From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"Ben Segall" <bsegall@google.com>,
"Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
"David Hildenbrand" <david@kernel.org>,
"David Howells" <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Davidlohr Bueso" <dave@stgolabs.net>,
"Dietmar Eggemann" <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>, "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Juri Lelli" <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
"K Prateek Nayak" <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
"Liam R. Howlett" <liam@infradead.org>,
"Lorenzo Stoakes" <ljs@kernel.org>,
"Manfred Spraul" <manfred@colorfullife.com>,
"Mel Gorman" <mgorman@suse.de>, "Michal Hocko" <mhocko@suse.com>,
"Mike Rapoport" <rppt@kernel.org>, "Neal Gompa" <neal@gompa.dev>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"Pavel Tikhomirov" <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Serge Hallyn" <sergeh@kernel.org>,
"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Steven Rostedt" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
"Suren Baghdasaryan" <surenb@google.com>,
"Valentin Schneider" <vschneid@redhat.com>,
"Vincent Guittot" <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
"Vlastimil Babka" <vbabka@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 07/13] rootns: Add rootns_enter() system call
Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 05:09:49 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-220142@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261117050841.3289652-8-jarkko@kernel.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 7 potential
issues to consider:
- [Critical] cred: privilege escalation and NNP bypass in
may_enter_rootns_creds()
- [High] cred: missing dumpability reset in copy_creds() on rootns entry
- [High] rootns: refcount underflow and UAF of rootns via setns() on
pid_ns
- [High] rootns: sys_rootns_enter() calls kernel_clone() without arch
fork wrappers
- [Medium] nsproxy: missing timens_commit() in copy_namespaces() on
rootns entry
- [Medium] fork: stale rootns->root used in copy_fs() after pivot_root()
- [Medium] rootns: rootns_may_setns() rejects setns() to inherited
rootns namespaces
--
commit 2b3b027946b3cddbb69540b1d520fd1496bf137c
Author: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
rootns: Add rootns_enter() system call
This commit introduces the rootns_enter() system call to fork a child
process directly into a configured rootns, along with credential checks
and namespace provenance tracking for setns().
> diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
> index d01df40a9a386..97d334db7758a 100644
> --- a/kernel/cred.c
> +++ b/kernel/cred.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -251,6 +255,25 @@ struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void)
> return new;
> }
>
> +static bool cred_cap_issubset(const struct cred *set,
> + const struct cred *subset);
> +
> +static bool may_enter_rootns_creds(const struct cred *old,
> + const struct cred *target)
> +{
> + if (cred_cap_issubset(old, target) &&
> + uid_eq(old->euid, target->euid) &&
> + gid_eq(old->egid, target->egid))
> + return true;
> +
> + if (task_no_new_privs(current) || old->user_ns == target->user_ns)
> + return false;
> +
> + return ns_capable(target->user_ns->parent, CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
> + ns_capable(target->user_ns->parent, CAP_SETUID) &&
> + ns_capable(target->user_ns->parent, CAP_SETGID);
> +}
[Severity: Critical]
Can a process bypass PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, regain dropped credentials, or
escape an LSM domain through may_enter_rootns_creds()?
When may_enter_rootns_creds() succeeds, copy_creds() replaces the child's
entire struct cred with dup_creds(rootns->cred). The early return runs
before the task_no_new_privs(current) check and only compares euid, egid,
and cred_cap_issubset(old, target). For a ROOTNS_USER namespace where
old->euid is target->user_ns->owner, cred_cap_issubset() returns true
even if old dropped capabilities or set PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, letting the
child gain full capabilities in target->user_ns.
Even in the same user namespace, the early return does not check real,
saved, or fs UIDs/GIDs, group_info, cap_effective, cap_bset, securebits,
or the LSM security blob. A process that creates a rootns and later
drops real/saved UIDs, clears supplementary groups, drops bounding set
bits, or restricts itself with Landlock can call rootns_enter() to spawn
a child with the original unrestricted rootns->cred.
In the second branch, CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID are checked only against
target->user_ns->parent without checking old->user_ns or verifying that
target's UIDs, GIDs, and supplementary groups are mapped into
target->user_ns->parent. Conversely, when old->user_ns == target->user_ns,
a caller holding CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_SETUID, and CAP_SETGID in old->user_ns
is rejected if its euid or egid differs from target.
> @@ -260,7 +283,8 @@ struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void)
> * The new process gets the current process's subjective credentials as its
> * objective and subjective credentials
> */
> -int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, u64 clone_flags)
> +int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, u64 clone_flags,
> + struct rootns *rootns)
> {
> struct cred *new;
> int ret;
> @@ -283,7 +307,13 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, u64 clone_flags)
> return 0;
> }
>
> - new = prepare_creds();
> + if (rootns) {
> + if (!may_enter_rootns_creds(current_cred(), rootns->cred))
> + return -EPERM;
> + new = dup_creds(rootns->cred);
> + } else {
> + new = prepare_creds();
> + }
> if (!new)
> return -ENOMEM;
[Severity: High]
Does switching credentials to rootns->cred in copy_creds() leave
p->exec_state->dumpable set to TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER?
In copy_process(), copy_exec_state() copies current->exec_state->dumpable
into p->exec_state before copy_creds() runs. Unlike commit_creds(),
copy_creds() does not reset dumpable to suid_dumpable when UIDs, GIDs, or
capabilities change. When a privileged daemon calls rootns_enter() to
fork into a rootns owned by an unprivileged user, processes inside the
target user namespace pass task_still_dumpable() and can ptrace the child
before execve(), reading the daemon's duplicated memory or stealing its
open file descriptors via pidfd_getfd().
> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> index 99e22b3cd213e..5e23d36b7ac3e 100644
> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -1671,6 +1683,10 @@ static int copy_fs(u64 clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk,
> tsk->real_fs = tsk->fs = copy_fs_struct(fs);
> if (!tsk->fs)
> return -ENOMEM;
> + if (rootns) {
> + set_fs_root(tsk->fs, &rootns->root);
> + set_fs_pwd(tsk->fs, &rootns->root);
> + }
> return 0;
> }
[Severity: Medium]
If a process inside a running rootns changes the root mount with
pivot_root() or overmounts "/", will subsequent rootns_enter() calls get
a stale root path here?
rootns->root holds the initial mount installed by MOVE_MOUNT_T_ROOTNS_ROOT
and is not updated by pivot_root(). Setting tsk->fs root and pwd to
&rootns->root gives newly entering tasks the old root mount instead of
the current root of rootns->ns->mnt_ns.
> diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c
> index a76837b3ee332..0c6407757d896 100644
> --- a/kernel/nsproxy.c
> +++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c
> @@ -169,13 +169,21 @@ struct nsproxy *create_new_namespaces(u64 flags,
> /*
> * called from clone. This now handles copy for nsproxy and all
> * namespaces therein.
> + *
> + * Namespaces derived from a rootns member inherit the same rootns domain.
> */
> -int copy_namespaces(u64 flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
> +int copy_namespaces(u64 flags, struct task_struct *tsk,
> + struct rootns *rootns)
> {
> struct nsproxy *old_ns = tsk->nsproxy;
> struct user_namespace *user_ns = task_cred_xxx(tsk, user_ns);
> struct nsproxy *new_ns;
>
> + if (rootns) {
> + get_nsproxy(rootns->ns);
> + tsk->nsproxy = rootns->ns;
> + return 0;
> + }
[Severity: Medium]
Does returning early here without calling timens_commit() leave the child
with the parent's VDSO vvar mappings when entering a rootns in a
different time namespace?
copy_mm() runs before copy_namespaces() and duplicates the caller's vvar
PTEs into tsk->mm. When old_ns->time_ns differs from rootns->ns->time_ns,
skipping timens_commit() leaves the old vvar mappings in place until
execve(), so vDSO clock_gettime() in the child reads the wrong time
namespace offsets.
> diff --git a/kernel/rootns.c b/kernel/rootns.c
> index f59b2fe9910de..e286c1e753b71 100644
> --- a/kernel/rootns.c
> +++ b/kernel/rootns.c
[ ... ]
> +static atomic64_t rootns_id = ATOMIC64_INIT(0);
> +
> +static void rootns_tag_namespaces(struct rootns *c, const struct nsproxy *old)
> +{
> + struct nsproxy *ns = c->ns;
> +
> + if (c->cred->user_ns != current_user_ns())
> + c->cred->user_ns->ns.rootns_id = c->id;
> + from_mnt_ns(ns->mnt_ns)->rootns_id = c->id;
> + ns->pid_ns_for_children->ns.rootns_id = c->id;
> + if (ns->uts_ns != old->uts_ns)
> + ns->uts_ns->ns.rootns_id = c->id;
> + if (ns->ipc_ns != old->ipc_ns)
> + ns->ipc_ns->ns.rootns_id = c->id;
> + if (ns->cgroup_ns != old->cgroup_ns)
> + ns->cgroup_ns->ns.rootns_id = c->id;
> + if (ns->net_ns != old->net_ns)
> + ns->net_ns->ns.rootns_id = c->id;
> +}
> +
> +bool rootns_may_setns(struct rootns *rootns, struct ns_common *ns)
> +{
> + if (!ns)
> + return false;
> + if (!rootns || is_current_namespace(ns))
> + return true;
> +
> + return ns->rootns_id == rootns->id;
> +}
[Severity: Medium]
Does rootns_may_setns() reject intra-rootns setns() back to a namespace
that the rootns inherited at creation time?
rootns_tag_namespaces() only sets c->id on newly created namespaces, so
any namespace inherited from the creator (such as time_ns, or UTS, IPC,
cgroup, net, or user namespaces omitted from rootns_create() flags) keeps
its previous rootns_id. If a task inside the rootns unshares one of
those namespace types, is_current_namespace(ns) becomes false for the
rootns's initial namespace and ns->rootns_id != rootns->id, causing
setns() back to PID 1's namespace to fail with -EPERM.
> @@ -249,6 +308,7 @@ static struct rootns *create_rootns(unsigned int flags)
> c->ns = ns;
> ns->rootns = c;
> ns->pid_ns_for_children->rootns = c;
> + rootns_tag_namespaces(c, current->nsproxy);
> nsproxy_ns_active_get(ns);
>
> return c;
[Severity: High]
Can an external task joining ns->pid_ns_for_children via setns() trigger
a refcount underflow and use-after-free on struct rootns?
create_rootns() sets ns->pid_ns_for_children->rootns = c without taking a
reference on c, and marks ns->pid_ns_for_children active in the namespace
tree via nsproxy_ns_active_get(ns). The reference on c that pairs with
exit_rootns()'s put_rootns(c) is only acquired in copy_rootns() when PID 1
is forked through sys_rootns_enter() in state ROOTNS_FORKING:
kernel/rootns.c:copy_rootns() {
if (likely(!c || READ_ONCE(c->state) != ROOTNS_FORKING))
return;
scoped_guard(spinlock, &c->lock) {
get_rootns(c);
...
}
Because rootns_may_setns() returns true when task_rootns(current) is NULL,
a process outside any rootns can open ns->pid_ns_for_children from nsfs,
call setns(fd, CLONE_NEWPID), and fork() PID 1 with args->rootns == NULL.
copy_rootns() then skips get_rootns(c), but when that child exits,
zap_pid_ns_processes() -> exit_rootns() still calls put_rootns(c),
dropping the rootns fd's reference and freeing c while the fd is still
open (or dereferencing a dangling pid_ns->rootns if the fd was already
closed, since put_rootns() does not clear pid_ns->rootns).
> @@ -455,3 +515,85 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(rootns_kill, int, rootnsfd, int, sig)
[ ... ]
> +SYSCALL_DEFINE1(rootns_enter, int, rootnsfd)
> +{
[ ... ]
> + args.rootns = rootns;
> + ret = kernel_clone(&args);
[Severity: High]
Is calling kernel_clone() directly from a regular C syscall safe on
architectures that require fork/clone entry wrappers?
On alpha, m68k, parisc, mips, arc, nios2, and openrisc, fork and clone
syscalls enter through assembly wrappers that allocate a switch_stack or
save callee-saved registers before calling C code, which copy_thread()
then reads from the stack. On sparc, the wrapper must flush register
windows via synchronize_user_stack(), and copy_thread() checks whether
UREG_G1 is __NR_clone3 to return 0 in the child instead of the parent's
PID. Calling kernel_clone() from sys_rootns_enter() bypasses those paths
and corrupts the child's register state or return value on those
architectures.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261117050841.3289652-1-jarkko@kernel.org?part=7
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-18 5:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-17 5:08 [RFC PATCH 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 01/13] nsproxy: Pass nsproxy to create_new_namespaces() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 02/13] rootns: Add core infrastructure for root namespaces Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 03/13] rootns: Track init lifecycle via copy_process() and pid_namespace Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 5:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 04/13] rootns: Add rootns_create() system call Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 5:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 05/13] rootns: Add rootns_wait() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 06/13] rootns: Add rootns_kill() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 5:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 07/13] rootns: Add rootns_enter() " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 17:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-17 20:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 20:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-18 5:09 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 08/13] fs: Support FSCONFIG_SET_ROOTNS in fsconfig() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 5:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 09/13] fs: Support installing rootns mount trees via move_mount() Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 5:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 10/13] arch: Wire up rootns system calls Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 5:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 11/13] docs: Document root namespace uAPI Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 12/13] selftests/rootns: Add root namespace test suite Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-18 5:09 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-17 5:08 ` [RFC PATCH 13/13] MAINTAINERS: Add entry for ROOT NAMESPACE Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 11:10 ` [RFC PATCH 00/13] Namespace for namespace roots Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 17:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-17 18:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-11-17 19:10 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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