From: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com>,
Daniel Gomez <da.gomez@kernel.org>,
Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>,
Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@atomlin.com>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
linux-modules@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-usb@vger.kernel.org,
driver-core@lists.linux.dev, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] driver core: add TAINT_FORCED_BIND for when userspace manually messes with devices and drivers
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 2026 15:33:19 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <apA8n524yIn-g6ep@hovoldconsulting.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260826-bind_taint-v1-2-52b05f4a965c@linuxfoundation.org>
On Wed, Aug 26, 2026 at 11:19:33AM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> The ability to add and remove devices from a driver through the sysfs
> "bind" and "unbind" files was created all those decades ago as a way
> that kernel developers can iterate faster, and provide a debugging way
> for users to attempt to add a new device to a driver without having to
> rebuild their kernel.
>
> This api over the years has been abused and recently come under a major
> fuzzing "attack" through tools like syzbot which decided that it would
> attempt to just randomly bind any driver to any type of device, causing
> loads of unneeded errors and pointless kernel patches to be generated by
> unsuspecting new developers.
>
> Handle all of this by adding a new taint flag, TAINT_FORCED_BIND, which
> will be set on the driver if the bind/unbind sysfs files are ever
> successfully written to. This lets kernel developers "know" that a user
> is attempting to do something that is not normal, and as such, if the
> kernel breaks they get to keep the shiny pieces laying around on the
> floor.
>
> Note, the taint flag gets set _BEFORE_ the bind/unbind callback happens,
> as many times crashes/oops/warnings/failures happen within the callback,
> and the taint flag needs to be there to show what was being attempted.
> If it were to be set after the callback happens, the oops report would
> not properly reflect what foolishness was being attempted.
>
> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This makes it clear that this is a development tool, and it is a good
compromise preferable to adding unnecessary complexity or suppressing
the attributes completely just to prevent root from shooting themselves
in the foot:
Reviewed-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Johan
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-27 13:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-26 9:19 [PATCH 0/2] driver core: add TAINT_FORCED_BIND for when userspace manually messes with devices and drivers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-26 9:19 ` [PATCH 1/2] module: pull out add_taint_module() to be public Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-26 10:29 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-26 10:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-26 11:13 ` Aaron Tomlin
2026-08-26 11:54 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-27 13:36 ` Johan Hovold
2026-08-27 14:30 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-26 9:19 ` [PATCH 2/2] driver core: add TAINT_FORCED_BIND for when userspace manually messes with devices and drivers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-26 10:34 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-26 11:58 ` Bradley Morgan
2026-08-26 13:10 ` Greg KH
2026-08-26 14:26 ` Steven Rostedt
2026-08-26 14:34 ` Bradley Morgan
2026-08-27 13:33 ` Johan Hovold [this message]
2026-08-26 13:33 ` [PATCH 0/2] " Michal Pecio
2026-08-26 14:25 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-26 15:35 ` Michal Pecio
2026-08-26 15:44 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-08-26 17:09 ` Michal Pecio
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