From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.0 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,FSL_HELO_FAKE,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BA661C76186 for ; Mon, 29 Jul 2019 20:30:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8811820693 for ; Mon, 29 Jul 2019 20:30:16 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=lists.infradead.org header.i=@lists.infradead.org header.b="DvJgJSFq"; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="DPew4TPf" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 8811820693 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-mtd-bounces+linux-mtd=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=bombadil.20170209; h=Sender: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:Cc:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post: List-Archive:List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:References: Message-ID:Subject:To:From:Date:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description: Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID: List-Owner; bh=5gKCPD8O2CiY+W1CXx+b+lmLRLBEEKJX8e7QBgL0A28=; b=DvJgJSFq2lcMST uQgY/FO6tqZzQ3zUxeEdJ62b8ndovj6M94WPmu7X4XU1sy7HLgKqdJ3sivlpYgROIeiS+QkP19ulC AoaKrl1DoMvyNpsbhqnhFyS/udB3bXaTItItB7+s11djoiT2OEGf8eD6yppOHr0ZQF8sW3q+zYqf/ AhgmW91vWRSRiXyEzzrED3a0ek5+a4WuD8c+hz0p9Bve/BxgVzLhQ6jMmk3iWLW7n808pRfbp6/7e 0lYvqGBI87DinVzWtwRb2HA0HTFyJcMZWWNGGB9LIbYx+beA/FLXKsBc4x6jxsxGiL1i45sbgdxmt hmWsQQUEGqBqoevX6LmA==; Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=bombadil.infradead.org) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1hsCHO-0005HD-Ve; Mon, 29 Jul 2019 20:29:58 +0000 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.92 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1hsCHL-0005G8-UF for linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org; Mon, 29 Jul 2019 20:29:57 +0000 Received: from gmail.com (unknown [104.132.1.77]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B2FB620679; Mon, 29 Jul 2019 20:29:53 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1564432194; bh=7LK4u/xXVtAq5xQMkemCjB4sBIVdQGteWvKYNQ+TBCY=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=DPew4TPf3PkKUXWtCLWWIQsryuZDmRsZW9HWBPCFmul6GOPKrMhWsOP2j0s6E1587 pPpWGjXg0oLEblY9YgIrbRyuoJDVlQC0LdMHo0X3YE5xtPBbo3Oz6TZzJnytmQbINO 1di8FZ/AmOwFvTEDEuqxMDphn/LIvGf9Grr0aIA8= Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2019 13:29:52 -0700 From: Eric Biggers To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 09/16] fscrypt: add an HKDF-SHA512 implementation Message-ID: <20190729202951.GG169027@gmail.com> Mail-Followup-To: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" , linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Paul Crowley , Satya Tangirala References: <20190726224141.14044-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> <20190726224141.14044-10-ebiggers@kernel.org> <20190728193949.GI6088@mit.edu> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20190728193949.GI6088@mit.edu> User-Agent: Mutt/1.10.1 (2018-07-13) X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20190729_132956_011317_E545237B X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 22.44 ) X-BeenThere: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux MTD discussion mailing list List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Satya Tangirala , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, Paul Crowley Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "linux-mtd" Errors-To: linux-mtd-bounces+linux-mtd=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org On Sun, Jul 28, 2019 at 03:39:49PM -0400, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote: > On Fri, Jul 26, 2019 at 03:41:34PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > > From: Eric Biggers > > > > Add an implementation of HKDF (RFC 5869) to fscrypt, for the purpose of > > deriving additional key material from the fscrypt master keys for v2 > > encryption policies. HKDF is a key derivation function built on top of > > HMAC. We choose SHA-512 for the underlying unkeyed hash, and use an > > "hmac(sha512)" transform allocated from the crypto API. > > > > We'll be using this to replace the AES-ECB based KDF currently used to > > derive the per-file encryption keys. While the AES-ECB based KDF is > > believed to meet the original security requirements, it is nonstandard > > and has problems that don't exist in modern KDFs such as HKDF: > > > > 1. It's reversible. Given a derived key and nonce, an attacker can > > easily compute the master key. This is okay if the master key and > > derived keys are equally hard to compromise, but now we'd like to be > > more robust against threats such as a derived key being compromised > > through a timing attack, or a derived key for an in-use file being > > compromised after the master key has already been removed. > > > > 2. It doesn't evenly distribute the entropy from the master key; each 16 > > input bytes only affects the corresponding 16 output bytes. > > > > 3. It isn't easily extensible to deriving other values or keys, such as > > a public hash for securely identifying the key, or per-mode keys. > > Per-mode keys will be immediately useful for Adiantum encryption, for > > which fscrypt currently uses the master key directly, introducing > > unnecessary usage constraints. Per-mode keys will also be useful for > > hardware inline encryption, which is currently being worked on. > > > > HKDF solves all the above problems. > > > > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers > > Unless I missed something there's nothing here which is fscrypt > specific. Granted that it's somewhat unlikely that someone would want > to implement (the very bloated) IKE from IPSEC in the kernel, I wonder > if there might be other users of HKDF, and whether this would be > better placed in lib/ or crypto/ instead of fs/crypto? > This is standard HKDF-SHA512; only the choice of parameters is fscrypt-specific. So it could indeed use a common implementation of HKDF if one were available. However, I don't think there are any other HKDF users in the kernel currently. Also, while there was a patch to support HKDF via the crypto_rng API, there was no consensus about whether this was actually the best way to add KDF support: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/2423373.Zd5ThvQH5g@positron.chronox.de So for now, to avoid unnecessarily blocking this patchset I think we should just go with this implementation in fs/crypto/. It can always be changed later, once we decide on the best way to add KDFs to the crypto API. [To be clear: this patch already uses "hmac(sha512)" from the crypto API. It's only the actual HKDF part that we're talking about here. Also, its correctness is tested by the ciphertext verification xfstests.] - Eric ______________________________________________________ Linux MTD discussion mailing list http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/