public inbox for linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
To: Waqar Hameed <waqar.hameed@axis.com>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Cc: <kernel@axis.com>, <linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC] ubifs: Fix use-after-free in ubifs_tnc_end_commit
Date: Sat, 12 Oct 2024 20:30:17 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5173d3d2-4a6b-8b0b-c8f7-8034c9763532@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1225b9b5bbf5278e5ae512177712915f1bc0aebf.1728570925.git.waqar.hameed@axis.com>

在 2024/10/9 22:46, Waqar Hameed 写道:
> Running
> 
>    rm -f /etc/test-file.bin
>    dd if=/dev/urandom of=/etc/test-file.bin bs=1M count=60 conv=fsync
> 
> in a loop, with `CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_AUTHENTICATION`, KASAN reports:
> 
>    BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ubifs_tnc_end_commit+0xa5c/0x1950
>    Write of size 32 at addr ffffff800a3af86c by task ubifs_bgt0_20/153
> 
>    Call trace:
>     dump_backtrace+0x0/0x340
>     show_stack+0x18/0x24
>     dump_stack_lvl+0x9c/0xbc
>     print_address_description.constprop.0+0x74/0x2b0
>     kasan_report+0x1d8/0x1f0
>     kasan_check_range+0xf8/0x1a0
>     memcpy+0x84/0xf4
>     ubifs_tnc_end_commit+0xa5c/0x1950
>     do_commit+0x4e0/0x1340
>     ubifs_bg_thread+0x234/0x2e0
>     kthread+0x36c/0x410
>     ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
> 
>    Allocated by task 401:
>     kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x70
>     __kasan_kmalloc+0x8c/0xd0
>     __kmalloc+0x34c/0x5bc
>     tnc_insert+0x140/0x16a4
>     ubifs_tnc_add+0x370/0x52c
>     ubifs_jnl_write_data+0x5d8/0x870
>     do_writepage+0x36c/0x510
>     ubifs_writepage+0x190/0x4dc
>     __writepage+0x58/0x154
>     write_cache_pages+0x394/0x830
>     do_writepages+0x1f0/0x5b0
>     filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x170/0x25c
>     file_write_and_wait_range+0x140/0x190
>     ubifs_fsync+0xe8/0x290
>     vfs_fsync_range+0xc0/0x1e4
>     do_fsync+0x40/0x90
>     __arm64_sys_fsync+0x34/0x50
>     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0xa8/0x260
>     do_el0_svc+0xc8/0x1f0
>     el0_svc+0x34/0x70
>     el0t_64_sync_handler+0x108/0x114
>     el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8
> 
>    Freed by task 403:
>     kasan_save_stack+0x38/0x70
>     kasan_set_track+0x28/0x40
>     kasan_set_free_info+0x28/0x4c
>     __kasan_slab_free+0xd4/0x13c
>     kfree+0xc4/0x3a0
>     tnc_delete+0x3f4/0xe40
>     ubifs_tnc_remove_range+0x368/0x73c
>     ubifs_tnc_remove_ino+0x29c/0x2e0
>     ubifs_jnl_delete_inode+0x150/0x260
>     ubifs_evict_inode+0x1d4/0x2e4
>     evict+0x1c8/0x450
>     iput+0x2a0/0x3c4
>     do_unlinkat+0x2cc/0x490
>     __arm64_sys_unlinkat+0x90/0x100
>     invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0xa8/0x260
>     do_el0_svc+0xc8/0x1f0
>     el0_svc+0x34/0x70
>     el0t_64_sync_handler+0x108/0x114
>     el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8
> 
> The offending `memcpy` is in `ubifs_copy_hash()`. Fix this by checking
> if the `znode` is obsolete before accessing the hash (just like we do
> for `znode->parent`).

Do you mean that the UAF occurs in following path:
do_commit -> ubifs_tnc_end_commit -> write_index:
while (1) {
    ...
    znode = cnext;
    ...
    if (znode->cparent)
      ubifs_copy_hash(c, hash, 
znode->cparent->zbranch[znode->ciip].hash);  // znode->cparent has been 
freed!
}

If so, according to the current implementation(lastest linux kernel is 
v6.12), I cannot understand that how the znode->cparent is freed before 
write_index() finished, it looks impossible.
All dirty znodes are gathered by function get_znodes_to_commit() which 
is protected by c->tnc_mutex, and the 'cparent' member in all dirty 
znodes is assigned with non-NULL. Then I think the znode memory freeing 
path 'tnc_delete->kfree(znode)' cannot happen, because:
1) If a znode is dirtied, all its' ancestor znodes(a path from znode to 
root znode) must be dirtied, which is guaranteed by UBIFS. See 
dirty_cow_bottom_up/lookup_level0_dirty.
2) A dirty znode waiting for commit cannot be freed before write_index() 
finished, which is guaranteed by tnc_delete:
   if (znode->cnext) {
     __set_bit(OBSOLETE_ZNODE, &znode->flags);
     ...
   } else {
     kfree(znode);
   }
> 
> Fixes: 16a26b20d2af ("ubifs: authentication: Add hashes to index nodes")
> Signed-off-by: Waqar Hameed <waqar.hameed@axis.com>
> ---
> I'm not entirely sure if this is the _correct_ way to fix this. However,
> testing shows that the problem indeed disappears.
> 
> My understanding is that the `znode` could concurrently be deleted (with
> a reference in an unprotected code section without `tnc_mutex`). The
> assumption is that in this case it would be sufficient to check
> `ubifs_zn_obsolete(znode)`, like as in the if-statement for
> `znode->parent` just below.

I'm analyzing tnc-related code these days, however I can't find places 
that may concurrently operate the same znode. And I cannot reproduce the 
problem with your reproducer:
while true; do
   rm -f /UBIFS_MNT/test-file.bin
   dd if=/dev/urandom of=/UBIFS_MNT/test-file.bin bs=1M count=60 conv=fsync
done

Can you dig more deeper by adding more debug message, so that we can 
figure out what is really happening.
> 
> I'll be happy to get any helpful feedback!
> 
>   fs/ubifs/tnc_commit.c | 6 ++++--
>   1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/ubifs/tnc_commit.c b/fs/ubifs/tnc_commit.c
> index a55e04822d16..0b358254272b 100644
> --- a/fs/ubifs/tnc_commit.c
> +++ b/fs/ubifs/tnc_commit.c
> @@ -891,8 +891,10 @@ static int write_index(struct ubifs_info *c)
>   		mutex_lock(&c->tnc_mutex);
>   
>   		if (znode->cparent)
> -			ubifs_copy_hash(c, hash,
> -					znode->cparent->zbranch[znode->ciip].hash);
> +			if (!ubifs_zn_obsolete(znode))
> +				ubifs_copy_hash(c, hash,
> +					znode->cparent->zbranch[znode->ciip]
> +					.hash);
>   
>   		if (znode->parent) {
>   			if (!ubifs_zn_obsolete(znode))
> 


______________________________________________________
Linux MTD discussion mailing list
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/

  reply	other threads:[~2024-10-12 12:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-10-09 14:46 [PATCH RFC] ubifs: Fix use-after-free in ubifs_tnc_end_commit Waqar Hameed
2024-10-12 12:30 ` Zhihao Cheng [this message]
2024-10-15 18:52   ` Waqar Hameed
2024-10-16  2:11     ` Zhihao Cheng
2024-10-17 18:36       ` Waqar Hameed
2024-10-18  1:40         ` Zhihao Cheng
2024-11-06 16:36           ` Waqar Hameed
2024-11-07  7:14             ` Zhihao Cheng
2024-11-07 22:11               ` Waqar Hameed
2024-10-29  8:10 ` Ryder Wang
2024-10-29  9:06   ` Zhihao Cheng
2024-10-29  9:56     ` Ryder Wang
2024-10-29 11:19       ` Zhihao Cheng
2024-11-07  8:39 ` Zhihao Cheng
2024-11-07 22:38   ` Waqar Hameed
2024-11-08  1:38     ` Zhihao Cheng
2024-11-08 18:02     ` Waqar Hameed

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=5173d3d2-4a6b-8b0b-c8f7-8034c9763532@huawei.com \
    --to=chengzhihao1@huawei.com \
    --cc=kernel@axis.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=richard@nod.at \
    --cc=s.hauer@pengutronix.de \
    --cc=waqar.hameed@axis.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox