From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>,
selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
Trond Myklebust <trondmy@primarydata.com>,
"J . Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] security/selinux: allow security_sb_clone_mnt_opts to enable/disable native labeling behavior
Date: Mon, 05 Jun 2017 15:53:07 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1496692387.4759.2.camel@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170605154504.3659-1-smayhew@redhat.com>
On Mon, 2017-06-05 at 11:45 -0400, Scott Mayhew wrote:
> When an NFSv4 client performs a mount operation, it first mounts the
> NFSv4 root and then does path walk to the exported path and performs
> a
> submount on that, cloning the security mount options from the root's
> superblock to the submount's superblock in the process.
>
> Unless the NFS server has an explicit fsid=0 export with the
> "security_label" option, the NFSv4 root superblock will not have
> SBLABEL_MNT set, and neither will the submount superblock after
> cloning
> the security mount options. As a result, setxattr's of security
> labels
> over NFSv4.2 will fail. In a similar fashion, NFSv4.2 mounts mounted
> with the context= mount option will not show the correct labels
> because
> the nfs_server->caps flags of the cloned superblock will still have
> NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL set.
>
> Allowing the NFSv4 client to enable or disable
> SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
> behavior will ensure that the SBLABEL_MNT flag has the correct value
> when the client traverses from an exported path without the
> "security_label" option to one with the "security_label" option and
> vice versa. Similarly, checking to see if SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
> is
> set upon return from security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() and clearing
> NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL if necessary will allow the correct labels to
> be displayed for NFSv4.2 mounts mounted with the context= mount
> option.
>
> Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Resolves: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/35
> ---
> fs/nfs/super.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 +++-
> include/linux/security.h | 8 ++++++--
> security/security.c | 7 +++++--
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/nfs/super.c b/fs/nfs/super.c
> index 2f3822a..b8e0735 100644
> --- a/fs/nfs/super.c
> +++ b/fs/nfs/super.c
> @@ -2544,10 +2544,25 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nfs_set_sb_security);
> int nfs_clone_sb_security(struct super_block *s, struct dentry
> *mntroot,
> struct nfs_mount_info *mount_info)
> {
> + int error;
> + unsigned long kflags = 0, kflags_out = 0;
> +
> /* clone any lsm security options from the parent to the new
> sb */
> if (d_inode(mntroot)->i_op != NFS_SB(s)->nfs_client-
> >rpc_ops->dir_inode_ops)
> return -ESTALE;
> - return security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(mount_info->cloned->sb,
> s);
> +
> + if (NFS_SB(s)->caps & NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL)
> + kflags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
> +
> + error = security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(mount_info->cloned->sb,
> s, kflags,
> + &kflags_out);
> + if (error)
> + return error;
> +
> + if (NFS_SB(s)->caps & NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL &&
> + !(kflags_out & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS))
> + NFS_SB(s)->caps &= ~NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL;
> + return 0;
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nfs_clone_sb_security);
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> index 68d91e4..3cc9d77 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
> @@ -1409,7 +1409,9 @@ union security_list_options {
> unsigned long kern_flags,
> unsigned long *set_kern_flags);
> int (*sb_clone_mnt_opts)(const struct super_block *oldsb,
> - struct super_block *newsb);
> + struct super_block *newsb,
> + unsigned long kern_flags,
> + unsigned long
> *set_kern_flags);
> int (*sb_parse_opts_str)(char *options, struct
> security_mnt_opts *opts);
> int (*dentry_init_security)(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
> const struct qstr *name,
> void **ctx,
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 549cb82..b44e954 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -249,7 +249,9 @@ int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block
> *sb,
> unsigned long kern_flags,
> unsigned long *set_kern_flags);
> int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
> - struct super_block *newsb);
> + struct super_block *newsb,
> + unsigned long kern_flags,
> + unsigned long *set_kern_flags);
> int security_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct
> security_mnt_opts *opts);
> int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
> const struct qstr *name,
> void **ctx,
> @@ -605,7 +607,9 @@ static inline int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct
> super_block *sb,
> }
>
> static inline int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct
> super_block *oldsb,
> - struct super_block
> *newsb)
> + struct super_block
> *newsb,
> + unsigned long
> kern_flags,
> + unsigned long
> *set_kern_flags)
> {
> return 0;
> }
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 714433e..3013237 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -420,9 +420,12 @@ int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block
> *sb,
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts);
>
> int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
> - struct super_block *newsb)
> + struct super_block *newsb,
> + unsigned long kern_flags,
> + unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
> {
> - return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb);
> + return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb,
> + kern_flags, set_kern_flags);
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts);
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 9926adb..9cc042d 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -525,8 +525,16 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block
> *sb)
> }
>
> sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
> +
> + /*
> + * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient
> to simply
> + * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might
> be handing
> + * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
> + */
> if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
> sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
> + else
> + sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
>
> /* Initialize the root inode. */
> rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
> @@ -959,8 +967,11 @@ static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct
> super_block *oldsb,
> }
>
> static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block
> *oldsb,
> - struct super_block *newsb)
> + struct super_block *newsb,
> + unsigned long kern_flags,
> + unsigned long
> *set_kern_flags)
> {
> + int rc = 0;
> const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb-
> >s_security;
> struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb-
> >s_security;
>
> @@ -975,6 +986,13 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const
> struct super_block *oldsb,
> if (!ss_initialized)
> return 0;
>
> + /*
> + * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
> + * place the results is not allowed.
> + */
> + if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
> BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
>
> @@ -990,6 +1008,18 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const
> struct super_block *oldsb,
> newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
> newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
>
> + if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
> + !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) &&
> !set_context) {
> + rc = security_fs_use(newsb);
> + if (rc)
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context)
> {
> + newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
> + *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
> + }
> +
> if (set_context) {
> u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
>
> @@ -1009,8 +1039,9 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const
> struct super_block *oldsb,
> }
>
> sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
> +out:
> mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
> - return 0;
> + return rc;
> }
>
> static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-05 19:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20170404232646.GB24146@parsley.fieldses.org>
2017-05-25 21:07 ` [PATCH RFC 0/2] Fix setting of security labels over NFSv4.2 Scott Mayhew
2017-05-25 21:07 ` [PATCH RFC 1/2] selinux: allow SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS to be set on an already initialized superblock Scott Mayhew
2017-05-25 21:07 ` [PATCH RFC 2/2] nfs: update labeling behavior on a superblock when submounting Scott Mayhew
2017-05-26 14:24 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-05-26 15:28 ` Scott Mayhew
2017-05-26 15:42 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-06-01 14:46 ` [PATCH] security/selinux: allow security_sb_clone_mnt_opts to enable/disable native labeling behavior Scott Mayhew
2017-06-01 14:55 ` Scott Mayhew
2017-06-01 18:08 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-06-01 18:48 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-06-01 19:40 ` Scott Mayhew
2017-06-01 18:30 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-06-01 19:42 ` Scott Mayhew
2017-06-01 20:59 ` [PATCH v2] " Scott Mayhew
2017-06-02 12:55 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-06-02 13:09 ` Scott Mayhew
2017-06-05 15:45 ` [PATCH v3] " Scott Mayhew
2017-06-05 15:55 ` Scott Mayhew
2017-06-05 19:53 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2017-06-05 21:21 ` Paul Moore
2017-06-06 0:46 ` J . Bruce Fields
2017-06-09 20:24 ` Paul Moore
2017-05-30 14:38 ` [PATCH RFC 2/2] nfs: update labeling behavior on a superblock when submounting Stephen Smalley
2017-05-30 19:40 ` J . Bruce Fields
2017-05-30 19:52 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-05-26 14:48 ` [PATCH RFC 0/2] Fix setting of security labels over NFSv4.2 Stephen Smalley
2017-05-26 15:17 ` J . Bruce Fields
2017-05-26 15:18 ` J . Bruce Fields
2017-05-26 15:30 ` Scott Mayhew
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