Re: [PATCH v5 0/9] mm/memory-failure: keep hardware-poisoned pages out of the next kexec

[Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>]

On 2026/9/15 20:53, Breno Leitao wrote:
> Problem:
> ========
> 
> When a page is hard-offlined due to an uncorrectable memory error (multi
> bit ECC), memory_failure() sets PG_hwpoison, unmaps it, removes it from
> the buddy allocator. This information is not carried to the next kernel
> that is kexeced. The new kernel kexecs and trip over that bad memory
> bank _again_.
> 
> Why now:
> ========
> 
> Several industry trends make this increasingly important:
> 
>     1) DRAM is getting more expensive
>     2) soldered / on-package memory (LPDDR, HBM) is becoming more common, so a
>        failing part can no longer simply be swapped;
>     3) memory is kept in service far longer (at Meta, DRAM lifetime is being
>        drastically extended).
>     4) It is more and more common to kexec instead of full reboot
>     5) Increase of memory per system with CXL
> 
> What was done already:
> ======================
> 
> In order make linux deal better with the problem above, I've done
> already fixed a bunch of stuff in this area, such as:
> 
> 1) Panic on unrecoverable errors, instead of "printk and carry over":
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260630-ecc_panic-v10-0-c6ed5b62eea2@debian.org/
> 
> 2) Respect poisoned memory at kexec time
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260812-kexec_posioned-v6-0-e477887086f0@debian.org/
> 
> Now, the natural follow up is to carry the poisoned memory information
> to the next kexec kernel, avoiding tripping over a known "bad page".
> 
> Proposed Solution:
> ==================
> 
> Carry the poisoned frames to the next kernel in a new EFI configuration
> table, LINUX_EFI_POISONED_MEMORY.
> 
> The table is a bitmap with one bit per 2MB of physical memory, modeled
> on LINUX_EFI_UNACCEPTED_MEMORY. The stub sizes it from the EFI memory
> map and installs it empty while boot services are up -- a running kernel
> cannot install a configuration table, it can only flip bits -- and a
> table inherited from an earlier boot is reused as-is. That is one
> fixed-size allocation, 64KB per TiB of the span the memory map describes,
> with no list to grow at runtime and no chain to trust at parse time.
> 
> The mechanism is architecture independent, so x86 and arm64 use the same
> code.
> 
> Each hard offline sets the bit for its unit. Soft-offlined pages are not
> recorded: they are still functional, and were offlined predictively.
> 
> The next kernel takes the table into use from efi_config_parse_tables(),
> which vets the inherited header and hands the table's pages to memblock.
> It is EFI ACPI reclaim memory, which x86 leaves out of memblock and so
> out of the direct map; the unaccepted memory table is handled the same
> way for the same reason.
> 
> The frames themselves are poisoned in __free_pages_core(), as each block
> reaches the buddy allocator. That is the one point every producer passes
> through -- memblock_free_pages() early, deferred_free_pages() once the
> deferred struct pages are up, and generic_online_page() at any later
> hotplug -- and it is already where the unaccepted memory table is
> consulted. The recorded frames are held back and the rest of the block is
> freed, so they never enter the allocator instead of being taken back out
> of it. They end up in the state a frame poisoned by this kernel would be
> in, so everything that already understands PG_hwpoison covers them --
> including the kexec segment placement check from the series linked above,
> which keeps the segments a kexec places off these frames.
> 
> Granularity is the trade-off: one bad 4KB frame costs a whole 2MB unit in
> every later kernel of the chain. In exchange, a row or column fault --
> roughly a quarter of the DRAM faults reported in [1], and potentially
> thousands of 4KB pages scattered over gigabytes -- collapses into a bit
> or two.
> 
> A bit is never cleared, which is a known limitation: it stands for a
> whole unit, so an unpoison of one frame cannot tell whether the unit as a
> whole is good again.

Thanks for your patches. I have a question about unpoison: If a bit is never
cleared, after we do some memory-failure+unpoison tests, kexec will lose the
tested memory without reboot?

Thanks.
.