From: coverity-bot <keescook@chromium.org>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>,
Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
Olivia Mackall <olivia@selenic.com>,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>,
linux-next@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Coverity: add_early_randomness(): Integer handling issues
Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2022 09:29:27 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202211080929.F5B344C9F@keescook> (raw)
Hello!
This is an experimental semi-automated report about issues detected by
Coverity from a scan of next-20221108 as part of the linux-next scan project:
https://scan.coverity.com/projects/linux-next-weekly-scan
You're getting this email because you were associated with the identified
lines of code (noted below) that were touched by commits:
Mon Nov 7 12:47:57 2022 +0100
e0a37003ff0b ("hw_random: use add_hwgenerator_randomness() for early entropy")
Coverity reported the following:
*** CID 1527234: Integer handling issues (SIGN_EXTENSION)
drivers/char/hw_random/core.c:73 in add_early_randomness()
67 int bytes_read;
68
69 mutex_lock(&reading_mutex);
70 bytes_read = rng_get_data(rng, rng_fillbuf, 32, 0);
71 mutex_unlock(&reading_mutex);
72 if (bytes_read > 0) {
vvv CID 1527234: Integer handling issues (SIGN_EXTENSION)
vvv Suspicious implicit sign extension: "rng->quality" with type "unsigned short" (16 bits, unsigned) is promoted in "bytes_read * 8 * rng->quality / 1024" to type "int" (32 bits, signed), then sign-extended to type "unsigned long" (64 bits, unsigned). If "bytes_read * 8 * rng->quality / 1024" is greater than 0x7FFFFFFF, the upper bits of the result will all be 1.
73 size_t entropy = bytes_read * 8 * rng->quality / 1024;
74 add_hwgenerator_randomness(rng_fillbuf, bytes_read, entropy, false);
75 }
76 }
77
78 static inline void cleanup_rng(struct kref *kref)
If this is a false positive, please let us know so we can mark it as
such, or teach the Coverity rules to be smarter. If not, please make
sure fixes get into linux-next. :) For patches fixing this, please
include these lines (but double-check the "Fixes" first):
Reported-by: coverity-bot <keescook+coverity-bot@chromium.org>
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1527234 ("Integer handling issues")
Fixes: e0a37003ff0b ("hw_random: use add_hwgenerator_randomness() for early entropy")
Thanks for your attention!
--
Coverity-bot
next reply other threads:[~2022-11-08 17:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-11-08 17:29 coverity-bot [this message]
2022-11-08 17:31 ` Coverity: add_early_randomness(): Integer handling issues Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-11-18 8:49 ` Rasmus Villemoes
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