From: Chuck Lever <cel@kernel.org>
To: NeilBrown <neil@brown.name>, Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev@redhat.com>,
Dai Ngo <dai.ngo@oracle.com>, Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
Cc: <linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org>, Chris Mason <clm@meta.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/2] sunrpc: pin svc_xprt across the asynchronous TLS handshake callback
Date: Fri, 22 May 2026 09:39:06 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260522133907.326296-1-cel@kernel.org> (raw)
From: Chris Mason <clm@meta.com>
svc_tcp_handshake() stores the raw svc_xprt pointer in
tls_handshake_args.ta_data and submits the request through
tls_server_hello_x509(). The handshake core takes only
sock_hold(req->hr_sk); nothing references the embedding struct
svc_sock that svc_tcp_handshake_done() reaches via container_of().
Two close races leave the in-flight callback writing through a freed
svc_sock. svc_sock_free() calls tls_handshake_cancel() and discards
its return value: a false return means handshake_complete() has
already set HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED but hp_done() may not have
finished, yet svc_sock_free() proceeds to kfree(svsk). The
cancel-loser fall-through inside svc_tcp_handshake() itself produces
the same window: when wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout()
returns <= 0 (timeout or signal) and tls_handshake_cancel() returns
false, the function does not drain, returns, and svc_handle_xprt()
calls svc_xprt_received(), which clears XPT_BUSY and can drop the
last reference. A concurrent close then runs svc_sock_free() while
svc_tcp_handshake_done() is still updating xpt_flags and walking
svsk->sk_handshake_done.
The corruption surfaces as set_bit/clear_bit RMW into the freed
xpt_flags slab slot and as complete_all() walking and writing the
freed wait_queue_head_t list embedded in sk_handshake_done -- a
slab-corruption primitive, not a benign read. The path is reachable
on any TLS-enabled NFS server whenever a connection close overlaps
the tlshd downcall delivery window; the interruptible wait means
signal delivery suffices, not just SVC_HANDSHAKE_TO expiry.
Take svc_xprt_get(xprt) immediately before tls_server_hello_x509()
so the in-flight callback owns its own reference. Release it on the
two edges where the callback is guaranteed not to fire -- submission
failure from tls_server_hello_x509() and a successful
tls_handshake_cancel() -- and at the tail of
svc_tcp_handshake_done() after complete_all().
Fixes: b3cbf98e2fdf ("SUNRPC: Support TLS handshake in the server-side TCP socket code")
Assisted-by: kres (claude-opus-4-7)
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <clm@meta.com>
[cel: rewrote commit message to describe the actual change]
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
---
net/sunrpc/svcsock.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c b/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c
index 7be3de1a1aed..c8e194fce622 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/svcsock.c
@@ -471,6 +471,7 @@ static void svc_tcp_handshake_done(void *data, int status, key_serial_t peerid)
}
clear_bit(XPT_HANDSHAKE, &xprt->xpt_flags);
complete_all(&svsk->sk_handshake_done);
+ svc_xprt_put(xprt);
}
/**
@@ -494,9 +495,13 @@ static void svc_tcp_handshake(struct svc_xprt *xprt)
clear_bit(XPT_TLS_SESSION, &xprt->xpt_flags);
init_completion(&svsk->sk_handshake_done);
+ /* Pin the transport across the asynchronous handshake callback. */
+ svc_xprt_get(xprt);
+
ret = tls_server_hello_x509(&args, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ret) {
trace_svc_tls_not_started(xprt);
+ svc_xprt_put(xprt);
goto out_failed;
}
@@ -505,6 +510,7 @@ static void svc_tcp_handshake(struct svc_xprt *xprt)
if (ret <= 0) {
if (tls_handshake_cancel(sk)) {
trace_svc_tls_timed_out(xprt);
+ svc_xprt_put(xprt);
goto out_close;
}
}
--
2.54.0
next reply other threads:[~2026-05-22 13:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-22 13:39 Chuck Lever [this message]
2026-05-22 13:39 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] sunrpc: wait for in-flight TLS handshake callback when cancel loses race Chuck Lever
2026-05-22 13:45 ` Jeff Layton
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