From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from mail-io0-x22c.google.com ([2607:f8b0:4001:c06::22c]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.80.1 #2 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1a56AK-0003Yv-1D for linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org; Sat, 05 Dec 2015 06:17:52 +0000 Received: by iofh3 with SMTP id h3so137670153iof.3 for ; Fri, 04 Dec 2015 22:17:30 -0800 (PST) Date: Sat, 5 Dec 2015 00:15:58 -0600 From: Seth Forshee To: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: Theodore Ts'o , "Serge E. Hallyn" , "Eric W. Biederman" , Alexander Viro , Serge Hallyn , Richard Weinberger , Austin S Hemmelgarn , Miklos Szeredi , linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-raid@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: Re: [PATCH 14/19] fs: Permit FIBMAP for users with CAP_SYS_RAWIO in s_user_ns Message-ID: <20151205061558.GA14580@ubuntu-hedt> References: <1449070821-73820-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> <1449070821-73820-15-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> <20151204191143.GE3624@mail.hallyn.com> <20151204200528.GC18359@thunk.org> <20151204200736.GJ3624@mail.hallyn.com> <20151204204532.GG147214@ubuntu-hedt> <20151204231152.GE18359@thunk.org> <20151204234348.GA6908@mail.hallyn.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20151204234348.GA6908@mail.hallyn.com> List-Id: Linux MTD discussion mailing list List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , On Fri, Dec 04, 2015 at 05:43:49PM -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > On Fri, Dec 04, 2015 at 06:11:52PM -0500, Theodore Ts'o wrote: > > On Fri, Dec 04, 2015 at 02:45:32PM -0600, Seth Forshee wrote: > > > On Fri, Dec 04, 2015 at 02:07:36PM -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > > > Heh, I was looking over http://www.gossamer-threads.com/lists/linux/kernel/103611 > > > > a little while ago :) The same question was asked 16 years ago. Apparently > > > > the answer then was that it was easier than fixing the code. > > > > > > So it seems then that either it still isn't safe and so unprivileged > > > users shouldn't be allowed to do it at all, or else it's safe and we > > > should drop the requirement completely. I can't say which is right, > > > unfortunately. > > > > It may not have been safe 16 years agoo, but giving invalid arguments > > to FIBMAP is safe for ext4 and ext2. This is the sort of thing that > > tools like trinity should and does test for, so I think it should be > > fine to remove the root check for FIBMAP. > > Seth, can I tempt you into sending a standalone patch to remove that? :) Patch sent. I'll drop this patch in v2.