Linux NFS development
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Prabhakar Pujeri <prabhakar.pujeri@dell.com>
To: Chuck Lever <cel@kernel.org>
Cc: Prabhakar Pujeri <prabhakar.pujeri@dell.com>,
	Trond Myklebust <trondmy@kernel.org>,
	Anna Schumaker <anna@kernel.org>,
	linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [v1] NFS: use TCP for MOUNT when xprtsec= selects TLS
Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2026 10:30:46 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260917103046.16018-1-prabhakar.pujeri@dell.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260916204336.14436-1-cel@kernel.org>

Hi Chuck,

Reproduced the reasoning against v7.3-rc3. nfs_server.protocol gets set
to XPRT_TRANSPORT_TCP_TLS by xprtsec=, the switch in
nfs_set_mount_transport_protocol() has no case for it, so
mount_server.protocol stays zero and nfs_init_timeout_values() lands in
its default BUG() while setting up the MOUNT client. The one added case
is the smallest correct fix:

- There are no TLS transport variants for RDMA or backchannel, so this
  case covers every selectable TLS value today.
- MOUNT running over plain TCP matches what mount.nfs already arranges
  (it probed rpcbind and appends mountproto=tcp), so no security
  downgrade: MOUNT never runs over TLS either way on NFSv2/v3 text
  mounts.

> 	case XPRT_TRANSPORT_TCP:
> +	case XPRT_TRANSPORT_TCP_TLS:
>  	case XPRT_TRANSPORT_RDMA:

looks right.

Two notes, neither blocking:

- This is a mount-time BUG() reachable via a bare fsconfig() caller
  (mount -i). With Fixes: c8407f2e560c dating to mid-2023, it feels
  worth a Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org.
- As a follow-up, not for this patch: BUG() on an unrecognized
  transport is a harsh way to fail parse-time input. A WARN + error
  would make the next unknown transport friendlier to debug, and keeps
  with the current no-new-BUG() house rule.

Reviewed-by: Prabhakar Pujeri <prabhakar.pujeri@dell.com>

      reply	other threads:[~2026-09-17 10:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-16 20:43 [PATCH v1] NFS: use TCP for MOUNT when xprtsec= selects TLS Chuck Lever
2026-09-17 10:30 ` Prabhakar Pujeri [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20260917103046.16018-1-prabhakar.pujeri@dell.com \
    --to=prabhakar.pujeri@dell.com \
    --cc=anna@kernel.org \
    --cc=cel@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=trondmy@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox