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From: Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
To: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Cc: trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com,
	Linux NFS Mailing List <linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: EVM HMAC and FS UUID
Date: Tue, 22 May 2018 16:17:01 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180522201701.GC32139@fieldses.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0AD3BFFF-8A3D-440A-B186-0019B8D924B2@oracle.com>

On Tue, May 22, 2018 at 09:17:53AM -0700, Chuck Lever wrote:
> 
> 
> > On May 22, 2018, at 9:07 AM, Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org> wrote:
> > 
> > On Tue, May 22, 2018 at 08:53:34AM -0700, Chuck Lever wrote:
> >> Hi-
> >> 
> >> I'm continuing to look at NFS support for the Linux Integrity
> >> Measurement Architecture.
> >> 
> >> When computing an HMAC hash of file attributes, sometimes the
> >> FS UUID is included. For a client to verify that hash, the
> >> server will have to expose that UUID somehow.
> >> 
> >> Is there currently an NFSv4 attribute that carries the FS UUID?
> > 
> > I think the fsid is as close as you get.
> > 
> > Do you need to calculate hashes in exactly the way the server does?  If
> > you're assuming a "dumb server" that just stores signatures without
> > interpreting them, then maybe not?
> 
> The hashes have to be computed the same way everywhere, of course,
> whether it's on a client or on the server.
> 
> Assuming that NFS were not in the picture, then the EVM hash would
> use the raw FS UUID. This is the hash that would be exposed to NFS
> clients if that filesystem were suddenly to be exported. So the
> NFS clients would need to have the same raw FS UUID in order to
> verify the hash. (And I'm actually not sure what benefit there is
> to including the FS UUID).

I guess it prevents you from reusing a signature on an otherwise
identical file on another filesystem?

We'd need to understand what exactly the threats are that IMA is meant
to prevent.

--b.

> I see two alternatives:
> 
> -- Provide a new read-only filesystem attribute that exposes the
>    FS UUID
> 
> -- The FS UUID is optional. We could make it illegal to use the
>    FS UUID in EVM hashes that will be exposed via NFS
> 
> The bigger picture:
> 
> - The input set for the hash contains optional items that will have
> to be given to remote EVM hash consumers. I think a new attribute
> that lists the set of hashed attributes will be necessary.
> 
> - The input set can contain security.* xattrs, like security.SMACK64.
> These are currently not exposed to NFS clients, but not all files
> will have them. Not quite sure how to make that work generally.

      reply	other threads:[~2018-05-22 20:17 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-05-22 15:53 EVM HMAC and FS UUID Chuck Lever
2018-05-22 16:07 ` Bruce Fields
2018-05-22 16:17   ` Chuck Lever
2018-05-22 20:17     ` Bruce Fields [this message]

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