From: coverity-bot <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Edward Cree <ecree.xilinx@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
Martin Habets <habetsm.xilinx@gmail.com>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>,
linux-next@vger.kernel.org, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Coverity: efx_tc_rx(): Memory - illegal accesses
Date: Thu, 17 Nov 2022 14:17:15 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202211171416.0BC0EDDA36@keescook> (raw)
Hello!
This is an experimental semi-automated report about issues detected by
Coverity from a scan of next-20221117 as part of the linux-next scan project:
https://scan.coverity.com/projects/linux-next-weekly-scan
You're getting this email because you were associated with the identified
lines of code (noted below) that were touched by commits:
Wed Nov 16 09:07:02 2022 +0000
25730d8be5d8 ("sfc: add extra RX channel to receive MAE counter updates on ef100")
Coverity reported the following:
*** CID 1527356: Memory - illegal accesses (OVERRUN)
drivers/net/ethernet/sfc/tc_counters.c:483 in efx_tc_rx()
477 }
478
479 /* Update seen_gen unconditionally, to avoid a missed wakeup if
480 * we race with efx_mae_stop_counters().
481 */
482 efx->tc->seen_gen[type] = mark;
vvv CID 1527356: Memory - illegal accesses (OVERRUN)
vvv Overrunning array "efx->tc->flush_gen" of 3 4-byte elements at element index 3 (byte offset 15) using index "type" (which evaluates to 3).
483 if (efx->tc->flush_counters &&
484 (s32)(efx->tc->flush_gen[type] - mark) <= 0)
485 wake_up(&efx->tc->flush_wq);
486 out:
487 efx_free_rx_buffers(rx_queue, rx_buf, 1);
488 channel->rx_pkt_n_frags = 0;
If this is a false positive, please let us know so we can mark it as
such, or teach the Coverity rules to be smarter. If not, please make
sure fixes get into linux-next. :) For patches fixing this, please
include these lines (but double-check the "Fixes" first):
Reported-by: coverity-bot <keescook+coverity-bot@chromium.org>
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1527356 ("Memory - illegal accesses")
Fixes: 25730d8be5d8 ("sfc: add extra RX channel to receive MAE counter updates on ef100")
AFAICT, efx_tc_rx_version_2() may return EFX_TC_COUNTER_TYPE_MAX.
Thanks for your attention!
--
Coverity-bot
reply other threads:[~2022-11-17 22:17 UTC|newest]
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