From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>,
Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv4 18/18] x86: Introduce CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME
Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2018 10:30:12 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ecf92475-93b4-295c-f1fc-7efba4843d98@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180626142245.82850-19-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
On 06/26/2018 07:22 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> Add new config option to enabled/disable Multi-Key Total Memory
> Encryption support.
>
> MKTME uses MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING to reserve enough space in per-KeyID
> direct mappings for memory hotplug.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/Kconfig | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index fa5e1ec09247..9a843bd63108 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -1523,6 +1523,23 @@ config ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT
> def_bool y
> depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
>
> +config X86_INTEL_MKTME
> + bool "Intel Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption"
> + select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK
> + select PAGE_EXTENSION
> + depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_INTEL
> + ---help---
> + Say yes to enable support for Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption.
> + This requires an Intel processor that has support of the feature.
> +
> + Multikey Total Memory Encryption (MKTME) is a technology that allows
> + transparent memory encryption in and upcoming Intel platforms.
huh? Maybe drop the "and"?
> +
> + MKTME is built on top of TME. TME allows encryption of the entirety
> + of system memory using a single key. MKTME allows having multiple
> + encryption domains, each having own key -- different memory pages can
> + be encrypted with different keys.
> +
> # Common NUMA Features
> config NUMA
> bool "Numa Memory Allocation and Scheduler Support"
> @@ -2199,7 +2216,7 @@ config RANDOMIZE_MEMORY
>
> config MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING
> hex "Physical memory mapping padding" if EXPERT
> - depends on RANDOMIZE_MEMORY
> + depends on RANDOMIZE_MEMORY || X86_INTEL_MKTME
> default "0xa" if MEMORY_HOTPLUG
> default "0x0"
> range 0x1 0x40 if MEMORY_HOTPLUG
>
--
~Randy
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-06-26 17:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-06-26 14:22 [PATCHv4 00/18] MKTME enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 01/18] mm: Do no merge VMAs with different encryption KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 02/18] mm/ksm: Do not merge pages with different KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-09 18:03 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 03/18] mm/page_alloc: Unify alloc_hugepage_vma() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 04/18] mm/page_alloc: Handle allocation for encrypted memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 05/18] mm/khugepaged: Handle encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 06/18] x86/mm: Mask out KeyID bits from page table entry pfn Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 07/18] x86/mm: Introduce variables to store number, shift and mask of KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-09 18:09 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-07-10 10:48 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 08/18] x86/mm: Preserve KeyID on pte_modify() and pgprot_modify() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 09/18] x86/mm: Implement page_keyid() using page_ext Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 10/18] x86/mm: Implement vma_keyid() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 11/18] x86/mm: Implement prep_encrypted_page() and arch_free_page() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 12/18] x86/mm: Rename CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 13/18] x86/mm: Allow to disable MKTME after enumeration Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-09 18:20 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-07-10 10:49 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-10 11:21 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 14/18] x86/mm: Detect MKTME early Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 15/18] x86/mm: Calculate direct mapping size Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-09 18:32 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 16/18] x86/mm: Implement sync_direct_mapping() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 17/18] x86/mm: Handle encrypted memory in page_to_virt() and __pa() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 16:38 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-27 21:56 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 18/18] x86: Introduce CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 17:30 ` Randy Dunlap [this message]
2018-06-27 21:57 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-27 23:48 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-07-09 18:36 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-07-09 18:44 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-09 18:52 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-07-09 18:59 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-09 20:29 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=ecf92475-93b4-295c-f1fc-7efba4843d98@infradead.org \
--to=rdunlap@infradead.org \
--cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
--cc=hpa@zytor.com \
--cc=jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com \
--cc=kai.huang@linux.intel.com \
--cc=kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
--cc=mingo@redhat.com \
--cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
--cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=x86@kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).