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From: ngabor <ngabor@protonmail.ch>
To: "linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"lizefan@huawei.com" <lizefan@huawei.com>,
	"tj@kernel.org" <tj@kernel.org>,
	"cl@linux-foundation.org" <cl@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: RAM encryption and key storing in CPU
Date: Sat, 23 May 2015 05:01:26 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <edd20e0d3264b01523d2a9b97a5cdf53@protonmail.ch> (raw)

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Any comments?


-------- Original Message --------

Subject: RAM encryption and key storing in CPU

Time (GMT): May 21 2015 10:17:25

From: ngabor@protonmail.ch

To: linux-mm@kvack.org, bp@alien8.de, lizefan@huawei.com, tj@kernel.org, cl@linux-foundation.org



Hello,



==========

Problem:



Everything is stored in plaintext in the Memory.



So if although full disc encryption is used on a Linux Desktop, it is possible to copy the content of the memory, while the notebook was on suspend or it was running:



https://citp.princeton.edu/research/memory/media/



==========

Solution:



Can we (optionally*) encrypt the content of the memory and store the key for decryption in the CPU to avoid in general these kind of attacks?



https://www1.informatik.uni-erlangen.de/tresor



Is this solution already in the Linux kernel? If yes, how can a Linux enduser turn it on? If no, how can we get the code/idea in the mainline? What are the arguments against it?



*if someone would want to harden it's Linux Desktop (since notebooks could be stolen..) it could turn on this feature to avoid a policy to always turn off the notebook while not using it.



Thank you for your comments.

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             reply	other threads:[~2015-05-23  9:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-05-23  9:01 ngabor [this message]
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2015-06-19 17:22 RAM encryption and key storing in CPU ngabor
2015-05-21 10:17 ngabor

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