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From: "David P. Quigley" <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: hch@infradead.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk,
	casey@schaufler-ca.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov,
	matthew.dodd@sparta.com, trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no,
	bfields@fieldses.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
	linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org,
	"David P. Quigley" <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	"Matthew N. Dodd" <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com>
Subject: [PATCH 02/10] Security: Add Hook to test if the particular xattr is part of a MAC model.
Date: Wed,  7 Jul 2010 10:31:18 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1278513086-23964-3-git-send-email-dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1278513086-23964-1-git-send-email-dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>

There are areas in the Labeled NFS code where where we need to test if the
attribute being requested exhibits the semantics of a MAC model. This allows us
to make sure that we get the desired semantics from the attribute instead of
something else such as capabilities or a time based LSM.

Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com>
Signed-off-by: David P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
---
 include/linux/security.h   |   11 +++++++++++
 security/capability.c      |    6 ++++++
 security/security.c        |    6 ++++++
 security/selinux/hooks.c   |    6 ++++++
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c |   11 +++++++++++
 5 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 4d01784..9597620 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1373,6 +1373,10 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  *	@pages contains the number of pages.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  *
+ * @ismaclabel:
+ * 	Check if the extended attribute specified by @name represents a MAC label.
+ * 	@name full extended attribute name to check against LSM as a MAC label.
+ *
  * @secid_to_secctx:
  *	Convert secid to security context.
  *	@secid contains the security ID.
@@ -1664,6 +1668,7 @@ struct security_operations {
 
 	int (*getprocattr) (struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
 	int (*setprocattr) (struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size);
+	int (*ismaclabel) (const char * name);
 	int (*secid_to_secctx) (u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
 	int (*secctx_to_secid) (const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
 	void (*release_secctx) (char *secdata, u32 seclen);
@@ -1919,6 +1924,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
 int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size);
 int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
 int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap);
+int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);
 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
 int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
 void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
@@ -2676,6 +2682,11 @@ static inline int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
 	return cap_netlink_recv(skb, cap);
 }
 
+static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 9ce1c2f..0d8f7e9 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -829,6 +829,11 @@ static int cap_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value,
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
+static int cap_ismaclabel(const char *name)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int cap_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
 	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -1064,6 +1069,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, d_instantiate);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, getprocattr);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, setprocattr);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ismaclabel);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secid_to_secctx);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secctx_to_secid);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, release_secctx);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index c1b6847..1f0765c 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1013,6 +1013,12 @@ int security_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_netlink_recv);
 
+int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
+{
+	return security_ops->ismaclabel(name);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
+
 int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
 	return security_ops->secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 435c51f..8239f5c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -5372,6 +5372,11 @@ abort_change:
 	return error;
 }
 
+static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
+{
+	return (strcmp(name,XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0);
+}
+
 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
 	return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
@@ -5610,6 +5615,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.getprocattr =			selinux_getprocattr,
 	.setprocattr =			selinux_setprocattr,
 
+	.ismaclabel =			selinux_ismaclabel,
 	.secid_to_secctx =		selinux_secid_to_secctx,
 	.secctx_to_secid =		selinux_secctx_to_secid,
 	.release_secctx =		selinux_release_secctx,
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index fdfeaa2..449e223 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -3012,6 +3012,16 @@ static void smack_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
 /**
+ * smack_ismaclabel - check if xattr @name references a smack MAC label
+ * @name: Full xattr name to check.
+ */
+static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
+{
+	return (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0);
+}
+
+
+/**
  * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
  * @secid: incoming integer
  * @secdata: destination
@@ -3199,6 +3209,7 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.audit_rule_free =		smack_audit_rule_free,
 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
 
+	.ismaclabel =			smack_ismaclabel,
 	.secid_to_secctx = 		smack_secid_to_secctx,
 	.secctx_to_secid = 		smack_secctx_to_secid,
 	.release_secctx = 		smack_release_secctx,
-- 
1.6.2.5


  parent reply	other threads:[~2010-07-07 14:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2010-07-07 14:31 Labeled-NFS: Security Label support in NFSv4 David P. Quigley
2010-07-07 14:31 ` [PATCH 01/10] Security: Add hook to calculate context based on a negative dentry David P. Quigley
2010-07-08 12:51   ` Stephen Smalley
2010-07-07 14:31 ` David P. Quigley [this message]
2010-07-07 16:49   ` [PATCH 02/10] Security: Add Hook to test if the particular xattr is part of a MAC model J. Bruce Fields
2010-07-07 14:31 ` [PATCH 03/10] LSM: Add flags field to security_sb_set_mnt_opts for in kernel mount data David P. Quigley
2010-07-07 14:31 ` [PATCH 04/10] SELinux: Add new labeling type native labels David P. Quigley
2010-07-07 23:23   ` James Morris
2010-07-08 13:31     ` David P. Quigley
2010-07-08 22:33       ` James Morris
2010-07-09 14:09         ` David P. Quigley
2010-07-07 14:31 ` [PATCH 05/10] KConfig: Add KConfig entries for Labeled NFS David P. Quigley
2010-07-07 16:56   ` J. Bruce Fields
2010-07-07 17:05     ` David P. Quigley
2010-07-07 17:53     ` Chuck Lever
2010-07-07 14:31 ` [PATCH 06/10] NFSv4: Add label recommended attribute and NFSv4 flags David P. Quigley
2010-07-07 17:00   ` J. Bruce Fields
2010-07-07 23:30     ` James Morris
2010-07-08 13:39       ` David P. Quigley
2010-07-08 22:48         ` James Morris
2010-07-09 13:47           ` Stephen Smalley
2010-07-09 14:05           ` David P. Quigley
2010-07-11  5:02             ` Kyle Moffett
2010-07-11  5:12               ` Casey Schaufler
2010-07-12 14:36                 ` Stephen Smalley
2010-07-17  0:09                   ` Kyle Moffett
2010-07-07 14:31 ` [PATCH 07/10] NFSv4: Introduce new label structure David P. Quigley
2010-07-07 16:01   ` Chuck Lever
2010-07-07 16:21     ` Casey Schaufler
2010-07-07 16:24       ` David P. Quigley
2010-07-07 17:42       ` Chuck Lever
2010-07-07 16:22     ` David P. Quigley
2010-07-07 17:49       ` Chuck Lever
2010-07-07 18:11         ` David P. Quigley
2010-07-07 14:31 ` [PATCH 08/10] NFS: Client implementation of Labeled-NFS David P. Quigley
2010-07-07 14:31 ` [PATCH 09/10] NFS: Extend NFS xattr handlers to accept the security namespace David P. Quigley
2010-07-07 14:31 ` [PATCH 10/10] NFSD: Server implementation of MAC Labeling David P. Quigley
2010-07-07 17:21   ` J. Bruce Fields
2010-07-07 18:03     ` David P. Quigley
2010-07-07 19:24       ` J. Bruce Fields
2010-07-08 13:27         ` David P. Quigley

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