linux-modules.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-modules <linux-modules@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	"linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Per-process flag set via prctl() to deny module loading?
Date: Tue, 11 Apr 2023 00:04:31 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <52301293-0e21-2885-904b-776b82d5a18d@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2023041010-vacation-scribble-ba46@gregkh>

On 10.4.2023 21.37, Greg KH wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 10, 2023 at 01:06:00PM +0300, Topi Miettinen wrote:
>> I'd propose to add a per-process flag to irrevocably deny any loading of
>> kernel modules for the process and its children. The flag could be set (but
>> not unset) via prctl() and for unprivileged processes, only when
>> NoNewPrivileges is also set. This would be similar to CAP_SYS_MODULE, but
>> unlike capabilities, there would be no issues with namespaces since the flag
>> isn't namespaced.
>>
>> The implementation should be very simple.
> 
> Patches are always welcome to be reviewed.
> 
> But note, please watch out for processes that cause devices to be found,
> and then modules to be loaded that way, it's not going to be as simple
> as you might have imagined...

A very simple version would only add a simple check like 
!current->allow_module_load after every !capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE). It 
wouldn't block all the ways how modules could be caused to be loaded 
indirectly.

I think a less simple version could also do the check at __request_module().

-Topi


      reply	other threads:[~2023-04-10 21:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-04-10 10:06 Per-process flag set via prctl() to deny module loading? Topi Miettinen
2023-04-10 13:36 ` Tycho Andersen
2023-04-10 20:47   ` Topi Miettinen
2023-04-10 21:25     ` Tycho Andersen
2023-04-10 18:37 ` Greg KH
2023-04-10 21:04   ` Topi Miettinen [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=52301293-0e21-2885-904b-776b82d5a18d@gmail.com \
    --to=toiwoton@gmail.com \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-modules@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).