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From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>, Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>,
	linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org, Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 05/19] nvme: add nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk()
Date: Wed,  8 May 2024 12:22:51 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240508102305.108949-6-hare@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240508102305.108949-1-hare@kernel.org>

Add a function to derive the TLS PSK as specified TP8018.

Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/nvme/common/auth.c | 90 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/nvme-auth.h  |  2 +
 2 files changed, 92 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c
index 891079c3dbd5..a4ccc4e76581 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c
@@ -684,5 +684,95 @@ int nvme_auth_generate_digest(u8 hmac_id, u8 *psk, size_t psk_len,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_generate_digest);
 
+/*
+ * Derive a TLS PSK as specified in TP8018 Section 3.6.1.3:
+ *   TLS PSK and PSK identity Derivation
+ *
+ * The TLS PSK shall be derived as follows from an input PSK
+ * (i.e., either a retained PSK or a generated PSK) and a PSK
+ * identity using the HKDF-Extract and HKDF-Expand-Label operations
+ * (refer to RFC 5869 and RFC 8446) where the hash function is the
+ * one specified by the hash specifier of the PSK identity:
+ * 1. PRK = HKDF-Extract(0, Input PSK); and
+ * 2. TLS PSK = HKDF-Expand-Label(PRK,"nvme-tls-psk", PskIdentityContext, L),
+ * where PskIdentityContext is the hash identifier indicated in
+ * the PSK identity concatenated to a space character and to the
+ * Base64 PSK digest (i.e., "<hash> <PSK digest>") and L is the
+ * output size in bytes of the hash function (i.e., 32 for SHA-256
+ * and 48 for SHA-384).
+ */
+int nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk(int hmac_id, u8 *psk, size_t psk_len,
+		u8 *psk_digest, u8 **ret_psk)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
+	const char *hmac_name;
+	const char *psk_prefix = "tls13 nvme-tls-psk";
+	size_t info_len, prk_len;
+	char *info;
+	unsigned char *prk, *tls_key;
+	int ret;
+
+	hmac_name = nvme_auth_hmac_name(hmac_id);
+	if (!hmac_name) {
+		pr_warn("%s: invalid hash algoritm %d\n",
+			__func__, hmac_id);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (hmac_id == NVME_AUTH_HASH_SHA512) {
+		pr_warn("%s: unsupported hash algorithm %s\n",
+			__func__, hmac_name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	hmac_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_name, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(hmac_tfm))
+		return PTR_ERR(hmac_tfm);
+
+	prk_len = crypto_shash_digestsize(hmac_tfm);
+	prk = kzalloc(prk_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!prk) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out_free_shash;
+	}
+
+	ret = hkdf_extract(hmac_tfm, psk, psk_len, prk);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_free_prk;
+
+	ret = crypto_shash_setkey(hmac_tfm, prk, prk_len);
+	if (ret)
+		goto out_free_prk;
+
+	info_len = strlen(psk_digest) + strlen(psk_prefix) + 1;
+	info = kzalloc(info_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!info)
+		goto out_free_prk;
+
+	memcpy(info, psk_prefix, strlen(psk_prefix));
+	memcpy(info + strlen(psk_prefix), psk_digest, strlen(psk_digest));
+
+	tls_key = kzalloc(psk_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tls_key) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out_free_info;
+	}
+	ret = hkdf_expand(hmac_tfm, info, strlen(info), tls_key, psk_len);
+	if (ret) {
+		kfree(tls_key);
+		goto out_free_info;
+	}
+	*ret_psk = tls_key;
+
+out_free_info:
+	kfree(info);
+out_free_prk:
+	kfree(prk);
+out_free_shash:
+	crypto_free_shash(hmac_tfm);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk);
+
 MODULE_DESCRIPTION("NVMe Authentication framework");
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
diff --git a/include/linux/nvme-auth.h b/include/linux/nvme-auth.h
index 998f06bf10fd..60e069a6757f 100644
--- a/include/linux/nvme-auth.h
+++ b/include/linux/nvme-auth.h
@@ -45,5 +45,7 @@ int nvme_auth_generate_psk(u8 hmac_id, u8 *skey, size_t skey_len,
 			   u8 **ret_psk, size_t *ret_len);
 int nvme_auth_generate_digest(u8 hmac_id, u8 *psk, size_t psk_len,
 		char *subsysnqn, char *hostnqn, u8 **ret_digest);
+int nvme_auth_derive_tls_psk(int hmac_id, u8 *psk, size_t psk_len,
+		u8 *psk_digest, u8 **ret_psk);
 
 #endif /* _NVME_AUTH_H */
-- 
2.35.3



  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-05-08 10:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-05-08 10:22 [PATCHv4 00/19] nvme: implement secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:22 ` [PATCH 01/19] nvme-keyring: restrict match length for version '1' identifiers Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:22 ` [PATCH 02/19] crypto,fs: Separate out hkdf_extract() and hkdf_expand() Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:22 ` [PATCH 03/19] nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_psk() Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:22 ` [PATCH 04/19] nvme: add nvme_auth_generate_digest() Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:22 ` Hannes Reinecke [this message]
2024-05-08 10:22 ` [PATCH 06/19] nvme-keyring: add nvme_tls_psk_refresh() Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:22 ` [PATCH 07/19] nvme-tcp: sanitize TLS key handling Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:22 ` [PATCH 08/19] nvme-tcp: check for invalidated or revoked key Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:22 ` [PATCH 09/19] nvme: add a newline to the 'tls_key' sysfs attribute Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:22 ` [PATCH 10/19] nvme-sysfs: add 'tls_configured_key' " Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:22 ` [PATCH 11/19] nvme-sysfs: add 'tls_keyring' attribute Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:22 ` [PATCH 12/19] nvme-tcp: request secure channel concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:22 ` [PATCH 13/19] nvme-fabrics: reset connection for secure concatenation Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:23 ` [PATCH 14/19] nvme-tcp: reset after recovery " Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:23 ` [PATCH 15/19] nvme-tcp: do not start queues when TLS is not enabled " Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:23 ` [PATCH 16/19] nvmet-auth: allow to clear DH-HMAC-CHAP keys Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:23 ` [PATCH 17/19] nvme-target: do not check authentication status for admin commands twice Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:23 ` [PATCH 18/19] nvme-target: do not check authentication status for I/O " Hannes Reinecke
2024-05-08 10:23 ` [PATCH 19/19] nvmet-tcp: support secure channel concatenation Hannes Reinecke

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