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From: Matt Mackall <mpm-VDJrAJ4Gl5ZBDgjK7y7TUQ@public.gmane.org>
To: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 06/19] Use get_random_bytes() to create confounder
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2008 12:50:38 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1205344238.11354.59.camel@calx> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080312164616.GF10015@fieldses.org>


On Wed, 2008-03-12 at 12:46 -0400, J. Bruce Fields wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 21, 2008 at 01:44:17PM -0500, Kevin Coffman wrote:
> > Instead of using an incementing value for the confounder, use
> > get_random_bytes() which gives us the desired unpredictable value.
> 
> OK, admittedly I was probably nuts to substitute a predictable number
> for a random number in any cryptographic protocol, even if I was pretty
> sure it didn't matter in our case--so thanks for doing this.
> 
> But my impression is that other callers of this function are using it on
> a per-connection basis instead of (as in our case) a per-rpc basis.  Is
> there any problem with calling it that frequently?  Is it fast enough?
> Will it deplete some common entropy pool?

get_random_bytes is in the many megabytes/second range, so it's fast
enough for most things, but considered too slow for per-socket use
(which means the comment above it is quite stale!). If per-rpc means
once per every stat over NFS, then definitely too expensive. It draws
from the non-blocking pool, so no worries about entropy depletion.

Take a look at lib/random32.c for a moderately stong and fast PRND.
Reseeding that periodically with get_random_bytes might be sufficient.
Or look at secure_tcp_sequence_number in random.c for a more ad-hoc
approach.

-- 
Mathematics is the supreme nostalgia of our time.


  reply	other threads:[~2008-03-12 17:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2008-02-21 18:43 [PATCH 00/19] RFC add kernel support for newer encrytpion types Kevin Coffman
     [not found] ` <20080221184208.19195.94518.stgit-zTNJhAanYLVZN1qrTdtDg5Vzexx5G7lz@public.gmane.org>
2008-02-21 18:43   ` [PATCH 01/19] crypto: Add CTS mode required for Kerberos AES support Kevin Coffman
2008-02-21 18:43   ` [PATCH 02/19] rpc: gss: Add oid values to the gss_api mechanism structures Kevin Coffman
2008-02-21 18:44   ` [PATCH 03/19] sunrpc: make token header values less confusing Kevin Coffman
     [not found]     ` <20080221184402.19195.57873.stgit-zTNJhAanYLVZN1qrTdtDg5Vzexx5G7lz@public.gmane.org>
2008-03-12 16:31       ` J. Bruce Fields
2008-03-12 16:44         ` Kevin Coffman
2008-02-21 18:44   ` [PATCH 04/19] Add new pipefs file indicating which Kerberos enctypes the kernel supports Kevin Coffman
     [not found]     ` <20080221184407.19195.62074.stgit-zTNJhAanYLVZN1qrTdtDg5Vzexx5G7lz@public.gmane.org>
2008-03-12 16:37       ` J. Bruce Fields
2008-02-21 18:44   ` [PATCH 05/19] Correct grammer/typos in dprintks Kevin Coffman
     [not found]     ` <20080221184412.19195.93743.stgit-zTNJhAanYLVZN1qrTdtDg5Vzexx5G7lz@public.gmane.org>
2008-03-12 16:38       ` J. Bruce Fields
2008-02-21 18:44   ` [PATCH 06/19] Use get_random_bytes() to create confounder Kevin Coffman
     [not found]     ` <20080221184417.19195.55123.stgit-zTNJhAanYLVZN1qrTdtDg5Vzexx5G7lz@public.gmane.org>
2008-03-12 16:46       ` J. Bruce Fields
2008-03-12 17:50         ` Matt Mackall [this message]
2008-03-12 18:03           ` J. Bruce Fields
2008-03-12 18:37             ` Kevin Coffman
     [not found]               ` <4d569c330803121137w755c5c76j4b692aac53d54619-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2008-03-12 18:39                 ` J. Bruce Fields
2008-03-12 18:53                   ` Matt Mackall
2008-02-21 18:44   ` [PATCH 07/19] Don't expect blocksize to always be 8 when calculating padding Kevin Coffman
2008-02-21 18:44   ` [PATCH 08/19] Remove define for KRB5_CKSUM_LENGTH, which will become enctype-dependent Kevin Coffman
     [not found]     ` <20080221184427.19195.16243.stgit-zTNJhAanYLVZN1qrTdtDg5Vzexx5G7lz@public.gmane.org>
2008-03-12 18:54       ` J. Bruce Fields
2008-02-21 18:44   ` [PATCH 09/19] gss_krb5: split up functions in preparation of adding new enctypes Kevin Coffman
2008-02-21 18:44   ` [PATCH 10/19] gss_krb5: prepare for new context format Kevin Coffman
2008-02-21 18:44   ` [PATCH 11/19] gss_krb5: introduce encryption type framework Kevin Coffman
2008-02-21 18:44   ` [PATCH 12/19] gss_krb5: add ability to have a keyed checksum (hmac) Kevin Coffman
2008-02-21 18:44   ` [PATCH 13/19] gss_krb5: import functionality to derive keys into the kernel Kevin Coffman
2008-02-21 18:44   ` [PATCH 14/19] gss_krb5: use a global static OID value for krb5 Kevin Coffman
2008-02-21 18:45   ` [PATCH 15/19] gss_krb5: handle new context format from gssd Kevin Coffman
2008-02-21 18:45   ` [PATCH 16/19] gss_krb5: add support for triple-des encryption Kevin Coffman
2008-02-21 18:45   ` [PATCH 17/19] xdr: add a new utility function to shift the head data of an xdr buffer Kevin Coffman
2008-02-21 18:45   ` [PATCH 18/19] gss_krb5: add support for new token formats in rfc4121 Kevin Coffman
2008-02-21 18:45   ` [PATCH 19/19] gss_krb5: add remaining pieces to enable AES encryption support Kevin Coffman

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