From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3.6 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,NICE_REPLY_A, SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2B7B4C43600 for ; Wed, 5 May 2021 19:08:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: from ml01.01.org (ml01.01.org [198.145.21.10]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 60FBC613C3 for ; Wed, 5 May 2021 19:08:12 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 60FBC613C3 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux-foundation.org Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-nvdimm-bounces@lists.01.org Received: from ml01.vlan13.01.org (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 29758100EB33C; Wed, 5 May 2021 12:08:12 -0700 (PDT) Received-SPF: Pass (mailfrom) identity=mailfrom; client-ip=198.145.29.99; helo=mail.kernel.org; envelope-from=akpm@linux-foundation.org; receiver= Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ml01.01.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D7609100EB334 for ; Wed, 5 May 2021 12:08:09 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 9F53D613BC; Wed, 5 May 2021 19:08:07 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linux-foundation.org; s=korg; t=1620241689; bh=hhpxxXD6aDeVp5ZewAeV19qTR1ebHSAlNlE2Ux5iOSM=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=ug/m3Htuj/0ky54AF8kZ3lyLJYozDhbNWgyIX0TCxQniyIIVskzJR85jb1a8l24+P wj3Uq3KGTcmSyyj8MjENJW/Q1S0V1k1C7Ipr+8QQ7aULrVrbnYhAQH9rFXWSlKHVc9 sXdVqWFVybXYIICA46jG/2KrFmKvLuINZAazEgtE= Date: Wed, 5 May 2021 12:08:06 -0700 From: Andrew Morton To: Mike Rapoport Subject: Re: [PATCH v18 0/9] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Message-Id: <20210505120806.abfd4ee657ccabf2f221a0eb@linux-foundation.org> In-Reply-To: <20210303162209.8609-1-rppt@kernel.org> References: <20210303162209.8609-1-rppt@kernel.org> X-Mailer: Sylpheed 3.5.1 (GTK+ 2.24.31; x86_64-pc-linux-gnu) Mime-Version: 1.0 Message-ID-Hash: 76LRK5IKRSMAOTPWUPM6OZXGGXWMT2TZ X-Message-ID-Hash: 76LRK5IKRSMAOTPWUPM6OZXGGXWMT2TZ X-MailFrom: akpm@linux-foundation.org X-Mailman-Rule-Hits: nonmember-moderation X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation CC: Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Arnd Bergmann , Borislav Petkov , Catalin Marinas , Christopher Lameter , Dave Hansen , David Hildenbrand , Elena Reshetova , "H. Peter Anvin" , Ingo Molnar , James Bottomley , "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Matthew Wilcox , Matthew Garrett , Mark Rutland , Michal Hocko , Mike Rapoport , Michael Kerrisk , Palmer Dabbelt , Paul Walmsley , Peter Zijlstra , "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Rick Edgecombe , Roman Gushchin , Shakeel Butt , Shuah Khan , Thomas Gleixner , Tycho Andersen , Will Deacon , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org X-Mailman-Version: 3.1.1 Precedence: list List-Id: "Linux-nvdimm developer list." Archived-At: List-Archive: List-Help: List-Post: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On Wed, 3 Mar 2021 18:22:00 +0200 Mike Rapoport wrote: > This is an implementation of "secret" mappings backed by a file descriptor. > > The file descriptor backing secret memory mappings is created using a > dedicated memfd_secret system call The desired protection mode for the > memory is configured using flags parameter of the system call. The mmap() > of the file descriptor created with memfd_secret() will create a "secret" > memory mapping. The pages in that mapping will be marked as not present in > the direct map and will be present only in the page table of the owning mm. > > Although normally Linux userspace mappings are protected from other users, > such secret mappings are useful for environments where a hostile tenant is > trying to trick the kernel into giving them access to other tenants > mappings. I continue to struggle with this and I don't recall seeing much enthusiasm from others. Perhaps we're all missing the value point and some additional selling is needed. Am I correct in understanding that the overall direction here is to protect keys (and perhaps other things) from kernel bugs? That if the kernel was bug-free then there would be no need for this feature? If so, that's a bit sad. But realistic I guess. Is this intended to protect keys/etc after the attacker has gained the ability to run arbitrary kernel-mode code? If so, that seems optimistic, doesn't it? I think that a very complete description of the threats which this feature addresses would be helpful. _______________________________________________ Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org To unsubscribe send an email to linux-nvdimm-leave@lists.01.org