From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-14.0 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 75033C43478 for ; Mon, 24 Aug 2020 06:35:27 +0000 (UTC) Received: from merlin.infradead.org (merlin.infradead.org [205.233.59.134]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 500CD22D03 for ; Mon, 24 Aug 2020 06:19:10 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=lists.infradead.org header.i=@lists.infradead.org header.b="2cm4pzN8"; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="aOFOzAVN" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 500CD22D03 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-mtd-bounces+linux-mtd=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=merlin.20170209; h=Sender:Content-Transfer-Encoding: Content-Type:Cc:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post:List-Archive: List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:MIME-Version:References:In-Reply-To:Message-Id:Date: Subject:To:From:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date: Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID:List-Owner; bh=2qgiI4hhuuvfq9V57e4W/fMq+AiiE+K99/sIJf5+9zo=; b=2cm4pzN8VixTs1ICPmCjaf+Af HUchynwah6GPx3DprEJrtbIdTzfHf8YmHyXCDQu1/W1vK0TqDv6DjvOPd1XdcIn8aajUfZe3+Ztzg vF7pEz8pKW8ZO7kbN03RUAn2134gcbB7iPvxAl9bnpVSoPujcfwQzxhm83D6ZGq4TYP/RsJ/XmUcf CLHWie/9WNgPkkQOaeTSE5A3wW3luL4KWwtXBpsuVCnu+fcn9RVqKfQ5GR0wP1EpWIXZL/8aNou19 OC84QOmbEnixPxBx/E2CEHvWz5ILk3Oh8b9zQ49xe3XqxGBu3+zluRaBtgHJ8qvcZeSuHiz2ELd0l yVy/H/17g==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=merlin.infradead.org) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kA5oS-0003mW-6U; Mon, 24 Aug 2020 06:18:36 +0000 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kA5oG-0003jL-Dl for linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org; Mon, 24 Aug 2020 06:18:27 +0000 Received: from sol.hsd1.ca.comcast.net (c-107-3-166-239.hsd1.ca.comcast.net [107.3.166.239]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9733422BEA; Mon, 24 Aug 2020 06:18:20 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1598249900; bh=FIdPAQ4uVgqepfVvwpPtlAMJGJ/BCwZf2dDwk5M0shA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=aOFOzAVN6aex+LS5Y2deYUb9Qjxp+H46wBD4Q4HDvUhaKg92JKU/CLVURb4LyzBUw 2+WvbtU7sO6GQxDGsaEnuYSknW0lS3fpbkqF4Evz/SyGisvOuCd6oEkWg/7aYH/ioI 8+eqiG/nQFxpH2RSz/7EstoUxgliPnfNi17KeKtQ= From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH 8/8] fscrypt: stop pretending that key setup is nofs-safe Date: Sun, 23 Aug 2020 23:17:12 -0700 Message-Id: <20200824061712.195654-9-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.28.0 In-Reply-To: <20200824061712.195654-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20200824061712.195654-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20200824_021824_800497_009BDCA1 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 17.17 ) X-BeenThere: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux MTD discussion mailing list List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Jeff Layton , ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "linux-mtd" Errors-To: linux-mtd-bounces+linux-mtd=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org From: Eric Biggers fscrypt_get_encryption_info() has never actually been safe to call in a context that needs GFP_NOFS, since it calls crypto_alloc_skcipher(). crypto_alloc_skcipher() isn't GFP_NOFS-safe, even if called under memalloc_nofs_save(). This is because it may load kernel modules, and also because it internally takes crypto_alg_sem. Other tasks can do GFP_KERNEL allocations while holding crypto_alg_sem for write. The use of fscrypt_init_mutex isn't GFP_NOFS-safe either. So, stop pretending that fscrypt_get_encryption_info() is nofs-safe. I.e., when it allocates memory, just use GFP_KERNEL instead of GFP_NOFS. Note, another reason to do this is that GFP_NOFS is deprecated in favor of using memalloc_nofs_save() in the proper places. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c | 7 ++----- fs/crypto/keysetup.c | 2 +- fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c | 8 ++++---- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c b/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c index faa25541ccb68..89bffa82ed74a 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c +++ b/fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ int fscrypt_select_encryption_impl(struct fscrypt_info *ci) crypto_cfg.data_unit_size = sb->s_blocksize; crypto_cfg.dun_bytes = fscrypt_get_dun_bytes(ci); num_devs = fscrypt_get_num_devices(sb); - devs = kmalloc_array(num_devs, sizeof(*devs), GFP_NOFS); + devs = kmalloc_array(num_devs, sizeof(*devs), GFP_KERNEL); if (!devs) return -ENOMEM; fscrypt_get_devices(sb, num_devs, devs); @@ -135,9 +135,8 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_inline_crypt_key(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key, struct fscrypt_blk_crypto_key *blk_key; int err; int i; - unsigned int flags; - blk_key = kzalloc(struct_size(blk_key, devs, num_devs), GFP_NOFS); + blk_key = kzalloc(struct_size(blk_key, devs, num_devs), GFP_KERNEL); if (!blk_key) return -ENOMEM; @@ -166,10 +165,8 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_inline_crypt_key(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key, } queue_refs++; - flags = memalloc_nofs_save(); err = blk_crypto_start_using_key(&blk_key->base, blk_key->devs[i]); - memalloc_nofs_restore(flags); if (err) { fscrypt_err(inode, "error %d starting to use blk-crypto", err); diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c index 6ac816d3e8478..ad64525ec6800 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c @@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, struct key *master_key = NULL; int res; - crypt_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(fscrypt_info_cachep, GFP_NOFS); + crypt_info = kmem_cache_zalloc(fscrypt_info_cachep, GFP_KERNEL); if (!crypt_info) return -ENOMEM; diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c index a3cb52572b05c..2762c53504323 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup_v1.c @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static int derive_key_aes(const u8 *master_key, goto out; } crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS); - req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS); + req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL); if (!req) { res = -ENOMEM; goto out; @@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ find_and_lock_process_key(const char *prefix, const struct user_key_payload *ukp; const struct fscrypt_key *payload; - description = kasprintf(GFP_NOFS, "%s%*phN", prefix, + description = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s%*phN", prefix, FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE, descriptor); if (!description) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); @@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ fscrypt_get_direct_key(const struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *raw_key) return dk; /* Nope, allocate one. */ - dk = kzalloc(sizeof(*dk), GFP_NOFS); + dk = kzalloc(sizeof(*dk), GFP_KERNEL); if (!dk) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); refcount_set(&dk->dk_refcount, 1); @@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ static int setup_v1_file_key_derived(struct fscrypt_info *ci, * This cannot be a stack buffer because it will be passed to the * scatterlist crypto API during derive_key_aes(). */ - derived_key = kmalloc(ci->ci_mode->keysize, GFP_NOFS); + derived_key = kmalloc(ci->ci_mode->keysize, GFP_KERNEL); if (!derived_key) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.28.0 ______________________________________________________ Linux MTD discussion mailing list http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/