From: "Matt W. Benjamin" <matt@linuxbox.com>
To: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] NFSv4: use mach cred for SECINFO_NO_NAME w/ integrity
Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2013 12:29:08 -0400 (EDT) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1816381628.87.1378312148730.JavaMail.root@thunderbeast.private.linuxbox.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <983545972.85.1378311975965.JavaMail.root@thunderbeast.private.linuxbox.com>
Hi
It honestly feels quite odd to me for sec=sys to actually connote krb5i.
Matt
----- "Weston Andros Adamson" <dros@netapp.com> wrote:
> Commit 97431204ea005ec8070ac94bc3251e836daa7ca7 introduced a
> regression
> that causes SECINFO_NO_NAME to fail without sending an RPC if:
>
> 1) the nfs_client's rpc_client is using krb5i/p (now tried by
> default)
> 2) the current user doesn't have valid kerberos credentials
>
> This situation is quite common - as of now a sec=sys mount would use
> krb5i for the nfs_client's rpc_client and a user would hardly be
> faulted
> for not having run kinit.
>
> The solution is to use the machine cred when trying to use an
> integrity
> protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME.
>
> Older servers may not support using the machine cred or an integrity
> protected auth flavor for SECINFO_NO_NAME in every circumstance, so we
> fall
> back to using the user's cred and the filesystem's auth flavor in this
> case.
>
> We run into another problem when running against linux nfs servers -
> they return NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC when using integrity auth flavor (unless
> the
> mount is also that flavor) even though that is not a valid error for
> SECINFO*. Even though it's against spec, handle WRONGSEC errors on
> SECINFO_NO_NAME by falling back to using the user cred and the
> filesystem's auth flavor.
>
> Signed-off-by: Weston Andros Adamson <dros@netapp.com>
> ---
>
> This patch goes along with yesterday's SECINFO patch
>
> fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
> index ab1461e..74b37f5 100644
> --- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
> +++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
> @@ -7291,7 +7291,8 @@ out:
> */
> static int
> _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh
> *fhandle,
> - struct nfs_fsinfo *info, struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors)
> + struct nfs_fsinfo *info,
> + struct nfs4_secinfo_flavors *flavors, bool use_integrity)
> {
> struct nfs41_secinfo_no_name_args args = {
> .style = SECINFO_STYLE_CURRENT_FH,
> @@ -7304,8 +7305,23 @@ _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server
> *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
> .rpc_argp = &args,
> .rpc_resp = &res,
> };
> - return nfs4_call_sync(server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient, server,
> &msg,
> - &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
> + struct rpc_clnt *clnt = server->client;
> + int status;
> +
> + if (use_integrity) {
> + clnt = server->nfs_client->cl_rpcclient;
> + msg.rpc_cred = nfs4_get_clid_cred(server->nfs_client);
> + }
> +
> + dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
> + status = nfs4_call_sync(clnt, server, &msg, &args.seq_args,
> + &res.seq_res, 0);
> + dprintk("<-- %s status=%d\n", __func__, status);
> +
> + if (msg.rpc_cred)
> + put_rpccred(msg.rpc_cred);
> +
> + return status;
> }
>
> static int
> @@ -7315,7 +7331,24 @@ nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(struct nfs_server
> *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
> struct nfs4_exception exception = { };
> int err;
> do {
> - err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info, flavors);
> + /* first try using integrity protection */
> + err = -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC;
> +
> + /* try to use integrity protection with machine cred */
> + if (_nfs4_is_integrity_protected(server->nfs_client))
> + err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info,
> + flavors, true);
> +
> + /*
> + * if unable to use integrity protection, or SECINFO with
> + * integrity protection returns NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC (which is
> + * disallowed by spec, but exists in deployed servers) use
> + * the current filesystem's rpc_client and the user cred.
> + */
> + if (err == -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC)
> + err = _nfs41_proc_secinfo_no_name(server, fhandle, info,
> + flavors, false);
> +
> switch (err) {
> case 0:
> case -NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC:
> --
> 1.7.12.4 (Apple Git-37)
>
> --
> To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs"
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> the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
> More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
--
Matt Benjamin
The Linux Box
206 South Fifth Ave. Suite 150
Ann Arbor, MI 48104
http://linuxbox.com
tel. 734-761-4689
fax. 734-769-8938
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next parent reply other threads:[~2013-09-04 16:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <983545972.85.1378311975965.JavaMail.root@thunderbeast.private.linuxbox.com>
2013-09-04 16:29 ` Matt W. Benjamin [this message]
2013-09-04 16:53 ` [PATCH] NFSv4: use mach cred for SECINFO_NO_NAME w/ integrity Adamson, Dros
2013-09-05 12:50 ` Matt W. Benjamin
2013-09-05 15:26 ` Adamson, Dros
2013-09-04 16:13 Weston Andros Adamson
2013-09-04 16:24 ` Myklebust, Trond
2013-09-04 16:48 ` Adamson, Dros
2013-09-05 0:45 ` Myklebust, Trond
2013-09-05 14:07 ` Dr James Bruce Fields
2013-09-05 15:17 ` Adamson, Dros
2013-09-05 15:31 ` Dr James Bruce Fields
2013-09-05 17:05 ` Adamson, Dros
2013-09-05 17:22 ` Dr James Bruce Fields
2013-09-05 17:25 ` Myklebust, Trond
2013-09-05 18:31 ` Adamson, Dros
2013-09-05 20:40 ` J. Bruce Fields
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