linux-nfs.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
To: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
	Trond Myklebust <trondmy@primarydata.com>,
	"J . Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Subject: [PATCH v2] security/selinux: allow security_sb_clone_mnt_opts to enable/disable native labeling behavior
Date: Thu,  1 Jun 2017 16:59:47 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170601205947.4917-1-smayhew@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1496341807.27759.15.camel@tycho.nsa.gov>

When an NFSv4 client performs a mount operation, it first mounts the
NFSv4 root and then does path walk to the exported path and performs a
submount on that, cloning the security mount options from the root's
superblock to the submount's superblock in the process.

Unless the NFS server has an explicit fsid=0 export with the
"security_label" option, the NFSv4 root superblock will not have
SBLABEL_MNT set, and neither will the submount superblock after cloning
the security mount options.  As a result, setxattr's of security labels
over NFSv4.2 will fail.  In a similar fashion, NFSv4.2 mounts mounted
with the context= mount option will not show the correct labels because
the nfs_server->caps flags of the cloned superblock will still have
NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL set.

Allowing the NFSv4 client to enable or disable SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
behavior will ensure that the SBLABEL_MNT flag has the correct value
when the client traverses from an exported path without the
"security_label" option to one with the "security_label" option and
vice versa.  Similarly, checking to see if SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS is
set upon return from security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() and clearing
NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL if necessary will allow the correct labels to
be displayed for NFSv4.2 mounts mounted with the context= mount option.

Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
---
 fs/nfs/super.c            | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h |  4 +++-
 include/linux/security.h  |  8 ++++++--
 security/security.c       |  7 +++++--
 security/selinux/hooks.c  | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 5 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/nfs/super.c b/fs/nfs/super.c
index 2f3822a..ffded39 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/super.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/super.c
@@ -2544,10 +2544,26 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nfs_set_sb_security);
 int nfs_clone_sb_security(struct super_block *s, struct dentry *mntroot,
 			  struct nfs_mount_info *mount_info)
 {
+	int error;
+	unsigned long kflags = 0, kflags_out = 0;
+
 	/* clone any lsm security options from the parent to the new sb */
 	if (d_inode(mntroot)->i_op != NFS_SB(s)->nfs_client->rpc_ops->dir_inode_ops)
 		return -ESTALE;
-	return security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(mount_info->cloned->sb, s);
+
+	if (NFS_SB(s)->caps & NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL)
+		kflags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
+
+	error = security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(mount_info->cloned->sb, s, kflags,
+			&kflags_out);
+	if (error)
+		return error;
+
+	if (NFS_SB(s)->caps & NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL &&
+		!(kflags_out & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS))
+		NFS_SB(s)->caps &= ~NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL;
+	return error;
+
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nfs_clone_sb_security);
 
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 080f34e..2f54bfb 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -1388,7 +1388,9 @@ union security_list_options {
 				unsigned long kern_flags,
 				unsigned long *set_kern_flags);
 	int (*sb_clone_mnt_opts)(const struct super_block *oldsb,
-					struct super_block *newsb);
+					struct super_block *newsb,
+					unsigned long kern_flags,
+					unsigned long *set_kern_flags);
 	int (*sb_parse_opts_str)(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
 	int (*dentry_init_security)(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 					const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index af675b5..a55ae9c 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -240,7 +240,9 @@ int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 				unsigned long kern_flags,
 				unsigned long *set_kern_flags);
 int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
-				struct super_block *newsb);
+				struct super_block *newsb,
+				unsigned long kern_flags,
+				unsigned long *set_kern_flags);
 int security_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
 int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 					const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
@@ -581,7 +583,9 @@ static inline int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 }
 
 static inline int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
-					      struct super_block *newsb)
+					      struct super_block *newsb,
+					      unsigned long kern_flags,
+					      unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b9fea39..7b70ea2 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -380,9 +380,12 @@ int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts);
 
 int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
-				struct super_block *newsb)
+				struct super_block *newsb,
+				unsigned long kern_flags,
+				unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb);
+	return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb,
+				kern_flags, set_kern_flags);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts);
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index e67a526..d8d5d35 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -529,8 +529,16 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 		       sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 
 	sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
+
+	/*
+	 * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT.  It's not sufficient to simply
+	 * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
+	 * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
+	 */
 	if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
 		sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
+	else
+		sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
 
 	/* Initialize the root inode. */
 	rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
@@ -963,8 +971,11 @@ static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 }
 
 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
-					struct super_block *newsb)
+					struct super_block *newsb,
+					unsigned long kern_flags,
+					unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
 {
+	int rc = 0;
 	const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
 	struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
 
@@ -979,6 +990,13 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 	if (!ss_initialized)
 		return 0;
 
+	/*
+	 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
+	 * place the results is not allowed.
+	 */
+	if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
 	BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
 
@@ -994,6 +1012,18 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 	newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
 	newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
 
+	if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
+		!(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
+		rc = security_fs_use(newsb);
+		if (rc)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
+		newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
+		*set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
+	}
+
 	if (set_context) {
 		u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
 
@@ -1013,8 +1043,9 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 	}
 
 	sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
+out:
 	mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
-	return 0;
+	return rc;
 }
 
 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
-- 
2.9.3


  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-06-01 20:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20170404232646.GB24146@parsley.fieldses.org>
2017-05-25 21:07 ` [PATCH RFC 0/2] Fix setting of security labels over NFSv4.2 Scott Mayhew
2017-05-25 21:07   ` [PATCH RFC 1/2] selinux: allow SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS to be set on an already initialized superblock Scott Mayhew
2017-05-25 21:07   ` [PATCH RFC 2/2] nfs: update labeling behavior on a superblock when submounting Scott Mayhew
2017-05-26 14:24     ` Stephen Smalley
2017-05-26 15:28       ` Scott Mayhew
2017-05-26 15:42         ` Stephen Smalley
2017-06-01 14:46           ` [PATCH] security/selinux: allow security_sb_clone_mnt_opts to enable/disable native labeling behavior Scott Mayhew
2017-06-01 14:55             ` Scott Mayhew
2017-06-01 18:08               ` Stephen Smalley
2017-06-01 18:48                 ` Stephen Smalley
2017-06-01 19:40                 ` Scott Mayhew
2017-06-01 18:30             ` Stephen Smalley
2017-06-01 19:42               ` Scott Mayhew
2017-06-01 20:59               ` Scott Mayhew [this message]
2017-06-02 12:55                 ` [PATCH v2] " Stephen Smalley
2017-06-02 13:09                   ` Scott Mayhew
2017-06-05 15:45                     ` [PATCH v3] " Scott Mayhew
2017-06-05 15:55                       ` Scott Mayhew
2017-06-05 19:53                       ` Stephen Smalley
2017-06-05 21:21                       ` Paul Moore
2017-06-06  0:46                         ` J . Bruce Fields
2017-06-09 20:24                           ` Paul Moore
2017-05-30 14:38         ` [PATCH RFC 2/2] nfs: update labeling behavior on a superblock when submounting Stephen Smalley
2017-05-30 19:40           ` J . Bruce Fields
2017-05-30 19:52             ` Stephen Smalley
2017-05-26 14:48   ` [PATCH RFC 0/2] Fix setting of security labels over NFSv4.2 Stephen Smalley
2017-05-26 15:17     ` J . Bruce Fields
2017-05-26 15:18       ` J . Bruce Fields
2017-05-26 15:30     ` Scott Mayhew

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20170601205947.4917-1-smayhew@redhat.com \
    --to=smayhew@redhat.com \
    --cc=bfields@fieldses.org \
    --cc=eparis@parisplace.org \
    --cc=linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
    --cc=selinux@tycho.nsa.gov \
    --cc=trondmy@primarydata.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).