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Thu, 08 Oct 2026 07:07:17 +0000 Message-ID: <0632ec1e-dcd3-42f9-bd0c-a809a6f6db09@suse.de> Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2026 09:07:17 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [PATCH] nvme: auth: validate DHCHAP secret before stopping authentication To: Sreeraj S Kurup , linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kbusch@kernel.org, axboe@kernel.dk, hch@lst.de, sagi@grimberg.me References: <0602191a-81ce-4f8a-90d0-b47ba2bc36ac@suse.de> <20261003125115.2523-1-sreekuttan2156239@gmail.com> Content-Language: en-US From: Hannes Reinecke In-Reply-To: <20261003125115.2523-1-sreekuttan2156239@gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Rspamd-Server: rspamd2.dmz-prg2.suse.org X-Spamd-Result: default: False [-4.50 / 50.00]; BAYES_HAM(-3.00)[100.00%]; NEURAL_HAM_LONG(-1.00)[-1.000]; R_DKIM_ALLOW(-0.20)[suse.de:s=susede2_rsa,suse.de:s=susede2_ed25519]; NEURAL_HAM_SHORT(-0.20)[-0.996]; MIME_GOOD(-0.10)[text/plain]; XM_UA_NO_VERSION(0.01)[]; MX_GOOD(-0.01)[]; FREEMAIL_ENVRCPT(0.00)[gmail.com]; RBL_SPAMHAUS_BLOCKED_OPENRESOLVER(0.00)[2a07:de40:b281:104:10:150:64:97:from]; MIME_TRACE(0.00)[0:+]; RECEIVED_SPAMHAUS_BLOCKED_OPENRESOLVER(0.00)[2a07:de40:b281:106:10:150:64:167:received]; ARC_NA(0.00)[]; RCVD_VIA_SMTP_AUTH(0.00)[]; FREEMAIL_TO(0.00)[gmail.com,lists.infradead.org]; MID_RHS_MATCH_FROM(0.00)[]; TO_DN_SOME(0.00)[]; RCVD_TLS_ALL(0.00)[]; FROM_EQ_ENVFROM(0.00)[]; FROM_HAS_DN(0.00)[]; RCPT_COUNT_SEVEN(0.00)[7]; RCVD_COUNT_TWO(0.00)[2]; TO_MATCH_ENVRCPT_ALL(0.00)[]; DBL_BLOCKED_OPENRESOLVER(0.00)[imap1.dmz-prg2.suse.org:helo,imap1.dmz-prg2.suse.org:rdns,suse.de:email,suse.de:dkim]; DKIM_SIGNED(0.00)[suse.de:s=susede2_rsa,suse.de:s=susede2_ed25519]; DKIM_TRACE(0.00)[suse.de:+] X-Rspamd-Action: no action X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: 1BBDC1F786 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.9.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20261008_000721_841504_1FA205A0 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 18.30 ) X-BeenThere: linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.34 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: "Linux-nvme" Errors-To: linux-nvme-bounces+linux-nvme=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org On 10/3/26 2:51 PM, Sreeraj S Kurup wrote: > Hi Hannes, > > Yes, I agree that stopping the currently running authentication when the admin > requests a new one is intentional. > > The issue I was pointing out is slightly different: if the new key is invalid, > we never actually get to the point where the new authentication can be > started again. "nvme_auth_stop()" has already stopped the existing > authentication, and the parser returns an error before the restart > path is reached.> > So the question is whether writing an invalid replacement key should > leave the previous authentication stopped, or whether the key should > first be parsed/validated and only then replace the existing > authentication state.> > If the intended semantics are that an invalid key write should not > disturb an already running authentication, then moving the validation > before "nvme_auth_stop()" would make the operation effectively > transactional:> > validate new key > -> error: leave existing authentication unchanged > -> success: stop old authentication and start with new key > > If, however, the intended semantics are that any attempted replacement > stops the existing authentication even when the replacement is > invalid, then I agree that the current behaviour is intentional and > the patch doesn't fix a bug.> Hmm. Actually, I'm not sure. Both sides have something going for it. Stopping the transaction first follows the perceived will of the admin to start a new authentication. And that will is arguably independent on the question as to whether the new key is valid. But at the same time one cannot start a new authentication if the key is invalid. So I don't know. Let me think. Cheers, Hannes -- Dr. Hannes Reinecke Kernel Storage Architect hare@suse.de +49 911 74053 688 SUSE Software Solutions GmbH, Frankenstr. 146, 90461 Nürnberg HRB 36809 (AG Nürnberg), GF: I. Totev, A. McDonald, W. Knoblich