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From: Kanchan Joshi <joshi.k@samsung.com>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>, Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>,
	linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: block dangerous passthrough operation
Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2022 18:55:02 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221116132502.GA5094@test-zns> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221116130104.2186334-1-hch@lst.de>

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On Wed, Nov 16, 2022 at 02:01:00PM +0100, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
>Hi all,
>
>I recently had to debug some testing code that tried to send fabrics
>commands and caused a major havoc.  This series adds checks for various
>very low-level passthrough commands that have no business sent by anyone
>but the driver itself.  The list might now be complete, so discussion
>is welcome.

Sorry to hear about the trouble, but I am confused how did this
happen.
The old code also did not allow fabrics command and any other
admin command except id-ns variants. Yet this series had to
explicitly disallow admin cmds such create/delete sq/cq and
set-features.

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-11-16 13:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <CGME20221116130636epcas5p39a586e15d27045752f18d022f4efd74a@epcas5p3.samsung.com>
2022-11-16 13:01 ` block dangerous passthrough operation Christoph Hellwig
2022-11-16 13:01   ` [PATCH 1/4] nvme: return an errno from nvme_cmd_allowed Christoph Hellwig
2022-11-16 13:01   ` [PATCH 2/4] nvme: don't allow user space to send fabrics commands Christoph Hellwig
2022-11-16 13:01   ` [PATCH 3/4] nvme: don't allow userspace to set the Host Behavior Support feature Christoph Hellwig
2022-11-16 13:01   ` [PATCH 4/4] nvme: reject passthrough of queue creation / deletion commands Christoph Hellwig
2022-11-16 13:25   ` Kanchan Joshi [this message]
2022-11-16 13:38     ` block dangerous passthrough operation Christoph Hellwig
2022-11-16 13:43       ` Kanchan Joshi
2022-11-16 15:44         ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-11-17  3:13           ` Kanchan Joshi
2022-11-21  7:43             ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-11-16 16:12   ` Keith Busch
2022-11-17  3:51     ` Kanchan Joshi
2022-11-17 16:03       ` Keith Busch
2022-11-17  6:48     ` Chaitanya Kulkarni
2022-11-21  7:45     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-11-17  3:49   ` Jens Axboe
2022-11-21  7:46     ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-11-21 15:35       ` Keith Busch
2022-11-22  6:47         ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-11-22 10:38           ` Sagi Grimberg
2022-11-22 12:03             ` Christoph Hellwig
2022-11-22 15:11           ` Keith Busch

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