From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Steven Rostedt" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
"Stephen Rothwell" <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>,
"Linux Next Mailing List" <linux-next@vger.kernel.org>,
"Linux Kernel Mailing List" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>
Subject: Re: linux-next: Tree for May 16 (security/landlock/ruleset.c)
Date: Mon, 19 May 2025 11:19:53 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202505191117.C094A90F88@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250519.jiveise8Rau8@digikod.net>
On Mon, May 19, 2025 at 05:29:30PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> On Fri, May 16, 2025 at 07:54:14PM -0700, Randy Dunlap wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 5/16/25 3:24 AM, Stephen Rothwell wrote:
> > > Hi all,
> > >
> > > Changes since 20250515:
>
> Thanks for the report.
>
> It is the same warning as reported here:
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/202501040747.S3LYfvYq-lkp@intel.com/
>
> I don't know what the actual issue is though.
>
> >
> > on i386:
> >
> > In file included from ../arch/x86/include/asm/string.h:3,
> > from ../include/linux/string.h:65,
> > from ../include/linux/bitmap.h:13,
> > from ../include/linux/cpumask.h:12,
> > from ../include/linux/smp.h:13,
> > from ../include/linux/lockdep.h:14,
> > from ../security/landlock/ruleset.c:16:
> > ../security/landlock/ruleset.c: In function 'create_rule':
> > ../arch/x86/include/asm/string_32.h:150:25: warning: '__builtin_memcpy' accessing 4294967295 bytes at offsets 20 and 0 overlaps 6442450943 bytes at offset -2147483648 [-Wrestrict]
> > 150 | #define memcpy(t, f, n) __builtin_memcpy(t, f, n)
> > | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> > ../security/landlock/ruleset.c:137:9: note: in expansion of macro 'memcpy'
> > 137 | memcpy(new_rule->layers, layers,
> > | ^~~~~~
> >
> >
> > Full randconfig file is attached.
The trigger appears to be CONFIG_PROFILE_ALL_BRANCHES, and GCC getting
tricked into thinking check_mul_overflow() returns true:
In file included from ../arch/x86/include/asm/string.h:3,
from ../include/linux/string.h:65,
from ../include/linux/bitmap.h:13,
from ../include/linux/cpumask.h:12,
from ../include/linux/smp.h:13,
from ../include/linux/lockdep.h:14,
from ../security/landlock/ruleset.c:16:
../security/landlock/ruleset.c: In function 'create_rule':
../arch/x86/include/asm/string_32.h:150:25: warning: '__builtin_memcpy' accessing 4294967295 bytes at offsets 0 and 0 overlaps 6442450943 bytes at offset -2147483648 [-Wrestrict]
150 | #define memcpy(t, f, n) __builtin_memcpy(t, f, n)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
../security/landlock/ruleset.c:137:9: note: in expansion of macro 'memcpy'
137 | memcpy(new_rule->layers, layers,
| ^~~~~~
'create_rule': event 1
../include/linux/compiler.h:69:46:
68 | (cond) ? \
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
69 | (__if_trace.miss_hit[1]++,1) : \
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~
| |
| (1) when the condition is evaluated to true
70 | (__if_trace.miss_hit[0]++,0); \
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
../include/linux/compiler.h:57:69: note: in expansion of macro '__trace_if_value'
57 | #define __trace_if_var(cond) (__builtin_constant_p(cond) ? (cond) : __trace_if_value(cond))
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
../include/linux/compiler.h:55:28: note: in expansion of macro '__trace_if_var'
55 | #define if(cond, ...) if ( __trace_if_var( !!(cond , ## __VA_ARGS__) ) )
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
../include/linux/overflow.h:270:9: note: in expansion of macro 'if'
270 | if (check_mul_overflow(factor1, factor2, &bytes))
| ^~
'create_rule': event 2
../arch/x86/include/asm/string_32.h:150:25:
150 | #define memcpy(t, f, n) __builtin_memcpy(t, f, n)
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
| |
| (2) out of array bounds here
../security/landlock/ruleset.c:137:9: note: in expansion of macro 'memcpy'
137 | memcpy(new_rule->layers, layers,
| ^~~~~~
make[1]: Leaving directory '/srv/code/gcc-bug'
I'll take a look at ways to make either the overflow macros or memcpy
robust against this kind of weirdness...
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-05-19 18:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-05-16 10:24 linux-next: Tree for May 16 Stephen Rothwell
2025-05-16 21:03 ` linux-next: Tree for May 16 [drivers/platform/x86/amd/hsmp/hsmp_acpi.ko] Randy Dunlap
2025-05-17 2:54 ` linux-next: Tree for May 16 (security/landlock/ruleset.c) Randy Dunlap
2025-05-19 15:29 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-05-19 18:19 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2025-05-19 18:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-05-19 19:15 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-19 20:26 ` Randy Dunlap
2025-05-20 16:44 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-20 14:01 ` Andy Shevchenko
2025-05-20 16:47 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-20 14:45 ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-05-20 15:48 ` Randy Dunlap
2025-05-20 16:15 ` Kees Cook
2025-05-19 21:02 ` linux-next: Tree for May 16 (futex kernel-doc) Randy Dunlap
2025-05-20 7:59 ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior
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