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From: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Liang Z Li <liang.z.li@intel.com>,
	Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>, Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>, Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com>,
	Alexandre Julliard <julliard@winehq.org>,
	Stas Sergeev <stsp@list.ru>, Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kern
Subject: [PATCH v4 17/17] selftests/x86: Add tests for User-Mode Instruction Prevention
Date: Wed, 22 Feb 2017 22:37:06 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170223063706.71554-18-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170223063706.71554-1-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>

Certain user space programs that run on virtual-8086 mode may utilize
instructions protected by the User-Mode Instruction Prevention (UMIP)
security feature present in new Intel processors: SGDT, SIDT and SMSW. In
such a case, a general protection fault is issued if UMIP is enabled. When
such a fault happens, the kernel catches it and emulates the results of
these instructions with dummy values. The purpose of this new
test is to verify whether the impacted instructions can be executed without
causing such #GP. If no #GP exceptions occur, we expect to exit virtual-
8086 mode from INT 0x80.

The instructions protected by UMIP are executed in representative use
cases:
 a) the memory address of the result is given in the form of a displacement
    from the base of the data segment
 b) the memory address of the result is given in a general purpose register
 c) the result is stored directly in a general purpose register.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to check the results against a set of
expected values because no emulation will occur in systems that do not have
the UMIP feature. Instead, results are printed for verification.

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/x86/entry_from_vm86.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/entry_from_vm86.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/entry_from_vm86.c
index d075ea0..377b773 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/entry_from_vm86.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/entry_from_vm86.c
@@ -95,6 +95,22 @@ asm (
 	"int3\n\t"
 	"vmcode_int80:\n\t"
 	"int $0x80\n\t"
+	"umip:\n\t"
+	/* addressing via displacements */
+	"smsw (2052)\n\t"
+	"sidt (2054)\n\t"
+	"sgdt (2060)\n\t"
+	/* addressing via registers */
+	"mov $2066, %bx\n\t"
+	"smsw (%bx)\n\t"
+	"mov $2068, %bx\n\t"
+	"sidt (%bx)\n\t"
+	"mov $2074, %bx\n\t"
+	"sgdt (%bx)\n\t"
+	/* register operands, only for smsw */
+	"smsw %ax\n\t"
+	"mov %ax, (2080)\n\t"
+	"int $0x80\n\t"
 	".size vmcode, . - vmcode\n\t"
 	"end_vmcode:\n\t"
 	".code32\n\t"
@@ -103,7 +119,7 @@ asm (
 
 extern unsigned char vmcode[], end_vmcode[];
 extern unsigned char vmcode_bound[], vmcode_sysenter[], vmcode_syscall[],
-	vmcode_sti[], vmcode_int3[], vmcode_int80[];
+	vmcode_sti[], vmcode_int3[], vmcode_int80[], umip[];
 
 /* Returns false if the test was skipped. */
 static bool do_test(struct vm86plus_struct *v86, unsigned long eip,
@@ -218,6 +234,27 @@ int main(void)
 	v86.regs.eax = (unsigned int)-1;
 	do_test(&v86, vmcode_int80 - vmcode, VM86_INTx, 0x80, "int80");
 
+	/* UMIP -- should exit with INTx 0x80 unless UMIP was not disabled */
+	do_test(&v86, umip - vmcode, VM86_INTx, 0x80, "UMIP tests");
+	printf("[INFO]\tResults of UMIP-protected instructions via displacements:\n");
+	printf("[INFO]\tSMSW:[0x%04x]\n", *(unsigned short *)(addr + 2052));
+	printf("[INFO]\tSIDT: limit[0x%04x]base[0x%08lx]\n",
+	       *(unsigned short *)(addr + 2054),
+	       *(unsigned long  *)(addr + 2056));
+	printf("[INFO]\tSGDT: limit[0x%04x]base[0x%08lx]\n",
+	       *(unsigned short *)(addr + 2060),
+	       *(unsigned long  *)(addr + 2062));
+	printf("[INFO]\tResults of UMIP-protected instructions via addressing in registers:\n");
+	printf("[INFO]\tSMSW:[0x%04x]\n", *(unsigned short *)(addr + 2066));
+	printf("[INFO]\tSIDT: limit[0x%04x]base[0x%08lx]\n",
+	       *(unsigned short *)(addr + 2068),
+	       *(unsigned long  *)(addr + 2070));
+	printf("[INFO]\tSGDT: limit[0x%04x]base[0x%08lx]\n",
+	       *(unsigned short *)(addr + 2074),
+	       *(unsigned long  *)(addr + 2076));
+	printf("[INFO]\tResults of SMSW via register operands:\n");
+	printf("[INFO]\tSMSW:[0x%04x]\n", *(unsigned short *)(addr + 2080));
+
 	/* Execute a null pointer */
 	v86.regs.cs = 0;
 	v86.regs.ss = 0;
-- 
2.9.3


      parent reply	other threads:[~2017-02-23  6:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-02-23  6:36 [PATCH v4 00/17] x86: Enable User-Mode Instruction Prevention Ricardo Neri
2017-02-23  6:36 ` [PATCH v4 01/17] x86/mpx: Do not use SIB index if index points to R/ESP Ricardo Neri
2017-02-23  7:24   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-02-23  9:50     ` Paul Crawford
2017-02-23 12:47       ` Coding style vs legibility [was Re: [PATCH v4 01/17] x86/mpx: Do not use SIB index if index points to R/ESP] Mouse
2017-02-23 22:17     ` [PATCH v4 01/17] x86/mpx: Do not use SIB index if index points to R/ESP Ricardo Neri
2017-02-24  2:33       ` Joe Perches
2017-02-24  2:41         ` Ricardo Neri
2017-02-24 14:47         ` Nathan Howard
2017-02-24 19:07           ` Ricardo Neri
2017-02-24 15:00         ` Adan Hawthorn
2017-02-23  6:36 ` [PATCH v4 02/17] x86/mpx: Do not use R/EBP as base in the SIB byte with Mod = 0 Ricardo Neri
2017-02-23  6:36 ` [PATCH v4 03/17] x86/mpx, x86/insn: Relocate insn util functions to a new insn-kernel Ricardo Neri
2017-02-23 10:54   ` kbuild test robot
2017-02-23 22:18     ` Ricardo Neri
2017-02-23  6:36 ` [PATCH v4 04/17] x86/insn-eval: Add utility functions to get register offsets Ricardo Neri
2017-02-23  6:36 ` [PATCH v4 05/17] x86/insn-eval: Add utility function to get segment selector Ricardo Neri
2017-02-23  6:36 ` [PATCH v4 06/17] x86/insn-eval: Add utility function to get segment descriptor Ricardo Neri
2017-02-23  6:36 ` [PATCH v4 07/17] x86/insn-eval: Add utility function to get segment descriptor base address Ricardo Neri
2017-02-23  6:36 ` [PATCH v4 08/17] x86/insn-eval: Add functions to get default operand and address sizes Ricardo Neri
2017-02-23  6:36 ` [PATCH v4 09/17] x86/insn-eval: Do not use R/EBP as base if mod in ModRM is zero Ricardo Neri
2017-02-23  6:36 ` [PATCH v4 10/17] insn/eval: Incorporate segment base in address computation Ricardo Neri
2017-02-23  6:37 ` [PATCH v4 11/17] x86/insn-eval: Add support to resolve 16-bit addressing encodings Ricardo Neri
2017-02-23  6:37 ` [PATCH v4 12/17] x86/cpufeature: Add User-Mode Instruction Prevention definitions Ricardo Neri
2017-02-23  6:37 ` [PATCH v4 13/17] x86: Add emulation code for UMIP instructions Ricardo Neri
2017-02-23  6:37 ` [PATCH v4 14/17] x86/umip: Force a page fault when unable to copy emulated result to user Ricardo Neri
2017-02-23  6:37 ` [PATCH v4 15/17] x86/traps: Fixup general protection faults caused by UMIP Ricardo Neri
2017-02-23  9:27   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-02-23 22:15     ` Ricardo Neri
2017-02-24 19:11       ` Andy Lutomirski
2017-02-24 19:36         ` Ricardo Neri
2017-02-24 19:45           ` H. Peter Anvin
2017-02-23  6:37 ` [PATCH v4 16/17] x86: Enable User-Mode Instruction Prevention Ricardo Neri
2017-02-23  6:37 ` Ricardo Neri [this message]

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