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t=1794303218; bh=bww7nw5bSwEPBt04rDt0/bI4su6VmPuV17HzMgP1WVA=; h=From:Subject:Reply-To:To:Cc:In-Reply-To:References:Date; b=IKmf+e1gFKkj418fSwF/WvpYdm5kRAazs7jwnCLr8UBX0mWUP8DQEFBBBEZlbkXZ1 XI4prTk7TROigxS8fxK3H7nyiNmObFLtBmkCA0ke0HXW7pt9dEt/aaSRLKtzC4egpf OEHRA7RgND8FIgqLmipqQVPz2GNvvRJE2PgE7T/NOFf640AwOp8vZiaRQth92bBap0 HKEfy9pnSL5/wTdbiAfkWabIrGIRQRAr+uE+2HXR6t6FbfBJFofcbxlw42H4vOVzXk w77kmjm4jAJg1fdzTMQ0RDczx8gBsj6Uaq5LnRuUkl/WYcX9JduP6Rs8JOjO15ilQh USFa7wOu4MpQw== Message-ID: From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 37/41] target: fileio: refuse files on pseudo filesystems as backing files Reply-To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev To: "Christian Brauner" Cc: "Jann Horn" , "Chris Mason" , "Josef Bacik" , "Christoph Hellwig" , linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org, "Alexander Viro" , "Jan Kara" , linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, target-devel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, apparmor@lists.ubuntu.com, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, linux-usb@vger.kernel.org, "Amir Goldstein" , "Chuck Lever" , "Jeff Layton" , "Anna Schumaker" , "Heiko Carstens" , "Vasily Gorbik" , "Alexander Gordeev" , "Christian Borntraeger" , "Mark Fasheh" , "Joel Becker" , "Joseph Qi" In-Reply-To: <20261110-work-loop-pseudo-v1-37-4c998976c6c7@kernel.org> References: <20261110-work-loop-pseudo-v1-0-4c998976c6c7@kernel.org> <20261110-work-loop-pseudo-v1-37-4c998976c6c7@kernel.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2026 09:33:35 +0000 X-Stat-Signature: 3dkudjup65sse5a91j74p44ogmzr9uno X-Rspam-User: X-Rspamd-Server: rspam05 X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 6934240006 X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_PASS,SPF_PASS autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=4.0.1 X-HE-Tag: 1794303219-250217 X-HE-Meta: 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 94AGKeKh mPOrWUafgHEDDncCSvg4ILpO4k1f/4yirn8Dhndhj3VHVGEQB3QtJnKQsh834m0sQKlkX0aqJEOjA2m+laB8zdigN6nN0Fbn26JYD67hr4+bub0Tb4dFvwC4Ix6RHIooH37ZJqRVumTliySdpfa5ql+cG+N+j/l5omij5K0svnMhepW2gC07zqw9pAcCJZHr8mB6mnidQlhivt9LnDCir0DuxlAJxUJxv8sjVhMUeGzwvEWZqsX9L1+kZNV045RnzR+IJ8igm3LRWVnUh/nfGzgEaUNPFqgNGti/o4irsedOj2cx5vRfgUJXBdEjmh3b3HqLmYgx+/gi6dzTjACCops3zkgdQdlT7l/+IIHObUGiOEz/KhgMo/c8e0ngF14utXljxPW3sFeF9YTXBt6vW1OjwdVozG7IeUpryH8e+88iWHnAeTKhD6rvmH8TswUCVDgKANxC33KIzTRaj06yeQ5VLwCPapGBsAo4dvltuLEkyRvp1joWdgp3RDIrqRR+TNhO0Wtzcq6B1i8EY+Dszt8gfah0gzZhHCchybYsmbT13IXcF9ciejjz2DvivJ9+D3KEml7bzULsMmpNYemYhE9kN9Q== Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: List-Subscribe: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 4.0.1 (2024-03-26) on aws-us-west-2-korg-listserv-alma10-1 X-Archived-By: Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue to consider: - [Medium] target: fileio: missing file_is_pseudo() check in fd_init_prot() -- commit 4e15db58376b542897dd4203d7acdfd99df1aec4 Author: Christian Brauner target: fileio: refuse files on pseudo filesystems as backing files This commit rejects files on pseudo filesystems in fd_configure_device() so that SCSI initiators cannot read or write kernel interfaces such as procfs or sysfs with kernel credentials. > diff --git a/drivers/target/target_core_file.c b/drivers/target/target_co= re_file.c > index a5391e57e9aa5..7a3cf63dc979b 100644 > --- a/drivers/target/target_core_file.c > +++ b/drivers/target/target_core_file.c > @@ -152,6 +152,13 @@ static int fd_configure_device(struct se_device *dev) > goto fail; > } > =20 > + if (file_is_pseudo(file)) { > + pr_err("FILEIO: %s is on a pseudo filesystem\n", > + fd_dev->fd_dev_name); > + ret =3D -EINVAL; > + goto fail; > + } [Severity: Medium] Should fd_init_prot() also check file_is_pseudo() (and ->read_iter / ->write_iter) when opening fd_dev->fd_prot_file? When DIF protection is enabled via pi_prot_type_store(), fd_init_prot() opens "%s.protection" by pathname without these checks. If that path is a symlink or bind mount to a procfs or sysfs file, fd_execute_rw_buffered() -> fd_do_rw() will still read and write it with kernel worker credentials. --=20 Sashiko AI review =C2=B7 https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261110-work-loop-= pseudo-v1-0-4c998976c6c7@kernel.org?part=3D37