From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795106158; b=mjS6UmYa8Ay2x/qEAr2f2XrjK9c1XCjq6xSI0yjk2MhGUd+fqhD4BAzs3veVnTjHvxkR FoO8V0mKTiRJlWSecX0nVuFcX7EFkcMbmjvCbwtRRt/DHhkYeX5x6HWl2rvTw7j/kWEDD l2+ydm4XGRuSVKlyJbeP7tCaRkwly7JLhXBkjc/Zwjrac8qbQXTK6Vn0RSsEvdO+I6whF 95UhscPg1UoRG3KRfIkRiZD5Ku8SzbN1GZ9Ru4wZhEEHYXri1/JCzL/8cULUqHWEqGQJW pYByaZ1vmV04PBMxJ6+eHIFbWFnXaLIgR1KJJfDc7Yl05WOT0UBzeoC7sN/yhRXpQdA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795106158; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID: References:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; bh=vdpT6LJvyJoZU056rFgJK1cgm13iBFK2/AWVWgyfxl0=; b=sl1krUtugMx+K3e+KTssrtawfI6wexaOVujC+9bxxqRh+2nWDKV3snjcmx/iy28H/+QY hOz5r1DTdxxixrIf0JjJLYQjigsXZ6MQpm5+KMvCKpMNuoJ3eUNA/uUC/vAqGrtYK4u08 RTB3nWKHo/UuAzkLwiKucoCAa+FdPWu+2YfLD02SndFFRJSlhZNnGFf7v57I1Kakg6Qns 1ybvU92vYxmt33AhOE/2zoUmpdO4T7Sq+xnqWNIbxo4RLCroTRNT5RIilBDUq40BnSO8n klSCitZbX3+8bSqyIfpH1tlJH7QsrX9PoiwxUv8A1J1LgIr1z/D7od5Zs3/DIcKc3mw== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=gQYSVpk8; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3CA86606A324; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 16:35:58 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=gQYSVpk8 Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 511101F000C4; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 16:35:54 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1795106158; bh=vdpT6LJvyJoZU056rFgJK1cgm13iBFK2/AWVWgyfxl0=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To; b=gQYSVpk8Ti3Dz/c09ltm5E6cnoyLoK3hTNLppD3CmR67E27lg38E+/NCiyJoo762q 1JxZAcpE2jNuyH7arhdRbACTCBIFV5B499W36m5xUxPglxihcgAMnUl6P1qFnWYZ4A ezd6Xu771igMuOdZ5aggHIRRgwgXfRlWMMFAGf478Zt4qaRiCtizOmkjNT/qvfXO4d 2MjjshcGxxPN+92CMQDEpdEjqWE48UfVSvxylXsMxjVHk0GG+Z3S8S5vdgqPqRWYZV DCmzsDYax8vY22yr/uMKPF5oDO7+HGcLKgrnNe476l85h2K5RNG1vW5btEEM7rwpZF YE6t540hluycQ== Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 16:35:52 +0000 From: Simon Horman To: Chuck Lever Cc: Donald Hunter , Jakub Kicinski , "David S. Miller" , Paolo Abeni , John Fastabend , Sabrina Dubroca , Keith Busch , Jens Axboe , Christoph Hellwig , Sagi Grimberg , Chaitanya Kulkarni , Jeff Layton , NeilBrown , Olga Kornievskaia , Dai Ngo , Tom Talpey , Eric Dumazet , kernel-tls-handshake@lists.linux.dev, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, Hannes Reinecke Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v3 00/10] Deliver TLS session tags to upper-layer consumers (NFSD) Message-ID: <20261119163552.GZ860048@horms.kernel.org> References: <20261113-tls-session-tags-v3-0-91271964cdb0@kernel.org> X-Mailing-List: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20261113-tls-session-tags-v3-0-91271964cdb0@kernel.org> On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 02:21:58PM -0500, Chuck Lever wrote: > NFSD controls remote access to its exports today by IP address and > hostname. Neither of these are cryptographically secure. For > instance, a MitM can replace the response to a server's plaintext > DNS query. As a result, a malicious NFS client can pretend to be a > client whose hostname matches one that has access to exports it > would otherwise be denied access to. > > So instead, we want access-control decisions to be based on > cryptographically-vetted objects such as TLS peer-certificates. > In-kernel x.509 parsing would duplicate work mature userspace > libraries already do, so let's make tlshd evaluate peer certificates > in user space. > > The certificates are evaluated against admin-defined policy, such > as whether the certificate's Issuer matches a particular string. > tlshd then marks NFS TLS sessions with those policy matches. Admins > also provide a set of policy names on each NFSD export (allow_tags). > Computing the intersection with these per-export tags is quick and > completely separate from the details of parsing x.509 certificates. > > A yet-to-be-posted patch series introduces tag set support to the > exportfs command in nfs-utils. tlshd 1.5.0, current as of this > writing, already implements TLS session tagging. Hi Chuck, all, FYI, while looking over this patchset I noticed that CI flags shadow len variables in ynl generated C code. I believe this is a bug in ynl-gen and have posted a patch to try to address it. - [PATCH net-next] tools: ynl-gen: avoid shadow local variable declarations https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20261119-ynl-scope-v1-1-d3b0c964d4cb@kernel.org/ ...