From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Albert Esteve" <aesteve@redhat.com>, "Tejun Heo" <tj@kernel.org>,
"Johannes Weiner" <hannes@cmpxchg.org>,
"Michal Koutný" <mkoutny@suse.com>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Sumit Semwal" <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>,
"Christian König" <christian.koenig@amd.com>,
"Michal Hocko" <mhocko@kernel.org>,
"Roman Gushchin" <roman.gushchin@linux.dev>,
"Shakeel Butt" <shakeel.butt@linux.dev>,
"Muchun Song" <muchun.song@linux.dev>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Benjamin Gaignard" <benjamin.gaignard@collabora.com>,
"Brian Starkey" <Brian.Starkey@arm.com>,
"John Stultz" <jstultz@google.com>,
"T.J. Mercier" <tjmercier@google.com>,
"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Stephen Smalley" <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
"Shuah Khan" <shuah@kernel.org>,
"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Ondrej Mosnáček" <omosnacek@gmail.com>,
"Jens Wiklander" <jenswi@kernel.org>,
"Sumit Garg" <sumit.garg@kernel.org>
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org, media-ci@linuxtv.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 6/8] selinux: Restrict cross-cgroup dma-buf charging
Date: Thu, 05 Nov 2026 11:12:01 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-198921@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261104-v2_20230123_tjmercier_google_com-v4-6-1819a017000b@redhat.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Medium] selinux: one-off dma_buf class instead of general cgroup access control model
--
commit 675e985fff50ea6716b8c00023a75c07ff345a6f
Author: Albert Esteve <aesteve@redhat.com>
selinux: Restrict cross-cgroup dma-buf charging
This commit implements the selinux_dma_buf_charge_task() hook and adds a
new dma_buf object class with a charge_task permission in SELinux to
restrict cross-cgroup dma-buf memory charging.
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 30776b0107f29..8f39d91eabc97 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -2204,6 +2204,12 @@ static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
> return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
> }
>
> +static int selinux_dma_buf_charge_task(const struct cred *from, const struct cred *to)
> +{
> + return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(from), cred_sid(to),
> + SECCLASS_DMA_BUF, DMA_BUF__CHARGE_TASK, NULL);
> +}
> +
> static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, const struct super_block *sb)
> {
> const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
[ ... ]
> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> index 90cb61b164256..b4ebedc6e4240 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
> @@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ const struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
> { "user_namespace", { "create", NULL } },
> { "memfd_file",
> { COMMON_FILE_PERMS, "execute_no_trans", "entrypoint", NULL } },
> + { "dma_buf", { "charge_task", NULL } },
[Severity: Medium]
As reported by Paul Moore on RFC [1], adding a one-off SELinux object class
and permission for a specific subsystem's cgroup charging (previously
dma_heap with charge_to, now dma_buf with charge_task in secclass_map[]
and selinux_dma_buf_charge_task(), along with charge_cgroup in a later
patch in this series) introduces a narrow, subsystem-specific policy class
rather than a general cgroup and resource access control model for SELinux.
Although resolving the target memcg from charge_fd moved into generic
memcontrol code in mem_cgroup_get_from_fd(), the SELinux hook in
selinux_dma_buf_charge_task() and class definition in secclass_map[] still
define a dma-buf-specific class instead of a broader cgroup access control
abstraction.
Should this permission check be designed around a general cgroup or resource
SELinux object class rather than a one-off dma_buf class?
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/16093a0278a6d7d1a0a8bc055c228bed@paul-moore.com
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261104-v2_20230123_tjmercier_google_com-v4-0-1819a017000b@redhat.com?part=6
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-05 11:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-04 11:09 [PATCH v4 0/8] memcg: dma-buf cgroup accounting and charge transfer Albert Esteve
2026-11-04 11:09 ` [PATCH v4 1/8] memcg: Add MEMCG_DMABUF accounting infrastructure Albert Esteve
2026-11-05 11:11 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-04 11:09 ` [PATCH v4 2/8] dma-heap: charge dma-buf memory via explicit memcg Albert Esteve
2026-11-05 11:11 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-04 11:09 ` [PATCH v4 3/8] dma-buf: transfer memcg charges via DMA_BUF_IOCTL_XFER_CHARGE Albert Esteve
2026-11-04 13:51 ` Christian König
2026-11-05 11:11 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-04 11:09 ` [PATCH v4 4/8] security: dma-buf: Add dma_buf_charge_task LSM hook Albert Esteve
2026-11-05 11:11 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-04 11:09 ` [PATCH v4 5/8] security: dma-buf: Add dma_buf_charge_cgroup " Albert Esteve
2026-11-04 11:09 ` [PATCH v4 6/8] selinux: Restrict cross-cgroup dma-buf charging Albert Esteve
2026-11-05 11:12 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-04 11:09 ` [PATCH v4 7/8] selinux: Restrict dma-buf direct cgroup charging Albert Esteve
2026-11-05 11:12 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-04 11:09 ` [PATCH v4 8/8] selftests/dmabuf-heaps: Add dma-buf memcg accounting tests Albert Esteve
2026-11-05 11:12 ` sashiko-bot
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