From: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev@redhat.com>
To: chuck.lever@oracle.com, jlayton@kernel.org,
trondmy@hammerspace.com, anna.schumaker@oracle.com, hch@lst.de,
sagi@grimberg.me, kch@nvidia.com, davem@davemloft.net,
edumazet@google.com, kuba@kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, kernel-tls-handshake@lists.linux.dev,
neil@brown.name, Dai.Ngo@oracle.com, tom@talpey.com,
hare@suse.de, horms@kernel.org, kbusch@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 2/4] sunrpc: fix client side handling of tls alerts
Date: Thu, 31 Jul 2025 14:00:56 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250731180058.4669-3-okorniev@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250731180058.4669-1-okorniev@redhat.com>
A security exploit was discovered in NFS over TLS in tls_alert_recv
due to its assumption that there is valid data in the msghdr's
iterator's kvec.
Instead, this patch proposes the rework how control messages are
setup and used by sock_recvmsg().
If no control message structure is setup, kTLS layer will read and
process TLS data record types. As soon as it encounters a TLS control
message, it would return an error. At that point, NFS can setup a kvec
backed control buffer and read in the control message such as a TLS
alert. Scott found that a msg iterator can advance the kvec pointer
as a part of the copy process thus we need to revert the iterator
before calling into the tls_alert_recv.
Fixes: dea034b963c8 ("SUNRPC: Capture CMSG metadata on client-side receive")
Suggested-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@hammerspace.com>
Suggested-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev@redhat.com>
---
net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c b/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c
index 04ff66758fc3..c5f7bbf5775f 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/xprtsock.c
@@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ xs_alloc_sparse_pages(struct xdr_buf *buf, size_t want, gfp_t gfp)
static int
xs_sock_process_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
- struct cmsghdr *cmsg, int ret)
+ unsigned int *msg_flags, struct cmsghdr *cmsg, int ret)
{
u8 content_type = tls_get_record_type(sock->sk, cmsg);
u8 level, description;
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ xs_sock_process_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
* record, even though there might be more frames
* waiting to be decrypted.
*/
- msg->msg_flags &= ~MSG_EOR;
+ *msg_flags &= ~MSG_EOR;
break;
case TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT:
tls_alert_recv(sock->sk, msg, &level, &description);
@@ -386,19 +386,33 @@ xs_sock_process_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
}
static int
-xs_sock_recv_cmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags)
+xs_sock_recv_cmsg(struct socket *sock, unsigned int *msg_flags, int flags)
{
union {
struct cmsghdr cmsg;
u8 buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(u8))];
} u;
+ u8 alert[2];
+ struct kvec alert_kvec = {
+ .iov_base = alert,
+ .iov_len = sizeof(alert),
+ };
+ struct msghdr msg = {
+ .msg_flags = *msg_flags,
+ .msg_control = &u,
+ .msg_controllen = sizeof(u),
+ };
int ret;
- msg->msg_control = &u;
- msg->msg_controllen = sizeof(u);
- ret = sock_recvmsg(sock, msg, flags);
- if (msg->msg_controllen != sizeof(u))
- ret = xs_sock_process_cmsg(sock, msg, &u.cmsg, ret);
+ iov_iter_kvec(&msg.msg_iter, ITER_DEST, &alert_kvec, 1,
+ alert_kvec.iov_len);
+ ret = sock_recvmsg(sock, &msg, flags);
+ if (ret > 0 &&
+ tls_get_record_type(sock->sk, &u.cmsg) == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT) {
+ iov_iter_revert(&msg.msg_iter, ret);
+ ret = xs_sock_process_cmsg(sock, &msg, msg_flags, &u.cmsg,
+ -EAGAIN);
+ }
return ret;
}
@@ -408,7 +422,13 @@ xs_sock_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags, size_t seek)
ssize_t ret;
if (seek != 0)
iov_iter_advance(&msg->msg_iter, seek);
- ret = xs_sock_recv_cmsg(sock, msg, flags);
+ ret = sock_recvmsg(sock, msg, flags);
+ /* Handle TLS inband control message lazily */
+ if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC) {
+ msg->msg_flags &= ~(MSG_CTRUNC | MSG_EOR);
+ if (ret == 0 || ret == -EIO)
+ ret = xs_sock_recv_cmsg(sock, &msg->msg_flags, flags);
+ }
return ret > 0 ? ret + seek : ret;
}
@@ -434,7 +454,7 @@ xs_read_discard(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int flags,
size_t count)
{
iov_iter_discard(&msg->msg_iter, ITER_DEST, count);
- return xs_sock_recv_cmsg(sock, msg, flags);
+ return xs_sock_recvmsg(sock, msg, flags, 0);
}
#if ARCH_IMPLEMENTS_FLUSH_DCACHE_PAGE
--
2.47.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-07-31 18:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-07-31 18:00 [PATCH v2 0/4] address tls_alert_recv usage by NFS and NvME Olga Kornievskaia
2025-07-31 18:00 ` [PATCH v2 1/4] sunrpc: fix handling of server side tls alerts Olga Kornievskaia
2025-07-31 18:00 ` Olga Kornievskaia [this message]
2025-07-31 18:00 ` [PATCH v2 3/4] nvmet-tcp: fix handling of " Olga Kornievskaia
2025-09-05 16:10 ` Olga Kornievskaia
2025-07-31 18:00 ` [PATCH v2 4/4] net/handshake: change tls_alert_recv to receive a kvec Olga Kornievskaia
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