* [PATCH v13 11/12] x509, pkcs7: Limit crypto combinations that may be used for module signing
From: David Howells @ 2026-01-20 14:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin
Cc: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers,
Luis Chamberlain, Petr Pavlu, Daniel Gomez, Sami Tolvanen,
Jason A . Donenfeld, Ard Biesheuvel, Stephan Mueller,
linux-crypto, keyrings, linux-modules, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20260120145103.1176337-1-dhowells@redhat.com>
Limit the set of crypto combinations that may be used for module signing as
no indication of hash algorithm used for signing is added to the hash of
the data, so in theory a data blob hashed with a different algorithm can be
substituted provided it has the same hash output.
This also rejects the use of less secure algorithms.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index 13a5616becaa..90b98e1a952d 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -24,6 +24,52 @@ MODULE_DESCRIPTION("In-software asymmetric public-key subtype");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Red Hat, Inc.");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+struct public_key_restriction {
+ const char *pkey_algo; /* Signing algorithm (e.g. "rsa") */
+ const char *pkey_enc; /* Signature encoding (e.g. "pkcs1") */
+ const char *hash_algo; /* Content hash algorithm (e.g. "sha256") */
+};
+
+static const struct public_key_restriction public_key_restrictions[] = {
+ /* algo encoding hash */
+ { "rsa", "pkcs1", "sha256" },
+ { "rsa", "pkcs1", "sha384" },
+ { "rsa", "pkcs1", "sha512" },
+ { "rsa", "emsa-pss", "sha512" },
+ { "ecdsa", "x962", "sha256" },
+ { "ecdsa", "x962", "sha384" },
+ { "ecdsa", "x962", "sha512" },
+ { "ecrdsa", "raw", "sha256" },
+ { "ecrdsa", "raw", "sha384" },
+ { "ecrdsa", "raw", "sha512" },
+ { "mldsa44", "raw", "sha512" },
+ { "mldsa65", "raw", "sha512" },
+ { "mldsa87", "raw", "sha512" },
+ /* ML-DSA may also do its own hashing over the entire message. */
+ { "mldsa44", "raw", "-" },
+ { "mldsa65", "raw", "-" },
+ { "mldsa87", "raw", "-" },
+};
+
+/*
+ * Determine if a particular key/hash combination is allowed.
+ */
+static int is_public_key_sig_allowed(const struct public_key_signature *sig)
+{
+ for (int i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(public_key_restrictions); i++) {
+ if (strcmp(public_key_restrictions[i].pkey_algo, sig->pkey_algo) != 0)
+ continue;
+ if (strcmp(public_key_restrictions[i].pkey_enc, sig->encoding) != 0)
+ continue;
+ if (strcmp(public_key_restrictions[i].hash_algo, sig->hash_algo) != 0)
+ continue;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ pr_warn_once("Public key signature combo (%s,%s,%s) rejected\n",
+ sig->pkey_algo, sig->encoding, sig->hash_algo);
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+}
+
/*
* Provide a part of a description of the key for /proc/keys.
*/
@@ -391,12 +437,17 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
bool issig;
int ret;
- pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
-
BUG_ON(!pkey);
BUG_ON(!sig);
BUG_ON(!sig->s);
+ ret = is_public_key_sig_allowed(sig);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ pr_devel("==>%s(%s,%s,%s)\n",
+ __func__, sig->pkey_algo, sig->encoding, sig->hash_algo);
+
/*
* If the signature specifies a public key algorithm, it *must* match
* the key's actual public key algorithm.
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v13 10/12] pkcs7: Add FIPS selftest for RSASSA-PSS
From: David Howells @ 2026-01-20 14:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin
Cc: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers,
Luis Chamberlain, Petr Pavlu, Daniel Gomez, Sami Tolvanen,
Jason A . Donenfeld, Ard Biesheuvel, Stephan Mueller,
linux-crypto, keyrings, linux-modules, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20260120145103.1176337-1-dhowells@redhat.com>
Add a FIPS selftest for RSASSA-PSS.
This is the 267th test vector taken from NIST's SigVerPSS_186-3.rsp in
186-3rsatestvectors.zip on line 2460, packaged into a rudimentary X.509
cert and PKCS#7 message.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest_rsa.c | 133 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 133 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest_rsa.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest_rsa.c
index 09c9815e456a..c06e32da0f7e 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest_rsa.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest_rsa.c
@@ -159,6 +159,131 @@ static const u8 certs_selftest_rsa_sig[] __initconst = {
"\x77\x55\x3c\x6f\x0c\x32\xd3\x8c\x44\x39\x71\x25\xfe\x96\xd2"
};
+/*
+ * RSASSA-PSS test vector from SigVerPSS_186-3.rsp published by NIST
+ * in 186-3rsatestvectors.zip. This is the 267th test on line 2460.
+ */
+static const u8 certs_selftest_rsassa_keys[] __initconst = {
+ "\x30\x82\x04\x4c\x30\x82\x02\x84\xa0\x03\x02\x01\x02\x02\x04\x01"
+ "\x23\x41\x0b\x30\x3d\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x01\x0a"
+ "\x30\x30\xa0\x0d\x30\x0b\x06\x09\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02"
+ "\x03\xa1\x1a\x30\x18\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x01\x08"
+ "\x30\x0b\x06\x09\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x03\xa2\x03\x02"
+ "\x01\x00\x30\x0f\x31\x0d\x30\x0b\x06\x03\x55\x04\x03\x0c\x04\x46"
+ "\x72\x65\x64\x30\x20\x17\x0d\x32\x36\x30\x31\x30\x31\x30\x30\x30"
+ "\x30\x30\x30\x5a\x18\x0f\x32\x31\x39\x39\x30\x31\x30\x31\x30\x30"
+ "\x30\x30\x30\x30\x5a\x30\x1c\x31\x1a\x30\x18\x06\x03\x55\x04\x03"
+ "\x0c\x11\x6e\x69\x73\x74\x5f\x72\x73\x61\x70\x73\x73\x5f\x32\x36"
+ "\x37\x5f\x50\x30\x82\x01\xa1\x30\x0b\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7"
+ "\x0d\x01\x01\x0a\x03\x82\x01\x90\x00\x30\x82\x01\x8b\x02\x82\x01"
+ "\x81\x00\xa3\xf2\x23\x5a\xd2\x05\x3b\x4c\x83\xfa\x38\xf8\x28\x4e"
+ "\xd8\x05\x42\x16\x21\xfe\x98\x84\x5f\xb0\x1b\x68\x9f\x5b\x82\xb3"
+ "\x25\x11\xb6\xd1\x61\x73\xe7\xb4\x0a\x66\xa3\xa9\x99\xc1\x89\xbe"
+ "\xb9\xe0\x68\x22\x15\x0a\xc8\xbe\x67\x71\x86\x37\x0c\x82\x3b\x52"
+ "\x77\xd9\x09\xde\x07\x56\x4e\x28\x1c\xca\x2f\x13\x87\x3d\x9d\x07"
+ "\xb7\xbd\x85\xa2\xb9\xac\x66\xf4\xce\x4f\x5e\x38\xb8\xe9\xee\xbe"
+ "\xc0\x4c\x8c\xaf\x31\x1e\x37\x5d\x69\xe8\x08\x51\xd5\x59\xb8\xe9"
+ "\x0e\x85\xba\x6b\x96\x47\x67\x90\xf7\x27\xc2\x5a\xa8\x16\x30\x62"
+ "\xec\x85\x43\xfc\xc7\x75\x9b\xe6\x2c\x77\x68\xec\xc3\x7f\x34\x0b"
+ "\xb0\x61\x02\x76\x2b\xf0\x44\x1c\xa1\xaa\x2c\x7a\x81\xbf\x37\xdc"
+ "\x8b\x27\x43\x9d\x3a\xbb\xa9\x38\x12\xc9\xbb\x44\xfe\x4d\x6a\x94"
+ "\xba\xae\x70\x93\x79\xf5\xce\x5d\x0c\x8f\x81\xd0\x00\x86\xb9\xca"
+ "\xa3\x02\x68\x19\x58\x8f\x49\x1b\x52\x58\x07\x89\x9c\xda\xb3\x3d"
+ "\x8e\x99\x21\x50\xd2\xb1\x05\xd3\xaa\xb6\x15\x21\x7c\x6a\x3d\x74"
+ "\x08\x31\xc7\xdc\x76\xfa\xab\xd9\xc9\xb9\x81\x7e\xad\x0b\x49\x45"
+ "\x66\xde\x14\x33\xff\xf5\xba\x46\x04\xc6\xb8\x44\x6f\x6f\xc3\x5e"
+ "\x74\x6a\xff\x84\xff\x8b\xd7\x50\x04\x10\xd1\x0e\x82\xbf\x4c\x90"
+ "\x36\x48\x9d\xe4\x7d\xee\x9a\x32\x7a\x5c\x45\x10\xd8\x56\x13\x21"
+ "\xb9\x1d\x55\x55\x9a\x4c\xba\x85\xe0\xc3\x61\x76\x70\x84\xb2\x52"
+ "\x17\xe8\xa6\x3c\x4e\x15\x1a\x1e\x88\x68\x9f\xee\xcf\xfd\x16\xfa"
+ "\x0a\x65\xae\x41\xd2\xba\xbc\xa9\x9c\xf1\xb9\x59\xc3\xc0\x76\xc0"
+ "\xf7\x59\x74\x14\x6f\x2c\xc4\x94\x12\x6f\xbe\xca\xd4\x21\x7b\x9a"
+ "\xaa\x00\xf1\x69\xfa\x51\x25\x27\xff\x5a\x0b\x50\xda\x46\xd6\xbe"
+ "\x87\x0e\xce\xf2\xaf\x7a\x1e\x6c\x45\x56\xf6\xf7\xa0\xa0\x0b\x9f"
+ "\x47\xcb\x02\x04\x00\xb3\xf5\x7f\xa3\x42\x30\x40\x30\x0c\x06\x03"
+ "\x55\x1d\x13\x01\x01\xff\x04\x02\x30\x00\x30\x0e\x06\x03\x55\x1d"
+ "\x0f\x01\x01\x00\x04\x04\x03\x02\x07\x80\x30\x20\x06\x03\x55\x1d"
+ "\x0e\x01\x01\x00\x04\x16\x04\x14\x2b\x73\x93\x2c\xf0\x6c\x34\x1a"
+ "\xa7\x2c\xce\xa4\xe0\xac\x35\xa9\x6c\xcc\x01\x0b\x30\x3d\x06\x09"
+ "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x01\x0a\x30\x30\xa0\x0d\x30\x0b\x06"
+ "\x09\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x03\xa1\x1a\x30\x18\x06\x09"
+ "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x01\x08\x30\x0b\x06\x09\x60\x86\x48"
+ "\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x03\xa2\x03\x02\x01\x00\x03\x82\x01\x81\x00"
+ "\x78\x7c\xdd\x6e\x1d\x4f\xdf\x9a\x0d\x9f\x96\x5e\xb8\x57\x25\x23"
+ "\x2a\x9e\xfc\xc1\x2a\xbf\xa1\xef\x25\xa8\x1e\x09\x83\x11\x1d\x90"
+ "\x00\xd4\x94\xfc\x7d\x32\x01\xeb\x3b\xba\x32\x73\x02\x72\x7f\x70"
+ "\x86\x14\x7a\x75\x5b\x48\x27\x03\x0c\x72\x76\x53\x6f\x42\x55\x93"
+ "\xab\x2e\x91\x27\xa1\x49\xe7\x54\xde\x7a\xd7\x7f\x8c\x20\x43\x26"
+ "\x7d\xb4\x9f\x8a\x35\x03\x1d\x83\xf1\x3d\x14\x0d\x5d\xf4\xd4\x24"
+ "\xb4\x74\x54\x04\x1a\x23\xb9\x2f\xf6\x81\x8e\x74\x9d\x65\xd0\x1f"
+ "\xc5\x0b\xeb\xf6\x91\x52\xf3\xf5\xfc\xb4\x87\x3b\x10\x36\x21\x9e"
+ "\x22\xb1\xe7\x4f\x83\x68\xc8\xc5\x01\xce\x65\xf2\xc9\x29\xd9\x0a"
+ "\x8e\xc8\x99\x63\x0e\x80\x25\x47\xa7\xca\x6e\xf1\x8a\xb3\xcb\x3e"
+ "\xb4\xa6\x91\xee\x68\xae\xbe\xaf\x1b\x9c\x05\x5a\xd1\x22\x18\x03"
+ "\x9c\xf4\x80\xcd\x8d\x29\x43\x32\xc5\xe1\x6e\xbb\xe6\xaf\x11\xf8"
+ "\xf4\xbf\x49\xf9\xb4\xed\x2f\x51\x11\x26\xae\x78\x0a\x3b\x78\x4b"
+ "\xe8\xf4\x42\x6a\xbd\x17\xf8\x60\x00\x74\x48\x3f\x2a\xf3\xb7\x1a"
+ "\x89\x64\xc6\xe0\xfa\x00\x04\x9a\x1d\x94\x0d\x34\xcc\x08\x83\x9e"
+ "\x0c\x59\x25\x3d\x99\xe9\x0d\x17\x87\x1d\x48\x96\x74\x69\x56\x63"
+ "\x62\x61\x66\xd3\x6f\xf9\x1d\x8c\x22\x99\xa2\xf0\x51\xea\xe2\xd6"
+ "\x0e\x8e\xd0\xbc\x3f\xac\x1e\x49\x0b\x47\x0c\x12\xf3\xd6\x97\xf6"
+ "\xfb\xfd\x88\x0d\xe2\xe9\x0e\x9f\xcb\xd4\x85\xfa\x33\x93\x19\x83"
+ "\x72\xfb\x01\xe4\xce\xc5\xc1\x59\x17\xec\xdd\x42\xe5\x7c\x43\xec"
+ "\xf5\x5a\x8c\x0e\xcb\xdc\xef\x1b\xce\x4e\x36\xd9\x6d\x46\xb1\x12"
+ "\x57\x0b\x53\xf8\x2f\x3d\x20\x64\xb0\x8a\xc7\x86\x13\x67\x0a\x28"
+ "\xea\x69\xd7\x9c\x71\x7e\xb1\xc2\x94\x09\x0d\xbd\x56\x1f\xa6\xe5"
+ "\x04\xd0\x9d\x26\x57\x24\xe3\x7a\x2d\xc6\xf4\x45\xf6\xf5\x28\xc9"
+};
+
+static const u8 certs_selftest_rsassa_data[] __initconst = {
+ "\xbe\x2f\x3e\x1d\xc8\xa3\x71\x15\x70\x40\x1b\xd5\x35\x18\x54\x26"
+ "\x94\x4d\x09\x4e\x84\x81\xa1\x2a\x43\x8d\xe0\x7d\x54\x76\x0c\x88"
+ "\xc9\x9d\x4f\xdb\xbe\x35\x5d\x6a\x26\xfa\x56\xe3\xca\x20\xee\x3f"
+ "\x8e\x8a\xcb\x98\xf6\x3d\x2f\x3a\xea\x14\xd6\xfc\xb6\xb5\x22\xd1"
+ "\x55\xc3\x75\x9a\xef\x56\xde\x3e\xa0\xa8\xf9\xfd\x7b\x11\x10\x01"
+ "\xcf\x35\x86\x36\xa8\x7c\x76\x5c\x99\xc2\x97\x5b\xb9\x50\x63\xd6"
+ "\xec\x0b\x78\x02\x64\xec\x3e\xb9\x67\xb0\xca\xca\x52\xd1\x02\x94"
+ "\xde\xb4\x02\xd3\xa2\x24\xbf\xb9\xd9\xff\xea\x41\x66\x2f\x18\xc0"
+};
+
+static const u8 certs_selftest_rsassa_sig[] __initconst = {
+ "\x30\x82\x02\x26\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x07\x02\xa0"
+ "\x82\x02\x17\x30\x82\x02\x13\x02\x01\x01\x31\x0d\x30\x0b\x06\x09"
+ "\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x03\x30\x0b\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48"
+ "\x86\xf7\x0d\x01\x07\x01\x31\x82\x01\xf0\x30\x82\x01\xec\x02\x01"
+ "\x01\x30\x17\x30\x0f\x31\x0d\x30\x0b\x06\x03\x55\x04\x03\x0c\x04"
+ "\x46\x72\x65\x64\x02\x04\x01\x23\x41\x0b\x30\x0b\x06\x09\x60\x86"
+ "\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02\x03\x30\x3d\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7"
+ "\x0d\x01\x01\x0a\x30\x30\xa0\x0d\x30\x0b\x06\x09\x60\x86\x48\x01"
+ "\x65\x03\x04\x02\x03\xa1\x1a\x30\x18\x06\x09\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7"
+ "\x0d\x01\x01\x08\x30\x0b\x06\x09\x60\x86\x48\x01\x65\x03\x04\x02"
+ "\x03\xa2\x03\x02\x01\x00\x04\x82\x01\x80\x78\x7c\xdd\x6e\x1d\x4f"
+ "\xdf\x9a\x0d\x9f\x96\x5e\xb8\x57\x25\x23\x2a\x9e\xfc\xc1\x2a\xbf"
+ "\xa1\xef\x25\xa8\x1e\x09\x83\x11\x1d\x90\x00\xd4\x94\xfc\x7d\x32"
+ "\x01\xeb\x3b\xba\x32\x73\x02\x72\x7f\x70\x86\x14\x7a\x75\x5b\x48"
+ "\x27\x03\x0c\x72\x76\x53\x6f\x42\x55\x93\xab\x2e\x91\x27\xa1\x49"
+ "\xe7\x54\xde\x7a\xd7\x7f\x8c\x20\x43\x26\x7d\xb4\x9f\x8a\x35\x03"
+ "\x1d\x83\xf1\x3d\x14\x0d\x5d\xf4\xd4\x24\xb4\x74\x54\x04\x1a\x23"
+ "\xb9\x2f\xf6\x81\x8e\x74\x9d\x65\xd0\x1f\xc5\x0b\xeb\xf6\x91\x52"
+ "\xf3\xf5\xfc\xb4\x87\x3b\x10\x36\x21\x9e\x22\xb1\xe7\x4f\x83\x68"
+ "\xc8\xc5\x01\xce\x65\xf2\xc9\x29\xd9\x0a\x8e\xc8\x99\x63\x0e\x80"
+ "\x25\x47\xa7\xca\x6e\xf1\x8a\xb3\xcb\x3e\xb4\xa6\x91\xee\x68\xae"
+ "\xbe\xaf\x1b\x9c\x05\x5a\xd1\x22\x18\x03\x9c\xf4\x80\xcd\x8d\x29"
+ "\x43\x32\xc5\xe1\x6e\xbb\xe6\xaf\x11\xf8\xf4\xbf\x49\xf9\xb4\xed"
+ "\x2f\x51\x11\x26\xae\x78\x0a\x3b\x78\x4b\xe8\xf4\x42\x6a\xbd\x17"
+ "\xf8\x60\x00\x74\x48\x3f\x2a\xf3\xb7\x1a\x89\x64\xc6\xe0\xfa\x00"
+ "\x04\x9a\x1d\x94\x0d\x34\xcc\x08\x83\x9e\x0c\x59\x25\x3d\x99\xe9"
+ "\x0d\x17\x87\x1d\x48\x96\x74\x69\x56\x63\x62\x61\x66\xd3\x6f\xf9"
+ "\x1d\x8c\x22\x99\xa2\xf0\x51\xea\xe2\xd6\x0e\x8e\xd0\xbc\x3f\xac"
+ "\x1e\x49\x0b\x47\x0c\x12\xf3\xd6\x97\xf6\xfb\xfd\x88\x0d\xe2\xe9"
+ "\x0e\x9f\xcb\xd4\x85\xfa\x33\x93\x19\x83\x72\xfb\x01\xe4\xce\xc5"
+ "\xc1\x59\x17\xec\xdd\x42\xe5\x7c\x43\xec\xf5\x5a\x8c\x0e\xcb\xdc"
+ "\xef\x1b\xce\x4e\x36\xd9\x6d\x46\xb1\x12\x57\x0b\x53\xf8\x2f\x3d"
+ "\x20\x64\xb0\x8a\xc7\x86\x13\x67\x0a\x28\xea\x69\xd7\x9c\x71\x7e"
+ "\xb1\xc2\x94\x09\x0d\xbd\x56\x1f\xa6\xe5\x04\xd0\x9d\x26\x57\x24"
+ "\xe3\x7a\x2d\xc6\xf4\x45\xf6\xf5\x28\xc9"
+};
+
void __init fips_signature_selftest_rsa(void)
{
fips_signature_selftest("RSA",
@@ -168,4 +293,12 @@ void __init fips_signature_selftest_rsa(void)
sizeof(certs_selftest_rsa_data) - 1,
certs_selftest_rsa_sig,
sizeof(certs_selftest_rsa_sig) - 1);
+
+ fips_signature_selftest("RSASSA",
+ certs_selftest_rsassa_keys,
+ sizeof(certs_selftest_rsassa_keys) - 1,
+ certs_selftest_rsassa_data,
+ sizeof(certs_selftest_rsassa_data) - 1,
+ certs_selftest_rsassa_sig,
+ sizeof(certs_selftest_rsassa_sig) - 1);
}
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v13 09/12] modsign: Enable RSASSA-PSS module signing
From: David Howells @ 2026-01-20 14:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin
Cc: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers,
Luis Chamberlain, Petr Pavlu, Daniel Gomez, Sami Tolvanen,
Jason A . Donenfeld, Ard Biesheuvel, Stephan Mueller,
linux-crypto, keyrings, linux-modules, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20260120145103.1176337-1-dhowells@redhat.com>
Add support for RSASSA-PSS signatures (RFC8017) for use with module signing
and other public key cryptography done by the kernel.
Note that only signature verification is supported by the kernel.
Note further that this alters some of the same code as the MLDSA support,
so that needs to be applied first to avoid conflicts.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
---
Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst | 5 ++-
certs/Kconfig | 6 +++
certs/Makefile | 1 +
scripts/sign-file.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++-
4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst
index 7f2f127dc76f..aa24715cd2d8 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst
@@ -32,8 +32,9 @@ type. The built-in facility currently only supports the RSA, NIST P-384 ECDSA
and NIST FIPS-204 ML-DSA public key signing standards (though it is pluggable
and permits others to be used). For RSA and ECDSA, the possible hash
algorithms that can be used are SHA-2 and SHA-3 of sizes 256, 384, and 512 (the
-algorithm is selected by data in the signature); ML-DSA does its own hashing,
-but is allowed to be used with a SHA512 hash for signed attributes.
+algorithm is selected by data in the signature); RSASSA-PSS is allowed to use
+SHA512 only; ML-DSA does its own hashing, but is allowed to be used with a
+SHA512 hash for signed attributes.
==========================
diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig
index 67a5786423b5..524d1747c541 100644
--- a/certs/Kconfig
+++ b/certs/Kconfig
@@ -27,6 +27,12 @@ config MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_RSA
help
Use an RSA key for module signing.
+config MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_RSASSA_PSS
+ bool "RSASSA-PSS"
+ select CRYPTO_RSA
+ help
+ Use an RSASSA-PSS key for module signing.
+
config MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_ECDSA
bool "ECDSA"
select CRYPTO_ECDSA
diff --git a/certs/Makefile b/certs/Makefile
index 3ee1960f9f4a..3b5a3a303f4c 100644
--- a/certs/Makefile
+++ b/certs/Makefile
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ targets += x509_certificate_list
# boolean option and we unfortunately can't make it depend on !RANDCONFIG.
ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY),certs/signing_key.pem)
+keytype-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_RSASSA_PSS) := -newkey rsassa-pss
keytype-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_ECDSA) := -newkey ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:secp384r1
keytype-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_MLDSA_44) := -newkey ml-dsa-44
keytype-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_MLDSA_65) := -newkey ml-dsa-65
diff --git a/scripts/sign-file.c b/scripts/sign-file.c
index 547b97097230..800e2e2e36c3 100644
--- a/scripts/sign-file.c
+++ b/scripts/sign-file.c
@@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
EVP_PKEY *private_key;
#ifndef USE_PKCS7
CMS_ContentInfo *cms = NULL;
+ CMS_SignerInfo *signer;
unsigned int use_keyid = 0;
#else
PKCS7 *pkcs7 = NULL;
@@ -338,12 +339,46 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
flags |= use_signed_attrs;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(private_key, "RSASSA-PSS")) {
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx;
+ char mdname[1024] = {};
+
+ pkctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(private_key, NULL);
+
+ ERR(!EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pkctx), "EVP_PKEY_sign_init");
+ ERR(!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING),
+ "EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding");
+ ERR(!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md_name(pkctx, hash_algo, NULL),
+ "EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md_name");
+
+ ERR(!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md_name(pkctx, mdname, sizeof(mdname)),
+ "EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md_name");
+ printf("RSASSA-PSS %s\n", mdname);
+ flags |= CMS_KEY_PARAM;
+ }
+
/* Load the signature message from the digest buffer. */
cms = CMS_sign(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, flags);
ERR(!cms, "CMS_sign");
- ERR(!CMS_add1_signer(cms, x509, private_key, digest_algo, flags),
- "CMS_add1_signer");
+ signer = CMS_add1_signer(cms, x509, private_key, digest_algo, flags);
+ ERR(!signer, "CMS_add1_signer");
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(private_key, "RSASSA-PSS")) {
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx;
+ char mdname[1024] = {};
+
+ pkctx = CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(signer);
+ ERR(!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING),
+ "EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding");
+ ERR(!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md_name(pkctx, hash_algo, NULL),
+ "EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md_name");
+
+ ERR(!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md_name(pkctx, mdname, sizeof(mdname)),
+ "EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md_name");
+ printf("RSASSA-PSS %s\n", mdname);
+ }
+
ERR(CMS_final(cms, bm, NULL, flags) != 1,
"CMS_final");
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v13 08/12] pkcs7, x509: Add RSASSA-PSS support
From: David Howells @ 2026-01-20 14:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin
Cc: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers,
Luis Chamberlain, Petr Pavlu, Daniel Gomez, Sami Tolvanen,
Jason A . Donenfeld, Ard Biesheuvel, Stephan Mueller,
linux-crypto, keyrings, linux-modules, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20260120145103.1176337-1-dhowells@redhat.com>
Add support for RSASSA-PSS keys and signatures to the PKCS#7 and X.509
implementations. This requires adding support for algorithm parameters for
keys and signatures as RSASSA-PSS needs metadata. The ASN.1 encoded data
is converted into a printable key=value list string and passed to the
verification code.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 12 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/mgf1_params.asn1 | 12 ++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 | 2 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 114 +++++-----
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 10 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_params.asn1 | 25 +++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_parser.c | 240 ++++++++++++++++++++++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_parser.h | 25 +++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 | 2 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 100 ++++-----
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 45 +++-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 36 +++-
include/linux/oid_registry.h | 2 +
13 files changed, 503 insertions(+), 122 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/mgf1_params.asn1
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_params.asn1
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_parser.c
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_parser.h
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
index bc65d3b98dcb..c5aed382ee8a 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
@@ -21,7 +21,11 @@ x509_key_parser-y := \
x509_akid.asn1.o \
x509_cert_parser.o \
x509_loader.o \
- x509_public_key.o
+ x509_public_key.o \
+ rsassa_params.asn1.o \
+ rsassa_parser.o \
+ mgf1_params.asn1.o
+
obj-$(CONFIG_FIPS_SIGNATURE_SELFTEST) += x509_selftest.o
x509_selftest-y += selftest.o
x509_selftest-$(CONFIG_FIPS_SIGNATURE_SELFTEST_RSA) += selftest_rsa.o
@@ -31,8 +35,14 @@ $(obj)/x509_cert_parser.o: \
$(obj)/x509.asn1.h \
$(obj)/x509_akid.asn1.h
+$(obj)/rsassa_parser.o: \
+ $(obj)/rsassa_params.asn1.h \
+ $(obj)/mgf1_params.asn1.h
+
$(obj)/x509.asn1.o: $(obj)/x509.asn1.c $(obj)/x509.asn1.h
$(obj)/x509_akid.asn1.o: $(obj)/x509_akid.asn1.c $(obj)/x509_akid.asn1.h
+$(obj)/rsassa_params.asn1.o: $(obj)/rsassa_params.asn1.c $(obj)/rsassa_params.asn1.h
+$(obj)/mgf1_params.asn1.o: $(obj)/mgf1_params.asn1.c $(obj)/mgf1_params.asn1.h
#
# PKCS#8 private key handling
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mgf1_params.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mgf1_params.asn1
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c3bc4643e72c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mgf1_params.asn1
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+-- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+--
+-- Copyright (C) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as authors
+-- of the code
+--
+--
+-- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4055 Section 6.
+
+AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+ algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ mgf1_note_OID }),
+ parameters ANY OPTIONAL
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
index 28e1f4a41c14..03c2248f23bc 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ UnauthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
- parameters ANY OPTIONAL
+ parameters ANY OPTIONAL ({ pkcs7_sig_note_algo_params })
}
EncryptedDigest ::= OCTET STRING ({ pkcs7_sig_note_signature })
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
index 90c36fe1b5ed..47d3c1920e8f 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include "pkcs7_parser.h"
+#include "rsassa_parser.h"
#include "pkcs7.asn1.h"
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("PKCS#7 parser");
@@ -28,14 +29,16 @@ struct pkcs7_parse_context {
struct x509_certificate **ppcerts;
unsigned long data; /* Start of data */
enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */
- unsigned x509_index;
- unsigned sinfo_index;
+ unsigned int x509_index;
+ unsigned int sinfo_index;
+ unsigned int algo_params_size;
+ const void *algo_params;
const void *raw_serial;
- unsigned raw_serial_size;
- unsigned raw_issuer_size;
+ unsigned int raw_serial_size;
+ unsigned int raw_issuer_size;
const void *raw_issuer;
const void *raw_skid;
- unsigned raw_skid_size;
+ unsigned int raw_skid_size;
bool expect_skid;
};
@@ -225,45 +228,29 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ const char *algo;
- switch (ctx->last_oid) {
- case OID_sha1:
- ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha1";
- break;
- case OID_sha256:
- ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha256";
- break;
- case OID_sha384:
- ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha384";
- break;
- case OID_sha512:
- ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha512";
- break;
- case OID_sha224:
- ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha224";
- break;
- case OID_sm3:
- ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sm3";
- break;
- case OID_gost2012Digest256:
- ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "streebog256";
- break;
- case OID_gost2012Digest512:
- ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "streebog512";
- break;
- case OID_sha3_256:
- ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha3-256";
- break;
- case OID_sha3_384:
- ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha3-384";
- break;
- case OID_sha3_512:
- ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha3-512";
- break;
- default:
- printk("Unsupported digest algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
+ algo = oid_to_hash(ctx->last_oid);
+ if (!algo) {
+ pr_notice("Unsupported digest algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
return -ENOPKG;
}
+
+ ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = algo;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note the parameters for the signature.
+ */
+int pkcs7_sig_note_algo_params(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ ctx->algo_params = value - hdrlen;
+ ctx->algo_params_size = vlen + hdrlen;
return 0;
}
@@ -275,11 +262,21 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ struct public_key_signature *sig = ctx->sinfo->sig;
+ int err;
switch (ctx->last_oid) {
case OID_rsaEncryption:
- ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
- ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "pkcs1";
+ sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
+ sig->encoding = "pkcs1";
+ break;
+ case OID_id_rsassa_pss:
+ err = rsassa_parse_sig_params(sig, ctx->algo_params,
+ ctx->algo_params_size);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+ sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
+ sig->encoding = "emsa-pss";
break;
case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha1:
case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha224:
@@ -289,33 +286,36 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha3_256:
case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha3_384:
case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha3_512:
- ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "ecdsa";
- ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "x962";
+ sig->pkey_algo = "ecdsa";
+ sig->encoding = "x962";
break;
case OID_gost2012PKey256:
case OID_gost2012PKey512:
- ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "ecrdsa";
- ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "raw";
+ sig->pkey_algo = "ecrdsa";
+ sig->encoding = "raw";
break;
case OID_id_ml_dsa_44:
- ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "mldsa44";
- ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "raw";
- ctx->sinfo->sig->algo_does_hash = true;
+ sig->pkey_algo = "mldsa44";
+ sig->encoding = "raw";
+ sig->algo_does_hash = true;
break;
case OID_id_ml_dsa_65:
- ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "mldsa65";
- ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "raw";
- ctx->sinfo->sig->algo_does_hash = true;
+ sig->pkey_algo = "mldsa65";
+ sig->encoding = "raw";
+ sig->algo_does_hash = true;
break;
case OID_id_ml_dsa_87:
- ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "mldsa87";
- ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "raw";
- ctx->sinfo->sig->algo_does_hash = true;
+ sig->pkey_algo = "mldsa87";
+ sig->encoding = "raw";
+ sig->algo_does_hash = true;
break;
default:
- printk("Unsupported pkey algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
+ pr_notice("Unsupported pkey algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
return -ENOPKG;
}
+
+ ctx->algo_params = NULL;
+ ctx->algo_params_size = 0;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index 61dc4f626620..13a5616becaa 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -100,6 +100,16 @@ software_key_determine_akcipher(const struct public_key *pkey,
}
return n >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ? -EINVAL : 0;
}
+ if (strcmp(encoding, "emsa-pss") == 0) {
+ if (op != kernel_pkey_sign &&
+ op != kernel_pkey_verify)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ *sig = true;
+ if (!hash_algo)
+ hash_algo = "none";
+ n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "rsassa-pss");
+ return n >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ? -EINVAL : 0;
+ }
if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
/*
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_params.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_params.asn1
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..95a4e5f0dcd5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_params.asn1
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+-- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+--
+-- Copyright (C) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as authors
+-- of the code
+--
+--
+-- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4055 Section 6.
+
+RSASSA-PSS-params ::= SEQUENCE {
+ hashAlgorithm [0] HashAlgorithm,
+ maskGenAlgorithm [1] MaskGenAlgorithm,
+ saltLength [2] INTEGER ({ rsassa_note_salt_length }),
+ trailerField [3] TrailerField OPTIONAL
+}
+
+TrailerField ::= INTEGER ({ rsassa_note_trailer })
+-- { trailerFieldBC(1) }
+
+HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier ({ rsassa_note_hash_algo })
+MaskGenAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier ({ rsassa_note_maskgen_algo })
+
+AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
+ algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ rsassa_note_OID }),
+ parameters ANY OPTIONAL ({ rsassa_note_params })
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_parser.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b80720fa94be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_parser.c
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* RSASSA-PSS ASN.1 parameter parser
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2025 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "RSASSA-PSS: "fmt
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/asn1.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
+#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include "x509_parser.h"
+#include "rsassa_parser.h"
+#include "rsassa_params.asn1.h"
+#include "mgf1_params.asn1.h"
+
+struct rsassa_parse_context {
+ struct rsassa_parameters *rsassa; /* The parsed parameters */
+ unsigned long data; /* Start of data */
+ const void *params; /* Algo parameters */
+ unsigned int params_len; /* Length of algo parameters */
+ enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */
+ enum OID mgf1_last_oid; /* Last OID encountered in MGF1 */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Parse an RSASSA parameter block.
+ */
+struct rsassa_parameters *rsassa_params_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+ struct rsassa_parse_context ctx = {};
+ long ret;
+
+ struct rsassa_parameters *rsassa __free(kfree) =
+ kzalloc(sizeof(*rsassa), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rsassa)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ ctx.rsassa = rsassa;
+ ctx.data = (unsigned long)data;
+
+ /* Attempt to decode the parameters */
+ ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&rsassa_params_decoder, &ctx, data, datalen);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_debug("RSASSA parse failed %ld\n", ret);
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+ }
+
+ return no_free_ptr(rsassa);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how
+ * to interpret it.
+ */
+int rsassa_note_OID(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct rsassa_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ ctx->last_oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+ if (ctx->last_oid == OID__NR) {
+ char buffer[56];
+
+ sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+ pr_debug("Unknown OID: %s\n", buffer);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse trailerField. We only accept trailerFieldBC.
+ */
+int rsassa_note_trailer(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ if (vlen != 1 || *(u8 *)value != 0x01) {
+ pr_debug("Unknown trailerField\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int rsassa_note_hash_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct rsassa_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ ctx->rsassa->hash_algo = ctx->last_oid;
+ pr_debug("HASH-ALGO %u %u\n", ctx->rsassa->hash_algo, ctx->params_len);
+ ctx->params = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int rsassa_note_maskgen_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct rsassa_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ int ret;
+
+ ctx->rsassa->maskgen_algo = ctx->last_oid;
+ pr_debug("MGF-ALGO %u %u\n", ctx->rsassa->maskgen_algo, ctx->params_len);
+
+ switch (ctx->rsassa->maskgen_algo) {
+ case OID_id_mgf1:
+ if (!vlen) {
+ pr_debug("MGF1 missing parameters\n");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&mgf1_params_decoder, ctx,
+ ctx->params, ctx->params_len);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_debug("MGF1 parse failed %d\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ ctx->rsassa->maskgen_hash = ctx->mgf1_last_oid;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ pr_debug("Unsupported MaskGenAlgorithm %d\n", ret);
+ return -ENOPKG;
+ }
+
+ ctx->params = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int rsassa_note_salt_length(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct rsassa_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ u32 salt_len = 0;
+
+ if (!vlen) {
+ pr_debug("Salt len bad integer\n");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+ if (vlen > 4) {
+ pr_debug("Salt len too long %zu\n", vlen);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+ if (((u8 *)value)[0] & 0x80) {
+ pr_debug("Salt len negative\n");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < vlen; i++) {
+ salt_len <<= 8;
+ salt_len |= ((u8 *)value)[i];
+ }
+
+ ctx->rsassa->salt_len = salt_len;
+ pr_debug("Salt-Len %u\n", salt_len);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract arbitrary parameters.
+ */
+int rsassa_note_params(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct rsassa_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ ctx->params = value - hdrlen;
+ ctx->params_len = vlen + hdrlen;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how to
+ * interpret it.
+ */
+int mgf1_note_OID(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
+{
+ struct rsassa_parse_context *ctx = context;
+
+ ctx->mgf1_last_oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
+ if (ctx->mgf1_last_oid == OID__NR) {
+ char buffer[56];
+
+ sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+ pr_debug("Unknown MGF1 OID: %s\n", buffer);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse the signature parameter block and generate a suitable info string from
+ * it.
+ */
+int rsassa_parse_sig_params(struct public_key_signature *sig,
+ const u8 *sig_params, unsigned int sig_params_size)
+{
+ const char *mf, *mh;
+
+ if (!sig_params || !sig_params_size) {
+ pr_debug("sig algo without parameters\n");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ struct rsassa_parameters *rsassa __free(rsassa_params_free) =
+ rsassa_params_parse(sig_params, sig_params_size);
+ if (IS_ERR(rsassa))
+ return PTR_ERR(rsassa);
+
+ sig->hash_algo = oid_to_hash(rsassa->hash_algo);
+ if (!sig->hash_algo) {
+ pr_notice("Unsupported hash: %u\n", rsassa->hash_algo);
+ return -ENOPKG;
+ }
+
+ switch (rsassa->maskgen_algo) {
+ case OID_id_mgf1:
+ mf = "mgf1";
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_notice("Unsupported maskgen algo: %u\n", rsassa->maskgen_algo);
+ return -ENOPKG;
+ }
+
+ mh = oid_to_hash(rsassa->maskgen_hash);
+ if (!mh) {
+ pr_notice("Unsupported MGF1 hash: %u\n", rsassa->maskgen_hash);
+ return -ENOPKG;
+ }
+
+ sig->info = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "sighash=%s pss_mask=%s,%s pss_salt=%u",
+ sig->hash_algo, mf, mh, rsassa->salt_len);
+ if (!sig->info)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ pr_debug("Info string: %s\n", sig->info);
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_parser.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b80401a3de8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_parser.h
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
+/* RSASSA-PSS parameter parsing context
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2025 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+
+struct rsassa_parameters {
+ enum OID hash_algo; /* Hash algorithm identifier */
+ enum OID maskgen_algo; /* Mask gen algorithm identifier */
+ enum OID maskgen_hash; /* Mask gen hash algorithm identifier */
+ u32 salt_len;
+};
+
+struct rsassa_parameters *rsassa_params_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen);
+int rsassa_parse_sig_params(struct public_key_signature *sig,
+ const u8 *sig_params, unsigned int sig_params_size);
+
+static inline void rsassa_params_free(struct rsassa_parameters *params)
+{
+ kfree(params);
+}
+DEFINE_FREE(rsassa_params_free, struct rsassa_parameters*, rsassa_params_free(_T))
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1
index feb9573cacce..453b72eba1fe 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ x509_note_OID }),
- parameters ANY OPTIONAL ({ x509_note_params })
+ parameters ANY OPTIONAL ({ x509_note_algo_id_params })
}
Name ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index 5ab5b4e5f1b4..a4b848628e37 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -15,28 +15,7 @@
#include "x509_parser.h"
#include "x509.asn1.h"
#include "x509_akid.asn1.h"
-
-struct x509_parse_context {
- struct x509_certificate *cert; /* Certificate being constructed */
- unsigned long data; /* Start of data */
- const void *key; /* Key data */
- size_t key_size; /* Size of key data */
- const void *params; /* Key parameters */
- size_t params_size; /* Size of key parameters */
- enum OID key_algo; /* Algorithm used by the cert's key */
- enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */
- enum OID sig_algo; /* Algorithm used to sign the cert */
- u8 o_size; /* Size of organizationName (O) */
- u8 cn_size; /* Size of commonName (CN) */
- u8 email_size; /* Size of emailAddress */
- u16 o_offset; /* Offset of organizationName (O) */
- u16 cn_offset; /* Offset of commonName (CN) */
- u16 email_offset; /* Offset of emailAddress */
- unsigned raw_akid_size;
- const void *raw_akid; /* Raw authorityKeyId in ASN.1 */
- const void *akid_raw_issuer; /* Raw directoryName in authorityKeyId */
- unsigned akid_raw_issuer_size;
-};
+#include "rsassa_parser.h"
/*
* Free an X.509 certificate
@@ -60,12 +39,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_free_certificate);
*/
struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
{
- struct x509_certificate *cert __free(x509_free_certificate) = NULL;
- struct x509_parse_context *ctx __free(kfree) = NULL;
struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
long ret;
- cert = kzalloc(sizeof(struct x509_certificate), GFP_KERNEL);
+ struct x509_certificate *cert __free(x509_free_certificate) =
+ kzalloc(sizeof(struct x509_certificate), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cert)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
cert->pub = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -74,7 +52,9 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
cert->sig = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key_signature), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cert->sig)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct x509_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ struct x509_parse_context *ctx __free(kfree) =
+ kzalloc(sizeof(struct x509_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
@@ -104,15 +84,15 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
cert->pub->keylen = ctx->key_size;
- cert->pub->params = kmemdup(ctx->params, ctx->params_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ cert->pub->params = kmemdup(ctx->key_params, ctx->key_params_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!cert->pub->params)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- cert->pub->paramlen = ctx->params_size;
+ cert->pub->paramlen = ctx->key_params_size;
cert->pub->algo = ctx->key_algo;
/* Grab the signature bits */
- ret = x509_get_sig_params(cert);
+ ret = x509_get_sig_params(cert, ctx);
if (ret < 0)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
@@ -146,7 +126,7 @@ int x509_note_OID(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
ctx->last_oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
if (ctx->last_oid == OID__NR) {
- char buffer[50];
+ char buffer[56];
sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
pr_debug("Unknown OID: [%lu] %s\n",
(unsigned long)value - ctx->data, buffer);
@@ -179,6 +159,7 @@ int x509_note_sig_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
+ int err;
pr_debug("PubKey Algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
@@ -210,6 +191,9 @@ int x509_note_sig_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha1";
goto ecdsa;
+ case OID_id_rsassa_pss:
+ goto rsassa_pss;
+
case OID_id_rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_with_sha3_256:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha3-256";
goto rsa_pkcs1;
@@ -268,6 +252,19 @@ int x509_note_sig_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
goto ml_dsa;
}
+rsassa_pss:
+ err = rsassa_parse_sig_params(ctx->cert->sig,
+ ctx->algo_params, ctx->algo_params_size);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
+ ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
+ ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "emsa-pss";
+ ctx->sig_algo = ctx->last_oid;
+ ctx->algo_params = NULL;
+ ctx->algo_params_size = 0;
+ return 0;
+
rsa_pkcs1:
ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "pkcs1";
@@ -324,8 +321,8 @@ int x509_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
vlen--;
}
- ctx->cert->raw_sig = value;
- ctx->cert->raw_sig_size = vlen;
+ ctx->sig = value;
+ ctx->sig_size = vlen;
return 0;
}
@@ -479,23 +476,16 @@ int x509_note_subject(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
}
/*
- * Extract the parameters for the public key
+ * Extract the parameters for an AlgorithmIdentifier.
*/
-int x509_note_params(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
- unsigned char tag,
- const void *value, size_t vlen)
+int x509_note_algo_id_params(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
+ unsigned char tag,
+ const void *value, size_t vlen)
{
struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
- /*
- * AlgorithmIdentifier is used three times in the x509, we should skip
- * first and ignore third, using second one which is after subject and
- * before subjectPublicKey.
- */
- if (!ctx->cert->raw_subject || ctx->key)
- return 0;
- ctx->params = value - hdrlen;
- ctx->params_size = vlen + hdrlen;
+ ctx->algo_params = value - hdrlen;
+ ctx->algo_params_size = vlen + hdrlen;
return 0;
}
@@ -514,12 +504,28 @@ int x509_extract_key_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
case OID_rsaEncryption:
ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "rsa";
break;
+ case OID_id_rsassa_pss:
+ /* Parameters are optional for the key itself. */
+ if (ctx->algo_params_size) {
+ ctx->key_params = ctx->algo_params;
+ ctx->key_params_size = ctx->algo_params_size;
+ ctx->algo_params = NULL;
+ ctx->algo_params_size = 0;
+
+ struct rsassa_parameters *params __free(rsassa_params_free) =
+ rsassa_params_parse(ctx->key_params, ctx->key_params_size);
+ if (IS_ERR(params))
+ return PTR_ERR(params);
+ break;
+ }
+ ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "rsa";
+ break;
case OID_gost2012PKey256:
case OID_gost2012PKey512:
ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "ecrdsa";
break;
case OID_id_ecPublicKey:
- if (parse_OID(ctx->params, ctx->params_size, &oid) != 0)
+ if (parse_OID(ctx->algo_params, ctx->algo_params_size, &oid) != 0)
return -EBADMSG;
switch (oid) {
@@ -557,6 +563,8 @@ int x509_extract_key_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
return -EBADMSG;
ctx->key = value + 1;
ctx->key_size = vlen - 1;
+ ctx->algo_params = NULL;
+ ctx->algo_params_size = 0;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index 0688c222806b..578de49c37bc 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -22,18 +22,16 @@ struct x509_certificate {
time64_t valid_from;
time64_t valid_to;
const void *tbs; /* Signed data */
- unsigned tbs_size; /* Size of signed data */
- unsigned raw_sig_size; /* Size of signature */
- const void *raw_sig; /* Signature data */
+ unsigned int tbs_size; /* Size of signed data */
const void *raw_serial; /* Raw serial number in ASN.1 */
- unsigned raw_serial_size;
- unsigned raw_issuer_size;
+ unsigned int raw_serial_size;
+ unsigned int raw_issuer_size;
const void *raw_issuer; /* Raw issuer name in ASN.1 */
const void *raw_subject; /* Raw subject name in ASN.1 */
- unsigned raw_subject_size;
- unsigned raw_skid_size;
+ unsigned int raw_subject_size;
+ unsigned int raw_skid_size;
const void *raw_skid; /* Raw subjectKeyId in ASN.1 */
- unsigned index;
+ unsigned int index;
bool seen; /* Infinite recursion prevention */
bool verified;
bool self_signed; /* T if self-signed (check unsupported_sig too) */
@@ -41,6 +39,34 @@ struct x509_certificate {
bool blacklisted;
};
+struct x509_parse_context {
+ struct x509_certificate *cert; /* Certificate being constructed */
+ unsigned long data; /* Start of data */
+ const void *key; /* Key data */
+ size_t key_size; /* Size of key data */
+ const void *algo_params; /* AlgorithmIdentifier: parameters */
+ size_t algo_params_size; /* AlgorithmIdentifier: parameters size */
+ const void *key_params; /* Key parameters */
+ size_t key_params_size; /* Size of key parameters */
+ const void *sig_params; /* Signature parameters */
+ unsigned int sig_params_size; /* Size of sig parameters */
+ unsigned int sig_size; /* Size of signature */
+ const void *sig; /* Signature data */
+ enum OID key_algo; /* Algorithm used by the cert's key */
+ enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */
+ enum OID sig_algo; /* Algorithm used to sign the cert */
+ u8 o_size; /* Size of organizationName (O) */
+ u8 cn_size; /* Size of commonName (CN) */
+ u8 email_size; /* Size of emailAddress */
+ u16 o_offset; /* Offset of organizationName (O) */
+ u16 cn_offset; /* Offset of commonName (CN) */
+ u16 email_offset; /* Offset of emailAddress */
+ unsigned int raw_akid_size;
+ const void *raw_akid; /* Raw authorityKeyId in ASN.1 */
+ const void *akid_raw_issuer; /* Raw directoryName in authorityKeyId */
+ unsigned int akid_raw_issuer_size;
+};
+
/*
* x509_cert_parser.c
*/
@@ -55,5 +81,6 @@ extern int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t, size_t hdrlen,
/*
* x509_public_key.c
*/
-extern int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert);
+extern const char *oid_to_hash(enum OID oid);
+extern int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert, struct x509_parse_context *parse);
extern int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 2243add11d48..4490cfa368a3 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -17,11 +17,32 @@
#include "asymmetric_keys.h"
#include "x509_parser.h"
+/*
+ * Translate OIDs to hash algorithm names.
+ */
+const char *oid_to_hash(enum OID oid)
+{
+ switch (oid) {
+ case OID_sha1: return "sha1";
+ case OID_sha256: return "sha256";
+ case OID_sha384: return "sha384";
+ case OID_sha512: return "sha512";
+ case OID_sha224: return "sha224";
+ case OID_sm3: return "sm3";
+ case OID_gost2012Digest256: return "streebog256";
+ case OID_gost2012Digest512: return "streebog512";
+ case OID_sha3_256: return "sha3-256";
+ case OID_sha3_384: return "sha3-384";
+ case OID_sha3_512: return "sha3-512";
+ default: return NULL;
+ }
+}
+
/*
* Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate. This involves
* digesting the signed data and extracting the signature.
*/
-int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
+int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert, struct x509_parse_context *parse)
{
struct public_key_signature *sig = cert->sig;
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
@@ -31,11 +52,11 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
- sig->s = kmemdup(cert->raw_sig, cert->raw_sig_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ sig->s = kmemdup(parse->sig, parse->sig_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig->s)
return -ENOMEM;
- sig->s_size = cert->raw_sig_size;
+ sig->s_size = parse->sig_size;
/* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
* big the hash operational data will be.
@@ -43,6 +64,7 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sig->hash_algo, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) {
+ pr_debug("Unsupported hash %s\n", sig->hash_algo);
cert->unsupported_sig = true;
return 0;
}
@@ -149,13 +171,12 @@ int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert)
*/
static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- struct x509_certificate *cert __free(x509_free_certificate) = NULL;
- struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids __free(kfree) = NULL;
char *p, *desc __free(kfree) = NULL;
const char *q;
size_t srlen, sulen;
- cert = x509_cert_parse(prep->data, prep->datalen);
+ struct x509_certificate *cert __free(x509_free_certificate) =
+ x509_cert_parse(prep->data, prep->datalen);
if (IS_ERR(cert))
return PTR_ERR(cert);
@@ -198,7 +219,8 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
p = bin2hex(p, q, srlen);
*p = 0;
- kids = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_ids), GFP_KERNEL);
+ struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids __free(kfree) =
+ kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_ids), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!kids)
return -ENOMEM;
kids->id[0] = cert->id;
diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
index ebce402854de..7fe168f54a6c 100644
--- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h
+++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ enum OID {
/* PKCS#1 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1)} */
OID_rsaEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 */
OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.5 */
+ OID_id_mgf1, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.8 */
+ OID_id_rsassa_pss, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.10 */
OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 */
OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.12 */
OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.13 */
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v13 07/12] crypto: Add RSASSA-PSS support
From: David Howells @ 2026-01-20 14:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin
Cc: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers,
Luis Chamberlain, Petr Pavlu, Daniel Gomez, Sami Tolvanen,
Jason A . Donenfeld, Ard Biesheuvel, Stephan Mueller,
linux-crypto, keyrings, linux-modules, linux-kernel,
Tadeusz Struk, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <20260120145103.1176337-1-dhowells@redhat.com>
Add support for RSASSA-PSS [RFC8017 sec 8.1] signature verification support
to the RSA driver in crypto/. Note that signing support is not provided.
The verification function requires an info string formatted as a
space-separated list of key=value pairs. The following parameters need to
be provided:
(1) sighash=<algo>
The hash algorithm to be used to digest the data.
(2) pss_mask=<type>,...
The mask generation function (MGF) and its parameters.
(3) pss_salt=<len>
The length of the salt used.
The only MGF currently supported is "mgf1". This takes an additional
parameter indicating the mask-generating hash (which need not be the same
as the data hash). E.g.:
"sighash=sha256 pss_mask=mgf1,sha256 pss_salt=32"
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
---
crypto/Makefile | 1 +
crypto/rsa.c | 8 +
crypto/rsassa-pss.c | 383 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/crypto/hash.h | 3 +
include/crypto/internal/rsa.h | 2 +
5 files changed, 397 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 crypto/rsassa-pss.c
diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile
index 267d5403045b..5c91440d1751 100644
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ rsa_generic-y += rsa.o
rsa_generic-y += rsa_helper.o
rsa_generic-y += rsa-pkcs1pad.o
rsa_generic-y += rsassa-pkcs1.o
+rsa_generic-y += rsassa-pss.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA) += rsa_generic.o
$(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.o: $(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.c $(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.h
diff --git a/crypto/rsa.c b/crypto/rsa.c
index 6c7734083c98..189a09d54c16 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/mpi.h>
#include <crypto/internal/rsa.h>
#include <crypto/internal/akcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/sig.h>
#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
@@ -414,8 +415,14 @@ static int __init rsa_init(void)
if (err)
goto err_unregister_rsa_pkcs1pad;
+ err = crypto_register_sig(&rsassa_pss_alg);
+ if (err)
+ goto err_rsassa_pss;
+
return 0;
+err_rsassa_pss:
+ crypto_unregister_template(&rsassa_pkcs1_tmpl);
err_unregister_rsa_pkcs1pad:
crypto_unregister_template(&rsa_pkcs1pad_tmpl);
err_unregister_rsa:
@@ -425,6 +432,7 @@ static int __init rsa_init(void)
static void __exit rsa_exit(void)
{
+ crypto_unregister_sig(&rsassa_pss_alg);
crypto_unregister_template(&rsassa_pkcs1_tmpl);
crypto_unregister_template(&rsa_pkcs1pad_tmpl);
crypto_unregister_akcipher(&rsa);
diff --git a/crypto/rsassa-pss.c b/crypto/rsassa-pss.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4cc2b6fa9274
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/rsassa-pss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,383 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * RSA Signature Scheme combined with EMSA-PSS encoding (RFC 8017 sec 8.2)
+ *
+ * https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017#section-8.1
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2025 Red Hat
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "RSAPSS: "fmt
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/sig.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/akcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/rsa.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/sig.h>
+
+struct rsassa_pss_ctx {
+ struct crypto_akcipher *rsa;
+ unsigned int key_size;
+ unsigned int salt_len;
+ char *pss_hash;
+ char *mgf1_hash;
+};
+
+enum {
+ rsassa_pss_verify_hash_algo,
+ rsassa_pss_verify_pss_mask,
+ rsassa_pss_verify_pss_salt,
+};
+
+static const match_table_t rsassa_pss_verify_params = {
+ { rsassa_pss_verify_hash_algo, "sighash=%s" },
+ { rsassa_pss_verify_pss_mask, "pss_mask=%s" },
+ { rsassa_pss_verify_pss_salt, "pss_salt=%u" },
+ {}
+};
+
+/*
+ * Parse the signature parameters out of the info string.
+ */
+static int rsassa_pss_vinfo_parse(struct rsassa_pss_ctx *ctx,
+ char *info)
+{
+ substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+ char *p;
+
+ ctx->pss_hash = NULL;
+ ctx->mgf1_hash = NULL;
+ ctx->salt_len = 0;
+
+ while ((p = strsep(&info, " \t"))) {
+ if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t')
+ continue;
+
+ switch (match_token(p, rsassa_pss_verify_params, args)) {
+ case rsassa_pss_verify_hash_algo:
+ *args[0].to = 0;
+ ctx->pss_hash = args[0].from;
+ break;
+ case rsassa_pss_verify_pss_mask:
+ if (memcmp(args[0].from, "mgf1", 4) != 0)
+ return -ENOPKG;
+ if (args[0].from[4] != ',')
+ return -EINVAL;
+ args[0].from += 5;
+ if (args[0].from >= args[0].to)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ *args[0].to = 0;
+ ctx->mgf1_hash = args[0].from;
+ break;
+ case rsassa_pss_verify_pss_salt:
+ if (match_uint(&args[0], &ctx->salt_len) < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_debug("Unknown info param\n");
+ return -EINVAL; /* Ignoring it might be better. */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!ctx->pss_hash ||
+ !ctx->mgf1_hash)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform mask = MGF1(mgfSeed, masklen) - RFC8017 appendix B.2.1.
+ */
+static int MGF1(struct rsassa_pss_ctx *ctx,
+ const u8 *mgfSeed, unsigned int mgfSeed_len,
+ u8 *mask, unsigned int maskLen)
+{
+ unsigned int counter, count_to, hLen, T_len;
+ __be32 *C;
+ int err;
+ u8 *T, *t, *to_hash;
+
+ struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm __free(crypto_free_shash) =
+ crypto_alloc_shash(ctx->mgf1_hash, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(hash_tfm))
+ return PTR_ERR(hash_tfm);
+
+ hLen = crypto_shash_digestsize(hash_tfm);
+ count_to = DIV_ROUND_UP(maskLen, hLen);
+ T_len = hLen * count_to;
+
+ struct shash_desc *Hash __free(kfree) =
+ kmalloc(roundup(sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
+ crypto_shash_descsize(hash_tfm), 64) +
+ roundup(T_len, 64) + /* T */
+ roundup(mgfSeed_len + 4, 64), /* mgfSeed||C */
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!Hash)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ Hash->tfm = hash_tfm;
+
+ /* 2: Let T be the empty octet string. */
+ T = (void *)Hash +
+ roundup(sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
+ crypto_shash_descsize(hash_tfm), 64);
+
+ /* 3: Generate the mask. */
+ to_hash = T + roundup(T_len, 64);
+ memcpy(to_hash, mgfSeed, mgfSeed_len);
+ C = (__be32 *)(to_hash + mgfSeed_len);
+
+ t = T;
+ for (counter = 0; counter < count_to; counter++) {
+ /* 3A: C = I2OSP(counter, 4). */
+ put_unaligned_be32(counter, C);
+
+ /* 3B: T = T || Hash(mgfSeed || C). */
+ err = crypto_shash_digest(Hash, to_hash, mgfSeed_len + 4, t);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
+ t += hLen;
+ }
+
+ /* 4: Output T to mask */
+ memcpy(mask, T, maskLen);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform EMSA-PSS-VERIFY(M, EM, emBits) - RFC8017 sec 9.1.2.
+ */
+static int emsa_pss_verify(struct rsassa_pss_ctx *ctx,
+ const u8 *M, unsigned int M_len,
+ const u8 *EM, unsigned int emLen)
+{
+ unsigned int emBits, hLen, sLen, DB_len;
+ const u8 *maskedDB, *H;
+ u8 *mHash, *dbMask, *DB, *salt, *Mprime, *Hprime;
+ int err, i;
+
+ emBits = 8 - fls(EM[0]);
+ emBits = emLen * 8 - emBits;
+
+ struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm __free(crypto_free_shash) =
+ crypto_alloc_shash(ctx->pss_hash, 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(hash_tfm))
+ return PTR_ERR(hash_tfm);
+
+ hLen = crypto_shash_digestsize(hash_tfm);
+ sLen = ctx->salt_len;
+
+ if (sLen > 65536 ||
+ emBits < 8 * (hLen + sLen) + 9)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ DB_len = emLen - hLen - 1;
+
+ struct shash_desc *Hash __free(kfree) =
+ kmalloc(roundup(sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
+ crypto_shash_descsize(hash_tfm), 64) +
+ roundup(hLen, 64) + /* mHash */
+ roundup(DB_len, 64) + /* DB and dbMask */
+ roundup(8 + hLen + sLen, 64) + /* M' */
+ roundup(hLen, 64), /* H' */
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!Hash)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ Hash->tfm = hash_tfm;
+
+ mHash = (void *)Hash +
+ roundup(sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
+ crypto_shash_descsize(hash_tfm), 64);
+ DB = dbMask = mHash + roundup(hLen, 64);
+ Mprime = dbMask + roundup(DB_len, 64);
+ Hprime = Mprime + roundup(8 + hLen + sLen, 64);
+
+ /* 1. Check len M against hash input limitation. */
+ /* The standard says ~2EiB for SHA1, so I think we can ignore this. */
+
+ /* 2. mHash = Hash(M).
+ * In theory, we would do:
+ * err = crypto_shash_digest(Hash, M, M_len, mHash);
+ * but the caller is assumed to already have done that for us.
+ */
+ if (M_len != hLen)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ memcpy(mHash, M, hLen);
+
+ /* 3. Check emLen against hLen + sLen + 2. */
+ if (emLen < hLen + sLen + 2)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ /* 4. Validate EM. */
+ if (EM[emLen - 1] != 0xbc)
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+
+ /* 5. Pick maskedDB and H. */
+ maskedDB = EM;
+ H = EM + DB_len;
+
+ /* 6. Check leftmost 8emLen-emBits bits of maskedDB are 0. */
+ /* Can only find emBits by counting the zeros on the Left. */
+
+ /* 7. Let dbMask = MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1). */
+ err = MGF1(ctx, H, hLen, dbMask, DB_len);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
+ /* 8. Let DB = maskedDB XOR dbMask. */
+ for (i = 0; i < DB_len; i++)
+ DB[i] = maskedDB[i] ^ dbMask[i];
+
+ /* 9. Set leftmost bits in DB to zero. */
+ int z = 8 * emLen - emBits;
+
+ if (z > 0) {
+ if (z >= 8) {
+ DB[0] = 0;
+ } else {
+ z = 8 - z;
+ DB[0] &= (1 << z) - 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* 10. Check the left part of DB is {0,0,...,1}. */
+ for (i = 0; i < emLen - hLen - sLen - 2; i++)
+ if (DB[i] != 0)
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ if (DB[i] != 0x01)
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+
+ /* 11. Let salt be the last sLen octets of DB. */
+ salt = DB + DB_len - sLen;
+
+ /* 12. Let M' be 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 || mHash || salt. */
+ memset(Mprime, 0, 8);
+ memcpy(Mprime + 8, mHash, hLen);
+ memcpy(Mprime + 8 + hLen, salt, sLen);
+
+ /* 13. Let H' = Hash(M'). */
+ err = crypto_shash_digest(Hash, Mprime, 8 + hLen + sLen, Hprime);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
+ /* 14. Check H = H'. */
+ if (memcmp(H, Hprime, hLen) != 0)
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY((n,e),M,S) - RFC8017 sec 8.1.2.
+ */
+static int rsassa_pss_verify(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
+ const void *src, unsigned int slen,
+ const void *digest, unsigned int dlen,
+ const char *info)
+{
+ struct rsassa_pss_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
+ struct crypto_wait cwait;
+ struct scatterlist sg;
+ unsigned int rsa_reqsize = crypto_akcipher_reqsize(ctx->rsa);
+ u8 *EM;
+ int err;
+
+ if (!info)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ char *str __free(kfree) = kstrdup(info, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!str)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ err = rsassa_pss_vinfo_parse(ctx, str);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
+ /* RFC8017 sec 8.1.2 step 1 - length checking */
+ if (!ctx->key_size || slen != ctx->key_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* RFC8017 sec 8.1.2 step 2 - RSA verification */
+ struct akcipher_request *rsa_req __free(kfree) =
+ kmalloc(sizeof(*rsa_req) + rsa_reqsize + ctx->key_size,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rsa_req)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ EM = (u8 *)(rsa_req + 1) + rsa_reqsize;
+ memcpy(EM, src, slen);
+
+ crypto_init_wait(&cwait);
+ sg_init_one(&sg, EM, slen);
+ akcipher_request_set_tfm(rsa_req, ctx->rsa);
+ akcipher_request_set_crypt(rsa_req, &sg, &sg, slen, slen);
+ akcipher_request_set_callback(rsa_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
+ crypto_req_done, &cwait);
+
+ err = crypto_akcipher_encrypt(rsa_req);
+ err = crypto_wait_req(err, &cwait);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* RFC 8017 sec 8.1.2 step 3 - EMSA-PSS(M, EM, modbits-1) */
+ return emsa_pss_verify(ctx, digest, dlen, EM, slen);
+}
+
+static unsigned int rsassa_pss_key_size(struct crypto_sig *tfm)
+{
+ struct rsassa_pss_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
+
+ return ctx->key_size * BITS_PER_BYTE;
+}
+
+static int rsassa_pss_set_pub_key(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
+ const void *key, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ struct rsassa_pss_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
+
+ return rsa_set_key(ctx->rsa, &ctx->key_size, RSA_PUB, key, keylen);
+}
+
+static int rsassa_pss_init_tfm(struct crypto_sig *tfm)
+{
+ struct crypto_akcipher *rsa;
+ struct rsassa_pss_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
+
+ rsa = crypto_alloc_akcipher("rsa", 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(rsa))
+ return PTR_ERR(rsa);
+
+ ctx->rsa = rsa;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void rsassa_pss_exit_tfm(struct crypto_sig *tfm)
+{
+ struct rsassa_pss_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
+
+ crypto_free_akcipher(ctx->rsa);
+}
+
+struct sig_alg rsassa_pss_alg = {
+ .verify = rsassa_pss_verify,
+ .set_pub_key = rsassa_pss_set_pub_key,
+ .key_size = rsassa_pss_key_size,
+ .init = rsassa_pss_init_tfm,
+ .exit = rsassa_pss_exit_tfm,
+ .base = {
+ .cra_name = "rsassa-pss",
+ .cra_driver_name = "rsassa-pss-generic",
+ .cra_priority = 100,
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct rsassa_pss_ctx),
+ },
+};
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("rsassa-pss");
diff --git a/include/crypto/hash.h b/include/crypto/hash.h
index 586700332c73..49b1ea5cf78d 100644
--- a/include/crypto/hash.h
+++ b/include/crypto/hash.h
@@ -779,6 +779,9 @@ static inline void crypto_free_shash(struct crypto_shash *tfm)
crypto_destroy_tfm(tfm, crypto_shash_tfm(tfm));
}
+DEFINE_FREE(crypto_free_shash, struct crypto_shash*,
+ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(_T)) { crypto_free_shash(_T); });
+
static inline const char *crypto_shash_alg_name(struct crypto_shash *tfm)
{
return crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_shash_tfm(tfm));
diff --git a/include/crypto/internal/rsa.h b/include/crypto/internal/rsa.h
index 071a1951b992..d7f38a273949 100644
--- a/include/crypto/internal/rsa.h
+++ b/include/crypto/internal/rsa.h
@@ -83,4 +83,6 @@ static inline int rsa_set_key(struct crypto_akcipher *child,
extern struct crypto_template rsa_pkcs1pad_tmpl;
extern struct crypto_template rsassa_pkcs1_tmpl;
+extern struct sig_alg rsassa_pss_alg;
+
#endif
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v13 06/12] crypto: Add supplementary info param to asymmetric key signature verification
From: David Howells @ 2026-01-20 14:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin
Cc: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers,
Luis Chamberlain, Petr Pavlu, Daniel Gomez, Sami Tolvanen,
Jason A . Donenfeld, Ard Biesheuvel, Stephan Mueller,
linux-crypto, keyrings, linux-modules, linux-kernel,
David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <20260120145103.1176337-1-dhowells@redhat.com>
Add a supplementary information parameter to the asymmetric key signature
verification API, in particular crypto_sig_verify() and sig_alg::verify.
This takes the form of a printable string containing of key=val elements.
This is needed as some algorithms require additional metadata
(e.g. RSASSA-PSS) and this extra metadata is included in the X.509
certificates and PKCS#7 messages. Furthermore, keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY)
already allows for this to be passed to the kernel, as do the _SIGN,
_ENCRYPT and _DECRYPT keyctls.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 1 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 2 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c | 1 +
crypto/ecdsa-p1363.c | 5 +++--
crypto/ecdsa-x962.c | 5 +++--
crypto/ecdsa.c | 3 ++-
crypto/ecrdsa.c | 3 ++-
crypto/mldsa.c | 3 ++-
crypto/rsassa-pkcs1.c | 3 ++-
crypto/sig.c | 3 ++-
crypto/testmgr.c | 2 +-
crypto/testmgr.h | 1 +
include/crypto/public_key.h | 1 +
include/crypto/sig.h | 9 ++++++---
14 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
index 348966ea2175..dad4f0edfa25 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
@@ -596,6 +596,7 @@ static int asymmetric_key_verify_signature(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
.digest_size = params->in_len,
.encoding = params->encoding,
.hash_algo = params->hash_algo,
+ .info = params->info,
.digest = (void *)in,
.s = (void *)in2,
};
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index ed6b4b5ae4ef..61dc4f626620 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ int public_key_verify_signature(const struct public_key *pkey,
goto error_free_key;
ret = crypto_sig_verify(tfm, sig->s, sig->s_size,
- sig->digest, sig->digest_size);
+ sig->digest, sig->digest_size, sig->info);
error_free_key:
kfree_sensitive(key);
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
index bea01cf27d0a..30ba50eb44af 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ void public_key_signature_free(struct public_key_signature *sig)
kfree(sig->s);
if (sig->digest_free)
kfree(sig->digest);
+ kfree(sig->info);
kfree(sig);
}
}
diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa-p1363.c b/crypto/ecdsa-p1363.c
index e0c55c64711c..fa987dba1213 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdsa-p1363.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdsa-p1363.c
@@ -18,7 +18,8 @@ struct ecdsa_p1363_ctx {
static int ecdsa_p1363_verify(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
const void *src, unsigned int slen,
- const void *digest, unsigned int dlen)
+ const void *digest, unsigned int dlen,
+ const char *info)
{
struct ecdsa_p1363_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
unsigned int keylen = DIV_ROUND_UP_POW2(crypto_sig_keysize(ctx->child),
@@ -32,7 +33,7 @@ static int ecdsa_p1363_verify(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
ecc_digits_from_bytes(src, keylen, sig.r, ndigits);
ecc_digits_from_bytes(src + keylen, keylen, sig.s, ndigits);
- return crypto_sig_verify(ctx->child, &sig, sizeof(sig), digest, dlen);
+ return crypto_sig_verify(ctx->child, &sig, sizeof(sig), digest, dlen, info);
}
static unsigned int ecdsa_p1363_key_size(struct crypto_sig *tfm)
diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa-x962.c b/crypto/ecdsa-x962.c
index ee71594d10a0..5d7f1078989c 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdsa-x962.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdsa-x962.c
@@ -75,7 +75,8 @@ int ecdsa_get_signature_s(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
static int ecdsa_x962_verify(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
const void *src, unsigned int slen,
- const void *digest, unsigned int dlen)
+ const void *digest, unsigned int dlen,
+ const char *info)
{
struct ecdsa_x962_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
struct ecdsa_x962_signature_ctx sig_ctx;
@@ -89,7 +90,7 @@ static int ecdsa_x962_verify(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
return err;
return crypto_sig_verify(ctx->child, &sig_ctx.sig, sizeof(sig_ctx.sig),
- digest, dlen);
+ digest, dlen, info);
}
static unsigned int ecdsa_x962_key_size(struct crypto_sig *tfm)
diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa.c b/crypto/ecdsa.c
index ce8e4364842f..144fd6b9168b 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdsa.c
+++ b/crypto/ecdsa.c
@@ -65,7 +65,8 @@ static int _ecdsa_verify(struct ecc_ctx *ctx, const u64 *hash, const u64 *r, con
*/
static int ecdsa_verify(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
const void *src, unsigned int slen,
- const void *digest, unsigned int dlen)
+ const void *digest, unsigned int dlen,
+ const char *info)
{
struct ecc_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
size_t bufsize = ctx->curve->g.ndigits * sizeof(u64);
diff --git a/crypto/ecrdsa.c b/crypto/ecrdsa.c
index 2c0602f0cd40..59f2d5bb3be4 100644
--- a/crypto/ecrdsa.c
+++ b/crypto/ecrdsa.c
@@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ static const struct ecc_curve *get_curve_by_oid(enum OID oid)
static int ecrdsa_verify(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
const void *src, unsigned int slen,
- const void *digest, unsigned int dlen)
+ const void *digest, unsigned int dlen,
+ const char *info)
{
struct ecrdsa_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
unsigned int ndigits = dlen / sizeof(u64);
diff --git a/crypto/mldsa.c b/crypto/mldsa.c
index 2146c774b5ca..ba071d030ab0 100644
--- a/crypto/mldsa.c
+++ b/crypto/mldsa.c
@@ -25,7 +25,8 @@ static int crypto_mldsa_sign(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
static int crypto_mldsa_verify(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
const void *sig, unsigned int sig_len,
- const void *msg, unsigned int msg_len)
+ const void *msg, unsigned int msg_len,
+ const char *info)
{
const struct crypto_mldsa_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
diff --git a/crypto/rsassa-pkcs1.c b/crypto/rsassa-pkcs1.c
index 94fa5e9600e7..6283050e609a 100644
--- a/crypto/rsassa-pkcs1.c
+++ b/crypto/rsassa-pkcs1.c
@@ -215,7 +215,8 @@ static int rsassa_pkcs1_sign(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
static int rsassa_pkcs1_verify(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
const void *src, unsigned int slen,
- const void *digest, unsigned int dlen)
+ const void *digest, unsigned int dlen,
+ const char *info)
{
struct sig_instance *inst = sig_alg_instance(tfm);
struct rsassa_pkcs1_inst_ctx *ictx = sig_instance_ctx(inst);
diff --git a/crypto/sig.c b/crypto/sig.c
index beba745b6405..c56fea3a53ae 100644
--- a/crypto/sig.c
+++ b/crypto/sig.c
@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ static int sig_default_sign(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
static int sig_default_verify(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
const void *src, unsigned int slen,
- const void *dst, unsigned int dlen)
+ const void *dst, unsigned int dlen,
+ const char *info)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c
index 5df204d9c9dd..51f76b15f134 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.c
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
@@ -3969,7 +3969,7 @@ static int test_sig_one(struct crypto_sig *tfm, const struct sig_testvec *vecs)
* (which does not require a private key)
*/
err = crypto_sig_verify(tfm, vecs->c, vecs->c_size,
- vecs->m, vecs->m_size);
+ vecs->m, vecs->m_size, vecs->verify_info);
if (err) {
pr_err("alg: sig: verify test failed: err %d\n", err);
return err;
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.h b/crypto/testmgr.h
index 1a3329e1c325..305adad2f2d0 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.h
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.h
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ struct akcipher_testvec {
struct sig_testvec {
const unsigned char *key;
+ const unsigned char *verify_info;
const unsigned char *params;
const unsigned char *m;
const unsigned char *c;
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index 68899a49cd0d..b6f2f2218aae 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ struct public_key_signature {
u32 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
bool digest_free; /* T if digest needs freeing */
bool algo_does_hash; /* Public key algo does its own hashing */
+ char *info; /* Supplementary parameters */
const char *pkey_algo;
const char *hash_algo;
const char *encoding;
diff --git a/include/crypto/sig.h b/include/crypto/sig.h
index fa6dafafab3f..885fa6487780 100644
--- a/include/crypto/sig.h
+++ b/include/crypto/sig.h
@@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ struct sig_alg {
void *dst, unsigned int dlen);
int (*verify)(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
const void *src, unsigned int slen,
- const void *digest, unsigned int dlen);
+ const void *digest, unsigned int dlen,
+ const char *info);
int (*set_pub_key)(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
const void *key, unsigned int keylen);
int (*set_priv_key)(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
@@ -209,16 +210,18 @@ static inline int crypto_sig_sign(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
* @slen: source length
* @digest: digest
* @dlen: digest length
+ * @info: Additional parameters as a set of k=v
*
* Return: zero on verification success; error code in case of error.
*/
static inline int crypto_sig_verify(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
const void *src, unsigned int slen,
- const void *digest, unsigned int dlen)
+ const void *digest, unsigned int dlen,
+ const char *info)
{
struct sig_alg *alg = crypto_sig_alg(tfm);
- return alg->verify(tfm, src, slen, digest, dlen);
+ return alg->verify(tfm, src, slen, digest, dlen, info);
}
/**
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v13 05/12] modsign: Enable ML-DSA module signing
From: David Howells @ 2026-01-20 14:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin
Cc: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers,
Luis Chamberlain, Petr Pavlu, Daniel Gomez, Sami Tolvanen,
Jason A . Donenfeld, Ard Biesheuvel, Stephan Mueller,
linux-crypto, keyrings, linux-modules, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20260120145103.1176337-1-dhowells@redhat.com>
Allow ML-DSA module signing to be enabled.
Note that openssl's CMS_*() function suite does not, as of openssl-3.5.1,
support the use of CMS_NOATTR with ML-DSA, so the prohibition against using
authenticatedAttributes with module signing has to be removed. The
selected digest then applies only to the algorithm used to calculate the
digest stored in the messageDigest attribute.
The ML-DSA algorithm uses its own internal choice of digest (SHAKE256)
without regard to what's specified in the CMS message. This is, in theory,
configurable, but there's currently no hook in the crypto_sig API to do
that, though possibly it could be done by parameterising the name of the
algorithm, e.g. ("mldsa87(sha512)").
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
---
Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst | 16 +++++----
certs/Kconfig | 21 ++++++++++++
certs/Makefile | 3 ++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 4 ---
scripts/sign-file.c | 34 +++++++++++++++-----
5 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst
index a8667a777490..7f2f127dc76f 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst
@@ -28,10 +28,12 @@ trusted userspace bits.
This facility uses X.509 ITU-T standard certificates to encode the public keys
involved. The signatures are not themselves encoded in any industrial standard
-type. The built-in facility currently only supports the RSA & NIST P-384 ECDSA
-public key signing standard (though it is pluggable and permits others to be
-used). The possible hash algorithms that can be used are SHA-2 and SHA-3 of
-sizes 256, 384, and 512 (the algorithm is selected by data in the signature).
+type. The built-in facility currently only supports the RSA, NIST P-384 ECDSA
+and NIST FIPS-204 ML-DSA public key signing standards (though it is pluggable
+and permits others to be used). For RSA and ECDSA, the possible hash
+algorithms that can be used are SHA-2 and SHA-3 of sizes 256, 384, and 512 (the
+algorithm is selected by data in the signature); ML-DSA does its own hashing,
+but is allowed to be used with a SHA512 hash for signed attributes.
==========================
@@ -146,9 +148,9 @@ into vmlinux) using parameters in the::
file (which is also generated if it does not already exist).
-One can select between RSA (``MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_RSA``) and ECDSA
-(``MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_ECDSA``) to generate either RSA 4k or NIST
-P-384 keypair.
+One can select between RSA (``MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_RSA``), ECDSA
+(``MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_ECDSA``) and ML-DSA (``MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_MLDSA_*``) to
+generate an RSA 4k, a NIST P-384 keypair or an ML-DSA 44, 65 or 87 keypair.
It is strongly recommended that you provide your own x509.genkey file.
diff --git a/certs/Kconfig b/certs/Kconfig
index 78307dc25559..67a5786423b5 100644
--- a/certs/Kconfig
+++ b/certs/Kconfig
@@ -39,6 +39,27 @@ config MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_ECDSA
Note: Remove all ECDSA signing keys, e.g. certs/signing_key.pem,
when falling back to building Linux 5.14 and older kernels.
+config MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_MLDSA_44
+ bool "ML-DSA-44"
+ select CRYPTO_MLDSA
+ help
+ Use an ML-DSA-44 key (NIST FIPS 204) for module signing
+ with a SHAKE256 'hash' of the authenticatedAttributes.
+
+config MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_MLDSA_65
+ bool "ML-DSA-65"
+ select CRYPTO_MLDSA
+ help
+ Use an ML-DSA-65 key (NIST FIPS 204) for module signing
+ with a SHAKE256 'hash' of the authenticatedAttributes.
+
+config MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_MLDSA_87
+ bool "ML-DSA-87"
+ select CRYPTO_MLDSA
+ help
+ Use an ML-DSA-87 key (NIST FIPS 204) for module signing
+ with a SHAKE256 'hash' of the authenticatedAttributes.
+
endchoice
config SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
diff --git a/certs/Makefile b/certs/Makefile
index f6fa4d8d75e0..3ee1960f9f4a 100644
--- a/certs/Makefile
+++ b/certs/Makefile
@@ -43,6 +43,9 @@ targets += x509_certificate_list
ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY),certs/signing_key.pem)
keytype-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_ECDSA) := -newkey ec -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:secp384r1
+keytype-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_MLDSA_44) := -newkey ml-dsa-44
+keytype-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_MLDSA_65) := -newkey ml-dsa-65
+keytype-$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_MLDSA_87) := -newkey ml-dsa-87
quiet_cmd_gen_key = GENKEY $@
cmd_gen_key = openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH) -days 36500 \
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index 46eee9811023..3896e24423f9 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -442,10 +442,6 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
pr_warn("Invalid module sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
return -EKEYREJECTED;
}
- if (pkcs7->have_authattrs) {
- pr_warn("Invalid module sig (has authattrs)\n");
- return -EKEYREJECTED;
- }
break;
case VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE:
if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
diff --git a/scripts/sign-file.c b/scripts/sign-file.c
index 7070245edfc1..547b97097230 100644
--- a/scripts/sign-file.c
+++ b/scripts/sign-file.c
@@ -315,18 +315,36 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
ERR(!digest_algo, "EVP_get_digestbyname");
#ifndef USE_PKCS7
+
+ unsigned int flags =
+ CMS_NOCERTS |
+ CMS_PARTIAL |
+ CMS_BINARY |
+ CMS_DETACHED |
+ CMS_STREAM |
+ CMS_NOSMIMECAP |
+ CMS_NO_SIGNING_TIME |
+ use_keyid;
+
+ if ((EVP_PKEY_is_a(private_key, "ML-DSA-44") ||
+ EVP_PKEY_is_a(private_key, "ML-DSA-65") ||
+ EVP_PKEY_is_a(private_key, "ML-DSA-87")) &&
+ OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR < 4) {
+ /* ML-DSA + CMS_NOATTR is not supported in openssl-3.5
+ * and before.
+ */
+ use_signed_attrs = 0;
+ }
+
+ flags |= use_signed_attrs;
+
/* Load the signature message from the digest buffer. */
- cms = CMS_sign(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
- CMS_NOCERTS | CMS_PARTIAL | CMS_BINARY |
- CMS_DETACHED | CMS_STREAM);
+ cms = CMS_sign(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, flags);
ERR(!cms, "CMS_sign");
- ERR(!CMS_add1_signer(cms, x509, private_key, digest_algo,
- CMS_NOCERTS | CMS_BINARY |
- CMS_NOSMIMECAP | use_keyid |
- use_signed_attrs),
+ ERR(!CMS_add1_signer(cms, x509, private_key, digest_algo, flags),
"CMS_add1_signer");
- ERR(CMS_final(cms, bm, NULL, CMS_NOCERTS | CMS_BINARY) != 1,
+ ERR(CMS_final(cms, bm, NULL, flags) != 1,
"CMS_final");
#else
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v13 04/12] pkcs7, x509: Add ML-DSA support
From: David Howells @ 2026-01-20 14:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin
Cc: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers,
Luis Chamberlain, Petr Pavlu, Daniel Gomez, Sami Tolvanen,
Jason A . Donenfeld, Ard Biesheuvel, Stephan Mueller,
linux-crypto, keyrings, linux-modules, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20260120145103.1176337-1-dhowells@redhat.com>
Add support for ML-DSA keys and signatures to the PKCS#7 and X.509
implementations.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 15 ++++++++++++++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 7 +++++++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/oid_registry.h | 5 +++++
4 files changed, 51 insertions(+)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
index 3cdbab3b9f50..90c36fe1b5ed 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
@@ -297,6 +297,21 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "ecrdsa";
ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "raw";
break;
+ case OID_id_ml_dsa_44:
+ ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "mldsa44";
+ ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "raw";
+ ctx->sinfo->sig->algo_does_hash = true;
+ break;
+ case OID_id_ml_dsa_65:
+ ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "mldsa65";
+ ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "raw";
+ ctx->sinfo->sig->algo_does_hash = true;
+ break;
+ case OID_id_ml_dsa_87:
+ ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "mldsa87";
+ ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "raw";
+ ctx->sinfo->sig->algo_does_hash = true;
+ break;
default:
printk("Unsupported pkey algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
return -ENOPKG;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index e5b177c8e842..ed6b4b5ae4ef 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -142,6 +142,13 @@ software_key_determine_akcipher(const struct public_key *pkey,
if (strcmp(hash_algo, "streebog256") != 0 &&
strcmp(hash_algo, "streebog512") != 0)
return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "mldsa44") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "mldsa65") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "mldsa87") == 0) {
+ if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (!hash_algo)
+ return -EINVAL;
} else {
/* Unknown public key algorithm */
return -ENOPKG;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
index b37cae914987..5ab5b4e5f1b4 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
@@ -257,6 +257,15 @@ int x509_note_sig_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
case OID_gost2012Signature512:
ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "streebog512";
goto ecrdsa;
+ case OID_id_ml_dsa_44:
+ ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "mldsa44";
+ goto ml_dsa;
+ case OID_id_ml_dsa_65:
+ ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "mldsa65";
+ goto ml_dsa;
+ case OID_id_ml_dsa_87:
+ ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "mldsa87";
+ goto ml_dsa;
}
rsa_pkcs1:
@@ -274,6 +283,12 @@ int x509_note_sig_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "x962";
ctx->sig_algo = ctx->last_oid;
return 0;
+ml_dsa:
+ ctx->cert->sig->algo_does_hash = true;
+ ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo;
+ ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "raw";
+ ctx->sig_algo = ctx->last_oid;
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -524,6 +539,15 @@ int x509_extract_key_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
return -ENOPKG;
}
break;
+ case OID_id_ml_dsa_44:
+ ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "mldsa44";
+ break;
+ case OID_id_ml_dsa_65:
+ ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "mldsa65";
+ break;
+ case OID_id_ml_dsa_87:
+ ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "mldsa87";
+ break;
default:
return -ENOPKG;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
index 6de479ebbe5d..ebce402854de 100644
--- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h
+++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
@@ -145,6 +145,11 @@ enum OID {
OID_id_rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_with_sha3_384, /* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.15 */
OID_id_rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_with_sha3_512, /* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.16 */
+ /* NIST FIPS-204 ML-DSA */
+ OID_id_ml_dsa_44, /* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.17 */
+ OID_id_ml_dsa_65, /* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.18 */
+ OID_id_ml_dsa_87, /* 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.19 */
+
OID__NR
};
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v13 03/12] pkcs7: Allow direct signing of data with ML-DSA
From: David Howells @ 2026-01-20 14:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin
Cc: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers,
Luis Chamberlain, Petr Pavlu, Daniel Gomez, Sami Tolvanen,
Jason A . Donenfeld, Ard Biesheuvel, Stephan Mueller,
linux-crypto, keyrings, linux-modules, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20260120145103.1176337-1-dhowells@redhat.com>
Allow the data part of a PKCS#7 or CMS messge to be passed directly to an
asymmetric cipher algorithm (e.g. ML-DSA) if it wants to do the digestion
itself. The normal digestion of the data is then skipped as that would be
ignored unless another signed info in the message has some other algorithm
that needs it.
This is done by setting the digest parameters to point to the data to be
verified rather than making public_key_verify_signature() access the data
directly. This is so that keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY) will still work.
To test this with ML-DSA, sign-file must be built with openssl > v3.5 and
must include the following fix:
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/28923
which will allow CMS_NOATTR to be used with CMS_sign() for an ML-DSA key.
sign-file will remove CMS_NOATTR if openssl is earlier than v4 and signed
attributes will be used.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c | 2 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c | 3 ++-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c | 3 ++-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h | 1 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 1 +
include/crypto/public_key.h | 1 +
7 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c
index 8aecbe4637f3..54dac17f19e2 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c
@@ -124,6 +124,6 @@ int mscode_note_digest(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
return -ENOMEM;
ctx->digest_len = vlen;
-
+ ctx->digest_free = true;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index 0f9f515b784d..46eee9811023 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -30,6 +30,16 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
kenter(",%u,%s", sinfo->index, sinfo->sig->hash_algo);
+ if (!sinfo->authattrs && sig->algo_does_hash) {
+ /* There's no intermediate digest and the signature algo
+ * doesn't want the data prehashing.
+ */
+ sig->digest = (void *)pkcs7->data;
+ sig->digest_size = pkcs7->data_len;
+ sig->digest_free = false;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
/* The digest was calculated already. */
if (sig->digest)
return 0;
@@ -51,6 +61,7 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
sig->digest = kmalloc(sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig->digest)
goto error_no_desc;
+ sig->digest_free = true;
desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!desc)
@@ -103,6 +114,7 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
*/
if (sig->algo_does_hash) {
kfree(sig->digest);
+ sig->digest_free = false;
ret = -ENOMEM;
sig->digest = kmalloc(umax(sinfo->authattrs_len, sig->digest_size),
@@ -110,6 +122,7 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
if (!sig->digest)
goto error_no_desc;
+ sig->digest_free = true;
sig->digest_size = sinfo->authattrs_len;
memcpy(sig->digest, sinfo->authattrs, sinfo->authattrs_len);
((u8 *)sig->digest)[0] = ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SET;
@@ -155,6 +168,11 @@ int pkcs7_get_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, const u8 **buf, u32 *len,
ret = pkcs7_digest(pkcs7, sinfo);
if (ret)
return ret;
+ if (!sinfo->sig->digest_free) {
+ pr_notice_once("%s: No digest available\n", __func__);
+ return -EINVAL; /* TODO: MLDSA doesn't necessarily calculate an
+ * intermediate digest. */
+ }
*buf = sinfo->sig->digest;
*len = sinfo->sig->digest_size;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
index 041d04b5c953..bea01cf27d0a 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@ void public_key_signature_free(struct public_key_signature *sig)
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sig->auth_ids); i++)
kfree(sig->auth_ids[i]);
kfree(sig->s);
- kfree(sig->digest);
+ if (sig->digest_free)
+ kfree(sig->digest);
kfree(sig);
}
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
index 1f3b227ba7f2..30c23aea3b25 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c
@@ -451,6 +451,7 @@ int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
ret = pefile_digest_pe(pebuf, pelen, &ctx);
error:
- kfree_sensitive(ctx.digest);
+ if (ctx.digest_free)
+ kfree_sensitive(ctx.digest);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h
index e1628e100cde..f641437264b4 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ struct pefile_context {
/* PKCS#7 MS Individual Code Signing content */
const void *digest; /* Digest */
unsigned digest_len; /* Digest length */
+ bool digest_free; /* T if digest should be freed */
const char *digest_algo; /* Digest algorithm */
};
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 12e3341e806b..2243add11d48 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
sig->digest = kmalloc(sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig->digest)
goto error;
+ sig->digest_free = true;
desc = kzalloc(desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!desc)
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index e4ec8003a3a4..68899a49cd0d 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ struct public_key_signature {
u8 *digest;
u32 s_size; /* Number of bytes in signature */
u32 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
+ bool digest_free; /* T if digest needs freeing */
bool algo_does_hash; /* Public key algo does its own hashing */
const char *pkey_algo;
const char *hash_algo;
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v13 02/12] pkcs7: Allow the signing algo to calculate the digest itself
From: David Howells @ 2026-01-20 14:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin
Cc: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers,
Luis Chamberlain, Petr Pavlu, Daniel Gomez, Sami Tolvanen,
Jason A . Donenfeld, Ard Biesheuvel, Stephan Mueller,
linux-crypto, keyrings, linux-modules, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20260120145103.1176337-1-dhowells@redhat.com>
The ML-DSA public key algorithm really wants to calculate the message
digest itself, rather than having the digest precalculated and fed to it
separately as RSA does[*]. The kernel's PKCS#7 parser, however, is
designed around the latter approach.
[*] ML-DSA does allow for an "external mu", but CMS doesn't yet have that
standardised.
Fix this by noting in the public_key_signature struct when the signing
algorithm is going to want this and then, rather than doing the digest of
the authenticatedAttributes ourselves and overwriting the sig->digest with
that, replace sig->digest with a copy of the contents of the
authenticatedAttributes section and adjust the digest length to match.
This will then be fed to the public key algorithm as normal which can do
what it wants with the data.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
---
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 4 +--
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++---------
include/crypto/public_key.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
index 423d13c47545..3cdbab3b9f50 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
@@ -599,8 +599,8 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_set_of_authattrs(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
}
/* We need to switch the 'CONT 0' to a 'SET OF' when we digest */
- sinfo->authattrs = value - (hdrlen - 1);
- sinfo->authattrs_len = vlen + (hdrlen - 1);
+ sinfo->authattrs = value - hdrlen;
+ sinfo->authattrs_len = vlen + hdrlen;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
index 6d6475e3a9bf..0f9f515b784d 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
@@ -70,8 +70,6 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
* digest we just calculated.
*/
if (sinfo->authattrs) {
- u8 tag;
-
if (!sinfo->msgdigest) {
pr_warn("Sig %u: No messageDigest\n", sinfo->index);
ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
@@ -97,20 +95,40 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
* as the contents of the digest instead. Note that we need to
* convert the attributes from a CONT.0 into a SET before we
* hash it.
+ *
+ * However, for certain algorithms, such as ML-DSA, the digest
+ * is integrated into the signing algorithm. In such a case,
+ * we copy the authattrs, modifying the tag type, and set that
+ * as the digest.
*/
- memset(sig->digest, 0, sig->digest_size);
-
- ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error;
- tag = ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SET;
- ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, &tag, 1);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error;
- ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sinfo->authattrs,
- sinfo->authattrs_len, sig->digest);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error;
+ if (sig->algo_does_hash) {
+ kfree(sig->digest);
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ sig->digest = kmalloc(umax(sinfo->authattrs_len, sig->digest_size),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sig->digest)
+ goto error_no_desc;
+
+ sig->digest_size = sinfo->authattrs_len;
+ memcpy(sig->digest, sinfo->authattrs, sinfo->authattrs_len);
+ ((u8 *)sig->digest)[0] = ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SET;
+ ret = 0;
+ } else {
+ u8 tag = ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SET;
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+ ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, &tag, 1);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+ ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sinfo->authattrs + 1,
+ sinfo->authattrs_len - 1,
+ sig->digest);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+ }
pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->digest);
}
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index 81098e00c08f..e4ec8003a3a4 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ struct public_key_signature {
u8 *digest;
u32 s_size; /* Number of bytes in signature */
u32 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
+ bool algo_does_hash; /* Public key algo does its own hashing */
const char *pkey_algo;
const char *hash_algo;
const char *encoding;
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v13 01/12] crypto: Add ML-DSA crypto_sig support
From: David Howells @ 2026-01-20 14:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin
Cc: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers,
Luis Chamberlain, Petr Pavlu, Daniel Gomez, Sami Tolvanen,
Jason A . Donenfeld, Ard Biesheuvel, Stephan Mueller,
linux-crypto, keyrings, linux-modules, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20260120145103.1176337-1-dhowells@redhat.com>
Add verify-only public key crypto support for ML-DSA so that the
X.509/PKCS#7 signature verification code, as used by module signing,
amongst other things, can make use of it through the common crypto_sig API.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
---
crypto/Kconfig | 10 +++
crypto/Makefile | 2 +
crypto/mldsa.c | 201 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 213 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 crypto/mldsa.c
diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
index 12a87f7cf150..8dd5c6660c5a 100644
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -344,6 +344,16 @@ config CRYPTO_ECRDSA
One of the Russian cryptographic standard algorithms (called GOST
algorithms). Only signature verification is implemented.
+config CRYPTO_MLDSA
+ tristate "ML-DSA (Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm)"
+ select CRYPTO_SIG
+ select CRYPTO_LIB_MLDSA
+ select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA3
+ help
+ ML-DSA (Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm) (FIPS-204).
+
+ Only signature verification is implemented.
+
endmenu
menu "Block ciphers"
diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile
index 23d3db7be425..267d5403045b 100644
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ ecdsa_generic-y += ecdsa-p1363.o
ecdsa_generic-y += ecdsasignature.asn1.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECDSA) += ecdsa_generic.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MLDSA) += mldsa.o
+
crypto_acompress-y := acompress.o
crypto_acompress-y += scompress.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ACOMP2) += crypto_acompress.o
diff --git a/crypto/mldsa.c b/crypto/mldsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2146c774b5ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/mldsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * crypto_sig wrapper around ML-DSA library.
+ */
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/sig.h>
+#include <crypto/mldsa.h>
+
+struct crypto_mldsa_ctx {
+ u8 pk[MAX(MAX(MLDSA44_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE,
+ MLDSA65_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE),
+ MLDSA87_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE)];
+ unsigned int pk_len;
+ enum mldsa_alg strength;
+ u8 key_set;
+};
+
+static int crypto_mldsa_sign(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
+ const void *msg, unsigned int msg_len,
+ void *sig, unsigned int sig_len)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static int crypto_mldsa_verify(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
+ const void *sig, unsigned int sig_len,
+ const void *msg, unsigned int msg_len)
+{
+ const struct crypto_mldsa_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
+
+ if (unlikely(!ctx->key_set))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return mldsa_verify(ctx->strength, sig, sig_len, msg, msg_len,
+ ctx->pk, ctx->pk_len);
+}
+
+static unsigned int crypto_mldsa_key_size(struct crypto_sig *tfm)
+{
+ struct crypto_mldsa_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
+
+ switch (ctx->strength) {
+ case MLDSA44:
+ return MLDSA44_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
+ case MLDSA65:
+ return MLDSA65_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
+ case MLDSA87:
+ return MLDSA87_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
+ default:
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+static int crypto_mldsa_set_pub_key(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
+ const void *key, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ struct crypto_mldsa_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
+ unsigned int expected_len = crypto_mldsa_key_size(tfm);
+
+ if (keylen != expected_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ctx->pk_len = keylen;
+ memcpy(ctx->pk, key, keylen);
+ ctx->key_set = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypto_mldsa_set_priv_key(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
+ const void *key, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static unsigned int crypto_mldsa_max_size(struct crypto_sig *tfm)
+{
+ struct crypto_mldsa_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
+
+ switch (ctx->strength) {
+ case MLDSA44:
+ return MLDSA44_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
+ case MLDSA65:
+ return MLDSA65_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
+ case MLDSA87:
+ return MLDSA87_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
+ default:
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+static int crypto_mldsa44_alg_init(struct crypto_sig *tfm)
+{
+ struct crypto_mldsa_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
+
+ ctx->strength = MLDSA44;
+ ctx->key_set = false;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypto_mldsa65_alg_init(struct crypto_sig *tfm)
+{
+ struct crypto_mldsa_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
+
+ ctx->strength = MLDSA65;
+ ctx->key_set = false;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int crypto_mldsa87_alg_init(struct crypto_sig *tfm)
+{
+ struct crypto_mldsa_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
+
+ ctx->strength = MLDSA87;
+ ctx->key_set = false;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void crypto_mldsa_alg_exit(struct crypto_sig *tfm)
+{
+}
+
+static struct sig_alg crypto_mldsa_algs[] = {
+ {
+ .sign = crypto_mldsa_sign,
+ .verify = crypto_mldsa_verify,
+ .set_pub_key = crypto_mldsa_set_pub_key,
+ .set_priv_key = crypto_mldsa_set_priv_key,
+ .key_size = crypto_mldsa_key_size,
+ .max_size = crypto_mldsa_max_size,
+ .init = crypto_mldsa44_alg_init,
+ .exit = crypto_mldsa_alg_exit,
+ .base.cra_name = "mldsa44",
+ .base.cra_driver_name = "mldsa44-lib",
+ .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crypto_mldsa_ctx),
+ .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .base.cra_priority = 5000,
+ }, {
+ .sign = crypto_mldsa_sign,
+ .verify = crypto_mldsa_verify,
+ .set_pub_key = crypto_mldsa_set_pub_key,
+ .set_priv_key = crypto_mldsa_set_priv_key,
+ .key_size = crypto_mldsa_key_size,
+ .max_size = crypto_mldsa_max_size,
+ .init = crypto_mldsa65_alg_init,
+ .exit = crypto_mldsa_alg_exit,
+ .base.cra_name = "mldsa65",
+ .base.cra_driver_name = "mldsa65-lib",
+ .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crypto_mldsa_ctx),
+ .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .base.cra_priority = 5000,
+ }, {
+ .sign = crypto_mldsa_sign,
+ .verify = crypto_mldsa_verify,
+ .set_pub_key = crypto_mldsa_set_pub_key,
+ .set_priv_key = crypto_mldsa_set_priv_key,
+ .key_size = crypto_mldsa_key_size,
+ .max_size = crypto_mldsa_max_size,
+ .init = crypto_mldsa87_alg_init,
+ .exit = crypto_mldsa_alg_exit,
+ .base.cra_name = "mldsa87",
+ .base.cra_driver_name = "mldsa87-lib",
+ .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crypto_mldsa_ctx),
+ .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .base.cra_priority = 5000,
+ },
+};
+
+static int __init mldsa_init(void)
+{
+ int ret, i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_mldsa_algs); i++) {
+ ret = crypto_register_sig(&crypto_mldsa_algs[i]);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ pr_err("Failed to register (%d)\n", ret);
+ for (i--; i >= 0; i--)
+ crypto_unregister_sig(&crypto_mldsa_algs[i]);
+ return ret;
+}
+module_init(mldsa_init);
+
+static void mldsa_exit(void)
+{
+ for (int i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_mldsa_algs); i++)
+ crypto_unregister_sig(&crypto_mldsa_algs[i]);
+}
+module_exit(mldsa_exit);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Crypto API support for ML-DSA signature verification");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("mldsa44");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("mldsa65");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("mldsa87");
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH v13 00/12] x509, pkcs7, crypto: Add ML-DSA and RSASSA-PSS signing
From: David Howells @ 2026-01-20 14:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin
Cc: David Howells, Jarkko Sakkinen, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers,
Luis Chamberlain, Petr Pavlu, Daniel Gomez, Sami Tolvanen,
Jason A . Donenfeld, Ard Biesheuvel, Stephan Mueller,
linux-crypto, keyrings, linux-modules, linux-kernel
Hi Lukas, Ignat,
[Note this is based on Eric Bigger's libcrypto-next branch].
These patches add ML-DSA module signing and RSASSA-PSS module signing. The
first half of the set adds ML-DSA signing:
(1) Add a crypto_sig interface for ML-DSA, verification only.
(2) Modify PKCS#7 support to allow kernel module signatures to carry
authenticatedAttributes as OpenSSL refuses to let them be opted out of
for ML-DSA (CMS_NOATTR). This adds an extra digest calculation to the
process.
Modify PKCS#7 to pass the authenticatedAttributes directly to the
ML-DSA algorithm rather than passing over a digest as is done with RSA
as ML-DSA wants to do its own hashing and will add other stuff into
the hash. We could use hashML-DSA or an external mu instead, but they
aren't standardised for CMS yet.
(3) Add support to the PKCS#7 and X.509 parsers for ML-DSA.
(4) Modify sign-file to handle OpenSSL not permitting CMS_NOATTR with
ML-DSA and add ML-DSA to the choice of algorithm with which to sign
modules. Note that this might need some more 'select' lines in the
Kconfig to select the lib stuff as well.
This is based on Eric's libcrypto-next branch which has the core
implementation of ML-DSA.
The second half of the set adds RSASSA-PSS signing:
(5) Add an info string parameter to the internal signature verification
routines where that does not already exist. This is necessary to pass
extra parameters and is already supported in the KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY
keyctl.
Both X.509 and PKCS#7 provide for these parameters to be supplied, but
it is tricky to pass the parameters in a blob with the signature or
key data as there are checks on these sizes that are then violated;
further, the way the parameters are laid out in the ASN.1 doesn't lend
itself easily to simply extracting out a larger blob.
(6) Add RSASSA-PSS support to the RSA driver in crypto/. This parses the
info string to get the verification parameters.
(7) Add support to the PKCS#7 and X.509 parsers for RSASSA-PSS.
(8) Modify sign-file to pass the extra parameters necessary to be able
generate RSASSA-PSS. For the moment, only select MGF1 with the same
hash algorithm as for the data for the mask function. Add RSASSA-PSS
to the choice of algorithm with which to sign modules.
Note that I do still need to add some FIPS tests for ML-DSA in the form of
X.509 certs, data and detached PKCS#7 signatures. I'm not sure if I can
use FIPS-standard tests for that.
The patches can also be found here:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=keys-pqc
David
Changes
=======
ver #13)
- Allow a zero-length salt in RSAPSS-PSS.
- Don't reject ECDSA/ECRDSA with SHA256 and SHA384 otherwise the FIPS
selftest panics when used.
- Add a FIPS test for RSASSA-PSS (from NIST's SigVerPSS_186-3.rsp).
- Add a FIPS test for ML-DSA (from NIST's FIPS204 JSON set).
ver #12)
- Rebased on Eric's libcrypto-next branch.
- Delete references to Dilithium (ML-DSA derived from this).
- Made sign-file supply CMS_NOATTR for ML-DSA if openssl >= v4.
- Made it possible to do ML-DSA over the data without signedAttrs.
- Made RSASSA-PSS info parser use strsep() and match_token().
- Cleaned the RSASSA-PSS param parsing.
- Added limitation on what hashes can be used with what algos.
- Moved __free()-marked variables to the point of setting.
ver #11)
- Rebased on Eric's libcrypto-next branch.
- Added RSASSA-PSS support patches.
ver #10)
- Replaced the Leancrypto ML-DSA implementation with Eric's.
- Fixed Eric's implementation to have MODULE_* info.
- Added a patch to drive Eric's ML-DSA implementation from crypto_sig.
- Removed SHAKE256 from the list of available module hash algorithms.
- Changed a some more ML_DSA to MLDSA in config symbols.
ver #9)
- ML-DSA changes:
- Separate output into four modules (1 common, 3 strength-specific).
- Solves Kconfig issue with needing to select at least one strength.
- Separate the strength-specific crypto-lib APIs.
- This is now generated by preprocessor-templating.
- Remove the multiplexor code.
- Multiplex the crypto-lib APIs by C type.
- Fix the PKCS#7/X.509 code to have the correct algo names.
ver #8)
- Moved the ML-DSA code to lib/crypto/mldsa/.
- Renamed some bits from ml-dsa to mldsa.
- Created a simplified API and placed that in include/crypto/mldsa.h.
- Made the testing code use the simplified API.
- Fixed a warning about implicitly casting between uint16_t and __le16.
ver #7)
- Rebased on Eric's tree as that now contains all the necessary SHA-3
infrastructure and drop the SHA-3 patches from here.
- Added a minimal patch to provide shake256 support for crypto_sig.
- Got rid of the memory allocation wrappers.
- Removed the ML-DSA keypair generation code and the signing code, leaving
only the signature verification code.
- Removed the secret key handling code.
- Removed the secret keys from the kunit tests and the signing testing.
- Removed some unused bits from the ML-DSA code.
- Downgraded the kdoc comments to ordinary comments, but keep the markup
for easier comparison to Leancrypto.
ver #6)
- Added a patch to make the jitterentropy RNG use lib/sha3.
- Added back the crypto/sha3_generic changes.
- Added ML-DSA implementation (still needs more cleanup).
- Added kunit test for ML-DSA.
- Modified PKCS#7 to accommodate ML-DSA.
- Modified PKCS#7 and X.509 to allow ML-DSA to be specified and used.
- Modified sign-file to not use CMS_NOATTR with ML-DSA.
- Allowed SHA3 and SHAKE* algorithms for module signing default.
- Allowed ML-DSA-{44,65,87} to be selected as the module signing default.
ver #5)
- Fix gen-hash-testvecs.py to correctly handle algo names that contain a
dash.
- Fix gen-hash-testvecs.py to not generate HMAC for SHA3-* or SHAKE* as
these don't currently have HMAC variants implemented.
- Fix algo names to be correct.
- Fix kunit module description as it now tests all SHA3 variants.
ver #4)
- Fix a couple of arm64 build problems.
- Doc fixes:
- Fix the description of the algorithm to be closer to the NIST spec's
terminology.
- Don't talk of finialising the context for XOFs.
- Don't say "Return: None".
- Declare the "Context" to be "Any context" and make no mention of the
fact that it might use the FPU.
- Change "initialise" to "initialize".
- Don't warn that the context is relatively large for stack use.
- Use size_t for size parameters/variables.
- Make the module_exit unconditional.
- Dropped the crypto/ dir-affecting patches for the moment.
ver #3)
- Renamed conflicting arm64 functions.
- Made a separate wrapper API for each algorithm in the family.
- Removed sha3_init(), sha3_reinit() and sha3_final().
- Removed sha3_ctx::digest_size.
- Renamed sha3_ctx::partial to sha3_ctx::absorb_offset.
- Refer to the output of SHAKE* as "output" not "digest".
- Moved the Iota transform into the one-round function.
- Made sha3_update() warn if called after sha3_squeeze().
- Simplified the module-load test to not do update after squeeze.
- Added Return: and Context: kdoc statements and expanded the kdoc
headers.
- Added an API description document.
- Overhauled the kunit tests.
- Only have one kunit test.
- Only call the general hash tester on one algo.
- Add separate simple cursory checks for the other algos.
- Add resqueezing tests.
- Add some NIST example tests.
- Changed crypto/sha3_generic to use this
- Added SHAKE128/256 to crypto/sha3_generic and crypto/testmgr
- Folded struct sha3_state into struct sha3_ctx.
ver #2)
- Simplify the endianness handling.
- Rename sha3_final() to sha3_squeeze() and don't clear the context at the
end as it's permitted to continue calling sha3_final() to extract
continuations of the digest (needed by ML-DSA).
- Don't reapply the end marker to the hash state in continuation
sha3_squeeze() unless sha3_update() gets called again (needed by
ML-DSA).
- Give sha3_squeeze() the amount of digest to produce as a parameter
rather than using ctx->digest_size and don't return the amount digested.
- Reimplement sha3_final() as a wrapper around sha3_squeeze() that
extracts ctx->digest_size amount of digest and then zeroes out the
context. The latter is necessary to avoid upsetting
hash-test-template.h.
- Provide a sha3_reinit() function to clear the state, but to leave the
parameters that indicate the hash properties unaffected, allowing for
reuse.
- Provide a sha3_set_digestsize() function to change the size of the
digest to be extracted by sha3_final(). sha3_squeeze() takes a
parameter for this instead.
- Don't pass the digest size as a parameter to shake128/256_init() but
rather default to 128/256 bits as per the function name.
- Provide a sha3_clear() function to zero out the context.
David Howells (12):
crypto: Add ML-DSA crypto_sig support
pkcs7: Allow the signing algo to calculate the digest itself
pkcs7: Allow direct signing of data with ML-DSA
pkcs7, x509: Add ML-DSA support
modsign: Enable ML-DSA module signing
crypto: Add supplementary info param to asymmetric key signature
verification
crypto: Add RSASSA-PSS support
pkcs7, x509: Add RSASSA-PSS support
modsign: Enable RSASSA-PSS module signing
pkcs7: Add FIPS selftest for RSASSA-PSS
x509, pkcs7: Limit crypto combinations that may be used for module
signing
pkcs7: Add ML-DSA FIPS selftest
Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst | 17 +-
certs/Kconfig | 27 +
certs/Makefile | 4 +
crypto/Kconfig | 10 +
crypto/Makefile | 3 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 6 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 13 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 1 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/mgf1_params.asn1 | 12 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/mscode_parser.c | 2 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 | 2 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 115 ++--
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 70 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 74 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_params.asn1 | 25 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_parser.c | 240 +++++++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_parser.h | 25 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest.c | 1 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest.h | 6 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest_mldsa.c | 688 +++++++++++++++++++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest_rsa.c | 133 ++++
crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c | 4 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c | 3 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.h | 1 +
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 | 2 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 124 ++--
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 45 +-
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 37 +-
crypto/ecdsa-p1363.c | 5 +-
crypto/ecdsa-x962.c | 5 +-
crypto/ecdsa.c | 3 +-
crypto/ecrdsa.c | 3 +-
crypto/mldsa.c | 202 ++++++
crypto/rsa.c | 8 +
crypto/rsassa-pkcs1.c | 3 +-
crypto/rsassa-pss.c | 383 +++++++++++
crypto/sig.c | 3 +-
crypto/testmgr.c | 2 +-
crypto/testmgr.h | 1 +
include/crypto/hash.h | 3 +
include/crypto/internal/rsa.h | 2 +
include/crypto/public_key.h | 3 +
include/crypto/sig.h | 9 +-
include/linux/oid_registry.h | 7 +
scripts/sign-file.c | 71 +-
45 files changed, 2235 insertions(+), 168 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/mgf1_params.asn1
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_params.asn1
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_parser.c
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_parser.h
create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest_mldsa.c
create mode 100644 crypto/mldsa.c
create mode 100644 crypto/rsassa-pss.c
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v12 08/10] pkcs7, x509: Add RSASSA-PSS support
From: Ignat Korchagin @ 2026-01-20 14:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Howells
Cc: Lukas Wunner, Jarkko Sakkinen, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers,
Luis Chamberlain, Petr Pavlu, Daniel Gomez, Sami Tolvanen,
Jason A . Donenfeld, Ard Biesheuvel, Stephan Mueller,
linux-crypto, keyrings, linux-modules, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20260115215100.312611-9-dhowells@redhat.com>
Hi David,
On Thu, Jan 15, 2026 at 9:52 PM David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> Add support for RSASSA-PSS keys and signatures to the PKCS#7 and X.509
> implementations. This requires adding support for algorithm parameters for
> keys and signatures as RSASSA-PSS needs metadata. The ASN.1 encoded data
> is converted into a printable key=value list string and passed to the
> verification code.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
> cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
> cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
> cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 12 +-
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/mgf1_params.asn1 | 12 ++
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 | 2 +-
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 114 +++++-----
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 10 +
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_params.asn1 | 25 +++
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_parser.c | 240 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_parser.h | 25 +++
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 | 2 +-
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 100 ++++-----
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 45 +++-
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 36 +++-
> include/linux/oid_registry.h | 2 +
> 13 files changed, 503 insertions(+), 122 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/mgf1_params.asn1
> create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_params.asn1
> create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_parser.c
> create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_parser.h
>
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
> index bc65d3b98dcb..c5aed382ee8a 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile
> @@ -21,7 +21,11 @@ x509_key_parser-y := \
> x509_akid.asn1.o \
> x509_cert_parser.o \
> x509_loader.o \
> - x509_public_key.o
> + x509_public_key.o \
> + rsassa_params.asn1.o \
> + rsassa_parser.o \
> + mgf1_params.asn1.o
> +
> obj-$(CONFIG_FIPS_SIGNATURE_SELFTEST) += x509_selftest.o
> x509_selftest-y += selftest.o
> x509_selftest-$(CONFIG_FIPS_SIGNATURE_SELFTEST_RSA) += selftest_rsa.o
> @@ -31,8 +35,14 @@ $(obj)/x509_cert_parser.o: \
> $(obj)/x509.asn1.h \
> $(obj)/x509_akid.asn1.h
>
> +$(obj)/rsassa_parser.o: \
> + $(obj)/rsassa_params.asn1.h \
> + $(obj)/mgf1_params.asn1.h
> +
> $(obj)/x509.asn1.o: $(obj)/x509.asn1.c $(obj)/x509.asn1.h
> $(obj)/x509_akid.asn1.o: $(obj)/x509_akid.asn1.c $(obj)/x509_akid.asn1.h
> +$(obj)/rsassa_params.asn1.o: $(obj)/rsassa_params.asn1.c $(obj)/rsassa_params.asn1.h
> +$(obj)/mgf1_params.asn1.o: $(obj)/mgf1_params.asn1.c $(obj)/mgf1_params.asn1.h
>
> #
> # PKCS#8 private key handling
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mgf1_params.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mgf1_params.asn1
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..c3bc4643e72c
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/mgf1_params.asn1
> @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
> +-- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
> +--
> +-- Copyright (C) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as authors
> +-- of the code
> +--
> +--
> +-- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4055 Section 6.
> +
> +AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
> + algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ mgf1_note_OID }),
> + parameters ANY OPTIONAL
> +}
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
> index 28e1f4a41c14..03c2248f23bc 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7.asn1
> @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ UnauthenticatedAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
>
> DigestEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
> algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ pkcs7_note_OID }),
> - parameters ANY OPTIONAL
> + parameters ANY OPTIONAL ({ pkcs7_sig_note_algo_params })
> }
>
> EncryptedDigest ::= OCTET STRING ({ pkcs7_sig_note_signature })
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
> index 90c36fe1b5ed..47d3c1920e8f 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
> @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
> #include <linux/oid_registry.h>
> #include <crypto/public_key.h>
> #include "pkcs7_parser.h"
> +#include "rsassa_parser.h"
> #include "pkcs7.asn1.h"
>
> MODULE_DESCRIPTION("PKCS#7 parser");
> @@ -28,14 +29,16 @@ struct pkcs7_parse_context {
> struct x509_certificate **ppcerts;
> unsigned long data; /* Start of data */
> enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */
> - unsigned x509_index;
> - unsigned sinfo_index;
> + unsigned int x509_index;
> + unsigned int sinfo_index;
> + unsigned int algo_params_size;
> + const void *algo_params;
> const void *raw_serial;
> - unsigned raw_serial_size;
> - unsigned raw_issuer_size;
> + unsigned int raw_serial_size;
> + unsigned int raw_issuer_size;
> const void *raw_issuer;
> const void *raw_skid;
> - unsigned raw_skid_size;
> + unsigned int raw_skid_size;
> bool expect_skid;
> };
>
> @@ -225,45 +228,29 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_digest_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> const void *value, size_t vlen)
> {
> struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
> + const char *algo;
>
> - switch (ctx->last_oid) {
> - case OID_sha1:
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha1";
> - break;
> - case OID_sha256:
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha256";
> - break;
> - case OID_sha384:
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha384";
> - break;
> - case OID_sha512:
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha512";
> - break;
> - case OID_sha224:
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha224";
> - break;
> - case OID_sm3:
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sm3";
> - break;
> - case OID_gost2012Digest256:
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "streebog256";
> - break;
> - case OID_gost2012Digest512:
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "streebog512";
> - break;
> - case OID_sha3_256:
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha3-256";
> - break;
> - case OID_sha3_384:
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha3-384";
> - break;
> - case OID_sha3_512:
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = "sha3-512";
> - break;
> - default:
> - printk("Unsupported digest algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
> + algo = oid_to_hash(ctx->last_oid);
> + if (!algo) {
> + pr_notice("Unsupported digest algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
> return -ENOPKG;
> }
> +
> + ctx->sinfo->sig->hash_algo = algo;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Note the parameters for the signature.
> + */
> +int pkcs7_sig_note_algo_params(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> + unsigned char tag,
> + const void *value, size_t vlen)
> +{
> + struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
> +
> + ctx->algo_params = value - hdrlen;
> + ctx->algo_params_size = vlen + hdrlen;
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -275,11 +262,21 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> const void *value, size_t vlen)
> {
> struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
> + struct public_key_signature *sig = ctx->sinfo->sig;
> + int err;
>
> switch (ctx->last_oid) {
> case OID_rsaEncryption:
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "pkcs1";
> + sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
> + sig->encoding = "pkcs1";
> + break;
> + case OID_id_rsassa_pss:
> + err = rsassa_parse_sig_params(sig, ctx->algo_params,
> + ctx->algo_params_size);
> + if (err < 0)
> + return err;
> + sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
> + sig->encoding = "emsa-pss";
> break;
> case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha1:
> case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha224:
> @@ -289,33 +286,36 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_pkey_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha3_256:
> case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha3_384:
> case OID_id_ecdsa_with_sha3_512:
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "ecdsa";
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "x962";
> + sig->pkey_algo = "ecdsa";
> + sig->encoding = "x962";
> break;
> case OID_gost2012PKey256:
> case OID_gost2012PKey512:
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "ecrdsa";
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "raw";
> + sig->pkey_algo = "ecrdsa";
> + sig->encoding = "raw";
> break;
> case OID_id_ml_dsa_44:
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "mldsa44";
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "raw";
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->algo_does_hash = true;
> + sig->pkey_algo = "mldsa44";
> + sig->encoding = "raw";
> + sig->algo_does_hash = true;
> break;
> case OID_id_ml_dsa_65:
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "mldsa65";
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "raw";
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->algo_does_hash = true;
> + sig->pkey_algo = "mldsa65";
> + sig->encoding = "raw";
> + sig->algo_does_hash = true;
> break;
> case OID_id_ml_dsa_87:
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->pkey_algo = "mldsa87";
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->encoding = "raw";
> - ctx->sinfo->sig->algo_does_hash = true;
> + sig->pkey_algo = "mldsa87";
> + sig->encoding = "raw";
> + sig->algo_does_hash = true;
> break;
> default:
> - printk("Unsupported pkey algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
> + pr_notice("Unsupported pkey algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
> return -ENOPKG;
> }
> +
> + ctx->algo_params = NULL;
> + ctx->algo_params_size = 0;
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> index 61dc4f626620..13a5616becaa 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
> @@ -100,6 +100,16 @@ software_key_determine_akcipher(const struct public_key *pkey,
> }
> return n >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ? -EINVAL : 0;
> }
> + if (strcmp(encoding, "emsa-pss") == 0) {
> + if (op != kernel_pkey_sign &&
> + op != kernel_pkey_verify)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + *sig = true;
> + if (!hash_algo)
> + hash_algo = "none";
> + n = snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "rsassa-pss");
> + return n >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME ? -EINVAL : 0;
> + }
> if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0)
> return -EINVAL;
> /*
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_params.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_params.asn1
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..95a4e5f0dcd5
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_params.asn1
> @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
> +-- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
> +--
> +-- Copyright (C) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as authors
> +-- of the code
> +--
> +--
> +-- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4055 Section 6.
> +
> +RSASSA-PSS-params ::= SEQUENCE {
> + hashAlgorithm [0] HashAlgorithm,
> + maskGenAlgorithm [1] MaskGenAlgorithm,
> + saltLength [2] INTEGER ({ rsassa_note_salt_length }),
> + trailerField [3] TrailerField OPTIONAL
> +}
> +
> +TrailerField ::= INTEGER ({ rsassa_note_trailer })
> +-- { trailerFieldBC(1) }
> +
> +HashAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier ({ rsassa_note_hash_algo })
> +MaskGenAlgorithm ::= AlgorithmIdentifier ({ rsassa_note_maskgen_algo })
> +
> +AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
> + algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ rsassa_note_OID }),
> + parameters ANY OPTIONAL ({ rsassa_note_params })
> +}
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_parser.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..b80720fa94be
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_parser.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
> +/* RSASSA-PSS ASN.1 parameter parser
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2025 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
> + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
> + */
> +
> +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "RSASSA-PSS: "fmt
> +#include <linux/kernel.h>
> +#include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/err.h>
> +#include <linux/asn1.h>
> +#include <crypto/hash.h>
> +#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
> +#include <crypto/public_key.h>
> +#include "x509_parser.h"
> +#include "rsassa_parser.h"
> +#include "rsassa_params.asn1.h"
> +#include "mgf1_params.asn1.h"
> +
> +struct rsassa_parse_context {
> + struct rsassa_parameters *rsassa; /* The parsed parameters */
> + unsigned long data; /* Start of data */
> + const void *params; /* Algo parameters */
> + unsigned int params_len; /* Length of algo parameters */
> + enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */
> + enum OID mgf1_last_oid; /* Last OID encountered in MGF1 */
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * Parse an RSASSA parameter block.
> + */
> +struct rsassa_parameters *rsassa_params_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
> +{
> + struct rsassa_parse_context ctx = {};
> + long ret;
> +
> + struct rsassa_parameters *rsassa __free(kfree) =
Did you mean to use the newly added rsassa_params_free() here?
> + kzalloc(sizeof(*rsassa), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!rsassa)
> + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> +
> + ctx.rsassa = rsassa;
> + ctx.data = (unsigned long)data;
> +
> + /* Attempt to decode the parameters */
> + ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&rsassa_params_decoder, &ctx, data, datalen);
> + if (ret < 0) {
> + pr_debug("RSASSA parse failed %ld\n", ret);
> + return ERR_PTR(ret);
> + }
> +
> + return no_free_ptr(rsassa);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how
> + * to interpret it.
> + */
> +int rsassa_note_OID(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
> + const void *value, size_t vlen)
> +{
> + struct rsassa_parse_context *ctx = context;
> +
> + ctx->last_oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
> + if (ctx->last_oid == OID__NR) {
> + char buffer[56];
> +
> + sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
> + pr_debug("Unknown OID: %s\n", buffer);
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Parse trailerField. We only accept trailerFieldBC.
> + */
> +int rsassa_note_trailer(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
> + const void *value, size_t vlen)
> +{
> + if (vlen != 1 || *(u8 *)value != 0x01) {
> + pr_debug("Unknown trailerField\n");
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int rsassa_note_hash_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
> + const void *value, size_t vlen)
> +{
> + struct rsassa_parse_context *ctx = context;
> +
> + ctx->rsassa->hash_algo = ctx->last_oid;
> + pr_debug("HASH-ALGO %u %u\n", ctx->rsassa->hash_algo, ctx->params_len);
> + ctx->params = NULL;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int rsassa_note_maskgen_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
> + const void *value, size_t vlen)
> +{
> + struct rsassa_parse_context *ctx = context;
> + int ret;
> +
> + ctx->rsassa->maskgen_algo = ctx->last_oid;
> + pr_debug("MGF-ALGO %u %u\n", ctx->rsassa->maskgen_algo, ctx->params_len);
> +
> + switch (ctx->rsassa->maskgen_algo) {
> + case OID_id_mgf1:
> + if (!vlen) {
> + pr_debug("MGF1 missing parameters\n");
> + return -EBADMSG;
> + }
> +
> + ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&mgf1_params_decoder, ctx,
> + ctx->params, ctx->params_len);
> + if (ret < 0) {
> + pr_debug("MGF1 parse failed %d\n", ret);
> + return ret;
> + }
> + ctx->rsassa->maskgen_hash = ctx->mgf1_last_oid;
> + break;
> +
> + default:
> + pr_debug("Unsupported MaskGenAlgorithm %d\n", ret);
> + return -ENOPKG;
> + }
> +
> + ctx->params = NULL;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +int rsassa_note_salt_length(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
> + const void *value, size_t vlen)
> +{
> + struct rsassa_parse_context *ctx = context;
> + u32 salt_len = 0;
> +
> + if (!vlen) {
> + pr_debug("Salt len bad integer\n");
> + return -EBADMSG;
> + }
> + if (vlen > 4) {
> + pr_debug("Salt len too long %zu\n", vlen);
> + return -EBADMSG;
> + }
> + if (((u8 *)value)[0] & 0x80) {
> + pr_debug("Salt len negative\n");
> + return -EBADMSG;
> + }
> +
> + for (size_t i = 0; i < vlen; i++) {
> + salt_len <<= 8;
> + salt_len |= ((u8 *)value)[i];
> + }
> +
> + ctx->rsassa->salt_len = salt_len;
> + pr_debug("Salt-Len %u\n", salt_len);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Extract arbitrary parameters.
> + */
> +int rsassa_note_params(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
> + const void *value, size_t vlen)
> +{
> + struct rsassa_parse_context *ctx = context;
> +
> + ctx->params = value - hdrlen;
> + ctx->params_len = vlen + hdrlen;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Note an OID when we find one for later processing when we know how to
> + * interpret it.
> + */
> +int mgf1_note_OID(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
> + const void *value, size_t vlen)
> +{
> + struct rsassa_parse_context *ctx = context;
> +
> + ctx->mgf1_last_oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
> + if (ctx->mgf1_last_oid == OID__NR) {
> + char buffer[56];
> +
> + sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
> + pr_debug("Unknown MGF1 OID: %s\n", buffer);
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Parse the signature parameter block and generate a suitable info string from
> + * it.
> + */
> +int rsassa_parse_sig_params(struct public_key_signature *sig,
> + const u8 *sig_params, unsigned int sig_params_size)
> +{
> + const char *mf, *mh;
> +
> + if (!sig_params || !sig_params_size) {
> + pr_debug("sig algo without parameters\n");
> + return -EBADMSG;
> + }
> +
> + struct rsassa_parameters *rsassa __free(rsassa_params_free) =
> + rsassa_params_parse(sig_params, sig_params_size);
> + if (IS_ERR(rsassa))
> + return PTR_ERR(rsassa);
> +
> + sig->hash_algo = oid_to_hash(rsassa->hash_algo);
> + if (!sig->hash_algo) {
> + pr_notice("Unsupported hash: %u\n", rsassa->hash_algo);
> + return -ENOPKG;
> + }
> +
> + switch (rsassa->maskgen_algo) {
> + case OID_id_mgf1:
> + mf = "mgf1";
> + break;
> + default:
> + pr_notice("Unsupported maskgen algo: %u\n", rsassa->maskgen_algo);
> + return -ENOPKG;
> + }
> +
> + mh = oid_to_hash(rsassa->maskgen_hash);
> + if (!mh) {
> + pr_notice("Unsupported MGF1 hash: %u\n", rsassa->maskgen_hash);
> + return -ENOPKG;
> + }
> +
> + sig->info = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "sighash=%s pss_mask=%s,%s pss_salt=%u",
> + sig->hash_algo, mf, mh, rsassa->salt_len);
> + if (!sig->info)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + pr_debug("Info string: %s\n", sig->info);
> + return 0;
> +}
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_parser.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..b80401a3de8f
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/rsassa_parser.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later */
> +/* RSASSA-PSS parameter parsing context
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2025 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
> + * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
> +
> +struct rsassa_parameters {
> + enum OID hash_algo; /* Hash algorithm identifier */
> + enum OID maskgen_algo; /* Mask gen algorithm identifier */
> + enum OID maskgen_hash; /* Mask gen hash algorithm identifier */
> + u32 salt_len;
> +};
> +
> +struct rsassa_parameters *rsassa_params_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen);
> +int rsassa_parse_sig_params(struct public_key_signature *sig,
> + const u8 *sig_params, unsigned int sig_params_size);
> +
> +static inline void rsassa_params_free(struct rsassa_parameters *params)
> +{
> + kfree(params);
> +}
> +DEFINE_FREE(rsassa_params_free, struct rsassa_parameters*, rsassa_params_free(_T))
So you use plain kfree() in one instance and this custom free
definition in another. We should probably pick one. What is the idea
behind this custom rsassa_params_free(), if it just calls into
kfree()?
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1
> index feb9573cacce..453b72eba1fe 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509.asn1
> @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
>
> AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
> algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ x509_note_OID }),
> - parameters ANY OPTIONAL ({ x509_note_params })
> + parameters ANY OPTIONAL ({ x509_note_algo_id_params })
> }
>
> Name ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> index 5ab5b4e5f1b4..a4b848628e37 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
> @@ -15,28 +15,7 @@
> #include "x509_parser.h"
> #include "x509.asn1.h"
> #include "x509_akid.asn1.h"
> -
> -struct x509_parse_context {
> - struct x509_certificate *cert; /* Certificate being constructed */
> - unsigned long data; /* Start of data */
> - const void *key; /* Key data */
> - size_t key_size; /* Size of key data */
> - const void *params; /* Key parameters */
> - size_t params_size; /* Size of key parameters */
> - enum OID key_algo; /* Algorithm used by the cert's key */
> - enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */
> - enum OID sig_algo; /* Algorithm used to sign the cert */
> - u8 o_size; /* Size of organizationName (O) */
> - u8 cn_size; /* Size of commonName (CN) */
> - u8 email_size; /* Size of emailAddress */
> - u16 o_offset; /* Offset of organizationName (O) */
> - u16 cn_offset; /* Offset of commonName (CN) */
> - u16 email_offset; /* Offset of emailAddress */
> - unsigned raw_akid_size;
> - const void *raw_akid; /* Raw authorityKeyId in ASN.1 */
> - const void *akid_raw_issuer; /* Raw directoryName in authorityKeyId */
> - unsigned akid_raw_issuer_size;
> -};
> +#include "rsassa_parser.h"
>
> /*
> * Free an X.509 certificate
> @@ -60,12 +39,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x509_free_certificate);
> */
> struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
> {
> - struct x509_certificate *cert __free(x509_free_certificate) = NULL;
> - struct x509_parse_context *ctx __free(kfree) = NULL;
Thank you for fixing this.
> struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
> long ret;
>
> - cert = kzalloc(sizeof(struct x509_certificate), GFP_KERNEL);
> + struct x509_certificate *cert __free(x509_free_certificate) =
> + kzalloc(sizeof(struct x509_certificate), GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!cert)
> return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> cert->pub = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key), GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -74,7 +52,9 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
> cert->sig = kzalloc(sizeof(struct public_key_signature), GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!cert->sig)
> return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> - ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct x509_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL);
> +
> + struct x509_parse_context *ctx __free(kfree) =
> + kzalloc(sizeof(struct x509_parse_context), GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!ctx)
> return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
>
> @@ -104,15 +84,15 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
>
> cert->pub->keylen = ctx->key_size;
>
> - cert->pub->params = kmemdup(ctx->params, ctx->params_size, GFP_KERNEL);
> + cert->pub->params = kmemdup(ctx->key_params, ctx->key_params_size, GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!cert->pub->params)
> return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
>
> - cert->pub->paramlen = ctx->params_size;
> + cert->pub->paramlen = ctx->key_params_size;
> cert->pub->algo = ctx->key_algo;
>
> /* Grab the signature bits */
> - ret = x509_get_sig_params(cert);
> + ret = x509_get_sig_params(cert, ctx);
> if (ret < 0)
> return ERR_PTR(ret);
>
> @@ -146,7 +126,7 @@ int x509_note_OID(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>
> ctx->last_oid = look_up_OID(value, vlen);
> if (ctx->last_oid == OID__NR) {
> - char buffer[50];
> + char buffer[56];
> sprint_oid(value, vlen, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
> pr_debug("Unknown OID: [%lu] %s\n",
> (unsigned long)value - ctx->data, buffer);
> @@ -179,6 +159,7 @@ int x509_note_sig_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
> const void *value, size_t vlen)
> {
> struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
> + int err;
>
> pr_debug("PubKey Algo: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
>
> @@ -210,6 +191,9 @@ int x509_note_sig_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
> ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha1";
> goto ecdsa;
>
> + case OID_id_rsassa_pss:
> + goto rsassa_pss;
> +
> case OID_id_rsassa_pkcs1_v1_5_with_sha3_256:
> ctx->cert->sig->hash_algo = "sha3-256";
> goto rsa_pkcs1;
> @@ -268,6 +252,19 @@ int x509_note_sig_algo(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
> goto ml_dsa;
> }
>
> +rsassa_pss:
> + err = rsassa_parse_sig_params(ctx->cert->sig,
> + ctx->algo_params, ctx->algo_params_size);
> + if (err < 0)
> + return err;
> +
> + ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
> + ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "emsa-pss";
> + ctx->sig_algo = ctx->last_oid;
> + ctx->algo_params = NULL;
> + ctx->algo_params_size = 0;
> + return 0;
> +
> rsa_pkcs1:
> ctx->cert->sig->pkey_algo = "rsa";
> ctx->cert->sig->encoding = "pkcs1";
> @@ -324,8 +321,8 @@ int x509_note_signature(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> vlen--;
> }
>
> - ctx->cert->raw_sig = value;
> - ctx->cert->raw_sig_size = vlen;
> + ctx->sig = value;
> + ctx->sig_size = vlen;
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -479,23 +476,16 @@ int x509_note_subject(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> }
>
> /*
> - * Extract the parameters for the public key
> + * Extract the parameters for an AlgorithmIdentifier.
> */
> -int x509_note_params(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> - unsigned char tag,
> - const void *value, size_t vlen)
> +int x509_note_algo_id_params(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> + unsigned char tag,
> + const void *value, size_t vlen)
> {
> struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
>
> - /*
> - * AlgorithmIdentifier is used three times in the x509, we should skip
> - * first and ignore third, using second one which is after subject and
> - * before subjectPublicKey.
> - */
> - if (!ctx->cert->raw_subject || ctx->key)
> - return 0;
> - ctx->params = value - hdrlen;
> - ctx->params_size = vlen + hdrlen;
> + ctx->algo_params = value - hdrlen;
> + ctx->algo_params_size = vlen + hdrlen;
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -514,12 +504,28 @@ int x509_extract_key_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> case OID_rsaEncryption:
> ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "rsa";
> break;
> + case OID_id_rsassa_pss:
> + /* Parameters are optional for the key itself. */
> + if (ctx->algo_params_size) {
> + ctx->key_params = ctx->algo_params;
> + ctx->key_params_size = ctx->algo_params_size;
> + ctx->algo_params = NULL;
> + ctx->algo_params_size = 0;
> +
> + struct rsassa_parameters *params __free(rsassa_params_free) =
> + rsassa_params_parse(ctx->key_params, ctx->key_params_size);
> + if (IS_ERR(params))
> + return PTR_ERR(params);
> + break;
> + }
> + ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "rsa";
> + break;
> case OID_gost2012PKey256:
> case OID_gost2012PKey512:
> ctx->cert->pub->pkey_algo = "ecrdsa";
> break;
> case OID_id_ecPublicKey:
> - if (parse_OID(ctx->params, ctx->params_size, &oid) != 0)
> + if (parse_OID(ctx->algo_params, ctx->algo_params_size, &oid) != 0)
> return -EBADMSG;
>
> switch (oid) {
> @@ -557,6 +563,8 @@ int x509_extract_key_data(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> return -EBADMSG;
> ctx->key = value + 1;
> ctx->key_size = vlen - 1;
> + ctx->algo_params = NULL;
> + ctx->algo_params_size = 0;
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
> index 0688c222806b..578de49c37bc 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
> @@ -22,18 +22,16 @@ struct x509_certificate {
> time64_t valid_from;
> time64_t valid_to;
> const void *tbs; /* Signed data */
> - unsigned tbs_size; /* Size of signed data */
> - unsigned raw_sig_size; /* Size of signature */
> - const void *raw_sig; /* Signature data */
> + unsigned int tbs_size; /* Size of signed data */
> const void *raw_serial; /* Raw serial number in ASN.1 */
> - unsigned raw_serial_size;
> - unsigned raw_issuer_size;
> + unsigned int raw_serial_size;
> + unsigned int raw_issuer_size;
> const void *raw_issuer; /* Raw issuer name in ASN.1 */
> const void *raw_subject; /* Raw subject name in ASN.1 */
> - unsigned raw_subject_size;
> - unsigned raw_skid_size;
> + unsigned int raw_subject_size;
> + unsigned int raw_skid_size;
> const void *raw_skid; /* Raw subjectKeyId in ASN.1 */
> - unsigned index;
> + unsigned int index;
> bool seen; /* Infinite recursion prevention */
> bool verified;
> bool self_signed; /* T if self-signed (check unsupported_sig too) */
> @@ -41,6 +39,34 @@ struct x509_certificate {
> bool blacklisted;
> };
>
> +struct x509_parse_context {
> + struct x509_certificate *cert; /* Certificate being constructed */
> + unsigned long data; /* Start of data */
> + const void *key; /* Key data */
> + size_t key_size; /* Size of key data */
> + const void *algo_params; /* AlgorithmIdentifier: parameters */
> + size_t algo_params_size; /* AlgorithmIdentifier: parameters size */
> + const void *key_params; /* Key parameters */
> + size_t key_params_size; /* Size of key parameters */
> + const void *sig_params; /* Signature parameters */
> + unsigned int sig_params_size; /* Size of sig parameters */
> + unsigned int sig_size; /* Size of signature */
> + const void *sig; /* Signature data */
> + enum OID key_algo; /* Algorithm used by the cert's key */
> + enum OID last_oid; /* Last OID encountered */
> + enum OID sig_algo; /* Algorithm used to sign the cert */
> + u8 o_size; /* Size of organizationName (O) */
> + u8 cn_size; /* Size of commonName (CN) */
> + u8 email_size; /* Size of emailAddress */
> + u16 o_offset; /* Offset of organizationName (O) */
> + u16 cn_offset; /* Offset of commonName (CN) */
> + u16 email_offset; /* Offset of emailAddress */
> + unsigned int raw_akid_size;
> + const void *raw_akid; /* Raw authorityKeyId in ASN.1 */
> + const void *akid_raw_issuer; /* Raw directoryName in authorityKeyId */
> + unsigned int akid_raw_issuer_size;
> +};
> +
> /*
> * x509_cert_parser.c
> */
> @@ -55,5 +81,6 @@ extern int x509_decode_time(time64_t *_t, size_t hdrlen,
> /*
> * x509_public_key.c
> */
> -extern int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert);
> +extern const char *oid_to_hash(enum OID oid);
> +extern int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert, struct x509_parse_context *parse);
> extern int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert);
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
> index 2243add11d48..4490cfa368a3 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
> @@ -17,11 +17,32 @@
> #include "asymmetric_keys.h"
> #include "x509_parser.h"
>
> +/*
> + * Translate OIDs to hash algorithm names.
> + */
> +const char *oid_to_hash(enum OID oid)
> +{
> + switch (oid) {
> + case OID_sha1: return "sha1";
> + case OID_sha256: return "sha256";
> + case OID_sha384: return "sha384";
> + case OID_sha512: return "sha512";
> + case OID_sha224: return "sha224";
> + case OID_sm3: return "sm3";
> + case OID_gost2012Digest256: return "streebog256";
> + case OID_gost2012Digest512: return "streebog512";
> + case OID_sha3_256: return "sha3-256";
> + case OID_sha3_384: return "sha3-384";
> + case OID_sha3_512: return "sha3-512";
> + default: return NULL;
> + }
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Set up the signature parameters in an X.509 certificate. This involves
> * digesting the signed data and extracting the signature.
> */
> -int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
> +int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert, struct x509_parse_context *parse)
> {
> struct public_key_signature *sig = cert->sig;
> struct crypto_shash *tfm;
> @@ -31,11 +52,11 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
>
> pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
>
> - sig->s = kmemdup(cert->raw_sig, cert->raw_sig_size, GFP_KERNEL);
> + sig->s = kmemdup(parse->sig, parse->sig_size, GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!sig->s)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> - sig->s_size = cert->raw_sig_size;
> + sig->s_size = parse->sig_size;
>
> /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
> * big the hash operational data will be.
> @@ -43,6 +64,7 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
> tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(sig->hash_algo, 0, 0);
> if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
> if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) {
> + pr_debug("Unsupported hash %s\n", sig->hash_algo);
> cert->unsupported_sig = true;
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -149,13 +171,12 @@ int x509_check_for_self_signed(struct x509_certificate *cert)
> */
> static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> {
> - struct x509_certificate *cert __free(x509_free_certificate) = NULL;
> - struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids __free(kfree) = NULL;
> char *p, *desc __free(kfree) = NULL;
> const char *q;
> size_t srlen, sulen;
>
> - cert = x509_cert_parse(prep->data, prep->datalen);
> + struct x509_certificate *cert __free(x509_free_certificate) =
> + x509_cert_parse(prep->data, prep->datalen);
> if (IS_ERR(cert))
> return PTR_ERR(cert);
>
> @@ -198,7 +219,8 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> p = bin2hex(p, q, srlen);
> *p = 0;
>
> - kids = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_ids), GFP_KERNEL);
> + struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids __free(kfree) =
> + kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_ids), GFP_KERNEL);
> if (!kids)
> return -ENOMEM;
> kids->id[0] = cert->id;
> diff --git a/include/linux/oid_registry.h b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
> index ebce402854de..7fe168f54a6c 100644
> --- a/include/linux/oid_registry.h
> +++ b/include/linux/oid_registry.h
> @@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ enum OID {
> /* PKCS#1 {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1)} */
> OID_rsaEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 */
> OID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.5 */
> + OID_id_mgf1, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.8 */
> + OID_id_rsassa_pss, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.10 */
> OID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 */
> OID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.12 */
> OID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, /* 1.2.840.113549.1.1.13 */
>
Ignat
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v12 07/10] crypto: Add RSASSA-PSS support
From: Ignat Korchagin @ 2026-01-20 14:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Howells
Cc: Lukas Wunner, Jarkko Sakkinen, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers,
Luis Chamberlain, Petr Pavlu, Daniel Gomez, Sami Tolvanen,
Jason A . Donenfeld, Ard Biesheuvel, Stephan Mueller,
linux-crypto, keyrings, linux-modules, linux-kernel,
Tadeusz Struk, David S. Miller
In-Reply-To: <20260115215100.312611-8-dhowells@redhat.com>
On Thu, Jan 15, 2026 at 9:51 PM David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> Add support for RSASSA-PSS [RFC8017 sec 8.1] signature verification support
> to the RSA driver in crypto/. Note that signing support is not provided.
>
> The verification function requires an info string formatted as a
> space-separated list of key=value pairs. The following parameters need to
> be provided:
>
> (1) sighash=<algo>
>
> The hash algorithm to be used to digest the data.
>
> (2) pss_mask=<type>,...
>
> The mask generation function (MGF) and its parameters.
>
> (3) pss_salt=<len>
>
> The length of the salt used.
>
> The only MGF currently supported is "mgf1". This takes an additional
> parameter indicating the mask-generating hash (which need not be the same
> as the data hash). E.g.:
>
> "sighash=sha256 pss_mask=mgf1,sha256 pss_salt=32"
>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
> cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@intel.com>
> cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
> cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
> cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
> cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
> cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> crypto/Makefile | 1 +
> crypto/rsa.c | 8 +
> crypto/rsassa-pss.c | 384 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/crypto/hash.h | 3 +
> include/crypto/internal/rsa.h | 2 +
> 5 files changed, 398 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 crypto/rsassa-pss.c
>
> diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile
> index 267d5403045b..5c91440d1751 100644
> --- a/crypto/Makefile
> +++ b/crypto/Makefile
> @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ rsa_generic-y += rsa.o
> rsa_generic-y += rsa_helper.o
> rsa_generic-y += rsa-pkcs1pad.o
> rsa_generic-y += rsassa-pkcs1.o
> +rsa_generic-y += rsassa-pss.o
> obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA) += rsa_generic.o
>
> $(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.o: $(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.c $(obj)/ecdsasignature.asn1.h
> diff --git a/crypto/rsa.c b/crypto/rsa.c
> index 6c7734083c98..189a09d54c16 100644
> --- a/crypto/rsa.c
> +++ b/crypto/rsa.c
> @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
> #include <linux/mpi.h>
> #include <crypto/internal/rsa.h>
> #include <crypto/internal/akcipher.h>
> +#include <crypto/internal/sig.h>
> #include <crypto/akcipher.h>
> #include <crypto/algapi.h>
>
> @@ -414,8 +415,14 @@ static int __init rsa_init(void)
> if (err)
> goto err_unregister_rsa_pkcs1pad;
>
> + err = crypto_register_sig(&rsassa_pss_alg);
> + if (err)
> + goto err_rsassa_pss;
> +
> return 0;
>
> +err_rsassa_pss:
> + crypto_unregister_template(&rsassa_pkcs1_tmpl);
> err_unregister_rsa_pkcs1pad:
> crypto_unregister_template(&rsa_pkcs1pad_tmpl);
> err_unregister_rsa:
> @@ -425,6 +432,7 @@ static int __init rsa_init(void)
>
> static void __exit rsa_exit(void)
> {
> + crypto_unregister_sig(&rsassa_pss_alg);
> crypto_unregister_template(&rsassa_pkcs1_tmpl);
> crypto_unregister_template(&rsa_pkcs1pad_tmpl);
> crypto_unregister_akcipher(&rsa);
> diff --git a/crypto/rsassa-pss.c b/crypto/rsassa-pss.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..c12ffa3813df
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/crypto/rsassa-pss.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,384 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
> +/*
> + * RSA Signature Scheme combined with EMSA-PSS encoding (RFC 8017 sec 8.2)
> + *
> + * https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017#section-8.1
> + *
> + * Copyright (c) 2025 Red Hat
> + */
> +
> +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "RSAPSS: "fmt
> +#include <linux/ctype.h>
> +#include <linux/module.h>
> +#include <linux/oid_registry.h>
> +#include <linux/parser.h>
> +#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
> +#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
> +#include <crypto/algapi.h>
> +#include <crypto/hash.h>
> +#include <crypto/sig.h>
> +#include <crypto/internal/akcipher.h>
> +#include <crypto/internal/rsa.h>
> +#include <crypto/internal/sig.h>
> +
> +struct rsassa_pss_ctx {
> + struct crypto_akcipher *rsa;
> + unsigned int key_size;
> + unsigned int salt_len;
> + char *pss_hash;
> + char *mgf1_hash;
> +};
> +
> +enum {
> + rsassa_pss_verify_hash_algo,
> + rsassa_pss_verify_pss_mask,
> + rsassa_pss_verify_pss_salt,
> +};
> +
> +static const match_table_t rsassa_pss_verify_params = {
> + { rsassa_pss_verify_hash_algo, "sighash=%s" },
> + { rsassa_pss_verify_pss_mask, "pss_mask=%s" },
> + { rsassa_pss_verify_pss_salt, "pss_salt=%u" },
> + {}
> +};
> +
> +/*
> + * Parse the signature parameters out of the info string.
> + */
> +static int rsassa_pss_vinfo_parse(struct rsassa_pss_ctx *ctx,
> + char *info)
> +{
> + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
> + char *p;
> +
> + ctx->pss_hash = NULL;
> + ctx->mgf1_hash = NULL;
> + ctx->salt_len = 0;
> +
> + while ((p = strsep(&info, " \t"))) {
> + if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t')
> + continue;
> +
> + switch (match_token(p, rsassa_pss_verify_params, args)) {
> + case rsassa_pss_verify_hash_algo:
> + *args[0].to = 0;
> + ctx->pss_hash = args[0].from;
> + break;
> + case rsassa_pss_verify_pss_mask:
> + if (memcmp(args[0].from, "mgf1", 4) != 0)
> + return -ENOPKG;
> + if (args[0].from[4] != ',')
> + return -EINVAL;
> + args[0].from += 5;
> + if (args[0].from >= args[0].to)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + *args[0].to = 0;
> + ctx->mgf1_hash = args[0].from;
> + break;
> + case rsassa_pss_verify_pss_salt:
> + if (match_uint(&args[0], &ctx->salt_len) < 0)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + break;
> + default:
> + pr_debug("Unknown info param\n");
> + return -EINVAL; /* Ignoring it might be better. */
> + }
> + }
> +
> + if (!ctx->pss_hash ||
> + !ctx->mgf1_hash ||
> + !ctx->salt_len)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Perform mask = MGF1(mgfSeed, masklen) - RFC8017 appendix B.2.1.
> + */
> +static int MGF1(struct rsassa_pss_ctx *ctx,
> + const u8 *mgfSeed, unsigned int mgfSeed_len,
> + u8 *mask, unsigned int maskLen)
> +{
> + unsigned int counter, count_to, hLen, T_len;
> + __be32 *C;
> + int err;
> + u8 *T, *t, *to_hash;
> +
> + struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm __free(crypto_free_shash) =
> + crypto_alloc_shash(ctx->mgf1_hash, 0, 0);
> + if (IS_ERR(hash_tfm))
> + return PTR_ERR(hash_tfm);
> +
> + hLen = crypto_shash_digestsize(hash_tfm);
> + count_to = DIV_ROUND_UP(maskLen, hLen);
> + T_len = hLen * count_to;
> +
> + struct shash_desc *Hash __free(kfree) =
> + kmalloc(roundup(sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
> + crypto_shash_descsize(hash_tfm), 64) +
> + roundup(T_len, 64) + /* T */
> + roundup(mgfSeed_len + 4, 64), /* mgfSeed||C */
> + GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!Hash)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + Hash->tfm = hash_tfm;
> +
> + /* 2: Let T be the empty octet string. */
> + T = (void *)Hash +
> + roundup(sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
> + crypto_shash_descsize(hash_tfm), 64);
> +
> + /* 3: Generate the mask. */
> + to_hash = T + roundup(T_len, 64);
> + memcpy(to_hash, mgfSeed, mgfSeed_len);
> + C = (__be32 *)(to_hash + mgfSeed_len);
> +
> + t = T;
> + for (counter = 0; counter < count_to; counter++) {
> + /* 3A: C = I2OSP(counter, 4). */
> + put_unaligned_be32(counter, C);
> +
> + /* 3B: T = T || Hash(mgfSeed || C). */
> + err = crypto_shash_digest(Hash, to_hash, mgfSeed_len + 4, t);
> + if (err < 0)
> + return err;
> +
> + t += hLen;
> + }
> +
> + /* 4: Output T to mask */
> + memcpy(mask, T, maskLen);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Perform EMSA-PSS-VERIFY(M, EM, emBits) - RFC8017 sec 9.1.2.
> + */
> +static int emsa_pss_verify(struct rsassa_pss_ctx *ctx,
> + const u8 *M, unsigned int M_len,
> + const u8 *EM, unsigned int emLen)
> +{
> + unsigned int emBits, hLen, sLen, DB_len;
> + const u8 *maskedDB, *H;
> + u8 *mHash, *dbMask, *DB, *salt, *Mprime, *Hprime;
> + int err, i;
> +
> + emBits = 8 - fls(EM[0]);
> + emBits = emLen * 8 - emBits;
> +
> + struct crypto_shash *hash_tfm __free(crypto_free_shash) =
> + crypto_alloc_shash(ctx->pss_hash, 0, 0);
> + if (IS_ERR(hash_tfm))
> + return PTR_ERR(hash_tfm);
> +
> + hLen = crypto_shash_digestsize(hash_tfm);
> + sLen = ctx->salt_len;
> +
> + if (sLen > 65536 ||
> + emBits < 8 * (hLen + sLen) + 9)
> + return -EBADMSG;
> +
> + DB_len = emLen - hLen - 1;
> +
> + struct shash_desc *Hash __free(kfree) =
> + kmalloc(roundup(sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
> + crypto_shash_descsize(hash_tfm), 64) +
> + roundup(hLen, 64) + /* mHash */
> + roundup(DB_len, 64) + /* DB and dbMask */
> + roundup(8 + hLen + sLen, 64) + /* M' */
> + roundup(hLen, 64), /* H' */
> + GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!Hash)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + Hash->tfm = hash_tfm;
> +
> + mHash = (void *)Hash +
> + roundup(sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
> + crypto_shash_descsize(hash_tfm), 64);
> + DB = dbMask = mHash + roundup(hLen, 64);
> + Mprime = dbMask + roundup(DB_len, 64);
> + Hprime = Mprime + roundup(8 + hLen + sLen, 64);
> +
> + /* 1. Check len M against hash input limitation. */
> + /* The standard says ~2EiB for SHA1, so I think we can ignore this. */
> +
> + /* 2. mHash = Hash(M).
> + * In theory, we would do:
> + * err = crypto_shash_digest(Hash, M, M_len, mHash);
> + * but the caller is assumed to already have done that for us.
> + */
> + if (M_len != hLen)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + memcpy(mHash, M, hLen);
> +
> + /* 3. Check emLen against hLen + sLen + 2. */
> + if (emLen < hLen + sLen + 2)
> + return -EBADMSG;
> +
> + /* 4. Validate EM. */
> + if (EM[emLen - 1] != 0xbc)
> + return -EKEYREJECTED;
> +
> + /* 5. Pick maskedDB and H. */
> + maskedDB = EM;
> + H = EM + DB_len;
> +
> + /* 6. Check leftmost 8emLen-emBits bits of maskedDB are 0. */
> + /* Can only find emBits by counting the zeros on the Left. */
> +
> + /* 7. Let dbMask = MGF(H, emLen - hLen - 1). */
> + err = MGF1(ctx, H, hLen, dbMask, DB_len);
> + if (err < 0)
> + return err;
> +
> + /* 8. Let DB = maskedDB XOR dbMask. */
> + for (i = 0; i < DB_len; i++)
> + DB[i] = maskedDB[i] ^ dbMask[i];
> +
> + /* 9. Set leftmost bits in DB to zero. */
> + int z = 8 * emLen - emBits;
> +
> + if (z > 0) {
> + if (z >= 8) {
> + DB[0] = 0;
> + } else {
> + z = 8 - z;
> + DB[0] &= (1 << z) - 1;
> + }
> + }
> +
> + /* 10. Check the left part of DB is {0,0,...,1}. */
> + for (i = 0; i < emLen - hLen - sLen - 2; i++)
> + if (DB[i] != 0)
> + return -EKEYREJECTED;
> + if (DB[i] != 0x01)
> + return -EKEYREJECTED;
> +
> + /* 11. Let salt be the last sLen octets of DB. */
> + salt = DB + DB_len - sLen;
> +
> + /* 12. Let M' be 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 || mHash || salt. */
> + memset(Mprime, 0, 8);
> + memcpy(Mprime + 8, mHash, hLen);
> + memcpy(Mprime + 8 + hLen, salt, sLen);
> +
> + /* 13. Let H' = Hash(M'). */
> + err = crypto_shash_digest(Hash, Mprime, 8 + hLen + sLen, Hprime);
> + if (err < 0)
> + return err;
> +
> + /* 14. Check H = H'. */
> + if (memcmp(H, Hprime, hLen) != 0)
> + return -EKEYREJECTED;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Perform RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY((n,e),M,S) - RFC8017 sec 8.1.2.
> + */
> +static int rsassa_pss_verify(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
> + const void *src, unsigned int slen,
> + const void *digest, unsigned int dlen,
> + const char *info)
> +{
> + struct rsassa_pss_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
> + struct crypto_wait cwait;
> + struct scatterlist sg;
> + unsigned int rsa_reqsize = crypto_akcipher_reqsize(ctx->rsa);
> + u8 *EM;
> + int err;
> +
> + if (!info)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + char *str __free(kfree) = kstrdup(info, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!str)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + err = rsassa_pss_vinfo_parse(ctx, str);
> + if (err < 0)
> + return err;
> +
> + /* RFC8017 sec 8.1.2 step 1 - length checking */
> + if (!ctx->key_size || slen != ctx->key_size)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + /* RFC8017 sec 8.1.2 step 2 - RSA verification */
> + struct akcipher_request *rsa_req __free(kfree) =
> + kmalloc(sizeof(*rsa_req) + rsa_reqsize + ctx->key_size,
> + GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!rsa_req)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + EM = (u8 *)(rsa_req + 1) + rsa_reqsize;
> + memcpy(EM, src, slen);
> +
> + crypto_init_wait(&cwait);
> + sg_init_one(&sg, EM, slen);
> + akcipher_request_set_tfm(rsa_req, ctx->rsa);
> + akcipher_request_set_crypt(rsa_req, &sg, &sg, slen, slen);
> + akcipher_request_set_callback(rsa_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
> + crypto_req_done, &cwait);
> +
> + err = crypto_akcipher_encrypt(rsa_req);
> + err = crypto_wait_req(err, &cwait);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> +
> + /* RFC 8017 sec 8.1.2 step 3 - EMSA-PSS(M, EM, modbits-1) */
> + return emsa_pss_verify(ctx, digest, dlen, EM, slen);
> +}
> +
> +static unsigned int rsassa_pss_key_size(struct crypto_sig *tfm)
> +{
> + struct rsassa_pss_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
> +
> + return ctx->key_size * BITS_PER_BYTE;
> +}
> +
> +static int rsassa_pss_set_pub_key(struct crypto_sig *tfm,
> + const void *key, unsigned int keylen)
> +{
> + struct rsassa_pss_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
> +
> + return rsa_set_key(ctx->rsa, &ctx->key_size, RSA_PUB, key, keylen);
> +}
> +
> +static int rsassa_pss_init_tfm(struct crypto_sig *tfm)
> +{
> + struct crypto_akcipher *rsa;
> + struct rsassa_pss_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
> +
> + rsa = crypto_alloc_akcipher("rsa", 0, 0);
> + if (IS_ERR(rsa))
> + return PTR_ERR(rsa);
> +
> + ctx->rsa = rsa;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void rsassa_pss_exit_tfm(struct crypto_sig *tfm)
> +{
> + struct rsassa_pss_ctx *ctx = crypto_sig_ctx(tfm);
> +
> + crypto_free_akcipher(ctx->rsa);
> +}
> +
> +struct sig_alg rsassa_pss_alg = {
> + .verify = rsassa_pss_verify,
> + .set_pub_key = rsassa_pss_set_pub_key,
> + .key_size = rsassa_pss_key_size,
> + .init = rsassa_pss_init_tfm,
> + .exit = rsassa_pss_exit_tfm,
> + .base = {
> + .cra_name = "rsassa-pss",
> + .cra_driver_name = "rsassa-pss-generic",
> + .cra_priority = 100,
> + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
> + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct rsassa_pss_ctx),
> + },
> +};
> +
> +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("rsassa-pss");
> diff --git a/include/crypto/hash.h b/include/crypto/hash.h
> index 586700332c73..49b1ea5cf78d 100644
> --- a/include/crypto/hash.h
> +++ b/include/crypto/hash.h
> @@ -779,6 +779,9 @@ static inline void crypto_free_shash(struct crypto_shash *tfm)
> crypto_destroy_tfm(tfm, crypto_shash_tfm(tfm));
> }
>
> +DEFINE_FREE(crypto_free_shash, struct crypto_shash*,
> + if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(_T)) { crypto_free_shash(_T); });
> +
> static inline const char *crypto_shash_alg_name(struct crypto_shash *tfm)
> {
> return crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_shash_tfm(tfm));
> diff --git a/include/crypto/internal/rsa.h b/include/crypto/internal/rsa.h
> index 071a1951b992..d7f38a273949 100644
> --- a/include/crypto/internal/rsa.h
> +++ b/include/crypto/internal/rsa.h
> @@ -83,4 +83,6 @@ static inline int rsa_set_key(struct crypto_akcipher *child,
>
> extern struct crypto_template rsa_pkcs1pad_tmpl;
> extern struct crypto_template rsassa_pkcs1_tmpl;
> +extern struct sig_alg rsassa_pss_alg;
> +
> #endif
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v12 02/10] pkcs7: Allow the signing algo to calculate the digest itself
From: Ignat Korchagin @ 2026-01-20 14:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Howells
Cc: Lukas Wunner, Jarkko Sakkinen, Herbert Xu, Eric Biggers,
Luis Chamberlain, Petr Pavlu, Daniel Gomez, Sami Tolvanen,
Jason A . Donenfeld, Ard Biesheuvel, Stephan Mueller,
linux-crypto, keyrings, linux-modules, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20260115215100.312611-3-dhowells@redhat.com>
Hi David,
On Thu, Jan 15, 2026 at 9:51 PM David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> The ML-DSA public key algorithm really wants to calculate the message
> digest itself, rather than having the digest precalculated and fed to it
> separately as RSA does[*]. The kernel's PKCS#7 parser, however, is
> designed around the latter approach.
>
> [*] ML-DSA does allow for an "external mu", but CMS doesn't yet have that
> standardised.
>
> Fix this by noting in the public_key_signature struct when the signing
> algorithm is going to want this and then, rather than doing the digest of
> the authenticatedAttributes ourselves and overwriting the sig->digest with
> that, replace sig->digest with a copy of the contents of the
> authenticatedAttributes section and adjust the digest length to match.
>
> This will then be fed to the public key algorithm as normal which can do
> what it wants with the data.
>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
> cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com>
> cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
> cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
> cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
> cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
> ---
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c | 4 +--
> crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++---------
> include/crypto/public_key.h | 1 +
> 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
> index 423d13c47545..3cdbab3b9f50 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
> @@ -599,8 +599,8 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_set_of_authattrs(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
> }
>
> /* We need to switch the 'CONT 0' to a 'SET OF' when we digest */
> - sinfo->authattrs = value - (hdrlen - 1);
> - sinfo->authattrs_len = vlen + (hdrlen - 1);
> + sinfo->authattrs = value - hdrlen;
> + sinfo->authattrs_len = vlen + hdrlen;
> return 0;
> }
>
> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
> index 6d6475e3a9bf..0f9f515b784d 100644
> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
> @@ -70,8 +70,6 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
> * digest we just calculated.
> */
> if (sinfo->authattrs) {
> - u8 tag;
> -
> if (!sinfo->msgdigest) {
> pr_warn("Sig %u: No messageDigest\n", sinfo->index);
> ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
> @@ -97,20 +95,40 @@ static int pkcs7_digest(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
> * as the contents of the digest instead. Note that we need to
> * convert the attributes from a CONT.0 into a SET before we
> * hash it.
> + *
> + * However, for certain algorithms, such as ML-DSA, the digest
> + * is integrated into the signing algorithm. In such a case,
> + * we copy the authattrs, modifying the tag type, and set that
> + * as the digest.
> */
> - memset(sig->digest, 0, sig->digest_size);
> -
> - ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
> - if (ret < 0)
> - goto error;
> - tag = ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SET;
> - ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, &tag, 1);
> - if (ret < 0)
> - goto error;
> - ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sinfo->authattrs,
> - sinfo->authattrs_len, sig->digest);
> - if (ret < 0)
> - goto error;
> + if (sig->algo_does_hash) {
> + kfree(sig->digest);
> +
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + sig->digest = kmalloc(umax(sinfo->authattrs_len, sig->digest_size),
> + GFP_KERNEL);
I'm still bothered by this "reallocation". You mentioned we need to do
some parsing for attributes, but it seems by the time this function is
called we have all the data to do something like
kmalloc(sig->algo_does_hash ? umax(sinfo->authattrs_len,
sig->digest_size) : sig->digest_size, GFP_KERNEL) during the initial
allocation. Or am I missing something?
> + if (!sig->digest)
> + goto error_no_desc;
> +
> + sig->digest_size = sinfo->authattrs_len;
> + memcpy(sig->digest, sinfo->authattrs, sinfo->authattrs_len);
> + ((u8 *)sig->digest)[0] = ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SET;
> + ret = 0;
> + } else {
> + u8 tag = ASN1_CONS_BIT | ASN1_SET;
> +
> + ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + goto error;
> + ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, &tag, 1);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + goto error;
> + ret = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sinfo->authattrs + 1,
> + sinfo->authattrs_len - 1,
> + sig->digest);
> + if (ret < 0)
> + goto error;
> + }
> pr_devel("AADigest = [%*ph]\n", 8, sig->digest);
> }
>
> diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> index 81098e00c08f..e4ec8003a3a4 100644
> --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
> +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
> @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ struct public_key_signature {
> u8 *digest;
> u32 s_size; /* Number of bytes in signature */
> u32 digest_size; /* Number of bytes in digest */
> + bool algo_does_hash; /* Public key algo does its own hashing */
nit: still do not like this name, but have no better alternatives so far
> const char *pkey_algo;
> const char *hash_algo;
> const char *encoding;
>
Ignat
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] Documentation/kbuild: gendwarfksyms: Style cleanup
From: Petr Pavlu @ 2026-01-20 12:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linjh22s
Cc: Nathan Chancellor, Nicolas Schier, Jonathan Corbet, Miguel Ojeda,
Boqun Feng, Sami Tolvanen, Masahiro Yamada, linux-modules,
linux-kbuild, linux-doc, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20260114-documents_gendwarfksyms-v2-2-297c98bd62c6@gmail.com>
On 1/14/26 12:47 PM, Jihan LIN via B4 Relay wrote:
> From: Jihan LIN <linjh22s@gmail.com>
>
> The indentation in gendwarfksyms.rst currently uses a mix of tabs and
> spaces.
> Convert all indentation to tabs, and match the usage output and code
> examples with theirs references.
>
> Suggested-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Jihan LIN <linjh22s@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com>
--
Thanks,
Petr
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] Documentation/kbuild: Document gendwarfksyms build dependencies
From: Petr Pavlu @ 2026-01-20 12:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linjh22s
Cc: Nathan Chancellor, Nicolas Schier, Jonathan Corbet, Miguel Ojeda,
Boqun Feng, Sami Tolvanen, Masahiro Yamada, linux-modules,
linux-kbuild, linux-doc, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20260114-documents_gendwarfksyms-v2-1-297c98bd62c6@gmail.com>
On 1/14/26 12:47 PM, Jihan LIN via B4 Relay wrote:
> From: Jihan LIN <linjh22s@gmail.com>
>
> Although dependencies for gendwarfksyms were recently added to the
> packaging rules [1-2], the corresponding documentation was missing.
>
> Document the required build dependencies for gendwarfksyms, and
> include a few examples for installing these dependencies on some
> distributions.
>
> [1] commit 657f96cb7c06 ("kbuild: deb-pkg: Add libdw-dev:native to
> Build-Depends-Arch")
> [2] commit 5bd6bdd0f76e ("kbuild: rpm-pkg: Add (elfutils-devel or
> libdw-devel) to BuildRequires")
> Signed-off-by: Jihan LIN <linjh22s@gmail.com>
> ---
> Documentation/kbuild/gendwarfksyms.rst | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/kbuild/gendwarfksyms.rst b/Documentation/kbuild/gendwarfksyms.rst
> index ed366250a54eac3a72c2f529da94a9e803704ae4..0e153d13b052da6edcf65950739730c123cd49db 100644
> --- a/Documentation/kbuild/gendwarfksyms.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/kbuild/gendwarfksyms.rst
> @@ -14,6 +14,29 @@ selected, **gendwarfksyms** is used instead to calculate symbol versions
> from the DWARF debugging information, which contains the necessary
> details about the final module ABI.
>
> +Dependencies
> +------------
> +
> +libelf, libdw and zlib are dependencies of gendwarfksyms.
> +
> +Here are a few examples for installing these dependencies:
> +
> +* Arch Linux and derivatives::
> +
> + sudo pacman --needed -S zlib libelf
> +
> +* Debian, Ubuntu, and derivatives::
> +
> + sudo apt install libelf-dev libdw-dev zlib1g-dev
> +
> +* Fedora and derivatives::
> +
> + sudo dnf install elfutils-libelf-devel elfutils-devel zlib-devel
> +
> +* openSUSE and derivatives::
> +
> + sudo zypper install libelf-devel libdw-devel zlib-devel
> +
Nit: I suggest slightly adjusting the text to something like:
"""
Gendwarfksyms depends on the libelf, libdw, and zlib libraries.
Here are a few examples of how to install these dependencies:
"""
.. and swap the items on the pacman line to 'libelf zlib' so the order
is always libelf, libdw, zlib.
Looks ok to me nonetheless, the list is consistent with similar examples
in Documentation/admin-guide/verify-bugs-and-bisect-regressions.rst.
Reviewed-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com>
--
Thanks,
Petr
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] livepatch: Free klp_{object,func}_ext data after initialization
From: Joe Lawrence @ 2026-01-19 22:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Petr Pavlu
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf, Jiri Kosina, Miroslav Benes, Petr Mladek,
Luis Chamberlain, Daniel Gomez, Sami Tolvanen, Aaron Tomlin,
Peter Zijlstra, live-patching, linux-modules, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20260114123056.2045816-3-petr.pavlu@suse.com>
On Wed, Jan 14, 2026 at 01:29:54PM +0100, Petr Pavlu wrote:
> The klp_object_ext and klp_func_ext data, which are stored in the
> __klp_objects and __klp_funcs sections, respectively, are not needed
> after they are used to create the actual klp_object and klp_func
> instances. This operation is implemented by the init function in
> scripts/livepatch/init.c.
>
> Prefix the two sections with ".init" so they are freed after the module
> is initializated.
>
> Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com>
> ---
> kernel/livepatch/core.c | 3 ++-
> scripts/module.lds.S | 4 ++--
> tools/objtool/check.c | 2 +-
> tools/objtool/include/objtool/klp.h | 10 +++++-----
> tools/objtool/klp-diff.c | 2 +-
> 5 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/livepatch/core.c b/kernel/livepatch/core.c
> index 4e0ac47b3623..3621a7c1b737 100644
> --- a/kernel/livepatch/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/livepatch/core.c
> @@ -1364,7 +1364,8 @@ struct klp_object_ext *klp_build_locate_init_objects(const struct module *mod,
> for (int i = 1; i < info->hdr.e_shnum; i++) {
> Elf_Shdr *shdr = &info->sechdrs[i];
>
> - if (strcmp(info->secstrings + shdr->sh_name, "__klp_objects"))
> + if (strcmp(info->secstrings + shdr->sh_name,
> + ".init.klp_objects"))
> continue;
>
> *nr_objs = shdr->sh_size / sizeof(struct klp_object_ext);
> diff --git a/scripts/module.lds.S b/scripts/module.lds.S
> index 383d19beffb4..054ef99e8288 100644
> --- a/scripts/module.lds.S
> +++ b/scripts/module.lds.S
> @@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ SECTIONS {
>
> __patchable_function_entries : { *(__patchable_function_entries) }
>
> - __klp_funcs 0: ALIGN(8) { KEEP(*(__klp_funcs)) }
> - __klp_objects 0: ALIGN(8) { KEEP(*(__klp_objects)) }
> + .init.klp_funcs 0 : ALIGN(8) { KEEP(*(.init.klp_funcs)) }
> + .init.klp_objects 0 : ALIGN(8) { KEEP(*(.init.klp_objects)) }
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_USES_CFI_TRAPS
> __kcfi_traps : { KEEP(*(.kcfi_traps)) }
> diff --git a/tools/objtool/check.c b/tools/objtool/check.c
> index 3f7999317f4d..933868ee3beb 100644
> --- a/tools/objtool/check.c
> +++ b/tools/objtool/check.c
> @@ -4761,7 +4761,7 @@ static int validate_ibt(struct objtool_file *file)
> !strcmp(sec->name, "__bug_table") ||
> !strcmp(sec->name, "__ex_table") ||
> !strcmp(sec->name, "__jump_table") ||
> - !strcmp(sec->name, "__klp_funcs") ||
> + !strcmp(sec->name, ".init.klp_funcs") ||
> !strcmp(sec->name, "__mcount_loc") ||
> !strcmp(sec->name, ".llvm.call-graph-profile") ||
> !strcmp(sec->name, ".llvm_bb_addr_map") ||
> diff --git a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/klp.h b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/klp.h
> index ad830a7ce55b..e32e5e8bc631 100644
> --- a/tools/objtool/include/objtool/klp.h
> +++ b/tools/objtool/include/objtool/klp.h
> @@ -6,12 +6,12 @@
> #define SHN_LIVEPATCH 0xff20
>
> /*
> - * __klp_objects and __klp_funcs are created by klp diff and used by the patch
> - * module init code to build the klp_patch, klp_object and klp_func structs
> - * needed by the livepatch API.
> + * .init.klp_objects and .init.klp_funcs are created by klp diff and used by the
> + * patch module init code to build the klp_patch, klp_object and klp_func
> + * structs needed by the livepatch API.
> */
> -#define KLP_OBJECTS_SEC "__klp_objects"
> -#define KLP_FUNCS_SEC "__klp_funcs"
> +#define KLP_OBJECTS_SEC ".init.klp_objects"
> +#define KLP_FUNCS_SEC ".init.klp_funcs"
>
> /*
> * __klp_relocs is an intermediate section which are created by klp diff and
> diff --git a/tools/objtool/klp-diff.c b/tools/objtool/klp-diff.c
> index 4d1f9e9977eb..fd64d5e3c3b6 100644
> --- a/tools/objtool/klp-diff.c
> +++ b/tools/objtool/klp-diff.c
> @@ -1439,7 +1439,7 @@ static int clone_special_sections(struct elfs *e)
> }
>
> /*
> - * Create __klp_objects and __klp_funcs sections which are intermediate
> + * Create .init.klp_objects and .init.klp_funcs sections which are intermediate
> * sections provided as input to the patch module's init code for building the
> * klp_patch, klp_object and klp_func structs for the livepatch API.
> */
> --
> 2.52.0
>
Acked-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com>
--
Joe
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 1/2] livepatch: Fix having __klp_objects relics in non-livepatch modules
From: Joe Lawrence @ 2026-01-19 22:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Petr Pavlu
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf, Jiri Kosina, Miroslav Benes, Petr Mladek,
Luis Chamberlain, Daniel Gomez, Sami Tolvanen, Aaron Tomlin,
Peter Zijlstra, live-patching, linux-modules, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20260114123056.2045816-2-petr.pavlu@suse.com>
On Wed, Jan 14, 2026 at 01:29:53PM +0100, Petr Pavlu wrote:
> The linker script scripts/module.lds.S specifies that all input
> __klp_objects sections should be consolidated into an output section of
> the same name, and start/stop symbols should be created to enable
> scripts/livepatch/init.c to locate this data.
>
> This start/stop pattern is not ideal for modules because the symbols are
> created even if no __klp_objects input sections are present.
> Consequently, a dummy __klp_objects section also appears in the
> resulting module. This unnecessarily pollutes non-livepatch modules.
>
> Instead, since modules are relocatable files, the usual method for
> locating consolidated data in a module is to read its section table.
> This approach avoids the aforementioned problem.
>
> The klp_modinfo already stores a copy of the entire section table with
> the final addresses. Introduce a helper function that
> scripts/livepatch/init.c can call to obtain the location of the
> __klp_objects section from this data.
>
> Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <petr.pavlu@suse.com>
> ---
> include/linux/livepatch.h | 3 +++
> kernel/livepatch/core.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
> scripts/livepatch/init.c | 17 ++++++-----------
> scripts/module.lds.S | 7 +------
> 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/livepatch.h b/include/linux/livepatch.h
> index 772919e8096a..ca90adbe89ed 100644
> --- a/include/linux/livepatch.h
> +++ b/include/linux/livepatch.h
> @@ -175,6 +175,9 @@ int klp_enable_patch(struct klp_patch *);
> int klp_module_coming(struct module *mod);
> void klp_module_going(struct module *mod);
>
> +struct klp_object_ext *klp_build_locate_init_objects(const struct module *mod,
> + unsigned int *nr_objs);
> +
> void klp_copy_process(struct task_struct *child);
> void klp_update_patch_state(struct task_struct *task);
>
> diff --git a/kernel/livepatch/core.c b/kernel/livepatch/core.c
> index 9917756dae46..4e0ac47b3623 100644
> --- a/kernel/livepatch/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/livepatch/core.c
> @@ -1356,6 +1356,26 @@ void klp_module_going(struct module *mod)
> mutex_unlock(&klp_mutex);
> }
>
> +struct klp_object_ext *klp_build_locate_init_objects(const struct module *mod,
> + unsigned int *nr_objs)
> +{
> + struct klp_modinfo *info = mod->klp_info;
> +
> + for (int i = 1; i < info->hdr.e_shnum; i++) {
> + Elf_Shdr *shdr = &info->sechdrs[i];
> +
> + if (strcmp(info->secstrings + shdr->sh_name, "__klp_objects"))
> + continue;
> +
Since this function is doing a string comparision to find the ELF
section, would it make sense to open up the API by allowing to caller to
specify the sh_name? That would give scripts/livepatch/init.c future
flexibility in finding similarly crafted data structures. Disregard if
there is already a pattern of doing it this way :)
> + *nr_objs = shdr->sh_size / sizeof(struct klp_object_ext);
> + return (struct klp_object_ext *)shdr->sh_addr;
> + }
> +
> + *nr_objs = 0;
> + return NULL;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(klp_build_locate_init_objects);
> +
> static int __init klp_init(void)
> {
> klp_root_kobj = kobject_create_and_add("livepatch", kernel_kobj);
> diff --git a/scripts/livepatch/init.c b/scripts/livepatch/init.c
> index 2274d8f5a482..23e037d6de19 100644
> --- a/scripts/livepatch/init.c
> +++ b/scripts/livepatch/init.c
> @@ -9,19 +9,16 @@
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> #include <linux/livepatch.h>
>
> -extern struct klp_object_ext __start_klp_objects[];
> -extern struct klp_object_ext __stop_klp_objects[];
> -
> static struct klp_patch *patch;
>
> static int __init livepatch_mod_init(void)
> {
> + struct klp_object_ext *obj_exts;
> struct klp_object *objs;
> unsigned int nr_objs;
> int ret;
>
> - nr_objs = __stop_klp_objects - __start_klp_objects;
> -
> + obj_exts = klp_build_locate_init_objects(THIS_MODULE, &nr_objs);
> if (!nr_objs) {
> pr_err("nothing to patch!\n");
> ret = -EINVAL;
> @@ -41,7 +38,7 @@ static int __init livepatch_mod_init(void)
> }
>
> for (int i = 0; i < nr_objs; i++) {
> - struct klp_object_ext *obj_ext = __start_klp_objects + i;
> + struct klp_object_ext *obj_ext = obj_exts + i;
> struct klp_func_ext *funcs_ext = obj_ext->funcs;
> unsigned int nr_funcs = obj_ext->nr_funcs;
> struct klp_func *funcs = objs[i].funcs;
> @@ -90,12 +87,10 @@ static int __init livepatch_mod_init(void)
>
> static void __exit livepatch_mod_exit(void)
> {
> - unsigned int nr_objs;
> -
> - nr_objs = __stop_klp_objects - __start_klp_objects;
> + struct klp_object *obj;
>
> - for (int i = 0; i < nr_objs; i++)
> - kfree(patch->objs[i].funcs);
> + klp_for_each_object_static(patch, obj)
> + kfree(obj->funcs);
>
> kfree(patch->objs);
> kfree(patch);
> diff --git a/scripts/module.lds.S b/scripts/module.lds.S
> index 3037d5e5527c..383d19beffb4 100644
> --- a/scripts/module.lds.S
> +++ b/scripts/module.lds.S
> @@ -35,12 +35,7 @@ SECTIONS {
> __patchable_function_entries : { *(__patchable_function_entries) }
>
> __klp_funcs 0: ALIGN(8) { KEEP(*(__klp_funcs)) }
> -
> - __klp_objects 0: ALIGN(8) {
> - __start_klp_objects = .;
> - KEEP(*(__klp_objects))
> - __stop_klp_objects = .;
> - }
> + __klp_objects 0: ALIGN(8) { KEEP(*(__klp_objects)) }
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_USES_CFI_TRAPS
> __kcfi_traps : { KEEP(*(.kcfi_traps)) }
> --
> 2.52.0
>
Acked-by: Joe Lawrence <joe.lawrence@redhat.com>
--
Joe
^ permalink raw reply
* [syzbot] [modules?] INFO: rcu detected stall in inotify_add_watch
From: syzbot @ 2026-01-19 19:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: atomlin, da.gomez, linux-kernel, linux-modules, mcgrof,
petr.pavlu, samitolvanen, syzkaller-bugs
Hello,
syzbot found the following issue on:
HEAD commit: 944aacb68baf Merge tag 'scsi-fixes' of git://git.kernel.or..
git tree: upstream
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1431d052580000
kernel config: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=323fe5bdde2384a5
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=aa5520f7faf8d5438034
compiler: Debian clang version 20.1.8 (++20250708063551+0c9f909b7976-1~exp1~20250708183702.136), Debian LLD 20.1.8
syz repro: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=162c2dfc580000
Downloadable assets:
disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/575dc0ba1f73/disk-944aacb6.raw.xz
vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/c81f6750bf1b/vmlinux-944aacb6.xz
kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/ce2273224949/bzImage-944aacb6.xz
IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+aa5520f7faf8d5438034@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
rcu: Tasks blocked on level-0 rcu_node (CPUs 0-1): P12/2:b..l P6218/1:b..l P5834/1:b..l
rcu: (detected by 1, t=10503 jiffies, g=14653, q=1024 ncpus=2)
task:udevd state:R running task stack:24568 pid:5834 tgid:5834 ppid:5196 task_flags:0x440140 flags:0x00080000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5256 [inline]
__schedule+0x149b/0x4fd0 kernel/sched/core.c:6863
preempt_schedule_irq+0x4d/0xa0 kernel/sched/core.c:7190
irqentry_exit+0x5e3/0x670 kernel/entry/common.c:216
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:697
RIP: 0010:rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:868 [inline]
RIP: 0010:class_rcu_constructor include/linux/rcupdate.h:1195 [inline]
RIP: 0010:is_module_text_address+0x44/0x1e0 kernel/module/main.c:3856
Code: 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 a0 1a f4 8d 31 f6 31 d2 b9 02 00 00 00 45 31 c0 45 31 c9 53 e8 77 82 f2 ff 48 83 c4 08 e8 4e 5a ae 09 85 c0 <74> 3a e8 85 91 fb ff 84 c0 75 31 e8 3c 5a ae 09 85 c0 74 28 80 3d
RSP: 0018:ffffc90002ff7920 EFLAGS: 00000202
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffffff81ab6c1d RCX: ffff88807bec3d00
RDX: 00000000706f5022 RSI: ffffffff8d976a6b RDI: ffffffff8bc086e0
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffff81ab6c1d R09: ffffffff8df41aa0
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff81acf4d0 R12: ffff88807bec3d00
R13: ffff88805500bc80 R14: 00007f1b687219a7 R15: 1ffff920005fef3e
kernel_text_address+0x94/0xe0 kernel/extable.c:119
__kernel_text_address+0xd/0x40 kernel/extable.c:79
unwind_get_return_address+0x4d/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c:385
arch_stack_walk+0xfc/0x150 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:26
stack_trace_save+0x9c/0xe0 kernel/stacktrace.c:122
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:78
unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:340 [inline]
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x6c/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:366
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:253 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4953 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:5263 [inline]
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x37d/0x710 mm/slub.c:5270
inotify_new_watch fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c:599 [inline]
inotify_update_watch fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c:647 [inline]
__do_sys_inotify_add_watch fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c:781 [inline]
__se_sys_inotify_add_watch+0x6d4/0xf10 fs/notify/inotify/inotify_user.c:729
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xec/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f1b687219a7
RSP: 002b:00007fffd4df20d8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000fe
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000558f453876d0 RCX: 00007f1b687219a7
RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: 0000558f45371360 RDI: 0000000000000007
RBP: 0000558f45360910 R08: 00000000000001d0 R09: 0000000000000003
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000558f453876d0
R13: 0000558f4536e190 R14: 0000000000000008 R15: 0000558f453876d0
</TASK>
task:kworker/u8:17 state:R running task stack:24568 pid:6218 tgid:6218 ppid:2 task_flags:0x4208060 flags:0x00080000
Workqueue: events_unbound cfg80211_wiphy_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5256 [inline]
__schedule+0x149b/0x4fd0 kernel/sched/core.c:6863
preempt_schedule_irq+0x4d/0xa0 kernel/sched/core.c:7190
irqentry_exit+0x5e3/0x670 kernel/entry/common.c:216
asm_sysvec_reschedule_ipi+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:702
RIP: 0010:lock_release+0x2d8/0x3b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5893
Code: 33 e2 10 00 00 00 00 eb b5 e8 d4 9e bb 09 f7 c3 00 02 00 00 74 b9 65 48 8b 05 c4 ed e1 10 48 3b 44 24 28 75 44 fb 48 83 c4 30 <5b> 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d e9 94 1e 72 ff cc 48 8d 3d 71 4a e7
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000257f3e0 EFLAGS: 00000282
RAX: 0526f4b768dc6600 RBX: 0000000000000202 RCX: 0000000000000046
RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: ffffffff8d976a6b RDI: ffffffff8bc086e0
RBP: ffff88802d8e2a28 R08: ffffc9000257fa20 R09: ffffc9000257f538
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff520004afea9 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: 0000000000000003 R14: ffffffff8df41aa0 R15: ffff88802d8e1e80
rcu_lock_release include/linux/rcupdate.h:341 [inline]
rcu_read_unlock include/linux/rcupdate.h:897 [inline]
class_rcu_destructor include/linux/rcupdate.h:1195 [inline]
unwind_next_frame+0x1ab1/0x23d0 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c:695
arch_stack_walk+0x11c/0x150 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:25
stack_trace_save+0x9c/0xe0 kernel/stacktrace.c:122
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:78
kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:584
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:253 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x5c/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:285
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:235 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2540 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:6670 [inline]
kmem_cache_free+0x197/0x620 mm/slub.c:6781
skb_release_data+0x62d/0x7c0 net/core/skbuff.c:1107
skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1182 [inline]
__kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:1196 [inline]
sk_skb_reason_drop+0x127/0x170 net/core/skbuff.c:1234
kfree_skb_reason include/linux/skbuff.h:1322 [inline]
kfree_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1331 [inline]
ieee80211_iface_work+0xb2a/0x12d0 net/mac80211/iface.c:1792
cfg80211_wiphy_work+0x2ab/0x450 net/wireless/core.c:438
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xad1/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3340
worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3421
kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463
ret_from_fork+0x510/0xa50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246
</TASK>
task:kworker/u8:0 state:R running task stack:24480 pid:12 tgid:12 ppid:2 task_flags:0x4208160 flags:0x00080000
Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5256 [inline]
__schedule+0x149b/0x4fd0 kernel/sched/core.c:6863
preempt_schedule_irq+0x4d/0xa0 kernel/sched/core.c:7190
irqentry_exit+0x5e3/0x670 kernel/entry/common.c:216
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:697
RIP: 0010:lock_release+0x2d8/0x3b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5893
Code: 33 e2 10 00 00 00 00 eb b5 e8 d4 9e bb 09 f7 c3 00 02 00 00 74 b9 65 48 8b 05 c4 ed e1 10 48 3b 44 24 28 75 44 fb 48 83 c4 30 <5b> 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d e9 94 1e 72 ff cc 48 8d 3d 71 4a e7
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000116f20 EFLAGS: 00000282
RAX: ccca9c3ae3660b00 RBX: 0000000000000202 RCX: 0000000000000046
RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: ffffffff8d976a6b RDI: ffffffff8bc086e0
RBP: ffff88801c2a6778 R08: ffffc900001175b8 R09: ffffc90000117078
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff52000022e11 R12: 0000000000000005
R13: 0000000000000005 R14: ffffffff8df41aa0 R15: ffff88801c2a5b80
rcu_lock_release include/linux/rcupdate.h:341 [inline]
rcu_read_unlock include/linux/rcupdate.h:897 [inline]
class_rcu_destructor include/linux/rcupdate.h:1195 [inline]
unwind_next_frame+0x1ab1/0x23d0 arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c:695
arch_stack_walk+0x11c/0x150 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:25
stack_trace_save+0x9c/0xe0 kernel/stacktrace.c:122
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:78
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:398 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:415
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:263 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x3e2/0x700 mm/slub.c:5776
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:957 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1094 [inline]
ref_tracker_alloc+0x133/0x460 lib/ref_tracker.c:271
__netdev_tracker_alloc include/linux/netdevice.h:4400 [inline]
netdev_hold include/linux/netdevice.h:4429 [inline]
dst_init+0xd9/0x450 net/core/dst.c:52
dst_alloc+0x12a/0x170 net/core/dst.c:93
ip6_dst_alloc net/ipv6/route.c:342 [inline]
icmp6_dst_alloc+0x75/0x420 net/ipv6/route.c:3333
mld_sendpack+0x683/0xe60 net/ipv6/mcast.c:1844
ipv6_mc_dad_complete+0x88/0x410 net/ipv6/mcast.c:2279
addrconf_dad_completed+0x6d5/0xd60 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:4340
addrconf_dad_work+0xc36/0x14b0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:-1
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3257 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xad1/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3340
worker_thread+0x8a0/0xda0 kernel/workqueue.c:3421
kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463
ret_from_fork+0x510/0xa50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246
</TASK>
rcu: rcu_preempt kthread starved for 10628 jiffies! g14653 f0x0 RCU_GP_WAIT_FQS(5) ->state=0x0 ->cpu=1
rcu: Unless rcu_preempt kthread gets sufficient CPU time, OOM is now expected behavior.
rcu: RCU grace-period kthread stack dump:
task:rcu_preempt state:R running task stack:27480 pid:16 tgid:16 ppid:2 task_flags:0x208040 flags:0x00080000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5256 [inline]
__schedule+0x149b/0x4fd0 kernel/sched/core.c:6863
__schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:6945 [inline]
schedule+0x165/0x360 kernel/sched/core.c:6960
schedule_timeout+0x12b/0x270 kernel/time/sleep_timeout.c:99
rcu_gp_fqs_loop+0x301/0x1540 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2083
rcu_gp_kthread+0x99/0x390 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2285
kthread+0x711/0x8a0 kernel/kthread.c:463
ret_from_fork+0x510/0xa50 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246
</TASK>
rcu: Stack dump where RCU GP kthread last ran:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025
RIP: 0010:pv_native_safe_halt+0x13/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c:82
Code: 1e 84 b6 f5 cc cc cc 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 66 90 0f 00 2d 53 91 0e 00 f3 0f 1e fa fb f4 <e9> f3 83 b6 f5 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000197e20 EFLAGS: 000002c6
RAX: 00000000000f3f43 RBX: ffffffff8197149e RCX: 0000000080000001
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff8d792d31 RDI: ffffffff8bc086e0
RBP: ffffc90000197f10 R08: ffff8880b87336db R09: 1ffff110170e66db
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed10170e66dc R12: ffffffff8f822470
R13: 1ffff1100385fb70 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888125f1f000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fe5546e0f98 CR3: 000000002efbb000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
arch_safe_halt arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:107 [inline]
default_idle+0x13/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:767
default_idle_call+0x73/0xb0 kernel/sched/idle.c:122
cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:191 [inline]
do_idle+0x1be/0x4d0 kernel/sched/idle.c:332
cpu_startup_entry+0x44/0x60 kernel/sched/idle.c:430
start_secondary+0x101/0x110 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:312
common_startup_64+0x13e/0x147
</TASK>
---
This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.
syzbot will keep track of this issue. See:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot.
If the report is already addressed, let syzbot know by replying with:
#syz fix: exact-commit-title
If you want syzbot to run the reproducer, reply with:
#syz test: git://repo/address.git branch-or-commit-hash
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^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v3 02/12] rust: macros: use `quote!` from vendored crate
From: David Gow @ 2026-01-19 7:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Gary Guo
Cc: Miguel Ojeda, Boqun Feng, Björn Roy Baron, Benno Lossin,
Andreas Hindborg, Alice Ryhl, Trevor Gross, Danilo Krummrich,
Brendan Higgins, Rae Moar, Luis Chamberlain, Petr Pavlu,
Daniel Gomez, Sami Tolvanen, Aaron Tomlin, Tamir Duberstein,
Greg Kroah-Hartman, José Expósito, rust-for-linux,
linux-kernel, linux-kselftest, kunit-dev, linux-modules
In-Reply-To: <20260112170919.1888584-3-gary@kernel.org>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 18529 bytes --]
On Tue, 13 Jan 2026 at 01:11, Gary Guo <gary@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> From: Gary Guo <gary@garyguo.net>
>
> With `quote` crate now vendored in the kernel, we can remove our custom
> `quote!` macro implementation and just rely on that crate instead.
>
> The `quote` crate uses types from the `proc-macro2` library so we also
> update to use that, and perform conversion in the top-level lib.rs.
>
> Clippy complains about unnecessary `.to_string()` as `proc-macro2`
> provides additional `PartialEq` impl, so they are removed.
>
> Reviewed-by: Tamir Duberstein <tamird@gmail.com>
> Reviewed-by: Benno Lossin <lossin@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Gary Guo <gary@garyguo.net>
> ---
Acked-by: David Gow <davidgow@google.com> # for kunit
Cheers,
-- David
-- David
> rust/macros/concat_idents.rs | 2 +-
> rust/macros/export.rs | 4 +-
> rust/macros/fmt.rs | 4 +-
> rust/macros/helpers.rs | 4 +-
> rust/macros/kunit.rs | 5 +-
> rust/macros/lib.rs | 21 ++--
> rust/macros/module.rs | 6 +-
> rust/macros/paste.rs | 2 +-
> rust/macros/quote.rs | 182 -----------------------------------
> rust/macros/vtable.rs | 7 +-
> 10 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 205 deletions(-)
> delete mode 100644 rust/macros/quote.rs
>
> diff --git a/rust/macros/concat_idents.rs b/rust/macros/concat_idents.rs
> index 7e4b450f3a507..12cb231c3d715 100644
> --- a/rust/macros/concat_idents.rs
> +++ b/rust/macros/concat_idents.rs
> @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
> // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>
> -use proc_macro::{token_stream, Ident, TokenStream, TokenTree};
> +use proc_macro2::{token_stream, Ident, TokenStream, TokenTree};
>
> use crate::helpers::expect_punct;
>
> diff --git a/rust/macros/export.rs b/rust/macros/export.rs
> index a08f6337d5c8d..92d9b30971929 100644
> --- a/rust/macros/export.rs
> +++ b/rust/macros/export.rs
> @@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
> // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>
> +use proc_macro2::TokenStream;
> +use quote::quote;
> +
> use crate::helpers::function_name;
> -use proc_macro::TokenStream;
>
> /// Please see [`crate::export`] for documentation.
> pub(crate) fn export(_attr: TokenStream, ts: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
> diff --git a/rust/macros/fmt.rs b/rust/macros/fmt.rs
> index 2f4b9f6e22110..19f709262552b 100644
> --- a/rust/macros/fmt.rs
> +++ b/rust/macros/fmt.rs
> @@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
> // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>
> -use proc_macro::{Ident, TokenStream, TokenTree};
> use std::collections::BTreeSet;
>
> +use proc_macro2::{Ident, TokenStream, TokenTree};
> +use quote::quote_spanned;
> +
> /// Please see [`crate::fmt`] for documentation.
> pub(crate) fn fmt(input: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
> let mut input = input.into_iter();
> diff --git a/rust/macros/helpers.rs b/rust/macros/helpers.rs
> index 365d7eb499c08..13fafaba12261 100644
> --- a/rust/macros/helpers.rs
> +++ b/rust/macros/helpers.rs
> @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
> // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>
> -use proc_macro::{token_stream, Group, Ident, TokenStream, TokenTree};
> +use proc_macro2::{token_stream, Group, Ident, TokenStream, TokenTree};
>
> pub(crate) fn try_ident(it: &mut token_stream::IntoIter) -> Option<String> {
> if let Some(TokenTree::Ident(ident)) = it.next() {
> @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ pub(crate) fn function_name(input: TokenStream) -> Option<Ident> {
> let mut input = input.into_iter();
> while let Some(token) = input.next() {
> match token {
> - TokenTree::Ident(i) if i.to_string() == "fn" => {
> + TokenTree::Ident(i) if i == "fn" => {
> if let Some(TokenTree::Ident(i)) = input.next() {
> return Some(i);
> }
> diff --git a/rust/macros/kunit.rs b/rust/macros/kunit.rs
> index b395bb0536959..5cd6aa5eef07d 100644
> --- a/rust/macros/kunit.rs
> +++ b/rust/macros/kunit.rs
> @@ -4,10 +4,11 @@
> //!
> //! Copyright (c) 2023 José Expósito <jose.exposito89@gmail.com>
>
> -use proc_macro::{Delimiter, Group, TokenStream, TokenTree};
> use std::collections::HashMap;
> use std::fmt::Write;
>
> +use proc_macro2::{Delimiter, Group, TokenStream, TokenTree};
> +
> pub(crate) fn kunit_tests(attr: TokenStream, ts: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
> let attr = attr.to_string();
>
> @@ -59,7 +60,7 @@ pub(crate) fn kunit_tests(attr: TokenStream, ts: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
> }
> _ => (),
> },
> - TokenTree::Ident(i) if i.to_string() == "fn" && attributes.contains_key("test") => {
> + TokenTree::Ident(i) if i == "fn" && attributes.contains_key("test") => {
> if let Some(TokenTree::Ident(test_name)) = body_it.next() {
> tests.push((test_name, attributes.remove("cfg").unwrap_or_default()))
> }
> diff --git a/rust/macros/lib.rs b/rust/macros/lib.rs
> index b38002151871a..945982c21f703 100644
> --- a/rust/macros/lib.rs
> +++ b/rust/macros/lib.rs
> @@ -11,8 +11,6 @@
> // to avoid depending on the full `proc_macro_span` on Rust >= 1.88.0.
> #![cfg_attr(not(CONFIG_RUSTC_HAS_SPAN_FILE), feature(proc_macro_span))]
>
> -#[macro_use]
> -mod quote;
> mod concat_idents;
> mod export;
> mod fmt;
> @@ -132,7 +130,7 @@
> /// the kernel module.
> #[proc_macro]
> pub fn module(ts: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
> - module::module(ts)
> + module::module(ts.into()).into()
> }
>
> /// Declares or implements a vtable trait.
> @@ -207,7 +205,7 @@ pub fn module(ts: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
> /// [`kernel::error::VTABLE_DEFAULT_ERROR`]: ../kernel/error/constant.VTABLE_DEFAULT_ERROR.html
> #[proc_macro_attribute]
> pub fn vtable(attr: TokenStream, ts: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
> - vtable::vtable(attr, ts)
> + vtable::vtable(attr.into(), ts.into()).into()
> }
>
> /// Export a function so that C code can call it via a header file.
> @@ -230,7 +228,7 @@ pub fn vtable(attr: TokenStream, ts: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
> /// automatically exported with `EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL`.
> #[proc_macro_attribute]
> pub fn export(attr: TokenStream, ts: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
> - export::export(attr, ts)
> + export::export(attr.into(), ts.into()).into()
> }
>
> /// Like [`core::format_args!`], but automatically wraps arguments in [`kernel::fmt::Adapter`].
> @@ -248,7 +246,7 @@ pub fn export(attr: TokenStream, ts: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
> /// [`pr_info!`]: ../kernel/macro.pr_info.html
> #[proc_macro]
> pub fn fmt(input: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
> - fmt::fmt(input)
> + fmt::fmt(input.into()).into()
> }
>
> /// Concatenate two identifiers.
> @@ -306,7 +304,7 @@ pub fn fmt(input: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
> /// ```
> #[proc_macro]
> pub fn concat_idents(ts: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
> - concat_idents::concat_idents(ts)
> + concat_idents::concat_idents(ts.into()).into()
> }
>
> /// Paste identifiers together.
> @@ -444,9 +442,12 @@ pub fn concat_idents(ts: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
> /// [`paste`]: https://docs.rs/paste/
> #[proc_macro]
> pub fn paste(input: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
> - let mut tokens = input.into_iter().collect();
> + let mut tokens = proc_macro2::TokenStream::from(input).into_iter().collect();
> paste::expand(&mut tokens);
> - tokens.into_iter().collect()
> + tokens
> + .into_iter()
> + .collect::<proc_macro2::TokenStream>()
> + .into()
> }
>
> /// Registers a KUnit test suite and its test cases using a user-space like syntax.
> @@ -473,5 +474,5 @@ pub fn paste(input: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
> /// ```
> #[proc_macro_attribute]
> pub fn kunit_tests(attr: TokenStream, ts: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
> - kunit::kunit_tests(attr, ts)
> + kunit::kunit_tests(attr.into(), ts.into()).into()
> }
> diff --git a/rust/macros/module.rs b/rust/macros/module.rs
> index 80cb9b16f5aaf..b855a2b586e18 100644
> --- a/rust/macros/module.rs
> +++ b/rust/macros/module.rs
> @@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
> // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>
> -use crate::helpers::*;
> -use proc_macro::{token_stream, Delimiter, Literal, TokenStream, TokenTree};
> use std::fmt::Write;
>
> +use proc_macro2::{token_stream, Delimiter, Literal, TokenStream, TokenTree};
> +
> +use crate::helpers::*;
> +
> fn expect_string_array(it: &mut token_stream::IntoIter) -> Vec<String> {
> let group = expect_group(it);
> assert_eq!(group.delimiter(), Delimiter::Bracket);
> diff --git a/rust/macros/paste.rs b/rust/macros/paste.rs
> index cce712d19855b..2181e312a7d32 100644
> --- a/rust/macros/paste.rs
> +++ b/rust/macros/paste.rs
> @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
> // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>
> -use proc_macro::{Delimiter, Group, Ident, Spacing, Span, TokenTree};
> +use proc_macro2::{Delimiter, Group, Ident, Spacing, Span, TokenTree};
>
> fn concat_helper(tokens: &[TokenTree]) -> Vec<(String, Span)> {
> let mut tokens = tokens.iter();
> diff --git a/rust/macros/quote.rs b/rust/macros/quote.rs
> deleted file mode 100644
> index ddfc21577539c..0000000000000
> --- a/rust/macros/quote.rs
> +++ /dev/null
> @@ -1,182 +0,0 @@
> -// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR MIT
> -
> -use proc_macro::{TokenStream, TokenTree};
> -
> -pub(crate) trait ToTokens {
> - fn to_tokens(&self, tokens: &mut TokenStream);
> -}
> -
> -impl<T: ToTokens> ToTokens for Option<T> {
> - fn to_tokens(&self, tokens: &mut TokenStream) {
> - if let Some(v) = self {
> - v.to_tokens(tokens);
> - }
> - }
> -}
> -
> -impl ToTokens for proc_macro::Group {
> - fn to_tokens(&self, tokens: &mut TokenStream) {
> - tokens.extend([TokenTree::from(self.clone())]);
> - }
> -}
> -
> -impl ToTokens for proc_macro::Ident {
> - fn to_tokens(&self, tokens: &mut TokenStream) {
> - tokens.extend([TokenTree::from(self.clone())]);
> - }
> -}
> -
> -impl ToTokens for TokenTree {
> - fn to_tokens(&self, tokens: &mut TokenStream) {
> - tokens.extend([self.clone()]);
> - }
> -}
> -
> -impl ToTokens for TokenStream {
> - fn to_tokens(&self, tokens: &mut TokenStream) {
> - tokens.extend(self.clone());
> - }
> -}
> -
> -/// Converts tokens into [`proc_macro::TokenStream`] and performs variable interpolations with
> -/// the given span.
> -///
> -/// This is a similar to the
> -/// [`quote_spanned!`](https://docs.rs/quote/latest/quote/macro.quote_spanned.html) macro from the
> -/// `quote` crate but provides only just enough functionality needed by the current `macros` crate.
> -macro_rules! quote_spanned {
> - ($span:expr => $($tt:tt)*) => {{
> - let mut tokens = ::proc_macro::TokenStream::new();
> - {
> - #[allow(unused_variables)]
> - let span = $span;
> - quote_spanned!(@proc tokens span $($tt)*);
> - }
> - tokens
> - }};
> - (@proc $v:ident $span:ident) => {};
> - (@proc $v:ident $span:ident #$id:ident $($tt:tt)*) => {
> - $crate::quote::ToTokens::to_tokens(&$id, &mut $v);
> - quote_spanned!(@proc $v $span $($tt)*);
> - };
> - (@proc $v:ident $span:ident #(#$id:ident)* $($tt:tt)*) => {
> - for token in $id {
> - $crate::quote::ToTokens::to_tokens(&token, &mut $v);
> - }
> - quote_spanned!(@proc $v $span $($tt)*);
> - };
> - (@proc $v:ident $span:ident ( $($inner:tt)* ) $($tt:tt)*) => {
> - #[allow(unused_mut)]
> - let mut tokens = ::proc_macro::TokenStream::new();
> - quote_spanned!(@proc tokens $span $($inner)*);
> - $v.extend([::proc_macro::TokenTree::Group(::proc_macro::Group::new(
> - ::proc_macro::Delimiter::Parenthesis,
> - tokens,
> - ))]);
> - quote_spanned!(@proc $v $span $($tt)*);
> - };
> - (@proc $v:ident $span:ident [ $($inner:tt)* ] $($tt:tt)*) => {
> - let mut tokens = ::proc_macro::TokenStream::new();
> - quote_spanned!(@proc tokens $span $($inner)*);
> - $v.extend([::proc_macro::TokenTree::Group(::proc_macro::Group::new(
> - ::proc_macro::Delimiter::Bracket,
> - tokens,
> - ))]);
> - quote_spanned!(@proc $v $span $($tt)*);
> - };
> - (@proc $v:ident $span:ident { $($inner:tt)* } $($tt:tt)*) => {
> - let mut tokens = ::proc_macro::TokenStream::new();
> - quote_spanned!(@proc tokens $span $($inner)*);
> - $v.extend([::proc_macro::TokenTree::Group(::proc_macro::Group::new(
> - ::proc_macro::Delimiter::Brace,
> - tokens,
> - ))]);
> - quote_spanned!(@proc $v $span $($tt)*);
> - };
> - (@proc $v:ident $span:ident :: $($tt:tt)*) => {
> - $v.extend([::proc_macro::Spacing::Joint, ::proc_macro::Spacing::Alone].map(|spacing| {
> - ::proc_macro::TokenTree::Punct(::proc_macro::Punct::new(':', spacing))
> - }));
> - quote_spanned!(@proc $v $span $($tt)*);
> - };
> - (@proc $v:ident $span:ident : $($tt:tt)*) => {
> - $v.extend([::proc_macro::TokenTree::Punct(
> - ::proc_macro::Punct::new(':', ::proc_macro::Spacing::Alone),
> - )]);
> - quote_spanned!(@proc $v $span $($tt)*);
> - };
> - (@proc $v:ident $span:ident , $($tt:tt)*) => {
> - $v.extend([::proc_macro::TokenTree::Punct(
> - ::proc_macro::Punct::new(',', ::proc_macro::Spacing::Alone),
> - )]);
> - quote_spanned!(@proc $v $span $($tt)*);
> - };
> - (@proc $v:ident $span:ident @ $($tt:tt)*) => {
> - $v.extend([::proc_macro::TokenTree::Punct(
> - ::proc_macro::Punct::new('@', ::proc_macro::Spacing::Alone),
> - )]);
> - quote_spanned!(@proc $v $span $($tt)*);
> - };
> - (@proc $v:ident $span:ident ! $($tt:tt)*) => {
> - $v.extend([::proc_macro::TokenTree::Punct(
> - ::proc_macro::Punct::new('!', ::proc_macro::Spacing::Alone),
> - )]);
> - quote_spanned!(@proc $v $span $($tt)*);
> - };
> - (@proc $v:ident $span:ident ; $($tt:tt)*) => {
> - $v.extend([::proc_macro::TokenTree::Punct(
> - ::proc_macro::Punct::new(';', ::proc_macro::Spacing::Alone),
> - )]);
> - quote_spanned!(@proc $v $span $($tt)*);
> - };
> - (@proc $v:ident $span:ident + $($tt:tt)*) => {
> - $v.extend([::proc_macro::TokenTree::Punct(
> - ::proc_macro::Punct::new('+', ::proc_macro::Spacing::Alone),
> - )]);
> - quote_spanned!(@proc $v $span $($tt)*);
> - };
> - (@proc $v:ident $span:ident = $($tt:tt)*) => {
> - $v.extend([::proc_macro::TokenTree::Punct(
> - ::proc_macro::Punct::new('=', ::proc_macro::Spacing::Alone),
> - )]);
> - quote_spanned!(@proc $v $span $($tt)*);
> - };
> - (@proc $v:ident $span:ident # $($tt:tt)*) => {
> - $v.extend([::proc_macro::TokenTree::Punct(
> - ::proc_macro::Punct::new('#', ::proc_macro::Spacing::Alone),
> - )]);
> - quote_spanned!(@proc $v $span $($tt)*);
> - };
> - (@proc $v:ident $span:ident & $($tt:tt)*) => {
> - $v.extend([::proc_macro::TokenTree::Punct(
> - ::proc_macro::Punct::new('&', ::proc_macro::Spacing::Alone),
> - )]);
> - quote_spanned!(@proc $v $span $($tt)*);
> - };
> - (@proc $v:ident $span:ident _ $($tt:tt)*) => {
> - $v.extend([::proc_macro::TokenTree::Ident(
> - ::proc_macro::Ident::new("_", $span),
> - )]);
> - quote_spanned!(@proc $v $span $($tt)*);
> - };
> - (@proc $v:ident $span:ident $id:ident $($tt:tt)*) => {
> - $v.extend([::proc_macro::TokenTree::Ident(
> - ::proc_macro::Ident::new(stringify!($id), $span),
> - )]);
> - quote_spanned!(@proc $v $span $($tt)*);
> - };
> -}
> -
> -/// Converts tokens into [`proc_macro::TokenStream`] and performs variable interpolations with
> -/// mixed site span ([`Span::mixed_site()`]).
> -///
> -/// This is a similar to the [`quote!`](https://docs.rs/quote/latest/quote/macro.quote.html) macro
> -/// from the `quote` crate but provides only just enough functionality needed by the current
> -/// `macros` crate.
> -///
> -/// [`Span::mixed_site()`]: https://doc.rust-lang.org/proc_macro/struct.Span.html#method.mixed_site
> -macro_rules! quote {
> - ($($tt:tt)*) => {
> - quote_spanned!(::proc_macro::Span::mixed_site() => $($tt)*)
> - }
> -}
> diff --git a/rust/macros/vtable.rs b/rust/macros/vtable.rs
> index ee06044fcd4f3..a67d1cc81a2d3 100644
> --- a/rust/macros/vtable.rs
> +++ b/rust/macros/vtable.rs
> @@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
> // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
>
> -use proc_macro::{Delimiter, Group, TokenStream, TokenTree};
> use std::collections::HashSet;
> use std::fmt::Write;
>
> +use proc_macro2::{Delimiter, Group, TokenStream, TokenTree};
> +
> pub(crate) fn vtable(_attr: TokenStream, ts: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
> let mut tokens: Vec<_> = ts.into_iter().collect();
>
> @@ -31,7 +32,7 @@ pub(crate) fn vtable(_attr: TokenStream, ts: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
> let mut consts = HashSet::new();
> while let Some(token) = body_it.next() {
> match token {
> - TokenTree::Ident(ident) if ident.to_string() == "fn" => {
> + TokenTree::Ident(ident) if ident == "fn" => {
> let fn_name = match body_it.next() {
> Some(TokenTree::Ident(ident)) => ident.to_string(),
> // Possibly we've encountered a fn pointer type instead.
> @@ -39,7 +40,7 @@ pub(crate) fn vtable(_attr: TokenStream, ts: TokenStream) -> TokenStream {
> };
> functions.push(fn_name);
> }
> - TokenTree::Ident(ident) if ident.to_string() == "const" => {
> + TokenTree::Ident(ident) if ident == "const" => {
> let const_name = match body_it.next() {
> Some(TokenTree::Ident(ident)) => ident.to_string(),
> // Possibly we've encountered an inline const block instead.
> --
> 2.51.2
>
[-- Attachment #2: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature --]
[-- Type: application/pkcs7-signature, Size: 5281 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v3 04/12] rust: macros: use `syn` to parse `module!` macro
From: Benno Lossin @ 2026-01-17 20:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Gary Guo, Miguel Ojeda, Boqun Feng, Björn Roy Baron,
Andreas Hindborg, Alice Ryhl, Trevor Gross, Danilo Krummrich,
Luis Chamberlain, Petr Pavlu, Daniel Gomez, Sami Tolvanen,
Aaron Tomlin, Tamir Duberstein, Igor Korotin,
José Expósito
Cc: rust-for-linux, linux-kernel, linux-modules
In-Reply-To: <20260112170919.1888584-5-gary@kernel.org>
On Mon Jan 12, 2026 at 6:07 PM CET, Gary Guo wrote:
> From: Gary Guo <gary@garyguo.net>
>
> With `syn` being available in the kernel, use it to parse the complex
> custom `module!` macro to replace existing helpers. Only parsing is
> changed in this commit, the code generation is untouched.
>
> This has the benefit of better error message when the macro is used
> incorrectly, as it can point to a concrete span on what's going wrong.
>
> For example, if a field is specified twice, previously it reads:
>
> error: proc macro panicked
> --> samples/rust/rust_minimal.rs:7:1
> |
> 7 | / module! {
> 8 | | type: RustMinimal,
> 9 | | name: "rust_minimal",
> 10 | | author: "Rust for Linux Contributors",
> 11 | | description: "Rust minimal sample",
> 12 | | license: "GPL",
> 13 | | license: "GPL",
> 14 | | }
> | |_^
> |
> = help: message: Duplicated key "license". Keys can only be specified once.
>
> now it reads:
>
> error: duplicated key "license". Keys can only be specified once.
> --> samples/rust/rust_minimal.rs:13:5
> |
> 13 | license: "GPL",
> | ^^^^^^^
>
> Reviewed-by: Tamir Duberstein <tamird@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Gary Guo <gary@garyguo.net>
Reviewed-by: Benno Lossin <lossin@kernel.org>
Cheers,
Benno
> ---
> rust/macros/helpers.rs | 109 ++++-------
> rust/macros/lib.rs | 6 +-
> rust/macros/module.rs | 399 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
> 3 files changed, 280 insertions(+), 234 deletions(-)
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] module: Add compile-time check for embedded NUL characters
From: Chris Li @ 2026-01-16 23:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Matthieu Baerts
Cc: Dan Carpenter, Daniel Gomez, Kees Cook, Rusty Russell, Petr Pavlu,
Sami Tolvanen, linux-modules, Hans Verkuil, Malcolm Priestley,
Mauro Carvalho Chehab, Hans Verkuil, Uwe Kleine-König,
linux-kernel, linux-media, linux-hardening, Luis Chamberlain,
linux-sparse
In-Reply-To: <bf5b9a62-a120-421e-908d-1404c42e0b60@kernel.org>
On Fri, Dec 19, 2025 at 6:59 AM Matthieu Baerts <matttbe@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> Hi Dan, Daniel
>
> On 19/12/2025 13:44, Dan Carpenter wrote:
> > On Fri, Dec 19, 2025 at 01:29:21PM +0100, Matthieu Baerts wrote:
> >> net/mptcp/crypto_test.c:72:1: error: bad integer constant expression
> >> net/mptcp/crypto_test.c:72:1: error: static assertion failed: "MODULE_INFO(license, ...) contains embedded NUL byte"
> >> net/mptcp/crypto_test.c:73:1: error: bad integer constant expression
> >> net/mptcp/crypto_test.c:73:1: error: static assertion failed: "MODULE_INFO(description, ...) contains embedded NUL byte"
> >
> > There was a fix for that posted. Let me ping them to see if anyone is
> > planning to send an actual patch.
Should I wait for the actual patch for sparse?
> >
> > https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251211175101.GA3405942@google.com/
>
> Thank you both for your reply! I didn't think about looking at the v1.
>
> I confirm that Sami's patch silences the errors on my side. Thanks!
Thanks for the report.
Chris
^ permalink raw reply
* RE: [PATCH] kernel: modules: Add SPDX license identifier to kmod.c
From: Bird, Tim @ 2026-01-16 18:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP), torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
mcgrof@kernel.org, petr.pavlu@suse.com, da.gomez@kernel.org
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org, linux-modules@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
In-Reply-To: <3beb5db7-efb8-4a68-b5fb-aa2aed2ac52f@kernel.org>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP) <chleroy@kernel.org>
>
>
> Le 16/01/2026 à 01:04, Tim Bird a écrit :
> > [Vous ne recevez pas souvent de courriers de tim.bird@sony.com. Découvrez pourquoi ceci est important à
> https://aka.ms/LearnAboutSenderIdentification ]
> >
> > Add a GPL-2.0 license identifier line for this file.
> >
> > kmod.c was originally introduced in the kernel in February
> > of 1998 by Linus Torvalds - who was familiar with kernel
> > licensing at the time this was introduced.
>
> 1998 ?
Yes. The file kernel/kmod.c first appeared in kernel version 2.1.90,
released on March 18, 1998.
>
> This file has Copyright (C) 2023 Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
> added by commit 8660484ed1cf ("module: add debugging auto-load duplicate
> module support")
That copyright line was added later.
While Linus first introduced the file, some of the code was likely authored by
Kirk Peterson, whose name is in the header (but without a formal copyright
notice.
-- Tim
>
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Tim Bird <tim.bird@sony.com>
> > ---
> > kernel/module/kmod.c | 1 +
> > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/module/kmod.c b/kernel/module/kmod.c
> > index 25f253812512..a25dccdf7aa7 100644
> > --- a/kernel/module/kmod.c
> > +++ b/kernel/module/kmod.c
> > @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
> > +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> > /*
> > * kmod - the kernel module loader
> > *
> > --
> > 2.43.0
> >
> >
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v5 0/6] Unload linux/kernel.h
From: Joel Fernandes @ 2026-01-16 17:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Yury Norov, Steven Rostedt, Andrew Morton, Masami Hiramatsu,
Mathieu Desnoyers, Andy Shevchenko, Christophe Leroy,
Randy Dunlap, Ingo Molnar, Jani Nikula, Joonas Lahtinen,
David Laight, Petr Pavlu, Andi Shyti, Rodrigo Vivi,
Tvrtko Ursulin, Daniel Gomez, Greg Kroah-Hartman,
Rafael J. Wysocki, Danilo Krummrich, linux-kernel, intel-gfx,
dri-devel, linux-modules, linux-trace-kernel
Cc: Yury Norov (NVIDIA)
In-Reply-To: <20260116042510.241009-1-ynorov@nvidia.com>
On 1/15/2026 11:25 PM, Yury Norov wrote:
> kernel.h hosts declarations that can be placed better. This series
> decouples kernel.h with some explicit and implicit dependencies; also,
> moves tracing functionality to a new independent header.
>
> For testing, see v4.
>
> v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251129195304.204082-1-yury.norov@gmail.com/
> v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251203162329.280182-1-yury.norov@gmail.com/
> v3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251205175237.242022-1-yury.norov@gmail.com/
> v4: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251225170930.1151781-1-yury.norov@gmail.com/
> v5:
> - drop v4#7, i.e. keep trace_printk.h included in kernel.h
Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes <joelagnelf@nvidia.com>
thanks,
- Joel
>
> Steven Rostedt (1):
> tracing: Remove size parameter in __trace_puts()
>
> Yury Norov (5):
> kernel.h: drop STACK_MAGIC macro
> moduleparam: include required headers explicitly
> kernel.h: move VERIFY_OCTAL_PERMISSIONS() to sysfs.h
> kernel.h: include linux/instruction_pointer.h explicitly
> tracing: move tracing declarations from kernel.h to a dedicated header
>
> Documentation/filesystems/sysfs.rst | 2 +-
> arch/s390/include/asm/processor.h | 1 +
> .../drm/i915/gt/selftest_ring_submission.c | 1 +
> drivers/gpu/drm/i915/i915_selftest.h | 2 +
> include/linux/kernel.h | 210 +-----------------
> include/linux/moduleparam.h | 7 +-
> include/linux/sysfs.h | 13 ++
> include/linux/trace_printk.h | 204 +++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/ww_mutex.h | 1 +
> kernel/trace/trace.c | 7 +-
> kernel/trace/trace.h | 2 +-
> 11 files changed, 234 insertions(+), 216 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 include/linux/trace_printk.h
>
^ permalink raw reply
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