From: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
To: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
Trond Myklebust <trondmy@primarydata.com>,
"J . Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Subject: [PATCH] security/selinux: allow security_sb_clone_mnt_opts to enable/disable native labeling behavior
Date: Thu, 1 Jun 2017 10:46:28 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170601144628.26535-1-smayhew@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1495813358.4586.1.camel@tycho.nsa.gov>
When an NFSv4 client performs a mount operation, it first mounts the
NFSv4 root and then does path walk to the exported path and performs a
submount on that, cloning the security mount options from the root's
superblock to the submount's superblock in the process.
Unless the NFS server has an explicit fsid=0 export with the
"security_label" option, the NFSv4 root superblock will not have
SBLABEL_MNT set, and neither will the submount superblock after cloning
the security mount options. As a result, setxattr's of security labels
over NFSv4.2 will fail. In a similar fashion, NFSv4.2 mounts mounted
with the context= mount option will not show the correct labels because
the nfs_server->caps flags of the cloned superblock will still have
NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL set.
Allowing the NFSv4 client to enable or disable SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
behavior will ensure that the SBLABEL_MNT flag has the correct value
when the client traverses from an exported path without the
"security_label" option to one with the "security_label" option and
vice versa. Similarly, checking to see if SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS is
set upon return from security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() and clearing
NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL if necessary will allow the correct labels to
be displayed for NFSv4.2 mounts mounted with the context= mount option.
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
---
fs/nfs/super.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 +++-
include/linux/security.h | 8 ++++++--
security/security.c | 7 +++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
5 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfs/super.c b/fs/nfs/super.c
index 2f3822a..6a11535 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/super.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/super.c
@@ -2544,10 +2544,26 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nfs_set_sb_security);
int nfs_clone_sb_security(struct super_block *s, struct dentry *mntroot,
struct nfs_mount_info *mount_info)
{
+ int error;
+ unsigned long kflags = 0, kflags_out = 0;
+
/* clone any lsm security options from the parent to the new sb */
if (d_inode(mntroot)->i_op != NFS_SB(s)->nfs_client->rpc_ops->dir_inode_ops)
return -ESTALE;
- return security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(mount_info->cloned->sb, s);
+
+ if (NFS_SB(s)->caps & NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL)
+ kflags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
+
+ error = security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(mount_info->cloned->sb, s, kflags, &kflags_out);
+ if (error)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (NFS_SB(s)->caps & NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL &&
+ !(kflags_out & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS))
+ NFS_SB(s)->caps &= ~NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL;
+err:
+ return error;
+
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nfs_clone_sb_security);
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 080f34e..2f54bfb 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1388,7 +1388,9 @@ union security_list_options {
unsigned long kern_flags,
unsigned long *set_kern_flags);
int (*sb_clone_mnt_opts)(const struct super_block *oldsb,
- struct super_block *newsb);
+ struct super_block *newsb,
+ unsigned long kern_flags,
+ unsigned long *set_kern_flags);
int (*sb_parse_opts_str)(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
int (*dentry_init_security)(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index af675b5..a55ae9c 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -240,7 +240,9 @@ int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
unsigned long kern_flags,
unsigned long *set_kern_flags);
int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
- struct super_block *newsb);
+ struct super_block *newsb,
+ unsigned long kern_flags,
+ unsigned long *set_kern_flags);
int security_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
@@ -581,7 +583,9 @@ static inline int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
}
static inline int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
- struct super_block *newsb)
+ struct super_block *newsb,
+ unsigned long kern_flags,
+ unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b9fea39..7b70ea2 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -380,9 +380,12 @@ int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts);
int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
- struct super_block *newsb)
+ struct super_block *newsb,
+ unsigned long kern_flags,
+ unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
{
- return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb);
+ return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb,
+ kern_flags, set_kern_flags);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index e67a526..80d9acf 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -529,8 +529,14 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
+
+ /* Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
+ leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
+ us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared. */
if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
+ else
+ sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
/* Initialize the root inode. */
rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
@@ -963,8 +969,11 @@ static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
}
static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
- struct super_block *newsb)
+ struct super_block *newsb,
+ unsigned long kern_flags,
+ unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
{
+ int rc = 0;
const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
@@ -977,14 +986,23 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
* mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
*/
if (!ss_initialized)
- return 0;
+ goto out;
+
+ if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
+ /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
+ * place the results is not allowed */
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
/* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
/* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
- if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
- return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
+ if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
+ rc = selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
+ goto out;
+ }
mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
@@ -994,6 +1012,19 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
+ if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE
+ && !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS)
+ && !set_context) {
+ rc = security_fs_use(newsb);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
+ newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
+ *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
+ }
+
if (set_context) {
u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
@@ -1013,8 +1044,10 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
}
sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
+out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
- return 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
}
static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
--
2.9.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-06-01 14:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20170404232646.GB24146@parsley.fieldses.org>
2017-05-25 21:07 ` [PATCH RFC 0/2] Fix setting of security labels over NFSv4.2 Scott Mayhew
2017-05-25 21:07 ` [PATCH RFC 1/2] selinux: allow SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS to be set on an already initialized superblock Scott Mayhew
2017-05-25 21:07 ` [PATCH RFC 2/2] nfs: update labeling behavior on a superblock when submounting Scott Mayhew
2017-05-26 14:24 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-05-26 15:28 ` Scott Mayhew
2017-05-26 15:42 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-06-01 14:46 ` Scott Mayhew [this message]
2017-06-01 14:55 ` [PATCH] security/selinux: allow security_sb_clone_mnt_opts to enable/disable native labeling behavior Scott Mayhew
2017-06-01 18:08 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-06-01 18:48 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-06-01 19:40 ` Scott Mayhew
2017-06-01 18:30 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-06-01 19:42 ` Scott Mayhew
2017-06-01 20:59 ` [PATCH v2] " Scott Mayhew
2017-06-02 12:55 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-06-02 13:09 ` Scott Mayhew
2017-06-05 15:45 ` [PATCH v3] " Scott Mayhew
2017-06-05 15:55 ` Scott Mayhew
2017-06-05 19:53 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-06-05 21:21 ` Paul Moore
2017-06-06 0:46 ` J . Bruce Fields
2017-06-09 20:24 ` Paul Moore
2017-05-30 14:38 ` [PATCH RFC 2/2] nfs: update labeling behavior on a superblock when submounting Stephen Smalley
2017-05-30 19:40 ` J . Bruce Fields
2017-05-30 19:52 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-05-26 14:48 ` [PATCH RFC 0/2] Fix setting of security labels over NFSv4.2 Stephen Smalley
2017-05-26 15:17 ` J . Bruce Fields
2017-05-26 15:18 ` J . Bruce Fields
2017-05-26 15:30 ` Scott Mayhew
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