From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: James Bottomley <jejb-tEXmvtCZX7AybS5Ee8rs3A@public.gmane.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] security/keys/trusted: Allow operation without hardware
 TPM
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2019 17:24:40 -0700
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On Mon, 2019-03-18 at 16:45 -0700, Dan Williams wrote:
> Rather than fail initialization of the trusted.ko module, arrange for
> the module to load, but rely on trusted_instantiate() to fail
> trusted-key operations.

What actual problem is this fixing?  To me it would seem like an
enhancement to make the trusted module fail at load time if there's no
TPM rather than waiting until first use to find out it can never work. 
Is there some piece of user code that depends on the successful
insertion of trusted.ko?

James