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From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Steven Rostedt" <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	"Stephen Rothwell" <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>,
	"Linux Next Mailing List" <linux-next@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Linux Kernel Mailing List" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>
Subject: Re: linux-next: Tree for May 16 (security/landlock/ruleset.c)
Date: Mon, 19 May 2025 11:19:53 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <202505191117.C094A90F88@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250519.jiveise8Rau8@digikod.net>

On Mon, May 19, 2025 at 05:29:30PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> On Fri, May 16, 2025 at 07:54:14PM -0700, Randy Dunlap wrote:
> > 
> > 
> > On 5/16/25 3:24 AM, Stephen Rothwell wrote:
> > > Hi all,
> > > 
> > > Changes since 20250515:
> 
> Thanks for the report.
> 
> It is the same warning as reported here:
> https://lore.kernel.org/all/202501040747.S3LYfvYq-lkp@intel.com/
> 
> I don't know what the actual issue is though.
> 
> > 
> > on i386:
> > 
> > In file included from ../arch/x86/include/asm/string.h:3,
> >                  from ../include/linux/string.h:65,
> >                  from ../include/linux/bitmap.h:13,
> >                  from ../include/linux/cpumask.h:12,
> >                  from ../include/linux/smp.h:13,
> >                  from ../include/linux/lockdep.h:14,
> >                  from ../security/landlock/ruleset.c:16:
> > ../security/landlock/ruleset.c: In function 'create_rule':
> > ../arch/x86/include/asm/string_32.h:150:25: warning: '__builtin_memcpy' accessing 4294967295 bytes at offsets 20 and 0 overlaps 6442450943 bytes at offset -2147483648 [-Wrestrict]
> >   150 | #define memcpy(t, f, n) __builtin_memcpy(t, f, n)
> >       |                         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> > ../security/landlock/ruleset.c:137:9: note: in expansion of macro 'memcpy'
> >   137 |         memcpy(new_rule->layers, layers,
> >       |         ^~~~~~
> > 
> > 
> > Full randconfig file is attached.

The trigger appears to be CONFIG_PROFILE_ALL_BRANCHES, and GCC getting
tricked into thinking check_mul_overflow() returns true:

In file included from ../arch/x86/include/asm/string.h:3,
                 from ../include/linux/string.h:65,
                 from ../include/linux/bitmap.h:13,
                 from ../include/linux/cpumask.h:12,
                 from ../include/linux/smp.h:13,
                 from ../include/linux/lockdep.h:14,
                 from ../security/landlock/ruleset.c:16:
../security/landlock/ruleset.c: In function 'create_rule':
../arch/x86/include/asm/string_32.h:150:25: warning: '__builtin_memcpy' accessing 4294967295 bytes at offsets 0 and 0 overlaps 6442450943 bytes at offset -2147483648 [-Wrestrict]
  150 | #define memcpy(t, f, n) __builtin_memcpy(t, f, n)
      |                         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
../security/landlock/ruleset.c:137:9: note: in expansion of macro 'memcpy'
  137 |         memcpy(new_rule->layers, layers,
      |         ^~~~~~
  'create_rule': event 1
../include/linux/compiler.h:69:46:
   68 |         (cond) ?                                        \
      |         ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
   69 |                 (__if_trace.miss_hit[1]++,1) :          \
      |                 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~
      |                                              |
      |                                              (1) when the condition is evaluated to true
   70 |                 (__if_trace.miss_hit[0]++,0);           \
      |                 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  
../include/linux/compiler.h:57:69: note: in expansion of macro '__trace_if_value'
   57 | #define __trace_if_var(cond) (__builtin_constant_p(cond) ? (cond) : __trace_if_value(cond))
      |                                                                     ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
../include/linux/compiler.h:55:28: note: in expansion of macro '__trace_if_var'
   55 | #define if(cond, ...) if ( __trace_if_var( !!(cond , ## __VA_ARGS__) ) )
      |                            ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
../include/linux/overflow.h:270:9: note: in expansion of macro 'if'
  270 |         if (check_mul_overflow(factor1, factor2, &bytes))
      |         ^~
  'create_rule': event 2
../arch/x86/include/asm/string_32.h:150:25:
  150 | #define memcpy(t, f, n) __builtin_memcpy(t, f, n)
      |                         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
      |                         |
      |                         (2) out of array bounds here
../security/landlock/ruleset.c:137:9: note: in expansion of macro 'memcpy'
  137 |         memcpy(new_rule->layers, layers,
      |         ^~~~~~
make[1]: Leaving directory '/srv/code/gcc-bug'


I'll take a look at ways to make either the overflow macros or memcpy
robust against this kind of weirdness...

-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2025-05-19 18:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-05-16 10:24 linux-next: Tree for May 16 Stephen Rothwell
2025-05-16 21:03 ` linux-next: Tree for May 16 [drivers/platform/x86/amd/hsmp/hsmp_acpi.ko] Randy Dunlap
2025-05-17  2:54 ` linux-next: Tree for May 16 (security/landlock/ruleset.c) Randy Dunlap
2025-05-19 15:29   ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-05-19 18:19     ` Kees Cook [this message]
2025-05-19 18:41       ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-05-19 19:15         ` Kees Cook
2025-05-19 20:26           ` Randy Dunlap
2025-05-20 16:44             ` Kees Cook
2025-05-20 14:01           ` Andy Shevchenko
2025-05-20 16:47             ` Kees Cook
2025-05-20 14:45           ` Mickaël Salaün
2025-05-20 15:48             ` Randy Dunlap
2025-05-20 16:15             ` Kees Cook
2025-05-19 21:02 ` linux-next: Tree for May 16 (futex kernel-doc) Randy Dunlap
2025-05-20  7:59   ` Sebastian Andrzej Siewior

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