From: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
To: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>,
Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org,
dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-raid@vger.kernel.org,
linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [PATCH RESEND v2 17/18] fuse: Restrict allow_other to the superblock's namespace or a descendant
Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2016 12:40:51 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160309114051.GG8655@tucsk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1451930639-94331-18-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com>
On Mon, Jan 04, 2016 at 12:03:56PM -0600, Seth Forshee wrote:
> Unprivileged users are normally restricted from mounting with the
> allow_other option by system policy, but this could be bypassed
> for a mount done with user namespace root permissions. In such
> cases allow_other should not allow users outside the userns
> to access the mount as doing so would give the unprivileged user
> the ability to manipulate processes it would otherwise be unable
> to manipulate. Restrict allow_other to apply to users in the same
> userns used at mount or a descendant of that namespace.
>
> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
> ---
> fs/fuse/dir.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c
> index 8fd9fe4dcd43..24e4cdb554f1 100644
> --- a/fs/fuse/dir.c
> +++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c
> @@ -1015,7 +1015,7 @@ int fuse_allow_current_process(struct fuse_conn *fc)
> const struct cred *cred;
>
> if (fc->flags & FUSE_ALLOW_OTHER)
> - return 1;
> + return current_in_userns(fc->user_ns);
>
> cred = current_cred();
> if (uid_eq(cred->euid, fc->user_id) &&
> --
> 1.9.1
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-03-09 11:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-01-04 18:03 [PATCH RESEND v2 00/19] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 01/18] block_dev: Support checking inode permissions in lookup_bdev() Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 02/18] block_dev: Check permissions towards block device inode when mounting Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 03/18] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
[not found] ` <1458043740-14229-1-git-send-email-ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
2016-03-15 13:45 ` [PATCH] fs: remove excess check for in_userns Seth Forshee
2016-03-22 23:19 ` James Morris
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 04/18] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 05/18] userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 06/18] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 07/18] fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link() Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 08/18] cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as() Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 09/18] fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 10/18] fs: Update posix_acl support to handle user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 11/18] fs: Ensure the mounter of a filesystem is privileged towards its inodes Seth Forshee
2016-03-03 17:02 ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-04 22:43 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-03-06 15:48 ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-06 22:07 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-03-07 13:32 ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-28 16:59 ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-30 1:36 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-03-30 14:58 ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-30 20:18 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 12/18] fs: Don't remove suid for CAP_FSETID in s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 13/18] fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb() Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 14/18] capabilities: Allow privileged user in s_user_ns to set security.* xattrs Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 15/18] fuse: Add support for pid namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 10:53 ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-03-09 14:17 ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 16/18] fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 11:29 ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-03-09 14:18 ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 14:48 ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-03-09 15:25 ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 15:51 ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-03-09 17:07 ` Seth Forshee
2016-03-14 20:58 ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-03-25 20:31 ` Seth Forshee
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 17/18] fuse: Restrict allow_other to the superblock's namespace or a descendant Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 11:40 ` Miklos Szeredi [this message]
2016-01-04 18:03 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 18/18] fuse: Allow user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
2016-03-09 13:08 ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-01-25 19:47 ` [PATCH RESEND v2 00/19] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-01-25 20:01 ` Eric W. Biederman
2016-01-25 20:36 ` Seth Forshee
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