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Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issues to consider: - [High] rootns: UAF via unreferenced pid_ns->rootns in create_rootns() - [High] rootns: cred->user mismatch in create_rootns_creds() for ROOTNS_USER -- commit 58de372391f170ac432dcc21ea8238b956c72a12 Author: Jarkko Sakkinen rootns: Add rootns_create() system call This commit adds the rootns_create() system call to allocate a detached root namespace with dedicated mount and PID namespaces, optional extra namespaces, and credentials, returning a control file descriptor. > diff --git a/kernel/rootns.c b/kernel/rootns.c > index e3b203322ae23..caa810b65d0da 100644 > --- a/kernel/rootns.c > +++ b/kernel/rootns.c > @@ -145,3 +145,142 @@ void exit_rootns(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns, stru= ct task_struct *tsk) > wake_up_poll(&c->waitq, EPOLLHUP); > put_rootns(c); > } > + > +/* > + * Create credentials for a rootns. Drop keyrings from the new credentia= l to > + * avoid unnecessary pinning. > + */ > +static const struct cred *create_rootns_creds(unsigned int flags) > +{ > + struct cred *new; > + int ret; > + > + new =3D prepare_creds(); > + if (!new) > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS > + key_put(new->thread_keyring); > + new->thread_keyring =3D NULL; > + key_put(new->process_keyring); > + new->process_keyring =3D NULL; > + key_put(new->session_keyring); > + new->session_keyring =3D NULL; > + key_put(new->request_key_auth); > + new->request_key_auth =3D NULL; > +#endif > + if (!(flags & ROOTNS_USER)) > + return new; > + > + ret =3D create_user_ns(new); > + if (ret < 0) > + goto err; > + new->euid =3D new->user_ns->owner; > + new->egid =3D new->user_ns->group; > + > + new->uid =3D new->euid; > + new->suid =3D new->euid; > + new->fsuid =3D new->euid; > + new->gid =3D new->egid; > + new->sgid =3D new->egid; > + new->fsgid =3D new->egid; > + ret =3D set_cred_ucounts(new); > + if (ret < 0) > + goto err; > + return new; [Severity: High] Does overwriting new->uid with new->euid without updating new->user leave cred->user out of sync when the caller's real and effective UIDs differ? prepare_creds() clones new->user from current->cred->user (the caller's real UID). If a process with real UID 0 switches its effective UID via seteuid() before calling rootns_create(ROOTNS_USER), new->uid and new->ucounts are set to the unprivileged effective UID, while new->user remains INIT_USER. Tasks entering the rootns then bypass the RLIMIT_NPROC check in copy_process() (which skips enforcement when p->real_cred->user =3D=3D INIT_USER) and charge per-user_struct resources to the wrong user_struct. Allocating the matching user_struct with alloc_uid(new->uid) and releasing the old one with free_uid(new->user), as set_user() does in kernel/sys.c, would keep cred->user consistent with cred->uid. > + > +err: > + abort_creds(new); > + return ERR_PTR(ret); > +} > + > +/* > + * Create a new rootns. > + */ > +static struct rootns *create_rootns(unsigned int flags) > +{ [ ... ] > + ns =3D create_new_namespaces(clone_flags, current->nsproxy, cred->user_= ns, > + NULL); > + if (IS_ERR(ns)) { > + ret =3D PTR_ERR(ns); > + goto err_put; > + } > + > + c->ns =3D ns; > + ns->pid_ns_for_children->rootns =3D c; > + nsproxy_ns_active_get(ns); [Severity: High] Can storing an uncounted pointer in ns->pid_ns_for_children->rootns lead to a use-after-free in exit_rootns()? create_new_namespaces() adds ns->pid_ns_for_children to the namespace tree, and nsproxy_ns_active_get() marks it active before any init task is forked into the rootns. However, the reference on c that pairs with exit_rootns() is only taken in copy_rootns() when c->state is ROOTNS_FORKING, and put_rootns() does not clear c->ns->pid_ns_for_children->rootns: kernel/rootns.c:copy_rootns() { if (likely(!c || READ_ONCE(c->state) !=3D ROOTNS_FORKING)) return; scoped_guard(spinlock, &c->lock) { get_rootns(c); ... } If a process with CAP_SYS_ADMIN in init_user_ns opens the active PID namespace via open_by_handle_at(FD_NSFS_ROOT, ...), enters it with setns(), and forks a child while c->state is still ROOTNS_EMPTY, that child becomes the PID namespace's child_reaper without copy_rootns() taking a reference on c. When the child exits, zap_pid_ns_processes() calls exit_rootns(), which dereferences the dangling pid_ns->rootns pointer if the rootns fd was already closed, or drops the control fd's sole reference on c while the fd is still open. --=20 Sashiko AI review =C2=B7 https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261117231352.3816= 603-1-jarkko@kernel.org?part=3D4