From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-15.5 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 363F0C64E7B for ; Wed, 2 Dec 2020 21:08:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: from merlin.infradead.org (merlin.infradead.org [205.233.59.134]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AF66520709 for ; Wed, 2 Dec 2020 21:08:36 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org AF66520709 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-mtd-bounces+linux-mtd=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=merlin.20170209; h=Sender:Content-Transfer-Encoding: Content-Type:Cc:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post:List-Archive: List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:References:Message-ID: Subject:To:From:Date:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date: Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID:List-Owner; bh=XdPt4SQcL4DL/Z9Qf8RjGxTB7CAq7oWeYk7tYupu5LU=; b=eI/YjPB0N0X6/zcmqSkiyQX7q 1EwKN3OhAY6va6SYR6MZvr/QgY9dV86WRA3y4TxqHkRiLv5KxH03nCGjvu1ixa9WwhJnT1h7q+1qQ hHzNn3jiH7MWAvz9jVTk+YMq1e/+4wdhPHrAjK/uczcFNG1rJe7BL/dByTNwwWQjSGsbFlLZG4NuW 6fQjWH/oW5FA7gtQMN19ATA7/XKVoqYm7WuzXl+IsLHupEiamcnP6Xo8r6lF3M1/uQ3YIdxHV18H2 ZT8Aa2XaP+/ni04k54iDIn/XF4r9L3e6kPnM33LXibgLQ/+uTj8LJKBdYvbtfJy+hJjrWeidwVywf CNnS3EVgQ==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=merlin.infradead.org) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kkZM4-0004r6-16; Wed, 02 Dec 2020 21:08:04 +0000 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.99]) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1kkZLy-0004p7-M8 for linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org; Wed, 02 Dec 2020 21:08:00 +0000 Date: Wed, 2 Dec 2020 13:07:53 -0800 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1606943277; bh=z7aM84uoaVRXDrRTKXVTwdXKK69LzrzJ1yjZQqo3344=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=EZNH/dFHxK112U8asIp9Tyi1NmmUiP3WZ8jKeTdDrVskZASdlAR/S1wDBS3JHVR6j 3z+pV6U+lXcVEMTt2lE9kKMNWS54qhtKYSyZJ1y/OwNcNYH+2zcwZXXoqTyEQWwNpS ZkQymrXas2DHQb0qKTLFm0/3JkDC9FC7r39gbgLcj5+c/ZI+idYLTm/7F/T7NVWXvO q4jhvHNzRrrww4sIAKh0IFFHKFWbaAxr6ln+yidV6vyDxnLQUewpajhRHkcPDimBi2 +7L2ec88F9TKg8MI6yFF0aM//oPxYTD/cl8b1g/XUOyYDXPhM0kBavcUQeTmQOIU7o p9GqnFEnkOM7g== From: Eric Biggers To: linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/9] Allow deleting files with unsupported encryption policy Message-ID: References: <20201125002336.274045-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20201125002336.274045-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20201202_160758_882547_00425657 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 16.82 ) X-BeenThere: linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux MTD discussion mailing list List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "linux-mtd" Errors-To: linux-mtd-bounces+linux-mtd=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org On Tue, Nov 24, 2020 at 04:23:27PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote: > Currently it's impossible to delete files that use an unsupported > encryption policy, as the kernel will just return an error when > performing any operation on the top-level encrypted directory, even just > a path lookup into the directory or opening the directory for readdir. > > It's desirable to return errors for most operations on files that use an > unsupported encryption policy, but the current behavior is too strict. > We need to allow enough to delete files, so that people can't be stuck > with undeletable files when downgrading kernel versions. That includes > allowing directories to be listed and allowing dentries to be looked up. > > This series fixes this (on ext4, f2fs, and ubifs) by treating an > unsupported encryption policy in the same way as "key unavailable" in > the cases that are required for a recursive delete to work. > > The actual fix is in patch 9, so see that for more details. > > Patches 1-8 are cleanups that prepare for the actual fix by removing > direct use of fscrypt_get_encryption_info() by filesystems. > > This patchset applies to branch "master" (commit 4a4b8721f1a5) of > https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/fscrypt.git. > > Eric Biggers (9): > ext4: remove ext4_dir_open() > f2fs: remove f2fs_dir_open() > ubifs: remove ubifs_dir_open() > ext4: don't call fscrypt_get_encryption_info() from dx_show_leaf() > fscrypt: introduce fscrypt_prepare_readdir() > fscrypt: move body of fscrypt_prepare_setattr() out-of-line > fscrypt: move fscrypt_require_key() to fscrypt_private.h > fscrypt: unexport fscrypt_get_encryption_info() > fscrypt: allow deleting files with unsupported encryption policy > > fs/crypto/fname.c | 8 +++- > fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 28 ++++++++++++++ > fs/crypto/hooks.c | 16 +++++++- > fs/crypto/keysetup.c | 20 ++++++++-- > fs/crypto/policy.c | 22 +++++++---- > fs/ext4/dir.c | 16 ++------ > fs/ext4/namei.c | 10 +---- > fs/f2fs/dir.c | 10 +---- > fs/ubifs/dir.c | 11 +----- > include/linux/fscrypt.h | 75 +++++++++++++++++++------------------ > 10 files changed, 126 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-) > > > base-commit: 4a4b8721f1a5e4b01e45b3153c68d5a1014b25de Any more comments on this patch series? - Eric ______________________________________________________ Linux MTD discussion mailing list http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/