From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id D20CAC388F2 for ; Tue, 3 Nov 2020 09:53:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: from ml01.01.org (ml01.01.org [198.145.21.10]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5DA32223BD for ; Tue, 3 Nov 2020 09:53:04 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="djsvb14S" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 5DA32223BD Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=kernel.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-nvdimm-bounces@lists.01.org Received: from ml01.vlan13.01.org (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B266016544F77; Tue, 3 Nov 2020 01:53:03 -0800 (PST) Received-SPF: Pass (mailfrom) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=198.145.29.99; helo=mail.kernel.org; envelope-from=rppt@kernel.org; receiver= Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E14E116522D91 for ; Tue, 3 Nov 2020 01:53:01 -0800 (PST) Received: from kernel.org (unknown [87.71.17.26]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0BBB92080C; Tue, 3 Nov 2020 09:52:51 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=default; t=1604397181; bh=lh70U56vprDGYqn/Uu8IBJ+iWmElKUpwOZcmksn3MyU=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=djsvb14SN0dTNdL0dHydqIGZTQQJIWeDKAvtb0veCp5Ix1gEvvQVcFhgeonkgf1/J RQrD7O/5SRUemCadMxWpVVfGhzdDbjksjDdqo9s8ZkUJfcSYo4rTs7bMtgSd2XHOjJ QvgAK34USsCDWELlPKdltzRhz93byDZzTNIknty0= Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2020 11:52:47 +0200 From: Mike Rapoport To: David Hildenbrand Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/6] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Message-ID: <20201103095247.GH4879@kernel.org> References: <20200924132904.1391-1-rppt@kernel.org> <9c38ac3b-c677-6a87-ce82-ec53b69eaf71@redhat.com> <20201102174308.GF4879@kernel.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Message-ID-Hash: Q22Y5ZYVFAJAQFR7QSFWDZ4I4NRFXWXZ X-Message-ID-Hash: Q22Y5ZYVFAJAQFR7QSFWDZ4I4NRFXWXZ X-MailFrom: rppt@kernel.org X-Mailman-Rule-Hits: nonmember-moderation X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation CC: Andrew Morton , Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dave Hansen , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Idan Yaniv , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Mark Rutland , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , Thomas Gleixner , Shuah Khan , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, lin ux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org X-Mailman-Version: 3.1.1 Precedence: list List-Id: "Linux-nvdimm developer list." Archived-At: List-Archive: List-Help: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On Mon, Nov 02, 2020 at 06:51:09PM +0100, David Hildenbrand wrote: > > > Assume you have a system with quite some ZONE_MOVABLE memory (esp. in > > > virtualized environments), eating up a significant amount of !ZONE_MOVABLE > > > memory dynamically at runtime can lead to non-obvious issues. It looks like > > > you have plenty of free memory, but the kernel might still OOM when trying > > > to do kernel allocations e.g., for pagetables. With CMA we at least know > > > what we're dealing with - it behaves like ZONE_MOVABLE except for the owner > > > that can place unmovable pages there. We can use it to compute statically > > > the amount of ZONE_MOVABLE memory we can have in the system without doing > > > harm to the system. > > > > Why would you say that secretmem allocates from !ZONE_MOVABLE? > > If we put boot time reservations aside, the memory allocation for > > secretmem follows the same rules as the memory allocations for any file > > descriptor. That means we allocate memory with GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE. > > Oh, okay - I missed that! I had the impression that pages are unmovable and > allocating from ZONE_MOVABLE would be a violation of that? > > > After the allocation the memory indeed becomes unmovable but it's not > > like we are eating memory from other zones here. > > ... and here you have your problem. That's a no-no. We only allow it in very > special cases where it can't be avoided - e.g., vfio having to pin guest > memory when passing through memory to VMs. > > Hotplug memory, online it to ZONE_MOVABLE. Allocate secretmem. Try to unplug > the memory again -> endless loop in offline_pages(). > > Or have a CMA area that gets used with GFP_HIGHUSER_MOVABLE. Allocate > secretmem. The owner of the area tries to allocate memory - always fails. > Purpose of CMA destroyed. > > > > > > Ideally, we would want to support page migration/compaction and allow for > > > allocation from ZONE_MOVABLE as well. Would involve temporarily mapping, > > > copying, unmapping. Sounds feasible, but not sure which roadblocks we would > > > find on the way. > > > > We can support migration/compaction with temporary mapping. The first > > roadblock I've hit there was that migration allocates 4K destination > > page and if we use it in secret map we are back to scrambling the direct > > map into 4K pieces. It still sounds feasible but not as trivial :) > > That sounds like the proper way for me to do it then. Although migration of secretmem pages sounds feasible now, there maybe other issues I didn't see because I'm not very familiar with migration/compaction code. I've looked again at CMA and I'm inclined to agree with you that using CMA for secretmem allocations could be the right thing. -- Sincerely yours, Mike. _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org To unsubscribe send an email to linux-nvdimm-leave@lists.01.org