From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>,
selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
Trond Myklebust <trondmy@primarydata.com>,
"J . Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 2/2] nfs: update labeling behavior on a superblock when submounting
Date: Fri, 26 May 2017 10:24:05 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1495808645.12091.10.camel@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170525210754.24265-3-smayhew@redhat.com>
On Thu, 2017-05-25 at 17:07 -0400, Scott Mayhew wrote:
> When the client traverses from filesystem exported without the
> "security_label" option to one exported with the "security_label"
> option, it needs to pass SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS to
> security_sb_set_mnt_opts() so that the new superblock has SBLABEL_MNT
> set in its security mount options. Otherwise, attempts to set
> security
> labels via setxattr over NFSv4.2 will fail.
>
> Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
> ---
> fs/nfs/super.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/nfs/super.c b/fs/nfs/super.c
> index 2f3822a..d7a3b89 100644
> --- a/fs/nfs/super.c
> +++ b/fs/nfs/super.c
> @@ -2544,10 +2544,31 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nfs_set_sb_security);
> int nfs_clone_sb_security(struct super_block *s, struct dentry
> *mntroot,
> struct nfs_mount_info *mount_info)
> {
> + int error;
> + unsigned long kflags = 0, kflags_out = 0;
> + struct security_mnt_opts opts;
> +
> /* clone any lsm security options from the parent to the new
> sb */
> if (d_inode(mntroot)->i_op != NFS_SB(s)->nfs_client-
> >rpc_ops->dir_inode_ops)
> return -ESTALE;
> - return security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(mount_info->cloned->sb,
> s);
> + error = security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(mount_info->cloned->sb,
> s);
> + if (error)
> + goto err;
> +
> + if (NFS_SB(s)->caps & NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL &&
> + !(NFS_SB(mount_info->cloned->sb)->caps &
> NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL)) {
> + memset(&opts, 0, sizeof(opts));
> + kflags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
> +
> + error = security_sb_set_mnt_opts(s, &opts, kflags,
> &kflags_out);
> + if (error)
> + goto err;
> +
> + if (!(kflags_out & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS))
> + NFS_SB(s)->caps &= ~NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL;
> + }
> +err:
> + return error;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nfs_clone_sb_security);
Could this clobber a context set via context= mount option?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-05-26 14:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20170404232646.GB24146@parsley.fieldses.org>
2017-05-25 21:07 ` [PATCH RFC 0/2] Fix setting of security labels over NFSv4.2 Scott Mayhew
2017-05-25 21:07 ` [PATCH RFC 1/2] selinux: allow SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS to be set on an already initialized superblock Scott Mayhew
2017-05-25 21:07 ` [PATCH RFC 2/2] nfs: update labeling behavior on a superblock when submounting Scott Mayhew
2017-05-26 14:24 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2017-05-26 15:28 ` Scott Mayhew
2017-05-26 15:42 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-06-01 14:46 ` [PATCH] security/selinux: allow security_sb_clone_mnt_opts to enable/disable native labeling behavior Scott Mayhew
2017-06-01 14:55 ` Scott Mayhew
2017-06-01 18:08 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-06-01 18:48 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-06-01 19:40 ` Scott Mayhew
2017-06-01 18:30 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-06-01 19:42 ` Scott Mayhew
2017-06-01 20:59 ` [PATCH v2] " Scott Mayhew
2017-06-02 12:55 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-06-02 13:09 ` Scott Mayhew
2017-06-05 15:45 ` [PATCH v3] " Scott Mayhew
2017-06-05 15:55 ` Scott Mayhew
2017-06-05 19:53 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-06-05 21:21 ` Paul Moore
2017-06-06 0:46 ` J . Bruce Fields
2017-06-09 20:24 ` Paul Moore
2017-05-30 14:38 ` [PATCH RFC 2/2] nfs: update labeling behavior on a superblock when submounting Stephen Smalley
2017-05-30 19:40 ` J . Bruce Fields
2017-05-30 19:52 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-05-26 14:48 ` [PATCH RFC 0/2] Fix setting of security labels over NFSv4.2 Stephen Smalley
2017-05-26 15:17 ` J . Bruce Fields
2017-05-26 15:18 ` J . Bruce Fields
2017-05-26 15:30 ` Scott Mayhew
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