >
> > With guest_memfd stage-2, KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY will direct all EPT
> > faults to kvm_gmem_get_pfn(), but KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY will only be
> > allowed if KVM_CAP_DISABLE_LEGACY_PRIVATE_TRACKING is true. TDX VMs
> > wishing to use guest_memfd as the only source of memory for the guest
> > should set KVM_CAP_DISABLE_LEGACY_PRIVATE_TRACKING to true before
> > creating the guest_memfd.
> >
> >> Even without mmap support, allow all the types of VM to create
> >> guest_memfd seems not something wrong. It's just that the guest_memfd
> >> allocated might not be used, e.g., for KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
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> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > p
>

Re: [PATCH v14 04/21] KVM: x86: Introduce kvm->arch.supports_gmem

[Xiaoyao Li]

On 7/17/2025 4:49 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> On Thu, 17 Jul 2025 at 02:48, Xiaoyao Li<xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
>> On 7/17/2025 8:12 AM, Ackerley Tng wrote:
>>> Xiaoyao Li<xiaoyao.li@intel.com> writes:
>>>

...

>>>>
>>>> Btw, it seems that supports_gmem can be enabled for all the types of VM?
>>>>
>>> For now, not really, because supports_gmem allows mmap support, and mmap
>>> support enables KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY, and KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY will
>>> mean that shared faults also get faulted from guest_memfd.
>> No, mmap support is checked by kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap() which is
>> independent to whether gmem is supported.
> It is dependent on gmem support:
> 
> kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap(kvm) depends on
> CONFIG_KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP, which in turn selects KVM_GMEM.

My bad that my words leads to misunderstanding.

What I wanted to express it that support_gmem doesn't mean mmap support 
is allowed, there is additional specific guard for mmap support via 
kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap().

Re: [PATCH v14 04/21] KVM: x86: Introduce kvm->arch.supports_gmem

[Ackerley Tng]

Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> writes:

> On 7/17/2025 8:12 AM, Ackerley Tng wrote:
>> Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> writes:
>> 
>>> On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
>>>> Introduce a new boolean member, supports_gmem, to kvm->arch.
>>>>
>>>> Previously, the has_private_mem boolean within kvm->arch was implicitly
>>>> used to indicate whether guest_memfd was supported for a KVM instance.
>>>> However, with the broader support for guest_memfd, it's not exclusively
>>>> for private or confidential memory. Therefore, it's necessary to
>>>> distinguish between a VM's general guest_memfd capabilities and its
>>>> support for private memory.
>>>>
>>>> This new supports_gmem member will now explicitly indicate guest_memfd
>>>> support for a given VM, allowing has_private_mem to represent only
>>>> support for private memory.
>>>>
>>>> Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
>>>> Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
>>>> Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
>>>> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
>>>> Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
>>>> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
>>>
>>> Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
>>>
>>> Btw, it seems that supports_gmem can be enabled for all the types of VM?
>>>
>> 
>> For now, not really, because supports_gmem allows mmap support, and mmap
>> support enables KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY, and KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY will
>> mean that shared faults also get faulted from guest_memfd.
>
> No, mmap support is checked by kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap() which is 
> independent to whether gmem is supported.
>
>> A TDX VM that wants to use guest_memfd for private memory and some other
>> backing memory for shared memory (let's call this use case "legacy CoCo
>> VMs") will not work if supports_gmem is just enabled for all types of
>> VMs, because then shared faults will also go to kvm_gmem_get_pfn().
>
> This is not what this patch does. Please go back read this patch.
>
> This patch sets kvm->arch.supports_gmem to true for 
> KVM_X86_SNP_VM/tdx/KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM.
>
> Further in patch 14, it sets kvm->arch.supports_gmem for KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM.
>
> After this series, supports_gmem remains false only for KVM_X86_SEV_VM 
> and KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM. And I don't see why cannot enable supports_gmem 
> for them.
>

My bad, my explanation was actually for
kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap(). Could the confusion on this thread be
showing that the .supports_gmem is actually kind of confusing?

If there's nothing dynamic about .supports_gmem, what have we remove the
.supports_gmem field and have kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap() decide based
on VM type? 

>> This will be cleaned up when guest_memfd supports conversion
>> (guest_memfd stage 2). There, a TDX VM will have .supports_gmem = true.
>> 
>> With guest_memfd stage-2 there will also be a
>> KVM_CAP_DISABLE_LEGACY_PRIVATE_TRACKING.
>> KVM_CAP_DISABLE_LEGACY_PRIVATE_TRACKING defaults to false, so for legacy
>> CoCo VMs, shared faults will go to the other non-guest_memfd memory
>> source that is configured in userspace_addr as before.
>> 
>> With guest_memfd stage-2, KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY will direct all EPT
>> faults to kvm_gmem_get_pfn(), but KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY will only be
>> allowed if KVM_CAP_DISABLE_LEGACY_PRIVATE_TRACKING is true. TDX VMs
>> wishing to use guest_memfd as the only source of memory for the guest
>> should set KVM_CAP_DISABLE_LEGACY_PRIVATE_TRACKING to true before
>> creating the guest_memfd.
>> 
>>> Even without mmap support, allow all the types of VM to create
>>> guest_memfd seems not something wrong. It's just that the guest_memfd
>>> allocated might not be used, e.g., for KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM.
>> 
>> 
>> 
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>> p

Re: [PATCH v14 04/21] KVM: x86: Introduce kvm->arch.supports_gmem

[Fuad Tabba]

On Thu, 17 Jul 2025 at 17:50, Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com> wrote:
>
> Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> writes:
>
> > On 7/17/2025 8:12 AM, Ackerley Tng wrote:
> >> Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> writes:
> >>
> >>> On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> >>>> Introduce a new boolean member, supports_gmem, to kvm->arch.
> >>>>
> >>>> Previously, the has_private_mem boolean within kvm->arch was implicitly
> >>>> used to indicate whether guest_memfd was supported for a KVM instance.
> >>>> However, with the broader support for guest_memfd, it's not exclusively
> >>>> for private or confidential memory. Therefore, it's necessary to
> >>>> distinguish between a VM's general guest_memfd capabilities and its
> >>>> support for private memory.
> >>>>
> >>>> This new supports_gmem member will now explicitly indicate guest_memfd
> >>>> support for a given VM, allowing has_private_mem to represent only
> >>>> support for private memory.
> >>>>
> >>>> Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
> >>>> Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
> >>>> Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
> >>>> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
> >>>> Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
> >>>> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
> >>>> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
> >>>
> >>> Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
> >>>
> >>> Btw, it seems that supports_gmem can be enabled for all the types of VM?
> >>>
> >>
> >> For now, not really, because supports_gmem allows mmap support, and mmap
> >> support enables KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY, and KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY will
> >> mean that shared faults also get faulted from guest_memfd.
> >
> > No, mmap support is checked by kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap() which is
> > independent to whether gmem is supported.
> >
> >> A TDX VM that wants to use guest_memfd for private memory and some other
> >> backing memory for shared memory (let's call this use case "legacy CoCo
> >> VMs") will not work if supports_gmem is just enabled for all types of
> >> VMs, because then shared faults will also go to kvm_gmem_get_pfn().
> >
> > This is not what this patch does. Please go back read this patch.
> >
> > This patch sets kvm->arch.supports_gmem to true for
> > KVM_X86_SNP_VM/tdx/KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM.
> >
> > Further in patch 14, it sets kvm->arch.supports_gmem for KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM.
> >
> > After this series, supports_gmem remains false only for KVM_X86_SEV_VM
> > and KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM. And I don't see why cannot enable supports_gmem
> > for them.
> >
>
> My bad, my explanation was actually for
> kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap(). Could the confusion on this thread be
> showing that the .supports_gmem is actually kind of confusing?
>
> If there's nothing dynamic about .supports_gmem, what have we remove the
> .supports_gmem field and have kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap() decide based
> on VM type?

I do think that, in the same manner has_private_vm is a field, this
should also be a field, and for the same reasons. It would confuse
things (in x86) having one be dynamic.

As David said, let's not nitpick this :)

Cheers,
/fuad

> >> This will be cleaned up when guest_memfd supports conversion
> >> (guest_memfd stage 2). There, a TDX VM will have .supports_gmem = true.
> >>
> >> With guest_memfd stage-2 there will also be a
> >> KVM_CAP_DISABLE_LEGACY_PRIVATE_TRACKING.
> >> KVM_CAP_DISABLE_LEGACY_PRIVATE_TRACKING defaults to false, so for legacy
> >> CoCo VMs, shared faults will go to the other non-guest_memfd memory
> >> source that is configured in userspace_addr as before.
> >>
> >> With guest_memfd stage-2, KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY will direct all EPT
> >> faults to kvm_gmem_get_pfn(), but KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY will only be
> >> allowed if KVM_CAP_DISABLE_LEGACY_PRIVATE_TRACKING is true. TDX VMs
> >> wishing to use guest_memfd as the only source of memory for the guest
> >> should set KVM_CAP_DISABLE_LEGACY_PRIVATE_TRACKING to true before
> >> creating the guest_memfd.
> >>
> >>> Even without mmap support, allow all the types of VM to create
> >>> guest_memfd seems not something wrong. It's just that the guest_memfd
> >>> allocated might not be used, e.g., for KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> p

[PATCH v14 05/21] KVM: Rename kvm_slot_can_be_private() to kvm_slot_has_gmem()

[Fuad Tabba]

Rename kvm_slot_can_be_private() to kvm_slot_has_gmem() to improve
clarity and accurately reflect its purpose.

The function kvm_slot_can_be_private() was previously used to check if a
given kvm_memory_slot is backed by guest_memfd. However, its name
implied that the memory in such a slot was exclusively "private".

As guest_memfd support expands to include non-private memory (e.g.,
shared host mappings), it's important to remove this association. The
new name, kvm_slot_has_gmem(), states that the slot is backed by
guest_memfd without making assumptions about the memory's privacy
attributes.

Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c   | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c   | 4 ++--
 include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +-
 virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c   | 2 +-
 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 4e06e2e89a8f..213904daf1e5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -3285,7 +3285,7 @@ static int __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,
 int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,
 			      const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn)
 {
-	bool is_private = kvm_slot_can_be_private(slot) &&
+	bool is_private = kvm_slot_has_gmem(slot) &&
 			  kvm_mem_is_private(kvm, gfn);
 
 	return __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(kvm, slot, gfn, PG_LEVEL_NUM, is_private);
@@ -4498,7 +4498,7 @@ static int kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_private(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 {
 	int max_order, r;
 
-	if (!kvm_slot_can_be_private(fault->slot)) {
+	if (!kvm_slot_has_gmem(fault->slot)) {
 		kvm_mmu_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault);
 		return -EFAULT;
 	}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index b201f77fcd49..687392c5bf5d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -2323,7 +2323,7 @@ static int snp_launch_update(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 	mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
 
 	memslot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, params.gfn_start);
-	if (!kvm_slot_can_be_private(memslot)) {
+	if (!kvm_slot_has_gmem(memslot)) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
@@ -4678,7 +4678,7 @@ void sev_handle_rmp_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code)
 	}
 
 	slot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn);
-	if (!kvm_slot_can_be_private(slot)) {
+	if (!kvm_slot_has_gmem(slot)) {
 		pr_warn_ratelimited("SEV: Unexpected RMP fault, non-private slot for GPA 0x%llx\n",
 				    gpa);
 		return;
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index ab1bde048034..ed00c2b40e4b 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ struct kvm_memory_slot {
 #endif
 };
 
-static inline bool kvm_slot_can_be_private(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+static inline bool kvm_slot_has_gmem(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
 {
 	return slot && (slot->flags & KVM_MEM_GUEST_MEMFD);
 }
diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
index befea51bbc75..6db515833f61 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
@@ -654,7 +654,7 @@ long kvm_gmem_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start_gfn, void __user *src, long
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	slot = gfn_to_memslot(kvm, start_gfn);
-	if (!kvm_slot_can_be_private(slot))
+	if (!kvm_slot_has_gmem(slot))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	file = kvm_gmem_get_file(slot);
-- 
2.50.0.727.gbf7dc18ff4-goog

Re: [PATCH v14 05/21] KVM: Rename kvm_slot_can_be_private() to kvm_slot_has_gmem()

[Xiaoyao Li]

On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> Rename kvm_slot_can_be_private() to kvm_slot_has_gmem() to improve
> clarity and accurately reflect its purpose.
> 
> The function kvm_slot_can_be_private() was previously used to check if a
> given kvm_memory_slot is backed by guest_memfd. However, its name
> implied that the memory in such a slot was exclusively "private".
> 
> As guest_memfd support expands to include non-private memory (e.g.,
> shared host mappings), it's important to remove this association. The
> new name, kvm_slot_has_gmem(), states that the slot is backed by
> guest_memfd without making assumptions about the memory's privacy
> attributes.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
> Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>

Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>

[PATCH v14 06/21] KVM: Fix comments that refer to slots_lock

[Fuad Tabba]

Fix comments so that they refer to slots_lock instead of slots_locks
(remove trailing s).

Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
 include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +-
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c      | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index ed00c2b40e4b..9c654dfb6dce 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -870,7 +870,7 @@ struct kvm {
 	struct notifier_block pm_notifier;
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
-	/* Protected by slots_locks (for writes) and RCU (for reads) */
+	/* Protected by slots_lock (for writes) and RCU (for reads) */
 	struct xarray mem_attr_array;
 #endif
 	char stats_id[KVM_STATS_NAME_SIZE];
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
index 162e2a69cc49..46bddac1dacd 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ void kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_memslot(struct kvm *kvm,
 	 * All current use cases for flushing the TLBs for a specific memslot
 	 * are related to dirty logging, and many do the TLB flush out of
 	 * mmu_lock. The interaction between the various operations on memslot
-	 * must be serialized by slots_locks to ensure the TLB flush from one
+	 * must be serialized by slots_lock to ensure the TLB flush from one
 	 * operation is observed by any other operation on the same memslot.
 	 */
 	lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->slots_lock);
-- 
2.50.0.727.gbf7dc18ff4-goog

Re: [PATCH v14 06/21] KVM: Fix comments that refer to slots_lock

[Xiaoyao Li]

On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> Fix comments so that they refer to slots_lock instead of slots_locks
> (remove trailing s).
> 
> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>

Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>

[PATCH v14 07/21] KVM: Fix comment that refers to kvm uapi header path

[Fuad Tabba]

The comment that points to the path where the user-visible memslot flags
are refers to an outdated path and has a typo.

Update the comment to refer to the correct path.

Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
 include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index 9c654dfb6dce..1ec71648824c 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
 /*
  * The bit 16 ~ bit 31 of kvm_userspace_memory_region::flags are internally
  * used in kvm, other bits are visible for userspace which are defined in
- * include/linux/kvm_h.
+ * include/uapi/linux/kvm.h.
  */
 #define KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID	(1UL << 16)
 
-- 
2.50.0.727.gbf7dc18ff4-goog

Re: [PATCH v14 07/21] KVM: Fix comment that refers to kvm uapi header path

[Xiaoyao Li]

On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> The comment that points to the path where the user-visible memslot flags
> are refers to an outdated path and has a typo.
> 
> Update the comment to refer to the correct path.
> 
> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
> Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>

Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>

> ---
>   include/linux/kvm_host.h | 2 +-
>   1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> index 9c654dfb6dce..1ec71648824c 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
>   /*
>    * The bit 16 ~ bit 31 of kvm_userspace_memory_region::flags are internally
>    * used in kvm, other bits are visible for userspace which are defined in
> - * include/linux/kvm_h.
> + * include/uapi/linux/kvm.h.
>    */
>   #define KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID	(1UL << 16)
>   

[PATCH v14 08/21] KVM: guest_memfd: Allow host to map guest_memfd pages

[Fuad Tabba]

Introduce the core infrastructure to enable host userspace to mmap()
guest_memfd-backed memory. This is needed for several evolving KVM use
cases:

* Non-CoCo VM backing: Allows VMMs like Firecracker to run guests
  entirely backed by guest_memfd, even for non-CoCo VMs [1]. This
  provides a unified memory management model and simplifies guest memory
  handling.

* Direct map removal for enhanced security: This is an important step
  for direct map removal of guest memory [2]. By allowing host userspace
  to fault in guest_memfd pages directly, we can avoid maintaining host
  kernel direct maps of guest memory. This provides additional hardening
  against Spectre-like transient execution attacks by removing a
  potential attack surface within the kernel.

* Future guest_memfd features: This also lays the groundwork for future
  enhancements to guest_memfd, such as supporting huge pages and
  enabling in-place sharing of guest memory with the host for CoCo
  platforms that permit it [3].

Therefore, enable the basic mmap and fault handling logic within
guest_memfd. However, this functionality is not yet exposed to userspace
and remains inactive until two conditions are met in subsequent patches:

* Kconfig Gate (CONFIG_KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP): A new Kconfig option,
  KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP, is introduced later in this series. This
  option gates the compilation and availability of this mmap
  functionality at a system level. While the code changes in this patch
  might seem small, the Kconfig option is introduced to explicitly
  signal the intent to enable this new capability and to provide a clear
  compile-time switch for it. It also helps ensure that the necessary
  architecture-specific glue (like kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap) is
  properly defined.

* Per-instance opt-in (GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP): On a per-instance basis,
  this functionality is enabled by the guest_memfd flag
  GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP, which will be set in the KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD
  ioctl. This flag is crucial because when host userspace maps
  guest_memfd pages, KVM must *not* manage the these memory regions in
  the same way it does for traditional KVM memory slots. The presence of
  GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP on a guest_memfd instance allows mmap() and
  faulting of guest_memfd memory to host userspace. Additionally, it
  informs KVM to always consume guest faults to this memory from
  guest_memfd, regardless of whether it is a shared or a private fault.
  This opt-in mechanism ensures compatibility and prevents conflicts
  with existing KVM memory management. This is a per-guest_memfd flag
  rather than a per-memslot or per-VM capability because the ability to
  mmap directly applies to the specific guest_memfd object, regardless
  of how it might be used within various memory slots or VMs.

[1] https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/tree/feature/secret-hiding
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/cc1bb8e9bc3e1ab637700a4d3defeec95b55060a.camel@amazon.com
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/c1c9591d-218a-495c-957b-ba356c8f8e09@redhat.com/T/#u

Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
 include/linux/kvm_host.h | 13 +++++++
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h |  1 +
 virt/kvm/Kconfig         |  4 +++
 virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c   | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 91 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index 1ec71648824c..9ac21985f3b5 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -740,6 +740,19 @@ static inline bool kvm_arch_supports_gmem(struct kvm *kvm)
 }
 #endif
 
+/*
+ * Returns true if this VM supports mmap() in guest_memfd.
+ *
+ * Arch code must define kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap if support for guest_memfd
+ * is enabled.
+ */
+#if !defined(kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap)
+static inline bool kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+	return false;
+}
+#endif
+
 #ifndef kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem
 static inline bool kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem(struct kvm *kvm)
 {
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index 7a4c35ff03fe..3beafbf306af 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -1596,6 +1596,7 @@ struct kvm_memory_attributes {
 #define KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_PRIVATE           (1ULL << 3)
 
 #define KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD	_IOWR(KVMIO,  0xd4, struct kvm_create_guest_memfd)
+#define GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP	(1ULL << 0)
 
 struct kvm_create_guest_memfd {
 	__u64 size;
diff --git a/virt/kvm/Kconfig b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
index 559c93ad90be..fa4acbedb953 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/virt/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -128,3 +128,7 @@ config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE
 config HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_INVALIDATE
        bool
        depends on KVM_GMEM
+
+config KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP
+       select KVM_GMEM
+       bool
diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
index 6db515833f61..07a4b165471d 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
@@ -312,7 +312,77 @@ static pgoff_t kvm_gmem_get_index(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn)
 	return gfn - slot->base_gfn + slot->gmem.pgoff;
 }
 
+static bool kvm_gmem_supports_mmap(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	const u64 flags = (u64)inode->i_private;
+
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP))
+		return false;
+
+	return flags & GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP;
+}
+
+static vm_fault_t kvm_gmem_fault_user_mapping(struct vm_fault *vmf)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(vmf->vma->vm_file);
+	struct folio *folio;
+	vm_fault_t ret = VM_FAULT_LOCKED;
+
+	if (((loff_t)vmf->pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT) >= i_size_read(inode))
+		return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
+	folio = kvm_gmem_get_folio(inode, vmf->pgoff);
+	if (IS_ERR(folio)) {
+		int err = PTR_ERR(folio);
+
+		if (err == -EAGAIN)
+			return VM_FAULT_RETRY;
+
+		return vmf_error(err);
+	}
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(folio_test_large(folio))) {
+		ret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+		goto out_folio;
+	}
+
+	if (!folio_test_uptodate(folio)) {
+		clear_highpage(folio_page(folio, 0));
+		kvm_gmem_mark_prepared(folio);
+	}
+
+	vmf->page = folio_file_page(folio, vmf->pgoff);
+
+out_folio:
+	if (ret != VM_FAULT_LOCKED) {
+		folio_unlock(folio);
+		folio_put(folio);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct vm_operations_struct kvm_gmem_vm_ops = {
+	.fault = kvm_gmem_fault_user_mapping,
+};
+
+static int kvm_gmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+	if (!kvm_gmem_supports_mmap(file_inode(file)))
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE)) !=
+	    (VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE)) {
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	vma->vm_ops = &kvm_gmem_vm_ops;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static struct file_operations kvm_gmem_fops = {
+	.mmap		= kvm_gmem_mmap,
 	.open		= generic_file_open,
 	.release	= kvm_gmem_release,
 	.fallocate	= kvm_gmem_fallocate,
@@ -463,6 +533,9 @@ int kvm_gmem_create(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_create_guest_memfd *args)
 	u64 flags = args->flags;
 	u64 valid_flags = 0;
 
+	if (kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap(kvm))
+		valid_flags |= GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP;
+
 	if (flags & ~valid_flags)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-- 
2.50.0.727.gbf7dc18ff4-goog

Re: [PATCH v14 08/21] KVM: guest_memfd: Allow host to map guest_memfd pages

[Xiaoyao Li]

On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> Introduce the core infrastructure to enable host userspace to mmap()
> guest_memfd-backed memory. This is needed for several evolving KVM use
> cases:
> 
> * Non-CoCo VM backing: Allows VMMs like Firecracker to run guests
>    entirely backed by guest_memfd, even for non-CoCo VMs [1]. This
>    provides a unified memory management model and simplifies guest memory
>    handling.
> 
> * Direct map removal for enhanced security: This is an important step
>    for direct map removal of guest memory [2]. By allowing host userspace
>    to fault in guest_memfd pages directly, we can avoid maintaining host
>    kernel direct maps of guest memory. This provides additional hardening
>    against Spectre-like transient execution attacks by removing a
>    potential attack surface within the kernel.
> 
> * Future guest_memfd features: This also lays the groundwork for future
>    enhancements to guest_memfd, such as supporting huge pages and
>    enabling in-place sharing of guest memory with the host for CoCo
>    platforms that permit it [3].
> 
> Therefore, enable the basic mmap and fault handling logic within
> guest_memfd. However, this functionality is not yet exposed to userspace
> and remains inactive until two conditions are met in subsequent patches:
> 
> * Kconfig Gate (CONFIG_KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP): A new Kconfig option,
>    KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP, is introduced later in this series. 

Well, KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP is actually introduced by *this* patch, not 
other patches later.

> This
>    option gates the compilation and availability of this mmap
>    functionality at a system level. 

Well, at least from this patch, it doesn't gate the compilation.

> While the code changes in this patch
>    might seem small, the Kconfig option is introduced to explicitly
>    signal the intent to enable this new capability and to provide a clear
>    compile-time switch for it. It also helps ensure that the necessary
>    architecture-specific glue (like kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap) is
>    properly defined.
> 
> * Per-instance opt-in (GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP): On a per-instance basis,
>    this functionality is enabled by the guest_memfd flag
>    GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP, which will be set in the KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD
>    ioctl. This flag is crucial because when host userspace maps
>    guest_memfd pages, KVM must *not* manage the these memory regions in
>    the same way it does for traditional KVM memory slots. The presence of
>    GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP on a guest_memfd instance allows mmap() and
>    faulting of guest_memfd memory to host userspace. Additionally, it
>    informs KVM to always consume guest faults to this memory from
>    guest_memfd, regardless of whether it is a shared or a private fault.
>    This opt-in mechanism ensures compatibility and prevents conflicts
>    with existing KVM memory management. This is a per-guest_memfd flag
>    rather than a per-memslot or per-VM capability because the ability to
>    mmap directly applies to the specific guest_memfd object, regardless
>    of how it might be used within various memory slots or VMs.
> 
> [1] https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/tree/feature/secret-hiding
> [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/cc1bb8e9bc3e1ab637700a4d3defeec95b55060a.camel@amazon.com
> [3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/c1c9591d-218a-495c-957b-ba356c8f8e09@redhat.com/T/#u
> 
> Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
> Co-developed-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
> ---
>   include/linux/kvm_host.h | 13 +++++++
>   include/uapi/linux/kvm.h |  1 +
>   virt/kvm/Kconfig         |  4 +++
>   virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c   | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   4 files changed, 91 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> index 1ec71648824c..9ac21985f3b5 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> @@ -740,6 +740,19 @@ static inline bool kvm_arch_supports_gmem(struct kvm *kvm)
>   }
>   #endif
>   
> +/*
> + * Returns true if this VM supports mmap() in guest_memfd.
> + *
> + * Arch code must define kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap if support for guest_memfd
> + * is enabled.

It describes the similar requirement as kvm_arch_has_private_mem and 
kvm_arch_supports_gmem, but it doesn't have the check of

	&& !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_GMEM)

So it's straightforward for people to wonder why.

I would suggest just adding the check of !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_GMEM) 
like what for kvm_arch_has_private_mem and kvm_arch_supports_gmem. So it 
will get compilation error if any ARCH enables CONFIG_KVM_GMEM without 
defining kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap.


> + */
> +#if !defined(kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap)
> +static inline bool kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap(struct kvm *kvm)
> +{
> +	return false;
> +}
> +#endif
> +

Re: [PATCH v14 08/21] KVM: guest_memfd: Allow host to map guest_memfd pages

[Fuad Tabba]

Hi Xiaoyao,

On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 06:40, Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
>
> On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> > Introduce the core infrastructure to enable host userspace to mmap()
> > guest_memfd-backed memory. This is needed for several evolving KVM use
> > cases:
> >
> > * Non-CoCo VM backing: Allows VMMs like Firecracker to run guests
> >    entirely backed by guest_memfd, even for non-CoCo VMs [1]. This
> >    provides a unified memory management model and simplifies guest memory
> >    handling.
> >
> > * Direct map removal for enhanced security: This is an important step
> >    for direct map removal of guest memory [2]. By allowing host userspace
> >    to fault in guest_memfd pages directly, we can avoid maintaining host
> >    kernel direct maps of guest memory. This provides additional hardening
> >    against Spectre-like transient execution attacks by removing a
> >    potential attack surface within the kernel.
> >
> > * Future guest_memfd features: This also lays the groundwork for future
> >    enhancements to guest_memfd, such as supporting huge pages and
> >    enabling in-place sharing of guest memory with the host for CoCo
> >    platforms that permit it [3].
> >
> > Therefore, enable the basic mmap and fault handling logic within
> > guest_memfd. However, this functionality is not yet exposed to userspace
> > and remains inactive until two conditions are met in subsequent patches:
> >
> > * Kconfig Gate (CONFIG_KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP): A new Kconfig option,
> >    KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP, is introduced later in this series.
>
> Well, KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP is actually introduced by *this* patch, not
> other patches later.
>
> > This
> >    option gates the compilation and availability of this mmap
> >    functionality at a system level.
>
> Well, at least from this patch, it doesn't gate the compilation.

You're right. This commit changed a bit, and I should have updated the
commit message.

>
> > While the code changes in this patch
> >    might seem small, the Kconfig option is introduced to explicitly
> >    signal the intent to enable this new capability and to provide a clear
> >    compile-time switch for it. It also helps ensure that the necessary
> >    architecture-specific glue (like kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap) is
> >    properly defined.
> >
> > * Per-instance opt-in (GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP): On a per-instance basis,
> >    this functionality is enabled by the guest_memfd flag
> >    GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP, which will be set in the KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD
> >    ioctl. This flag is crucial because when host userspace maps
> >    guest_memfd pages, KVM must *not* manage the these memory regions in
> >    the same way it does for traditional KVM memory slots. The presence of
> >    GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP on a guest_memfd instance allows mmap() and
> >    faulting of guest_memfd memory to host userspace. Additionally, it
> >    informs KVM to always consume guest faults to this memory from
> >    guest_memfd, regardless of whether it is a shared or a private fault.
> >    This opt-in mechanism ensures compatibility and prevents conflicts
> >    with existing KVM memory management. This is a per-guest_memfd flag
> >    rather than a per-memslot or per-VM capability because the ability to
> >    mmap directly applies to the specific guest_memfd object, regardless
> >    of how it might be used within various memory slots or VMs.
> >
> > [1] https://github.com/firecracker-microvm/firecracker/tree/feature/secret-hiding
> > [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/cc1bb8e9bc3e1ab637700a4d3defeec95b55060a.camel@amazon.com
> > [3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/c1c9591d-218a-495c-957b-ba356c8f8e09@redhat.com/T/#u
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
> > Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
> > Co-developed-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
> > ---
> >   include/linux/kvm_host.h | 13 +++++++
> >   include/uapi/linux/kvm.h |  1 +
> >   virt/kvm/Kconfig         |  4 +++
> >   virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c   | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >   4 files changed, 91 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> > index 1ec71648824c..9ac21985f3b5 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> > @@ -740,6 +740,19 @@ static inline bool kvm_arch_supports_gmem(struct kvm *kvm)
> >   }
> >   #endif
> >
> > +/*
> > + * Returns true if this VM supports mmap() in guest_memfd.
> > + *
> > + * Arch code must define kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap if support for guest_memfd
> > + * is enabled.
>
> It describes the similar requirement as kvm_arch_has_private_mem and
> kvm_arch_supports_gmem, but it doesn't have the check of
>
>         && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_GMEM)
>
> So it's straightforward for people to wonder why.
>
> I would suggest just adding the check of !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_GMEM)
> like what for kvm_arch_has_private_mem and kvm_arch_supports_gmem. So it
> will get compilation error if any ARCH enables CONFIG_KVM_GMEM without
> defining kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap.

Thanks!
/fuad

>
> > + */
> > +#if !defined(kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap)
> > +static inline bool kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap(struct kvm *kvm)
> > +{
> > +     return false;
> > +}
> > +#endif
> > +

[PATCH v14 09/21] KVM: guest_memfd: Track guest_memfd mmap support in memslot

[Fuad Tabba]

Add a new internal flag, KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY, to the top half of
memslot->flags. This flag tracks when a guest_memfd-backed memory slot
supports host userspace mmap operations. It's strictly for KVM's
internal use.

This optimization avoids repeatedly checking the underlying guest_memfd
file for mmap support, which would otherwise require taking and
releasing a reference on the file for each check. By caching this
information directly in the memslot, we reduce overhead and simplify the
logic involved in handling guest_memfd-backed pages for host mappings.

Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
 include/linux/kvm_host.h | 11 ++++++++++-
 virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c   |  2 ++
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index 9ac21985f3b5..d2218ec57ceb 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -54,7 +54,8 @@
  * used in kvm, other bits are visible for userspace which are defined in
  * include/uapi/linux/kvm.h.
  */
-#define KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID	(1UL << 16)
+#define KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID			(1UL << 16)
+#define KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY			(1UL << 17)
 
 /*
  * Bit 63 of the memslot generation number is an "update in-progress flag",
@@ -2536,6 +2537,14 @@ static inline void kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 		vcpu->run->memory_fault.flags |= KVM_MEMORY_EXIT_FLAG_PRIVATE;
 }
 
+static inline bool kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
+{
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP))
+		return false;
+
+	return slot->flags & KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY;
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
 static inline unsigned long kvm_get_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
 {
diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
index 07a4b165471d..2b00f8796a15 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
@@ -592,6 +592,8 @@ int kvm_gmem_bind(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
 	 */
 	WRITE_ONCE(slot->gmem.file, file);
 	slot->gmem.pgoff = start;
+	if (kvm_gmem_supports_mmap(inode))
+		slot->flags |= KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY;
 
 	xa_store_range(&gmem->bindings, start, end - 1, slot, GFP_KERNEL);
 	filemap_invalidate_unlock(inode->i_mapping);
-- 
2.50.0.727.gbf7dc18ff4-goog

Re: [PATCH v14 09/21] KVM: guest_memfd: Track guest_memfd mmap support in memslot

[Xiaoyao Li]

On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> Add a new internal flag, KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY, to the top half of
> memslot->flags. This flag tracks when a guest_memfd-backed memory slot
> supports host userspace mmap operations. It's strictly for KVM's
> internal use.

I would expect some clarification of why naming it with 
KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY, not something like KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_MMAP_ENABLED

There was a patch to check the userspace_addr of the memslot refers to 
the same memory as guest memfd[1], but that patch was dropped. Without 
the background that when guest memfd is mmapable, userspace doesn't need 
to provide separate memory via userspace_addr, it's hard to understand 
and accept the name of GMEM_ONLY.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250513163438.3942405-9-tabba@google.com/

> This optimization avoids repeatedly checking the underlying guest_memfd
> file for mmap support, which would otherwise require taking and
> releasing a reference on the file for each check. By caching this
> information directly in the memslot, we reduce overhead and simplify the
> logic involved in handling guest_memfd-backed pages for host mappings.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
> Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
> ---
>   include/linux/kvm_host.h | 11 ++++++++++-
>   virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c   |  2 ++
>   2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> index 9ac21985f3b5..d2218ec57ceb 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> @@ -54,7 +54,8 @@
>    * used in kvm, other bits are visible for userspace which are defined in
>    * include/uapi/linux/kvm.h.
>    */
> -#define KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID	(1UL << 16)
> +#define KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID			(1UL << 16)
> +#define KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY			(1UL << 17)
>   
>   /*
>    * Bit 63 of the memslot generation number is an "update in-progress flag",
> @@ -2536,6 +2537,14 @@ static inline void kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>   		vcpu->run->memory_fault.flags |= KVM_MEMORY_EXIT_FLAG_PRIVATE;
>   }
>   
> +static inline bool kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
> +{
> +	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP))
> +		return false;
> +
> +	return slot->flags & KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY;
> +}
> +
>   #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
>   static inline unsigned long kvm_get_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
>   {
> diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> index 07a4b165471d..2b00f8796a15 100644
> --- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> +++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> @@ -592,6 +592,8 @@ int kvm_gmem_bind(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
>   	 */
>   	WRITE_ONCE(slot->gmem.file, file);
>   	slot->gmem.pgoff = start;
> +	if (kvm_gmem_supports_mmap(inode))
> +		slot->flags |= KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY;
>   
>   	xa_store_range(&gmem->bindings, start, end - 1, slot, GFP_KERNEL);
>   	filemap_invalidate_unlock(inode->i_mapping);

Re: [PATCH v14 09/21] KVM: guest_memfd: Track guest_memfd mmap support in memslot

[Fuad Tabba]

Hi Xiaoyao,

On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 07:11, Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
>
> On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> > Add a new internal flag, KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY, to the top half of
> > memslot->flags. This flag tracks when a guest_memfd-backed memory slot
> > supports host userspace mmap operations. It's strictly for KVM's
> > internal use.
>
> I would expect some clarification of why naming it with
> KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY, not something like KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_MMAP_ENABLED
>
> There was a patch to check the userspace_addr of the memslot refers to
> the same memory as guest memfd[1], but that patch was dropped. Without
> the background that when guest memfd is mmapable, userspace doesn't need
> to provide separate memory via userspace_addr, it's hard to understand
> and accept the name of GMEM_ONLY.

The commit message could have clarified this a bit more. Regarding the
rationale for the naming, there have been various threads and live
discussions in the biweekly guest_memfd meeting . Instead of rehashing
the discussion here, I can refer you to a couple [1, 2].

[1] https://docs.google.com/document/d/1M6766BzdY1Lhk7LiR5IqVR8B8mG3cr-cxTxOrAosPOk/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.a15es1buok51
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/aFwChljXL5QJYLM_@google.com/

Thanks,
/fuad

> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250513163438.3942405-9-tabba@google.com/
>
> > This optimization avoids repeatedly checking the underlying guest_memfd
> > file for mmap support, which would otherwise require taking and
> > releasing a reference on the file for each check. By caching this
> > information directly in the memslot, we reduce overhead and simplify the
> > logic involved in handling guest_memfd-backed pages for host mappings.
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
> > Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
> > Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
> > ---
> >   include/linux/kvm_host.h | 11 ++++++++++-
> >   virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c   |  2 ++
> >   2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> > index 9ac21985f3b5..d2218ec57ceb 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
> > @@ -54,7 +54,8 @@
> >    * used in kvm, other bits are visible for userspace which are defined in
> >    * include/uapi/linux/kvm.h.
> >    */
> > -#define KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID  (1UL << 16)
> > +#define KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID                  (1UL << 16)
> > +#define KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY                        (1UL << 17)
> >
> >   /*
> >    * Bit 63 of the memslot generation number is an "update in-progress flag",
> > @@ -2536,6 +2537,14 @@ static inline void kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> >               vcpu->run->memory_fault.flags |= KVM_MEMORY_EXIT_FLAG_PRIVATE;
> >   }
> >
> > +static inline bool kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
> > +{
> > +     if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP))
> > +             return false;
> > +
> > +     return slot->flags & KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY;
> > +}
> > +
> >   #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
> >   static inline unsigned long kvm_get_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
> >   {
> > diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> > index 07a4b165471d..2b00f8796a15 100644
> > --- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> > +++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
> > @@ -592,6 +592,8 @@ int kvm_gmem_bind(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
> >        */
> >       WRITE_ONCE(slot->gmem.file, file);
> >       slot->gmem.pgoff = start;
> > +     if (kvm_gmem_supports_mmap(inode))
> > +             slot->flags |= KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY;
> >
> >       xa_store_range(&gmem->bindings, start, end - 1, slot, GFP_KERNEL);
> >       filemap_invalidate_unlock(inode->i_mapping);
>

Re: [PATCH v14 09/21] KVM: guest_memfd: Track guest_memfd mmap support in memslot

[Xiaoyao Li]

On 7/16/2025 4:21 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> Hi Xiaoyao,
> 
> On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 07:11, Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
>>> Add a new internal flag, KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY, to the top half of
>>> memslot->flags. This flag tracks when a guest_memfd-backed memory slot
>>> supports host userspace mmap operations. It's strictly for KVM's
>>> internal use.
>>
>> I would expect some clarification of why naming it with
>> KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY, not something like KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_MMAP_ENABLED
>>
>> There was a patch to check the userspace_addr of the memslot refers to
>> the same memory as guest memfd[1], but that patch was dropped. Without
>> the background that when guest memfd is mmapable, userspace doesn't need
>> to provide separate memory via userspace_addr, it's hard to understand
>> and accept the name of GMEM_ONLY.
> 
> The commit message could have clarified this a bit more. Regarding the
> rationale for the naming, there have been various threads and live
> discussions in the biweekly guest_memfd meeting . Instead of rehashing
> the discussion here, I can refer you to a couple [1, 2].

I don't object the name. Just want the clarification in commit message 
and even better add comment in code. That will be truly helpful for 
future readers.

> [1] https://docs.google.com/document/d/1M6766BzdY1Lhk7LiR5IqVR8B8mG3cr-cxTxOrAosPOk/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.a15es1buok51
> [2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/aFwChljXL5QJYLM_@google.com/
> 
> Thanks,
> /fuad
> 
>> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250513163438.3942405-9-tabba@google.com/
>>
>>> This optimization avoids repeatedly checking the underlying guest_memfd
>>> file for mmap support, which would otherwise require taking and
>>> releasing a reference on the file for each check. By caching this
>>> information directly in the memslot, we reduce overhead and simplify the
>>> logic involved in handling guest_memfd-backed pages for host mappings.
>>>
>>> Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
>>> Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
>>> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
>>> Suggested-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
>>> ---
>>>    include/linux/kvm_host.h | 11 ++++++++++-
>>>    virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c   |  2 ++
>>>    2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
>>> index 9ac21985f3b5..d2218ec57ceb 100644
>>> --- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
>>> +++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
>>> @@ -54,7 +54,8 @@
>>>     * used in kvm, other bits are visible for userspace which are defined in
>>>     * include/uapi/linux/kvm.h.
>>>     */
>>> -#define KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID  (1UL << 16)
>>> +#define KVM_MEMSLOT_INVALID                  (1UL << 16)
>>> +#define KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY                        (1UL << 17)
>>>
>>>    /*
>>>     * Bit 63 of the memslot generation number is an "update in-progress flag",
>>> @@ -2536,6 +2537,14 @@ static inline void kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>>>                vcpu->run->memory_fault.flags |= KVM_MEMORY_EXIT_FLAG_PRIVATE;
>>>    }
>>>
>>> +static inline bool kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
>>> +{
>>> +     if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP))
>>> +             return false;
>>> +
>>> +     return slot->flags & KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>>    #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES
>>>    static inline unsigned long kvm_get_memory_attributes(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
>>>    {
>>> diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
>>> index 07a4b165471d..2b00f8796a15 100644
>>> --- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
>>> +++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
>>> @@ -592,6 +592,8 @@ int kvm_gmem_bind(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
>>>         */
>>>        WRITE_ONCE(slot->gmem.file, file);
>>>        slot->gmem.pgoff = start;
>>> +     if (kvm_gmem_supports_mmap(inode))
>>> +             slot->flags |= KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY;
>>>
>>>        xa_store_range(&gmem->bindings, start, end - 1, slot, GFP_KERNEL);
>>>        filemap_invalidate_unlock(inode->i_mapping);
>>

Re: [PATCH v14 09/21] KVM: guest_memfd: Track guest_memfd mmap support in memslot

[David Hildenbrand]

On 16.07.25 10:21, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> Hi Xiaoyao,
> 
> On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 07:11, Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
>>> Add a new internal flag, KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY, to the top half of
>>> memslot->flags. This flag tracks when a guest_memfd-backed memory slot
>>> supports host userspace mmap operations. It's strictly for KVM's
>>> internal use.
>>
>> I would expect some clarification of why naming it with
>> KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY, not something like KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_MMAP_ENABLED
>>
>> There was a patch to check the userspace_addr of the memslot refers to
>> the same memory as guest memfd[1], but that patch was dropped. Without
>> the background that when guest memfd is mmapable, userspace doesn't need
>> to provide separate memory via userspace_addr, it's hard to understand
>> and accept the name of GMEM_ONLY.
> 
> The commit message could have clarified this a bit more. Regarding the
> rationale for the naming, there have been various threads and live
> discussions in the biweekly guest_memfd meeting . Instead of rehashing
> the discussion here, I can refer you to a couple [1, 2].

Maybe clarify here:

"Add a new internal flag, KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY, to the top half of
memslot->flags. This flag tracks when a guest_memfd-backed memory slot
supports host userspace mmap operations, which implies that all memory, 
not just private memory for CoCo VMs, is consumed through guest_memfd: 
"gmem only"

And add a pointer to the list discussion.

-- 
Cheers,

David / dhildenb

Re: [PATCH v14 09/21] KVM: guest_memfd: Track guest_memfd mmap support in memslot

[Fuad Tabba]

On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 11:31, David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> On 16.07.25 10:21, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> > Hi Xiaoyao,
> >
> > On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 07:11, Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> On 7/15/2025 5:33 PM, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> >>> Add a new internal flag, KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY, to the top half of
> >>> memslot->flags. This flag tracks when a guest_memfd-backed memory slot
> >>> supports host userspace mmap operations. It's strictly for KVM's
> >>> internal use.
> >>
> >> I would expect some clarification of why naming it with
> >> KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY, not something like KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_MMAP_ENABLED
> >>
> >> There was a patch to check the userspace_addr of the memslot refers to
> >> the same memory as guest memfd[1], but that patch was dropped. Without
> >> the background that when guest memfd is mmapable, userspace doesn't need
> >> to provide separate memory via userspace_addr, it's hard to understand
> >> and accept the name of GMEM_ONLY.
> >
> > The commit message could have clarified this a bit more. Regarding the
> > rationale for the naming, there have been various threads and live
> > discussions in the biweekly guest_memfd meeting . Instead of rehashing
> > the discussion here, I can refer you to a couple [1, 2].
>
> Maybe clarify here:
>
> "Add a new internal flag, KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY, to the top half of
> memslot->flags. This flag tracks when a guest_memfd-backed memory slot
> supports host userspace mmap operations, which implies that all memory,
> not just private memory for CoCo VMs, is consumed through guest_memfd:
> "gmem only"
>
> And add a pointer to the list discussion.

Ack.

Thanks,
/fuad

> --
> Cheers,
>
> David / dhildenb
>

[PATCH v14 10/21] KVM: x86/mmu: Generalize private_max_mapping_level x86 op to max_mapping_level

[Fuad Tabba]

From: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>

Generalize the private_max_mapping_level x86 operation to
max_mapping_level.

The private_max_mapping_level operation allows platform-specific code to
limit mapping levels (e.g., forcing 4K pages for certain memory types).
While it was previously used exclusively for private memory, guest_memfd
can now back both private and non-private memory. Platforms may have
specific mapping level restrictions that apply to guest_memfd memory
regardless of its privacy attribute. Therefore, generalize this
operation.

Rename the operation: Removes the "private" prefix to reflect its
broader applicability to any guest_memfd-backed memory.

Pass kvm_page_fault information: The operation is updated to receive a
struct kvm_page_fault object instead of just the pfn. This provides
platform-specific implementations (e.g., for TDX or SEV) with additional
context about the fault, such as whether it is private or shared,
allowing them to apply different mapping level rules as needed.

Enforce "private-only" behavior (for now): Since the current consumers
of this hook (TDX and SEV) still primarily use it to enforce private
memory constraints, platform-specific implementations are made to return
0 for non-private pages. A return value of 0 signals to callers that
platform-specific input should be ignored for that particular fault,
indicating no specific platform-imposed mapping level limits for
non-private pages. This allows the core MMU to continue determining the
mapping level based on generic rules for such cases.

Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Sean Christoperson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h    |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c             | 11 ++++++-----
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c             |  8 ++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c             |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h             |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c            |  6 +++---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c             |  5 ++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h         |  2 +-
 9 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
index 8d50e3e0a19b..02301fbad449 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(vcpu_get_apicv_inhibit_reasons);
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(get_untagged_addr)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(alloc_apic_backing_page)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(gmem_prepare)
-KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(private_max_mapping_level)
+KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL_RET0(max_mapping_level)
 KVM_X86_OP_OPTIONAL(gmem_invalidate)
 
 #undef KVM_X86_OP
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 938b5be03d33..543d09fd4bca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1907,7 +1907,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
 	void *(*alloc_apic_backing_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 	int (*gmem_prepare)(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, int max_order);
 	void (*gmem_invalidate)(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end);
-	int (*private_max_mapping_level)(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn);
+	int (*max_mapping_level)(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault);
 };
 
 struct kvm_x86_nested_ops {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 213904daf1e5..bb925994cbc5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -4467,9 +4467,11 @@ static inline u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order)
 	return PG_LEVEL_4K;
 }
 
-static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
-					u8 max_level, int gmem_order)
+static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,
+					struct kvm_page_fault *fault,
+					int gmem_order)
 {
+	u8 max_level = fault->max_level;
 	u8 req_max_level;
 
 	if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K)
@@ -4479,7 +4481,7 @@ static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn,
 	if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K)
 		return PG_LEVEL_4K;
 
-	req_max_level = kvm_x86_call(private_max_mapping_level)(kvm, pfn);
+	req_max_level = kvm_x86_call(max_mapping_level)(kvm, fault);
 	if (req_max_level)
 		max_level = min(max_level, req_max_level);
 
@@ -4511,8 +4513,7 @@ static int kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_private(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	}
 
 	fault->map_writable = !(fault->slot->flags & KVM_MEM_READONLY);
-	fault->max_level = kvm_max_private_mapping_level(vcpu->kvm, fault->pfn,
-							 fault->max_level, max_order);
+	fault->max_level = kvm_max_private_mapping_level(vcpu->kvm, fault, max_order);
 
 	return RET_PF_CONTINUE;
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 687392c5bf5d..dd470e26f6a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <asm/msr.h>
 #include <asm/sev.h>
 
+#include "mmu/mmu_internal.h"
 #include "mmu.h"
 #include "x86.h"
 #include "svm.h"
@@ -4906,7 +4907,7 @@ void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end)
 	}
 }
 
-int sev_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn)
+int sev_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
 {
 	int level, rc;
 	bool assigned;
@@ -4914,7 +4915,10 @@ int sev_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn)
 	if (!sev_snp_guest(kvm))
 		return 0;
 
-	rc = snp_lookup_rmpentry(pfn, &assigned, &level);
+	if (!fault->is_private)
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = snp_lookup_rmpentry(fault->pfn, &assigned, &level);
 	if (rc || !assigned)
 		return PG_LEVEL_4K;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index d1c484eaa8ad..6ad047189210 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -5347,7 +5347,7 @@ static struct kvm_x86_ops svm_x86_ops __initdata = {
 
 	.gmem_prepare = sev_gmem_prepare,
 	.gmem_invalidate = sev_gmem_invalidate,
-	.private_max_mapping_level = sev_private_max_mapping_level,
+	.max_mapping_level = sev_max_mapping_level,
 };
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index e6f3c6a153a0..c2579f7df734 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ void sev_handle_rmp_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, u64 error_code);
 void sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 int sev_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, int max_order);
 void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end);
-int sev_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn);
+int sev_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault);
 struct vmcb_save_area *sev_decrypt_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void sev_free_decrypted_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa);
 #else
@@ -816,7 +816,7 @@ static inline int sev_gmem_prepare(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn, gfn_t gfn, in
 	return 0;
 }
 static inline void sev_gmem_invalidate(kvm_pfn_t start, kvm_pfn_t end) {}
-static inline int sev_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn)
+static inline int sev_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
index d1e02e567b57..8e53554932ba 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c
@@ -871,10 +871,10 @@ static int vt_vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp)
 	return tdx_vcpu_ioctl(vcpu, argp);
 }
 
-static int vt_gmem_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn)
+static int vt_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
 {
 	if (is_td(kvm))
-		return tdx_gmem_private_max_mapping_level(kvm, pfn);
+		return tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level(kvm, fault);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -1044,7 +1044,7 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops vt_x86_ops __initdata = {
 	.mem_enc_ioctl = vt_op_tdx_only(mem_enc_ioctl),
 	.vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl = vt_op_tdx_only(vcpu_mem_enc_ioctl),
 
-	.private_max_mapping_level = vt_op_tdx_only(gmem_private_max_mapping_level)
+	.max_mapping_level = vt_op_tdx_only(gmem_max_mapping_level)
 };
 
 struct kvm_x86_init_ops vt_init_ops __initdata = {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
index a3db6df245ee..7f652241491a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c
@@ -3322,8 +3322,11 @@ int tdx_vcpu_ioctl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void __user *argp)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-int tdx_gmem_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn)
+int tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
 {
+	if (!fault->is_private)
+		return 0;
+
 	return PG_LEVEL_4K;
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
index b4596f651232..ca7bc9e0fce5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ int tdx_sept_remove_private_spte(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn,
 void tdx_flush_tlb_current(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void tdx_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void tdx_load_mmu_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t root_hpa, int root_level);
-int tdx_gmem_private_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, kvm_pfn_t pfn);
+int tdx_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_page_fault *fault);
 #endif
 
 #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_X86_OPS_H */
-- 
2.50.0.727.gbf7dc18ff4-goog

[PATCH v14 11/21] KVM: x86/mmu: Allow NULL-able fault in kvm_max_private_mapping_level

[Fuad Tabba]

From: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>

Refactor kvm_max_private_mapping_level() to accept a NULL kvm_page_fault
pointer and rename it to kvm_gmem_max_mapping_level().

The max_mapping_level x86 operation (previously private_max_mapping_level)
is designed to potentially be called without an active page fault, for
instance, when kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() is determining the maximum
mapping level for a gfn proactively.

Allow NULL fault pointer: Modify kvm_max_private_mapping_level() to
safely handle a NULL fault argument. This aligns its interface with the
kvm_x86_ops.max_mapping_level operation it wraps, which can also be
called with NULL.

Rename function to kvm_gmem_max_mapping_level(): This reinforces that
the function's scope is for guest_memfd-backed memory, which can be
either private or non-private, removing any remaining "private"
connotation from its name.

Optimize max_level checks: Introduce a check in the caller to skip
querying for max_mapping_level if the current max_level is already
PG_LEVEL_4K, as no further reduction is possible.

Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Sean Christoperson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 16 +++++++---------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index bb925994cbc5..6bd28fda0fd3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -4467,17 +4467,13 @@ static inline u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order)
 	return PG_LEVEL_4K;
 }
 
-static u8 kvm_max_private_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,
-					struct kvm_page_fault *fault,
-					int gmem_order)
+static u8 kvm_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, int order,
+				     struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
 {
-	u8 max_level = fault->max_level;
 	u8 req_max_level;
+	u8 max_level;
 
-	if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K)
-		return PG_LEVEL_4K;
-
-	max_level = min(kvm_max_level_for_order(gmem_order), max_level);
+	max_level = kvm_max_level_for_order(order);
 	if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K)
 		return PG_LEVEL_4K;
 
@@ -4513,7 +4509,9 @@ static int kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_private(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	}
 
 	fault->map_writable = !(fault->slot->flags & KVM_MEM_READONLY);
-	fault->max_level = kvm_max_private_mapping_level(vcpu->kvm, fault, max_order);
+	if (fault->max_level >= PG_LEVEL_4K)
+		fault->max_level = kvm_gmem_max_mapping_level(vcpu->kvm,
+							      max_order, fault);
 
 	return RET_PF_CONTINUE;
 }
-- 
2.50.0.727.gbf7dc18ff4-goog

[PATCH v14 12/21] KVM: x86/mmu: Consult guest_memfd when computing max_mapping_level

[Fuad Tabba]

From: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>

Modify kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() to consult guest_memfd for memory
regions backed by it when computing the maximum mapping level,
especially during huge page recovery.

Previously, kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() was designed primarily for
host-backed memory and private pages. With guest_memfd now supporting
non-private memory, it's necessary to factor in guest_memfd's influence
on mapping levels for such memory.

Since guest_memfd can now be used for non-private memory, make
kvm_max_max_mapping_level, when recovering huge pages, take input from
guest_memfd.

Input is taken from guest_memfd as long as a fault to that slot and gfn
would have been served from guest_memfd. For now, take a shortcut if the
slot and gfn points to memory that is private, since recovering huge
pages aren't supported for private memory yet.

Since guest_memfd memory can also be faulted into host page tables,
__kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() still applies since consulting lpage_info
and host page tables are required.

Move functions kvm_max_level_for_order() and
kvm_gmem_max_mapping_level() so kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() can use
those functions.

Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c   | 90 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 include/linux/kvm_host.h |  7 ++++
 virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c   | 17 ++++++++
 3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 6bd28fda0fd3..94be15cde6da 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -3282,13 +3282,67 @@ static int __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,
 	return min(host_level, max_level);
 }
 
+static u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order)
+{
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL > PG_LEVEL_1G);
+
+	KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(order != KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_1G) &&
+			order != KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_2M) &&
+			order != KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_4K));
+
+	if (order >= KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_1G))
+		return PG_LEVEL_1G;
+
+	if (order >= KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_2M))
+		return PG_LEVEL_2M;
+
+	return PG_LEVEL_4K;
+}
+
+static u8 kvm_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, int order,
+				     struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+{
+	u8 req_max_level;
+	u8 max_level;
+
+	max_level = kvm_max_level_for_order(order);
+	if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K)
+		return PG_LEVEL_4K;
+
+	req_max_level = kvm_x86_call(max_mapping_level)(kvm, fault);
+	if (req_max_level)
+		max_level = min(max_level, req_max_level);
+
+	return max_level;
+}
+
 int kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm,
 			      const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn)
 {
 	bool is_private = kvm_slot_has_gmem(slot) &&
 			  kvm_mem_is_private(kvm, gfn);
+	int max_level = PG_LEVEL_NUM;
+
+	/*
+	 * For now, kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() is only called from
+	 * kvm_mmu_recover_huge_pages(), and that's not yet supported for
+	 * private memory, hence we can take a shortcut and return early.
+	 */
+	if (is_private)
+		return PG_LEVEL_4K;
 
-	return __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(kvm, slot, gfn, PG_LEVEL_NUM, is_private);
+	/*
+	 * For non-private pages that would have been faulted from guest_memfd,
+	 * let guest_memfd influence max_mapping_level.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only(slot)) {
+		int order = kvm_gmem_mapping_order(slot, gfn);
+
+		max_level = min(max_level,
+				kvm_gmem_max_mapping_level(kvm, order, NULL));
+	}
+
+	return __kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level(kvm, slot, gfn, max_level, is_private);
 }
 
 void kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
@@ -4450,40 +4504,6 @@ void kvm_arch_async_page_ready(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_async_pf *work)
 		vcpu->stat.pf_fixed++;
 }
 
-static inline u8 kvm_max_level_for_order(int order)
-{
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(KVM_MAX_HUGEPAGE_LEVEL > PG_LEVEL_1G);
-
-	KVM_MMU_WARN_ON(order != KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_1G) &&
-			order != KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_2M) &&
-			order != KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_4K));
-
-	if (order >= KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_1G))
-		return PG_LEVEL_1G;
-
-	if (order >= KVM_HPAGE_GFN_SHIFT(PG_LEVEL_2M))
-		return PG_LEVEL_2M;
-
-	return PG_LEVEL_4K;
-}
-
-static u8 kvm_gmem_max_mapping_level(struct kvm *kvm, int order,
-				     struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
-{
-	u8 req_max_level;
-	u8 max_level;
-
-	max_level = kvm_max_level_for_order(order);
-	if (max_level == PG_LEVEL_4K)
-		return PG_LEVEL_4K;
-
-	req_max_level = kvm_x86_call(max_mapping_level)(kvm, fault);
-	if (req_max_level)
-		max_level = min(max_level, req_max_level);
-
-	return max_level;
-}
-
 static void kvm_mmu_finish_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				      struct kvm_page_fault *fault, int r)
 {
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index d2218ec57ceb..662271314778 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -2574,6 +2574,7 @@ static inline bool kvm_mem_is_private(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
 int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
 		     gfn_t gfn, kvm_pfn_t *pfn, struct page **page,
 		     int *max_order);
+int kvm_gmem_mapping_order(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn);
 #else
 static inline int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm,
 				   struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn,
@@ -2583,6 +2584,12 @@ static inline int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm,
 	KVM_BUG_ON(1, kvm);
 	return -EIO;
 }
+static inline int kvm_gmem_mapping_order(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
+					 gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	WARN_ONCE(1, "Unexpected call since gmem is disabled.");
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_GMEM */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_ARCH_GMEM_PREPARE
diff --git a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
index 2b00f8796a15..d01bd7a2c2bd 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c
@@ -713,6 +713,23 @@ int kvm_gmem_get_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gmem_get_pfn);
 
+/**
+ * kvm_gmem_mapping_order() - Get the mapping order for this @gfn in @slot.
+ *
+ * @slot: the memslot that gfn belongs to.
+ * @gfn: the gfn to look up mapping order for.
+ *
+ * This is equal to max_order that would be returned if kvm_gmem_get_pfn() were
+ * called now.
+ *
+ * Return: the mapping order for this @gfn in @slot.
+ */
+int kvm_gmem_mapping_order(const struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_gmem_mapping_order);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE
 long kvm_gmem_populate(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t start_gfn, void __user *src, long npages,
 		       kvm_gmem_populate_cb post_populate, void *opaque)
-- 
2.50.0.727.gbf7dc18ff4-goog

[PATCH v14 13/21] KVM: x86/mmu: Handle guest page faults for guest_memfd with shared memory

[Fuad Tabba]

From: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>

Update the KVM MMU fault handler to service guest page faults
for memory slots backed by guest_memfd with mmap support. For such
slots, the MMU must always fault in pages directly from guest_memfd,
bypassing the host's userspace_addr.

This ensures that guest_memfd-backed memory is always handled through
the guest_memfd specific faulting path, regardless of whether it's for
private or non-private (shared) use cases.

Additionally, rename kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_private() to
kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_gmem(), as this function is now used to fault in
pages from guest_memfd for both private and non-private memory,
accommodating the new use cases.

Co-developed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 94be15cde6da..ad5f337b496c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -4511,8 +4511,8 @@ static void kvm_mmu_finish_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				 r == RET_PF_RETRY, fault->map_writable);
 }
 
-static int kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_private(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
-				       struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+static int kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_gmem(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+				    struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
 {
 	int max_order, r;
 
@@ -4536,13 +4536,18 @@ static int kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_private(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	return RET_PF_CONTINUE;
 }
 
+static bool fault_from_gmem(struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
+{
+	return fault->is_private || kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only(fault->slot);
+}
+
 static int __kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				 struct kvm_page_fault *fault)
 {
 	unsigned int foll = fault->write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0;
 
-	if (fault->is_private)
-		return kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_private(vcpu, fault);
+	if (fault_from_gmem(fault))
+		return kvm_mmu_faultin_pfn_gmem(vcpu, fault);
 
 	foll |= FOLL_NOWAIT;
 	fault->pfn = __kvm_faultin_pfn(fault->slot, fault->gfn, foll,
-- 
2.50.0.727.gbf7dc18ff4-goog

[PATCH v14 14/21] KVM: x86: Enable guest_memfd mmap for default VM type

[Fuad Tabba]

Enable host userspace mmap support for guest_memfd-backed memory when
running KVM with the KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM type:

* Define kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap() for KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM: Introduce
  the architecture-specific kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap() macro,
  specifically enabling mmap support for KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM instances.
  This macro, gated by CONFIG_KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP, ensures that only
  the default VM type can leverage guest_memfd mmap functionality on
  x86. This explicit enablement prevents CoCo VMs, which use guest_memfd
  primarily for private memory and rely on hardware-enforced privacy,
  from accidentally exposing guest memory via host userspace mappings.

* Select CONFIG_KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP in KVM_X86: Enable the
  CONFIG_KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP Kconfig option when KVM_X86 is selected.
  This ensures that the necessary code for guest_memfd mmap support
  (introduced earlier) is compiled into the kernel for x86. This Kconfig
  option acts as a system-wide gate for the guest_memfd mmap capability.
  It implicitly enables CONFIG_KVM_GMEM, making guest_memfd available,
  and then layers the mmap capability on top specifically for the
  default VM.

These changes make guest_memfd a more versatile memory backing for
standard KVM guests, allowing VMMs to use a unified guest_memfd model
for both private (CoCo) and non-private (default) VMs. This is a
prerequisite for use cases such as running Firecracker guests entirely
backed by guest_memfd and implementing direct map removal for non-CoCo
VMs.

Co-developed-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 9 +++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig            | 1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              | 3 ++-
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 543d09fd4bca..e1426adfa93e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -2279,9 +2279,18 @@ void kvm_configure_mmu(bool enable_tdp, int tdp_forced_root_level,
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GMEM
 #define kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm) ((kvm)->arch.has_private_mem)
 #define kvm_arch_supports_gmem(kvm)  ((kvm)->arch.supports_gmem)
+
+/*
+ * CoCo VMs with hardware support that use guest_memfd only for backing private
+ * memory, e.g., TDX, cannot use guest_memfd with userspace mapping enabled.
+ */
+#define kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap(kvm)		\
+	(IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP) &&	\
+	 (kvm)->arch.vm_type == KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM)
 #else
 #define kvm_arch_has_private_mem(kvm) false
 #define kvm_arch_supports_gmem(kvm) false
+#define kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap(kvm) false
 #endif
 
 #define kvm_arch_has_readonly_mem(kvm) (!(kvm)->arch.has_protected_state)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
index df1fdbb4024b..1ba959b9eadc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ config KVM_X86
 	select KVM_GENERIC_HARDWARE_ENABLING
 	select KVM_GENERIC_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY
 	select KVM_GENERIC_GMEM_POPULATE if KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM
+	select KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP if X86_64
 	select KVM_WERROR if WERROR
 
 config KVM
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index adbdc2cc97d4..ca99187a566e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -12781,7 +12781,8 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type)
 
 	kvm->arch.vm_type = type;
 	kvm->arch.has_private_mem = (type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM);
-	kvm->arch.supports_gmem = (type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM);
+	kvm->arch.supports_gmem =
+		type == KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM || type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM;
 	/* Decided by the vendor code for other VM types.  */
 	kvm->arch.pre_fault_allowed =
 		type == KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM || type == KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM;
-- 
2.50.0.727.gbf7dc18ff4-goog

Re: [PATCH v14 14/21] KVM: x86: Enable guest_memfd mmap for default VM type

[David Hildenbrand]

On 15.07.25 11:33, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> Enable host userspace mmap support for guest_memfd-backed memory when
> running KVM with the KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM type:
> 
> * Define kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap() for KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM: Introduce
>    the architecture-specific kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap() macro,
>    specifically enabling mmap support for KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM instances.
>    This macro, gated by CONFIG_KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP, ensures that only
>    the default VM type can leverage guest_memfd mmap functionality on
>    x86. This explicit enablement prevents CoCo VMs, which use guest_memfd
>    primarily for private memory and rely on hardware-enforced privacy,
>    from accidentally exposing guest memory via host userspace mappings.
> 
> * Select CONFIG_KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP in KVM_X86: Enable the
>    CONFIG_KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP Kconfig option when KVM_X86 is selected.
>    This ensures that the necessary code for guest_memfd mmap support
>    (introduced earlier) is compiled into the kernel for x86. This Kconfig
>    option acts as a system-wide gate for the guest_memfd mmap capability.
>    It implicitly enables CONFIG_KVM_GMEM, making guest_memfd available,
>    and then layers the mmap capability on top specifically for the
>    default VM.
> 
> These changes make guest_memfd a more versatile memory backing for
> standard KVM guests, allowing VMMs to use a unified guest_memfd model
> for both private (CoCo) and non-private (default) VMs. This is a
> prerequisite for use cases such as running Firecracker guests entirely
> backed by guest_memfd and implementing direct map removal for non-CoCo
> VMs.
> 
> Co-developed-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
> ---

Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>

-- 
Cheers,

David / dhildenb

[PATCH v14 15/21] KVM: arm64: Refactor user_mem_abort()

[Fuad Tabba]

Refactor user_mem_abort() to improve code clarity and simplify
assumptions within the function.

Key changes include:

* Immediately set force_pte to true at the beginning of the function if
  logging_active is true. This simplifies the flow and makes the
  condition for forcing a PTE more explicit.

* Remove the misleading comment stating that logging_active is
  guaranteed to never be true for VM_PFNMAP memslots, as this assertion
  is not entirely correct.

* Extract reusable code blocks into new helper functions:
  * prepare_mmu_memcache(): Encapsulates the logic for preparing and
    topping up the MMU page cache.
  * adjust_nested_fault_perms(): Isolates the adjustments to shadow S2
    permissions and the encoding of nested translation levels.

* Update min(a, (long)b) to min_t(long, a, b) for better type safety and
  consistency.

* Perform other minor tidying up of the code.

These changes primarily aim to simplify user_mem_abort() and make its
logic easier to understand and maintain, setting the stage for future
modifications.

Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
index 2942ec92c5a4..b3eacb400fab 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -1470,13 +1470,56 @@ static bool kvm_vma_mte_allowed(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 	return vma->vm_flags & VM_MTE_ALLOWED;
 }
 
+static int prepare_mmu_memcache(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool topup_memcache,
+				void **memcache)
+{
+	int min_pages;
+
+	if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled())
+		*memcache = &vcpu->arch.mmu_page_cache;
+	else
+		*memcache = &vcpu->arch.pkvm_memcache;
+
+	if (!topup_memcache)
+		return 0;
+
+	min_pages = kvm_mmu_cache_min_pages(vcpu->arch.hw_mmu);
+
+	if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled())
+		return kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(*memcache, min_pages);
+
+	return topup_hyp_memcache(*memcache, min_pages);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Potentially reduce shadow S2 permissions to match the guest's own S2. For
+ * exec faults, we'd only reach this point if the guest actually allowed it (see
+ * kvm_s2_handle_perm_fault).
+ *
+ * Also encode the level of the original translation in the SW bits of the leaf
+ * entry as a proxy for the span of that translation. This will be retrieved on
+ * TLB invalidation from the guest and used to limit the invalidation scope if a
+ * TTL hint or a range isn't provided.
+ */
+static void adjust_nested_fault_perms(struct kvm_s2_trans *nested,
+				      enum kvm_pgtable_prot *prot,
+				      bool *writable)
+{
+	*writable &= kvm_s2_trans_writable(nested);
+	if (!kvm_s2_trans_readable(nested))
+		*prot &= ~KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R;
+
+	*prot |= kvm_encode_nested_level(nested);
+}
+
 static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
 			  struct kvm_s2_trans *nested,
 			  struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot, unsigned long hva,
 			  bool fault_is_perm)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
-	bool write_fault, writable, force_pte = false;
+	bool topup_memcache;
+	bool write_fault, writable;
 	bool exec_fault, mte_allowed;
 	bool device = false, vfio_allow_any_uc = false;
 	unsigned long mmu_seq;
@@ -1488,6 +1531,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
 	gfn_t gfn;
 	kvm_pfn_t pfn;
 	bool logging_active = memslot_is_logging(memslot);
+	bool force_pte = logging_active;
 	long vma_pagesize, fault_granule;
 	enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot = KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R;
 	struct kvm_pgtable *pgt;
@@ -1498,17 +1542,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
 		fault_granule = kvm_vcpu_trap_get_perm_fault_granule(vcpu);
 	write_fault = kvm_is_write_fault(vcpu);
 	exec_fault = kvm_vcpu_trap_is_exec_fault(vcpu);
-	VM_BUG_ON(write_fault && exec_fault);
-
-	if (fault_is_perm && !write_fault && !exec_fault) {
-		kvm_err("Unexpected L2 read permission error\n");
-		return -EFAULT;
-	}
-
-	if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled())
-		memcache = &vcpu->arch.mmu_page_cache;
-	else
-		memcache = &vcpu->arch.pkvm_memcache;
+	VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(write_fault && exec_fault);
 
 	/*
 	 * Permission faults just need to update the existing leaf entry,
@@ -1516,17 +1550,10 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
 	 * only exception to this is when dirty logging is enabled at runtime
 	 * and a write fault needs to collapse a block entry into a table.
 	 */
-	if (!fault_is_perm || (logging_active && write_fault)) {
-		int min_pages = kvm_mmu_cache_min_pages(vcpu->arch.hw_mmu);
-
-		if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled())
-			ret = kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(memcache, min_pages);
-		else
-			ret = topup_hyp_memcache(memcache, min_pages);
-
-		if (ret)
-			return ret;
-	}
+	topup_memcache = !fault_is_perm || (logging_active && write_fault);
+	ret = prepare_mmu_memcache(vcpu, topup_memcache, &memcache);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	/*
 	 * Let's check if we will get back a huge page backed by hugetlbfs, or
@@ -1540,16 +1567,10 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
 		return -EFAULT;
 	}
 
-	/*
-	 * logging_active is guaranteed to never be true for VM_PFNMAP
-	 * memslots.
-	 */
-	if (logging_active) {
-		force_pte = true;
+	if (force_pte)
 		vma_shift = PAGE_SHIFT;
-	} else {
+	else
 		vma_shift = get_vma_page_shift(vma, hva);
-	}
 
 	switch (vma_shift) {
 #ifndef __PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED
@@ -1601,7 +1622,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
 			max_map_size = PAGE_SIZE;
 
 		force_pte = (max_map_size == PAGE_SIZE);
-		vma_pagesize = min(vma_pagesize, (long)max_map_size);
+		vma_pagesize = min_t(long, vma_pagesize, max_map_size);
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -1630,7 +1651,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
 	 * Rely on mmap_read_unlock() for an implicit smp_rmb(), which pairs
 	 * with the smp_wmb() in kvm_mmu_invalidate_end().
 	 */
-	mmu_seq = vcpu->kvm->mmu_invalidate_seq;
+	mmu_seq = kvm->mmu_invalidate_seq;
 	mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
 
 	pfn = __kvm_faultin_pfn(memslot, gfn, write_fault ? FOLL_WRITE : 0,
@@ -1665,24 +1686,8 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
 	if (exec_fault && device)
 		return -ENOEXEC;
 
-	/*
-	 * Potentially reduce shadow S2 permissions to match the guest's own
-	 * S2. For exec faults, we'd only reach this point if the guest
-	 * actually allowed it (see kvm_s2_handle_perm_fault).
-	 *
-	 * Also encode the level of the original translation in the SW bits
-	 * of the leaf entry as a proxy for the span of that translation.
-	 * This will be retrieved on TLB invalidation from the guest and
-	 * used to limit the invalidation scope if a TTL hint or a range
-	 * isn't provided.
-	 */
-	if (nested) {
-		writable &= kvm_s2_trans_writable(nested);
-		if (!kvm_s2_trans_readable(nested))
-			prot &= ~KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R;
-
-		prot |= kvm_encode_nested_level(nested);
-	}
+	if (nested)
+		adjust_nested_fault_perms(nested, &prot, &writable);
 
 	kvm_fault_lock(kvm);
 	pgt = vcpu->arch.hw_mmu->pgt;
@@ -1953,6 +1958,9 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
+	VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_vcpu_trap_is_permission_fault(vcpu) &&
+			!write_fault && !kvm_vcpu_trap_is_exec_fault(vcpu));
+
 	ret = user_mem_abort(vcpu, fault_ipa, nested, memslot, hva,
 			     esr_fsc_is_permission_fault(esr));
 	if (ret == 0)
-- 
2.50.0.727.gbf7dc18ff4-goog

Re: [PATCH v14 15/21] KVM: arm64: Refactor user_mem_abort()

[David Hildenbrand]

On 15.07.25 11:33, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> Refactor user_mem_abort() to improve code clarity and simplify
> assumptions within the function.
> 
> Key changes include:
> 
> * Immediately set force_pte to true at the beginning of the function if
>    logging_active is true. This simplifies the flow and makes the
>    condition for forcing a PTE more explicit.
> 
> * Remove the misleading comment stating that logging_active is
>    guaranteed to never be true for VM_PFNMAP memslots, as this assertion
>    is not entirely correct.
> 
> * Extract reusable code blocks into new helper functions:
>    * prepare_mmu_memcache(): Encapsulates the logic for preparing and
>      topping up the MMU page cache.
>    * adjust_nested_fault_perms(): Isolates the adjustments to shadow S2
>      permissions and the encoding of nested translation levels.
> 
> * Update min(a, (long)b) to min_t(long, a, b) for better type safety and
>    consistency.
> 
> * Perform other minor tidying up of the code.
> 
> These changes primarily aim to simplify user_mem_abort() and make its
> logic easier to understand and maintain, setting the stage for future
> modifications.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
> Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
> ---
>   arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
>   1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
> index 2942ec92c5a4..b3eacb400fab 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
> @@ -1470,13 +1470,56 @@ static bool kvm_vma_mte_allowed(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
>   	return vma->vm_flags & VM_MTE_ALLOWED;
>   }
>   
> +static int prepare_mmu_memcache(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool topup_memcache,
> +				void **memcache)
> +{
> +	int min_pages;
> +
> +	if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled())
> +		*memcache = &vcpu->arch.mmu_page_cache;
> +	else
> +		*memcache = &vcpu->arch.pkvm_memcache;
> +
> +	if (!topup_memcache)
> +		return 0;
> +
> +	min_pages = kvm_mmu_cache_min_pages(vcpu->arch.hw_mmu);
> +
> +	if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled())
> +		return kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(*memcache, min_pages);
> +
> +	return topup_hyp_memcache(*memcache, min_pages);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Potentially reduce shadow S2 permissions to match the guest's own S2. For
> + * exec faults, we'd only reach this point if the guest actually allowed it (see
> + * kvm_s2_handle_perm_fault).
> + *
> + * Also encode the level of the original translation in the SW bits of the leaf
> + * entry as a proxy for the span of that translation. This will be retrieved on
> + * TLB invalidation from the guest and used to limit the invalidation scope if a
> + * TTL hint or a range isn't provided.
> + */
> +static void adjust_nested_fault_perms(struct kvm_s2_trans *nested,
> +				      enum kvm_pgtable_prot *prot,
> +				      bool *writable)
> +{
> +	*writable &= kvm_s2_trans_writable(nested);
> +	if (!kvm_s2_trans_readable(nested))
> +		*prot &= ~KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R;
> +
> +	*prot |= kvm_encode_nested_level(nested);
> +}
> +
>   static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
>   			  struct kvm_s2_trans *nested,
>   			  struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot, unsigned long hva,
>   			  bool fault_is_perm)
>   {
>   	int ret = 0;
> -	bool write_fault, writable, force_pte = false;
> +	bool topup_memcache;
> +	bool write_fault, writable;
>   	bool exec_fault, mte_allowed;
>   	bool device = false, vfio_allow_any_uc = false;
>   	unsigned long mmu_seq;
> @@ -1488,6 +1531,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
>   	gfn_t gfn;
>   	kvm_pfn_t pfn;
>   	bool logging_active = memslot_is_logging(memslot);
> +	bool force_pte = logging_active;
>   	long vma_pagesize, fault_granule;
>   	enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot = KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R;
>   	struct kvm_pgtable *pgt;
> @@ -1498,17 +1542,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
>   		fault_granule = kvm_vcpu_trap_get_perm_fault_granule(vcpu);
>   	write_fault = kvm_is_write_fault(vcpu);
>   	exec_fault = kvm_vcpu_trap_is_exec_fault(vcpu);
> -	VM_BUG_ON(write_fault && exec_fault);
> -
> -	if (fault_is_perm && !write_fault && !exec_fault) {
> -		kvm_err("Unexpected L2 read permission error\n");
> -		return -EFAULT;
> -	}
> -
> -	if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled())
> -		memcache = &vcpu->arch.mmu_page_cache;
> -	else
> -		memcache = &vcpu->arch.pkvm_memcache;
> +	VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(write_fault && exec_fault);
>   
>   	/*
>   	 * Permission faults just need to update the existing leaf entry,
> @@ -1516,17 +1550,10 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
>   	 * only exception to this is when dirty logging is enabled at runtime
>   	 * and a write fault needs to collapse a block entry into a table.
>   	 */
> -	if (!fault_is_perm || (logging_active && write_fault)) {
> -		int min_pages = kvm_mmu_cache_min_pages(vcpu->arch.hw_mmu);
> -
> -		if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled())
> -			ret = kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(memcache, min_pages);
> -		else
> -			ret = topup_hyp_memcache(memcache, min_pages);
> -
> -		if (ret)
> -			return ret;
> -	}
> +	topup_memcache = !fault_is_perm || (logging_active && write_fault);
> +	ret = prepare_mmu_memcache(vcpu, topup_memcache, &memcache);
> +	if (ret)
> +		return ret;
>   
>   	/*
>   	 * Let's check if we will get back a huge page backed by hugetlbfs, or
> @@ -1540,16 +1567,10 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
>   		return -EFAULT;
>   	}
>   
> -	/*
> -	 * logging_active is guaranteed to never be true for VM_PFNMAP
> -	 * memslots.
> -	 */
> -	if (logging_active) {
> -		force_pte = true;
> +	if (force_pte)
>   		vma_shift = PAGE_SHIFT;
> -	} else {
> +	else
>   		vma_shift = get_vma_page_shift(vma, hva);
> -	}
>   
>   	switch (vma_shift) {
>   #ifndef __PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED
> @@ -1601,7 +1622,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
>   			max_map_size = PAGE_SIZE;
>   
>   		force_pte = (max_map_size == PAGE_SIZE);
> -		vma_pagesize = min(vma_pagesize, (long)max_map_size);
> +		vma_pagesize = min_t(long, vma_pagesize, max_map_size);
>   	}
>   
>   	/*
> @@ -1630,7 +1651,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
>   	 * Rely on mmap_read_unlock() for an implicit smp_rmb(), which pairs
>   	 * with the smp_wmb() in kvm_mmu_invalidate_end().
>   	 */
> -	mmu_seq = vcpu->kvm->mmu_invalidate_seq;
> +	mmu_seq = kvm->mmu_invalidate_seq;
>   	mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
>   
>   	pfn = __kvm_faultin_pfn(memslot, gfn, write_fault ? FOLL_WRITE : 0,
> @@ -1665,24 +1686,8 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
>   	if (exec_fault && device)
>   		return -ENOEXEC;
>   
> -	/*
> -	 * Potentially reduce shadow S2 permissions to match the guest's own
> -	 * S2. For exec faults, we'd only reach this point if the guest
> -	 * actually allowed it (see kvm_s2_handle_perm_fault).
> -	 *
> -	 * Also encode the level of the original translation in the SW bits
> -	 * of the leaf entry as a proxy for the span of that translation.
> -	 * This will be retrieved on TLB invalidation from the guest and
> -	 * used to limit the invalidation scope if a TTL hint or a range
> -	 * isn't provided.
> -	 */
> -	if (nested) {
> -		writable &= kvm_s2_trans_writable(nested);
> -		if (!kvm_s2_trans_readable(nested))
> -			prot &= ~KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R;
> -
> -		prot |= kvm_encode_nested_level(nested);
> -	}
> +	if (nested)
> +		adjust_nested_fault_perms(nested, &prot, &writable);
>   
>   	kvm_fault_lock(kvm);
>   	pgt = vcpu->arch.hw_mmu->pgt;
> @@ -1953,6 +1958,9 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   		goto out_unlock;
>   	}
>   
> +	VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_vcpu_trap_is_permission_fault(vcpu) &&
> +			!write_fault && !kvm_vcpu_trap_is_exec_fault(vcpu));
> +
>   	ret = user_mem_abort(vcpu, fault_ipa, nested, memslot, hva,
>   			     esr_fsc_is_permission_fault(esr));
>   	if (ret == 0)


A note that on the KVM arm next tree

https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm.git/log/?h=next

there are some user_mem_abort() changes. IIUC, only smaller conflicts.

-- 
Cheers,

David / dhildenb

Re: [PATCH v14 15/21] KVM: arm64: Refactor user_mem_abort()

[Fuad Tabba]

On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 11:36, David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> On 15.07.25 11:33, Fuad Tabba wrote:
> > Refactor user_mem_abort() to improve code clarity and simplify
> > assumptions within the function.
> >
> > Key changes include:
> >
> > * Immediately set force_pte to true at the beginning of the function if
> >    logging_active is true. This simplifies the flow and makes the
> >    condition for forcing a PTE more explicit.
> >
> > * Remove the misleading comment stating that logging_active is
> >    guaranteed to never be true for VM_PFNMAP memslots, as this assertion
> >    is not entirely correct.
> >
> > * Extract reusable code blocks into new helper functions:
> >    * prepare_mmu_memcache(): Encapsulates the logic for preparing and
> >      topping up the MMU page cache.
> >    * adjust_nested_fault_perms(): Isolates the adjustments to shadow S2
> >      permissions and the encoding of nested translation levels.
> >
> > * Update min(a, (long)b) to min_t(long, a, b) for better type safety and
> >    consistency.
> >
> > * Perform other minor tidying up of the code.
> >
> > These changes primarily aim to simplify user_mem_abort() and make its
> > logic easier to understand and maintain, setting the stage for future
> > modifications.
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
> > Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
> > ---
> >   arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
> >   1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
> > index 2942ec92c5a4..b3eacb400fab 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
> > @@ -1470,13 +1470,56 @@ static bool kvm_vma_mte_allowed(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> >       return vma->vm_flags & VM_MTE_ALLOWED;
> >   }
> >
> > +static int prepare_mmu_memcache(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool topup_memcache,
> > +                             void **memcache)
> > +{
> > +     int min_pages;
> > +
> > +     if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled())
> > +             *memcache = &vcpu->arch.mmu_page_cache;
> > +     else
> > +             *memcache = &vcpu->arch.pkvm_memcache;
> > +
> > +     if (!topup_memcache)
> > +             return 0;
> > +
> > +     min_pages = kvm_mmu_cache_min_pages(vcpu->arch.hw_mmu);
> > +
> > +     if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled())
> > +             return kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(*memcache, min_pages);
> > +
> > +     return topup_hyp_memcache(*memcache, min_pages);
> > +}
> > +
> > +/*
> > + * Potentially reduce shadow S2 permissions to match the guest's own S2. For
> > + * exec faults, we'd only reach this point if the guest actually allowed it (see
> > + * kvm_s2_handle_perm_fault).
> > + *
> > + * Also encode the level of the original translation in the SW bits of the leaf
> > + * entry as a proxy for the span of that translation. This will be retrieved on
> > + * TLB invalidation from the guest and used to limit the invalidation scope if a
> > + * TTL hint or a range isn't provided.
> > + */
> > +static void adjust_nested_fault_perms(struct kvm_s2_trans *nested,
> > +                                   enum kvm_pgtable_prot *prot,
> > +                                   bool *writable)
> > +{
> > +     *writable &= kvm_s2_trans_writable(nested);
> > +     if (!kvm_s2_trans_readable(nested))
> > +             *prot &= ~KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R;
> > +
> > +     *prot |= kvm_encode_nested_level(nested);
> > +}
> > +
> >   static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
> >                         struct kvm_s2_trans *nested,
> >                         struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot, unsigned long hva,
> >                         bool fault_is_perm)
> >   {
> >       int ret = 0;
> > -     bool write_fault, writable, force_pte = false;
> > +     bool topup_memcache;
> > +     bool write_fault, writable;
> >       bool exec_fault, mte_allowed;
> >       bool device = false, vfio_allow_any_uc = false;
> >       unsigned long mmu_seq;
> > @@ -1488,6 +1531,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
> >       gfn_t gfn;
> >       kvm_pfn_t pfn;
> >       bool logging_active = memslot_is_logging(memslot);
> > +     bool force_pte = logging_active;
> >       long vma_pagesize, fault_granule;
> >       enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot = KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R;
> >       struct kvm_pgtable *pgt;
> > @@ -1498,17 +1542,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
> >               fault_granule = kvm_vcpu_trap_get_perm_fault_granule(vcpu);
> >       write_fault = kvm_is_write_fault(vcpu);
> >       exec_fault = kvm_vcpu_trap_is_exec_fault(vcpu);
> > -     VM_BUG_ON(write_fault && exec_fault);
> > -
> > -     if (fault_is_perm && !write_fault && !exec_fault) {
> > -             kvm_err("Unexpected L2 read permission error\n");
> > -             return -EFAULT;
> > -     }
> > -
> > -     if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled())
> > -             memcache = &vcpu->arch.mmu_page_cache;
> > -     else
> > -             memcache = &vcpu->arch.pkvm_memcache;
> > +     VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(write_fault && exec_fault);
> >
> >       /*
> >        * Permission faults just need to update the existing leaf entry,
> > @@ -1516,17 +1550,10 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
> >        * only exception to this is when dirty logging is enabled at runtime
> >        * and a write fault needs to collapse a block entry into a table.
> >        */
> > -     if (!fault_is_perm || (logging_active && write_fault)) {
> > -             int min_pages = kvm_mmu_cache_min_pages(vcpu->arch.hw_mmu);
> > -
> > -             if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled())
> > -                     ret = kvm_mmu_topup_memory_cache(memcache, min_pages);
> > -             else
> > -                     ret = topup_hyp_memcache(memcache, min_pages);
> > -
> > -             if (ret)
> > -                     return ret;
> > -     }
> > +     topup_memcache = !fault_is_perm || (logging_active && write_fault);
> > +     ret = prepare_mmu_memcache(vcpu, topup_memcache, &memcache);
> > +     if (ret)
> > +             return ret;
> >
> >       /*
> >        * Let's check if we will get back a huge page backed by hugetlbfs, or
> > @@ -1540,16 +1567,10 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
> >               return -EFAULT;
> >       }
> >
> > -     /*
> > -      * logging_active is guaranteed to never be true for VM_PFNMAP
> > -      * memslots.
> > -      */
> > -     if (logging_active) {
> > -             force_pte = true;
> > +     if (force_pte)
> >               vma_shift = PAGE_SHIFT;
> > -     } else {
> > +     else
> >               vma_shift = get_vma_page_shift(vma, hva);
> > -     }
> >
> >       switch (vma_shift) {
> >   #ifndef __PAGETABLE_PMD_FOLDED
> > @@ -1601,7 +1622,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
> >                       max_map_size = PAGE_SIZE;
> >
> >               force_pte = (max_map_size == PAGE_SIZE);
> > -             vma_pagesize = min(vma_pagesize, (long)max_map_size);
> > +             vma_pagesize = min_t(long, vma_pagesize, max_map_size);
> >       }
> >
> >       /*
> > @@ -1630,7 +1651,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
> >        * Rely on mmap_read_unlock() for an implicit smp_rmb(), which pairs
> >        * with the smp_wmb() in kvm_mmu_invalidate_end().
> >        */
> > -     mmu_seq = vcpu->kvm->mmu_invalidate_seq;
> > +     mmu_seq = kvm->mmu_invalidate_seq;
> >       mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
> >
> >       pfn = __kvm_faultin_pfn(memslot, gfn, write_fault ? FOLL_WRITE : 0,
> > @@ -1665,24 +1686,8 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
> >       if (exec_fault && device)
> >               return -ENOEXEC;
> >
> > -     /*
> > -      * Potentially reduce shadow S2 permissions to match the guest's own
> > -      * S2. For exec faults, we'd only reach this point if the guest
> > -      * actually allowed it (see kvm_s2_handle_perm_fault).
> > -      *
> > -      * Also encode the level of the original translation in the SW bits
> > -      * of the leaf entry as a proxy for the span of that translation.
> > -      * This will be retrieved on TLB invalidation from the guest and
> > -      * used to limit the invalidation scope if a TTL hint or a range
> > -      * isn't provided.
> > -      */
> > -     if (nested) {
> > -             writable &= kvm_s2_trans_writable(nested);
> > -             if (!kvm_s2_trans_readable(nested))
> > -                     prot &= ~KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R;
> > -
> > -             prot |= kvm_encode_nested_level(nested);
> > -     }
> > +     if (nested)
> > +             adjust_nested_fault_perms(nested, &prot, &writable);
> >
> >       kvm_fault_lock(kvm);
> >       pgt = vcpu->arch.hw_mmu->pgt;
> > @@ -1953,6 +1958,9 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> >               goto out_unlock;
> >       }
> >
> > +     VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_vcpu_trap_is_permission_fault(vcpu) &&
> > +                     !write_fault && !kvm_vcpu_trap_is_exec_fault(vcpu));
> > +
> >       ret = user_mem_abort(vcpu, fault_ipa, nested, memslot, hva,
> >                            esr_fsc_is_permission_fault(esr));
> >       if (ret == 0)
>
>
> A note that on the KVM arm next tree
>
> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm.git/log/?h=next
>
> there are some user_mem_abort() changes. IIUC, only smaller conflicts.

Thanks for the heads up. I can work with Marc and Oliver to resolve
any conflicts once we get there.

Cheers,
/fuad


> --
> Cheers,
>
> David / dhildenb
>

Re: [PATCH v14 15/21] KVM: arm64: Refactor user_mem_abort()

[Marc Zyngier]

On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 12:26:13 +0100,
Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com> wrote:
> 
> On Wed, 16 Jul 2025 at 11:36, David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> wrote:

[...]

> > A note that on the KVM arm next tree
> >
> > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm.git/log/?h=next
> >
> > there are some user_mem_abort() changes. IIUC, only smaller conflicts.
> 
> Thanks for the heads up. I can work with Marc and Oliver to resolve
> any conflicts once we get there.

Yup. Ideally, a stable branch, based on an -rc tag, would do the trick
and allow us to solve the conflicts ahead of this hitting -next. We
can either take that in the kvmarm tree, or from the main kvm repo.

Thanks,

	M.

-- 
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.

[PATCH v14 16/21] KVM: arm64: Handle guest_memfd-backed guest page faults

[Fuad Tabba]

Add arm64 architecture support for handling guest page faults on memory
slots backed by guest_memfd.

This change introduces a new function, gmem_abort(), which encapsulates
the fault handling logic specific to guest_memfd-backed memory. The
kvm_handle_guest_abort() entry point is updated to dispatch to
gmem_abort() when a fault occurs on a guest_memfd-backed memory slot (as
determined by kvm_slot_has_gmem()).

Until guest_memfd gains support for huge pages, the fault granule for
these memory regions is restricted to PAGE_SIZE.

Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Houghton <jthoughton@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 83 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
index b3eacb400fab..8c82df80a835 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -1512,6 +1512,82 @@ static void adjust_nested_fault_perms(struct kvm_s2_trans *nested,
 	*prot |= kvm_encode_nested_level(nested);
 }
 
+#define KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_MEMABORT_FLAGS (KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_HANDLE_FAULT | KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_SHARED)
+
+static int gmem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
+		      struct kvm_s2_trans *nested,
+		      struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot, bool is_perm)
+{
+	bool write_fault, exec_fault, writable;
+	enum kvm_pgtable_walk_flags flags = KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_MEMABORT_FLAGS;
+	enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot = KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R;
+	struct kvm_pgtable *pgt = vcpu->arch.hw_mmu->pgt;
+	unsigned long mmu_seq;
+	struct page *page;
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+	void *memcache;
+	kvm_pfn_t pfn;
+	gfn_t gfn;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = prepare_mmu_memcache(vcpu, true, &memcache);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (nested)
+		gfn = kvm_s2_trans_output(nested) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	else
+		gfn = fault_ipa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+	write_fault = kvm_is_write_fault(vcpu);
+	exec_fault = kvm_vcpu_trap_is_exec_fault(vcpu);
+
+	VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(write_fault && exec_fault);
+
+	mmu_seq = kvm->mmu_invalidate_seq;
+	/* Pairs with the smp_wmb() in kvm_mmu_invalidate_end(). */
+	smp_rmb();
+
+	ret = kvm_gmem_get_pfn(kvm, memslot, gfn, &pfn, &page, NULL);
+	if (ret) {
+		kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, fault_ipa, PAGE_SIZE,
+					      write_fault, exec_fault, false);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	writable = !(memslot->flags & KVM_MEM_READONLY);
+
+	if (nested)
+		adjust_nested_fault_perms(nested, &prot, &writable);
+
+	if (writable)
+		prot |= KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_W;
+
+	if (exec_fault ||
+	    (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_HAS_CACHE_DIC) &&
+	     (!nested || kvm_s2_trans_executable(nested))))
+		prot |= KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_X;
+
+	kvm_fault_lock(kvm);
+	if (mmu_invalidate_retry(kvm, mmu_seq)) {
+		ret = -EAGAIN;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
+
+	ret = KVM_PGT_FN(kvm_pgtable_stage2_map)(pgt, fault_ipa, PAGE_SIZE,
+						 __pfn_to_phys(pfn), prot,
+						 memcache, flags);
+
+out_unlock:
+	kvm_release_faultin_page(kvm, page, !!ret, writable);
+	kvm_fault_unlock(kvm);
+
+	if (writable && !ret)
+		mark_page_dirty_in_slot(kvm, memslot, gfn);
+
+	return ret != -EAGAIN ? ret : 0;
+}
+
 static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
 			  struct kvm_s2_trans *nested,
 			  struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot, unsigned long hva,
@@ -1536,7 +1612,7 @@ static int user_mem_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, phys_addr_t fault_ipa,
 	enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot = KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R;
 	struct kvm_pgtable *pgt;
 	struct page *page;
-	enum kvm_pgtable_walk_flags flags = KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_HANDLE_FAULT | KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_SHARED;
+	enum kvm_pgtable_walk_flags flags = KVM_PGTABLE_WALK_MEMABORT_FLAGS;
 
 	if (fault_is_perm)
 		fault_granule = kvm_vcpu_trap_get_perm_fault_granule(vcpu);
@@ -1961,8 +2037,12 @@ int kvm_handle_guest_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_vcpu_trap_is_permission_fault(vcpu) &&
 			!write_fault && !kvm_vcpu_trap_is_exec_fault(vcpu));
 
-	ret = user_mem_abort(vcpu, fault_ipa, nested, memslot, hva,
-			     esr_fsc_is_permission_fault(esr));
+	if (kvm_slot_has_gmem(memslot))
+		ret = gmem_abort(vcpu, fault_ipa, nested, memslot,
+				 esr_fsc_is_permission_fault(esr));
+	else
+		ret = user_mem_abort(vcpu, fault_ipa, nested, memslot, hva,
+				     esr_fsc_is_permission_fault(esr));
 	if (ret == 0)
 		ret = 1;
 out:
-- 
2.50.0.727.gbf7dc18ff4-goog

[PATCH v14 17/21] KVM: arm64: nv: Handle VNCR_EL2-triggered faults backed by guest_memfd

[Fuad Tabba]

Handle faults for memslots backed by guest_memfd in arm64 nested
virtualization triggerred by VNCR_EL2.

* Introduce is_gmem output parameter to kvm_translate_vncr(), indicating
  whether the faulted memory slot is backed by guest_memfd.

* Dispatch faults backed by guest_memfd to kvm_gmem_get_pfn().

* Update kvm_handle_vncr_abort() to handle potential guest_memfd errors.
  Some of the guest_memfd errors need to be handled by userspace,
  instead of attempting to (implicitly) retry by returning to the guest.

Suggested-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c
index dc1d26559bfa..b3edd7f7c8cd 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/nested.c
@@ -1172,8 +1172,9 @@ static u64 read_vncr_el2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return (u64)sign_extend64(__vcpu_sys_reg(vcpu, VNCR_EL2), 48);
 }
 
-static int kvm_translate_vncr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+static int kvm_translate_vncr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool *is_gmem)
 {
+	struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot;
 	bool write_fault, writable;
 	unsigned long mmu_seq;
 	struct vncr_tlb *vt;
@@ -1216,10 +1217,25 @@ static int kvm_translate_vncr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	smp_rmb();
 
 	gfn = vt->wr.pa >> PAGE_SHIFT;
-	pfn = kvm_faultin_pfn(vcpu, gfn, write_fault, &writable, &page);
-	if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn) || (write_fault && !writable))
+	memslot = gfn_to_memslot(vcpu->kvm, gfn);
+	if (!memslot)
 		return -EFAULT;
 
+	*is_gmem = kvm_slot_has_gmem(memslot);
+	if (!*is_gmem) {
+		pfn = __kvm_faultin_pfn(memslot, gfn, write_fault ? FOLL_WRITE : 0,
+					&writable, &page);
+		if (is_error_noslot_pfn(pfn) || (write_fault && !writable))
+			return -EFAULT;
+	} else {
+		ret = kvm_gmem_get_pfn(vcpu->kvm, memslot, gfn, &pfn, &page, NULL);
+		if (ret) {
+			kvm_prepare_memory_fault_exit(vcpu, vt->wr.pa, PAGE_SIZE,
+					      write_fault, false, false);
+			return ret;
+		}
+	}
+
 	scoped_guard(write_lock, &vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock) {
 		if (mmu_invalidate_retry(vcpu->kvm, mmu_seq))
 			return -EAGAIN;
@@ -1292,23 +1308,36 @@ int kvm_handle_vncr_abort(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (esr_fsc_is_permission_fault(esr)) {
 		inject_vncr_perm(vcpu);
 	} else if (esr_fsc_is_translation_fault(esr)) {
-		bool valid;
+		bool valid, is_gmem = false;
 		int ret;
 
 		scoped_guard(read_lock, &vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock)
 			valid = kvm_vncr_tlb_lookup(vcpu);
 
 		if (!valid)
-			ret = kvm_translate_vncr(vcpu);
+			ret = kvm_translate_vncr(vcpu, &is_gmem);
 		else
 			ret = -EPERM;
 
 		switch (ret) {
 		case -EAGAIN:
-		case -ENOMEM:
 			/* Let's try again... */
 			break;
+		case -ENOMEM:
+			/*
+			 * For guest_memfd, this indicates that it failed to
+			 * create a folio to back the memory. Inform userspace.
+			 */
+			if (is_gmem)
+				return 0;
+			/* Otherwise, let's try again... */
+			break;
 		case -EFAULT:
+		case -EIO:
+		case -EHWPOISON:
+			if (is_gmem)
+				return 0;
+			fallthrough;
 		case -EINVAL:
 		case -ENOENT:
 		case -EACCES:
-- 
2.50.0.727.gbf7dc18ff4-goog

[PATCH v14 18/21] KVM: arm64: Enable host mapping of shared guest_memfd memory

[Fuad Tabba]

Enable host userspace mmap support for guest_memfd-backed memory on
arm64. This change provides arm64 with the capability to map guest
memory at the host directly from guest_memfd:

* Define kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap() for arm64: The
  kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap() macro is defined for arm64 to be true if
  CONFIG_KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP is enabled. For existing arm64 KVM VM
  types that support guest_memfd, this enables them to use guest_memfd
  with host userspace mappings. This provides a consistent behavior as
  there are currently no arm64 CoCo VMs that rely on guest_memfd solely
  for private, non-mappable memory. Future arm64 VM types can override
  or restrict this behavior via the kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap() hook
  if needed.

* Select CONFIG_KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP in arm64 Kconfig.

* Enforce KVM_MEMSLOT_GMEM_ONLY for guest_memfd on arm64: Checks are
  added to ensure that if guest_memfd is enabled on arm64,
  KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP must also be enabled. This means
  guest_memfd-backed memory slots on arm64 are currently only supported
  if they are intended for shared memory use cases (i.e.,
  kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only() is true). This design reflects the current
  arm64 KVM ecosystem where guest_memfd is primarily being introduced
  for VMs that support shared memory.

Reviewed-by: James Houghton <jthoughton@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 4 ++++
 arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig            | 2 ++
 arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c              | 7 +++++++
 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 3e41a880b062..63f7827cfa1b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1674,5 +1674,9 @@ void compute_fgu(struct kvm *kvm, enum fgt_group_id fgt);
 void get_reg_fixed_bits(struct kvm *kvm, enum vcpu_sysreg reg, u64 *res0, u64 *res1);
 void check_feature_map(void);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GMEM
+#define kvm_arch_supports_gmem(kvm) true
+#define kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap(kvm) IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP)
+#endif
 
 #endif /* __ARM64_KVM_HOST_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig
index 713248f240e0..323b46b7c82f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ menuconfig KVM
 	select HAVE_KVM_VCPU_RUN_PID_CHANGE
 	select SCHED_INFO
 	select GUEST_PERF_EVENTS if PERF_EVENTS
+	select KVM_GMEM
+	select KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP
 	help
 	  Support hosting virtualized guest machines.
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
index 8c82df80a835..85559b8a0845 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -2276,6 +2276,13 @@ int kvm_arch_prepare_memory_region(struct kvm *kvm,
 	if ((new->base_gfn + new->npages) > (kvm_phys_size(&kvm->arch.mmu) >> PAGE_SHIFT))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
+	/*
+	 * Only support guest_memfd backed memslots with mappable memory, since
+	 * there aren't any CoCo VMs that support only private memory on arm64.
+	 */
+	if (kvm_slot_has_gmem(new) && !kvm_memslot_is_gmem_only(new))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	hva = new->userspace_addr;
 	reg_end = hva + (new->npages << PAGE_SHIFT);
 
-- 
2.50.0.727.gbf7dc18ff4-goog

[PATCH v14 19/21] KVM: Introduce the KVM capability KVM_CAP_GMEM_MMAP

[Fuad Tabba]

Introduce the new KVM capability KVM_CAP_GMEM_MMAP. This capability
signals to userspace that a KVM instance supports host userspace mapping
of guest_memfd-backed memory.

The availability of this capability is determined per architecture, and
its enablement for a specific guest_memfd instance is controlled by the
GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP flag at creation time.

Update the KVM API documentation to detail the KVM_CAP_GMEM_MMAP
capability, the associated GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP, and provide essential
information regarding support for mmap in guest_memfd.

Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 9 +++++++++
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h       | 1 +
 virt/kvm/kvm_main.c            | 4 ++++
 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
index 43ed57e048a8..5169066b53b2 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
@@ -6407,6 +6407,15 @@ most one mapping per page, i.e. binding multiple memory regions to a single
 guest_memfd range is not allowed (any number of memory regions can be bound to
 a single guest_memfd file, but the bound ranges must not overlap).
 
+When the capability KVM_CAP_GMEM_MMAP is supported, the 'flags' field supports
+GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP.  Setting this flag on guest_memfd creation enables mmap()
+and faulting of guest_memfd memory to host userspace.
+
+When the KVM MMU performs a PFN lookup to service a guest fault and the backing
+guest_memfd has the GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP set, then the fault will always be
+consumed from guest_memfd, regardless of whether it is a shared or a private
+fault.
+
 See KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION2 for additional details.
 
 4.143 KVM_PRE_FAULT_MEMORY
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index 3beafbf306af..698dd407980f 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -960,6 +960,7 @@ struct kvm_enable_cap {
 #define KVM_CAP_ARM_EL2 240
 #define KVM_CAP_ARM_EL2_E2H0 241
 #define KVM_CAP_RISCV_MP_STATE_RESET 242
+#define KVM_CAP_GMEM_MMAP 243
 
 struct kvm_irq_routing_irqchip {
 	__u32 irqchip;
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
index 46bddac1dacd..f1ac872e01e9 100644
--- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
+++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c
@@ -4916,6 +4916,10 @@ static int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension_generic(struct kvm *kvm, long arg)
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GMEM
 	case KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD:
 		return !kvm || kvm_arch_supports_gmem(kvm);
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GMEM_SUPPORTS_MMAP
+	case KVM_CAP_GMEM_MMAP:
+		return !kvm || kvm_arch_supports_gmem_mmap(kvm);
 #endif
 	default:
 		break;
-- 
2.50.0.727.gbf7dc18ff4-goog

[PATCH v14 20/21] KVM: selftests: Do not use hardcoded page sizes in guest_memfd test

[Fuad Tabba]

Update the guest_memfd_test selftest to use getpagesize() instead of
hardcoded 4KB page size values.

Using hardcoded page sizes can cause test failures on architectures or
systems configured with larger page sizes, such as arm64 with 64KB
pages. By dynamically querying the system's page size, the test becomes
more portable and robust across different environments.

Additionally, build the guest_memfd_test selftest for arm64.

Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
Suggested-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm       |  1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c | 11 ++++++-----
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm
index 38b95998e1e6..e11ed9e59ab5 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/Makefile.kvm
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ TEST_GEN_PROGS_arm64 += arch_timer
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_arm64 += coalesced_io_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_arm64 += dirty_log_perf_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_arm64 += get-reg-list
+TEST_GEN_PROGS_arm64 += guest_memfd_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_arm64 += memslot_modification_stress_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_arm64 += memslot_perf_test
 TEST_GEN_PROGS_arm64 += mmu_stress_test
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c
index ce687f8d248f..341ba616cf55 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c
@@ -146,24 +146,25 @@ static void test_create_guest_memfd_multiple(struct kvm_vm *vm)
 {
 	int fd1, fd2, ret;
 	struct stat st1, st2;
+	size_t page_size = getpagesize();
 
-	fd1 = __vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, 4096, 0);
+	fd1 = __vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, page_size, 0);
 	TEST_ASSERT(fd1 != -1, "memfd creation should succeed");
 
 	ret = fstat(fd1, &st1);
 	TEST_ASSERT(ret != -1, "memfd fstat should succeed");
-	TEST_ASSERT(st1.st_size == 4096, "memfd st_size should match requested size");
+	TEST_ASSERT(st1.st_size == page_size, "memfd st_size should match requested size");
 
-	fd2 = __vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, 8192, 0);
+	fd2 = __vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, page_size * 2, 0);
 	TEST_ASSERT(fd2 != -1, "memfd creation should succeed");
 
 	ret = fstat(fd2, &st2);
 	TEST_ASSERT(ret != -1, "memfd fstat should succeed");
-	TEST_ASSERT(st2.st_size == 8192, "second memfd st_size should match requested size");
+	TEST_ASSERT(st2.st_size == page_size * 2, "second memfd st_size should match requested size");
 
 	ret = fstat(fd1, &st1);
 	TEST_ASSERT(ret != -1, "memfd fstat should succeed");
-	TEST_ASSERT(st1.st_size == 4096, "first memfd st_size should still match requested size");
+	TEST_ASSERT(st1.st_size == page_size, "first memfd st_size should still match requested size");
 	TEST_ASSERT(st1.st_ino != st2.st_ino, "different memfd should have different inode numbers");
 
 	close(fd2);
-- 
2.50.0.727.gbf7dc18ff4-goog

[PATCH v14 21/21] KVM: selftests: guest_memfd mmap() test when mmap is supported

[Fuad Tabba]

Expand the guest_memfd selftests to comprehensively test host userspace
mmap functionality for guest_memfd-backed memory when supported by the
VM type.

Introduce new test cases to verify the following:

* Successful mmap operations: Ensure that MAP_SHARED mappings succeed
  when guest_memfd mmap is enabled.

* Data integrity: Validate that data written to the mmap'd region is
  correctly persistent and readable.

* fallocate interaction: Test that fallocate(FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE)
  correctly zeros out mapped pages.

* Out-of-bounds access: Verify that accessing memory beyond the
  guest_memfd's size correctly triggers a SIGBUS signal.

* Unsupported mmap: Confirm that mmap attempts fail as expected when
  guest_memfd mmap support is not enabled for the specific guest_memfd
  instance or VM type.

* Flag validity: Introduce test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity() to
  systematically test that only allowed guest_memfd creation flags are
  accepted for different VM types (e.g., GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP for
  default VMs, no flags for CoCo VMs).

The existing tests for guest_memfd creation (multiple instances, invalid
sizes), file read/write, file size, and invalid punch hole operations
are integrated into the new test_with_type() framework to allow testing
across different VM types.

Reviewed-by: James Houghton <jthoughton@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <gshan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Shivank Garg <shivankg@amd.com>
Co-developed-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Ackerley Tng <ackerleytng@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
 .../testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c  | 197 ++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 176 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c
index 341ba616cf55..1252e74fbb8f 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/guest_memfd_test.c
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
 
 #include <linux/bitmap.h>
 #include <linux/falloc.h>
+#include <setjmp.h>
+#include <signal.h>
 #include <sys/mman.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
@@ -34,12 +36,83 @@ static void test_file_read_write(int fd)
 		    "pwrite on a guest_mem fd should fail");
 }
 
-static void test_mmap(int fd, size_t page_size)
+static void test_mmap_supported(int fd, size_t page_size, size_t total_size)
+{
+	const char val = 0xaa;
+	char *mem;
+	size_t i;
+	int ret;
+
+	mem = mmap(NULL, total_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
+	TEST_ASSERT(mem == MAP_FAILED, "Copy-on-write not allowed by guest_memfd.");
+
+	mem = mmap(NULL, total_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
+	TEST_ASSERT(mem != MAP_FAILED, "mmap() for guest_memfd should succeed.");
+
+	memset(mem, val, total_size);
+	for (i = 0; i < total_size; i++)
+		TEST_ASSERT_EQ(READ_ONCE(mem[i]), val);
+
+	ret = fallocate(fd, FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE | FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE, 0,
+			page_size);
+	TEST_ASSERT(!ret, "fallocate the first page should succeed.");
+
+	for (i = 0; i < page_size; i++)
+		TEST_ASSERT_EQ(READ_ONCE(mem[i]), 0x00);
+	for (; i < total_size; i++)
+		TEST_ASSERT_EQ(READ_ONCE(mem[i]), val);
+
+	memset(mem, val, page_size);
+	for (i = 0; i < total_size; i++)
+		TEST_ASSERT_EQ(READ_ONCE(mem[i]), val);
+
+	ret = munmap(mem, total_size);
+	TEST_ASSERT(!ret, "munmap() should succeed.");
+}
+
+static sigjmp_buf jmpbuf;
+void fault_sigbus_handler(int signum)
+{
+	siglongjmp(jmpbuf, 1);
+}
+
+static void test_fault_overflow(int fd, size_t page_size, size_t total_size)
+{
+	struct sigaction sa_old, sa_new = {
+		.sa_handler = fault_sigbus_handler,
+	};
+	size_t map_size = total_size * 4;
+	const char val = 0xaa;
+	char *mem;
+	size_t i;
+	int ret;
+
+	mem = mmap(NULL, map_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
+	TEST_ASSERT(mem != MAP_FAILED, "mmap() for guest_memfd should succeed.");
+
+	sigaction(SIGBUS, &sa_new, &sa_old);
+	if (sigsetjmp(jmpbuf, 1) == 0) {
+		memset(mem, 0xaa, map_size);
+		TEST_ASSERT(false, "memset() should have triggered SIGBUS.");
+	}
+	sigaction(SIGBUS, &sa_old, NULL);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < total_size; i++)
+		TEST_ASSERT_EQ(READ_ONCE(mem[i]), val);
+
+	ret = munmap(mem, map_size);
+	TEST_ASSERT(!ret, "munmap() should succeed.");
+}
+
+static void test_mmap_not_supported(int fd, size_t page_size, size_t total_size)
 {
 	char *mem;
 
 	mem = mmap(NULL, page_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
 	TEST_ASSERT_EQ(mem, MAP_FAILED);
+
+	mem = mmap(NULL, total_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
+	TEST_ASSERT_EQ(mem, MAP_FAILED);
 }
 
 static void test_file_size(int fd, size_t page_size, size_t total_size)
@@ -120,26 +193,19 @@ static void test_invalid_punch_hole(int fd, size_t page_size, size_t total_size)
 	}
 }
 
-static void test_create_guest_memfd_invalid(struct kvm_vm *vm)
+static void test_create_guest_memfd_invalid_sizes(struct kvm_vm *vm,
+						  uint64_t guest_memfd_flags,
+						  size_t page_size)
 {
-	size_t page_size = getpagesize();
-	uint64_t flag;
 	size_t size;
 	int fd;
 
 	for (size = 1; size < page_size; size++) {
-		fd = __vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, size, 0);
-		TEST_ASSERT(fd == -1 && errno == EINVAL,
+		fd = __vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, size, guest_memfd_flags);
+		TEST_ASSERT(fd < 0 && errno == EINVAL,
 			    "guest_memfd() with non-page-aligned page size '0x%lx' should fail with EINVAL",
 			    size);
 	}
-
-	for (flag = BIT(0); flag; flag <<= 1) {
-		fd = __vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, page_size, flag);
-		TEST_ASSERT(fd == -1 && errno == EINVAL,
-			    "guest_memfd() with flag '0x%lx' should fail with EINVAL",
-			    flag);
-	}
 }
 
 static void test_create_guest_memfd_multiple(struct kvm_vm *vm)
@@ -171,30 +237,119 @@ static void test_create_guest_memfd_multiple(struct kvm_vm *vm)
 	close(fd1);
 }
 
-int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+static bool check_vm_type(unsigned long vm_type)
 {
-	size_t page_size;
+	/*
+	 * Not all architectures support KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES. However, those that
+	 * support guest_memfd have that support for the default VM type.
+	 */
+	if (vm_type == VM_TYPE_DEFAULT)
+		return true;
+
+	return kvm_check_cap(KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES) & BIT(vm_type);
+}
+
+static void test_with_type(unsigned long vm_type, uint64_t guest_memfd_flags,
+			   bool expect_mmap_allowed)
+{
+	struct kvm_vm *vm;
 	size_t total_size;
+	size_t page_size;
 	int fd;
-	struct kvm_vm *vm;
 
-	TEST_REQUIRE(kvm_has_cap(KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD));
+	if (!check_vm_type(vm_type))
+		return;
 
 	page_size = getpagesize();
 	total_size = page_size * 4;
 
-	vm = vm_create_barebones();
+	vm = vm_create_barebones_type(vm_type);
 
-	test_create_guest_memfd_invalid(vm);
 	test_create_guest_memfd_multiple(vm);
+	test_create_guest_memfd_invalid_sizes(vm, guest_memfd_flags, page_size);
 
-	fd = vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, total_size, 0);
+	fd = vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, total_size, guest_memfd_flags);
 
 	test_file_read_write(fd);
-	test_mmap(fd, page_size);
+
+	if (expect_mmap_allowed) {
+		test_mmap_supported(fd, page_size, total_size);
+		test_fault_overflow(fd, page_size, total_size);
+
+	} else {
+		test_mmap_not_supported(fd, page_size, total_size);
+	}
+
 	test_file_size(fd, page_size, total_size);
 	test_fallocate(fd, page_size, total_size);
 	test_invalid_punch_hole(fd, page_size, total_size);
 
 	close(fd);
+	kvm_vm_free(vm);
+}
+
+static void test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity(unsigned long vm_type,
+					    uint64_t expected_valid_flags)
+{
+	size_t page_size = getpagesize();
+	struct kvm_vm *vm;
+	uint64_t flag = 0;
+	int fd;
+
+	if (!check_vm_type(vm_type))
+		return;
+
+	vm = vm_create_barebones_type(vm_type);
+
+	for (flag = BIT(0); flag; flag <<= 1) {
+		fd = __vm_create_guest_memfd(vm, page_size, flag);
+
+		if (flag & expected_valid_flags) {
+			TEST_ASSERT(fd >= 0,
+				    "guest_memfd() with flag '0x%lx' should be valid",
+				    flag);
+			close(fd);
+		} else {
+			TEST_ASSERT(fd < 0 && errno == EINVAL,
+				    "guest_memfd() with flag '0x%lx' should fail with EINVAL",
+				    flag);
+		}
+	}
+
+	kvm_vm_free(vm);
+}
+
+static void test_gmem_flag_validity(void)
+{
+	uint64_t non_coco_vm_valid_flags = 0;
+
+	if (kvm_has_cap(KVM_CAP_GMEM_MMAP))
+		non_coco_vm_valid_flags = GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP;
+
+	test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity(VM_TYPE_DEFAULT, non_coco_vm_valid_flags);
+
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+	test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity(KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM, 0);
+	test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity(KVM_X86_SEV_VM, 0);
+	test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity(KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM, 0);
+	test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity(KVM_X86_SNP_VM, 0);
+	test_vm_type_gmem_flag_validity(KVM_X86_TDX_VM, 0);
+#endif
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	TEST_REQUIRE(kvm_has_cap(KVM_CAP_GUEST_MEMFD));
+
+	test_gmem_flag_validity();
+
+	test_with_type(VM_TYPE_DEFAULT, 0, false);
+	if (kvm_has_cap(KVM_CAP_GMEM_MMAP)) {
+		test_with_type(VM_TYPE_DEFAULT, GUEST_MEMFD_FLAG_MMAP,
+			       true);
+	}
+
+#ifdef __x86_64__
+	test_with_type(KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM, 0, false);
+#endif
 }
-- 
2.50.0.727.gbf7dc18ff4-goog