From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
To: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Cc: trond.myklebust@netapp.com, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] nfs: fix regression in handling of context= option in NFSv4
Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2011 15:13:05 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1324325585.22363.16.camel@localhost> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1324324223-9933-1-git-send-email-jlayton@redhat.com>
On Mon, 2011-12-19 at 14:50 -0500, Jeff Layton wrote:
> Setting the security context of a NFSv4 mount via the context= mount
> option is currently broken. The NFSv4 codepath allocates a parsed
> options struct, and then parses the mount options to fill it. It
> eventually calls nfs4_remote_mount which calls security_init_mnt_opts.
> That clobbers the lsm_opts struct that was populated earlier. This bug
> also looks like it causes a small memory leak on each v4 mount where
> context= is used.
>
> Fix this by moving the initialization of the lsm_opts into
> nfs_alloc_parsed_mount_data, and the freeing of the same into the
> functions that allocate the nfs_parsed_mount_data.
I think this is a good lifetime, but I don't think we have it quite
right.
> @@ -2222,8 +2223,6 @@ static struct dentry *nfs_fs_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
> if (data == NULL || mntfh == NULL)
> goto out_free_fh;
Lets assume we allocated data, but failed on mntfh. We are going to
have called security_init_mnt_opts() but never have called the
corresponding destructor. True, it'll be fine today with selinux, but I
make no promises what the future holds...
I'm pretty sure the v4 code has the same issue. Maybe you should write
an explicit nfs_free_parsed_mount_data() function to handle all of the
error paths in v3 and v4? Just a suggestion....
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-12-19 20:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-12-19 19:50 [PATCH] nfs: fix regression in handling of context= option in NFSv4 Jeff Layton
2011-12-19 20:13 ` Eric Paris [this message]
2011-12-20 20:23 ` Jeff Layton
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2011-12-20 11:57 Jeff Layton
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