From: David Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
To: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Fix possible stack smash in nfs_idmap_read_and_verify_message
Date: Tue, 15 May 2018 09:06:46 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1526389606.3803.4.camel@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180417201118.17841-1-dwysocha@redhat.com>
On Tue, 2018-04-17 at 16:11 -0400, Dave Wysochanski wrote:
> In nfs_idmap_read_and_verify_message there is an unprotected sprintf
> that converts the __u32 'im_id' from struct idmap_msg to 'id_str'
> that is a stack variable of 'NFS_UINT_MAXLEN' (defined as 11).
> If a uid or gid value is > 2147483647 = 0x7fffffff we corrupt
> kernel memory by one byte and if CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG
> is set we see a stack-protector panic as follows:
>
> [11558053.616565] Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: ffffffffa05b8a8c
>
> [11558053.639063] CPU: 6 PID: 9423 Comm: rpc.idmapd Tainted: G W ------------ T 3.10.0-514.el7.x86_64 #1
> [11558053.641990] Hardware name: Red Hat OpenStack Compute, BIOS 1.10.2-3.el7_4.1 04/01/2014
> [11558053.644462] ffffffff818c7bc0 00000000b1f3aec1 ffff880de0f9bd48 ffffffff81685eac
> [11558053.646430] ffff880de0f9bdc8 ffffffff8167f2b3 ffffffff00000010 ffff880de0f9bdd8
> [11558053.648313] ffff880de0f9bd78 00000000b1f3aec1 ffffffff811dcb03 ffffffffa05b8a8c
> [11558053.650107] Call Trace:
> [11558053.651347] [<ffffffff81685eac>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
> [11558053.653013] [<ffffffff8167f2b3>] panic+0xe3/0x1f2
> [11558053.666240] [<ffffffff811dcb03>] ? kfree+0x103/0x140
> [11558053.682589] [<ffffffffa05b8a8c>] ? idmap_pipe_downcall+0x1cc/0x1e0 [nfsv4]
> [11558053.689710] [<ffffffff810855db>] __stack_chk_fail+0x1b/0x30
> [11558053.691619] [<ffffffffa05b8a8c>] idmap_pipe_downcall+0x1cc/0x1e0 [nfsv4]
> [11558053.693867] [<ffffffffa00209d6>] rpc_pipe_write+0x56/0x70 [sunrpc]
> [11558053.695763] [<ffffffff811fe12d>] vfs_write+0xbd/0x1e0
> [11558053.702236] [<ffffffff810acccc>] ? task_work_run+0xac/0xe0
> [11558053.704215] [<ffffffff811fec4f>] SyS_write+0x7f/0xe0
> [11558053.709674] [<ffffffff816964c9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
>
> Fix this by snprintf and a safe length based on sizeof(id_str).
>
> Signed-off-by: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com>
> Reported-by: Stephen Johnston <sjohnsto@redhat.com>
> ---
> fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c
> index 22dc30a679a0..a8c663f8dd99 100644
> --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c
> +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c
> @@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ static int nfs_idmap_read_and_verify_message(struct idmap_msg *im,
> if (strcmp(upcall->im_name, im->im_name) != 0)
> break;
> /* Note: here we store the NUL terminator too */
> - len = sprintf(id_str, "%d", im->im_id) + 1;
> + len = snprintf(id_str, sizeof(id_str), "%u", im->im_id) + 1;
> ret = nfs_idmap_instantiate(key, authkey, id_str, len);
> break;
> case IDMAP_CONV_IDTONAME:
I did not see any reply to this and we did have one customer hit this
which caused a considerable outage of many machines. In essence once
this happened, it became a DoS on all machines using idmapping and they
implemented a temporary workaround.
Anna / Trond - if you need me to improve the patch header or want
clarification or see a problem with it, please let me know.
Thanks.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-05-15 13:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-04-17 20:11 [PATCH] Fix possible stack smash in nfs_idmap_read_and_verify_message Dave Wysochanski
2018-05-15 13:06 ` David Wysochanski [this message]
2018-05-15 13:59 ` Trond Myklebust
2018-05-15 15:44 ` David Wysochanski
2018-05-29 13:57 ` Trond Myklebust
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