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From: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
To: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>, Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>,
	linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org, Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 01/12] nvme-auth: modify nvme_auth_transform_key() to return status
Date: Fri, 25 Apr 2025 11:49:16 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250425094927.102656-2-hare@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250425094927.102656-1-hare@kernel.org>

Modify nvme_auth_transform_key() to return a status and provide
the transformed data as argument on the command line as raw data.

Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/nvme/common/auth.c | 80 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 drivers/nvme/host/auth.c   | 40 ++++++++++---------
 drivers/nvme/target/auth.c | 36 ++++++++---------
 include/linux/nvme-auth.h  |  4 +-
 4 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c
index 2c092ec8c0a9..d6dfc4ff39a2 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/common/auth.c
@@ -237,81 +237,97 @@ void nvme_auth_free_key(struct nvme_dhchap_key *key)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_free_key);
 
-struct nvme_dhchap_key *nvme_auth_transform_key(
-		struct nvme_dhchap_key *key, char *nqn)
+int nvme_auth_transform_key(struct nvme_dhchap_key *key, char *nqn,
+			    u8 **transformed_secret)
 {
 	const char *hmac_name;
 	struct crypto_shash *key_tfm;
 	struct shash_desc *shash;
-	struct nvme_dhchap_key *transformed_key;
-	int ret, key_len;
+	u8 *transformed_data;
+	u8 *key_data;
+	size_t transformed_len;
+	int ret;
 
 	if (!key) {
 		pr_warn("No key specified\n");
-		return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+		return -ENOKEY;
 	}
+	key_data = kzalloc(key->len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!key_data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	memcpy(key_data, key->key, key->len);
 	if (key->hash == 0) {
-		key_len = nvme_auth_key_struct_size(key->len);
-		transformed_key = kmemdup(key, key_len, GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (!transformed_key)
-			return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-		return transformed_key;
+		*transformed_secret = key_data;
+		return key->len;
 	}
 	hmac_name = nvme_auth_hmac_name(key->hash);
 	if (!hmac_name) {
 		pr_warn("Invalid key hash id %d\n", key->hash);
-		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_free_data;
 	}
 
 	key_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_name, 0, 0);
-	if (IS_ERR(key_tfm))
-		return ERR_CAST(key_tfm);
+	if (IS_ERR(key_tfm)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(key_tfm);
+		goto out_free_data;
+	}
+
+	transformed_len = crypto_shash_digestsize(key_tfm);
+	if (transformed_len != key->len) {
+		pr_warn("incompatible digest size %ld for key (hash %s, len %ld)\n",
+			transformed_len, hmac_name, key->len);
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto out_free_tfm;
+	}
+
+	transformed_data = kzalloc(transformed_len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!transformed_data) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out_free_tfm;
+	}
 
 	shash = kmalloc(sizeof(struct shash_desc) +
 			crypto_shash_descsize(key_tfm),
 			GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!shash) {
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
-		goto out_free_key;
-	}
-
-	key_len = crypto_shash_digestsize(key_tfm);
-	transformed_key = nvme_auth_alloc_key(key_len, key->hash);
-	if (!transformed_key) {
-		ret = -ENOMEM;
-		goto out_free_shash;
+		goto out_free_transformed_data;
 	}
 
 	shash->tfm = key_tfm;
 	ret = crypto_shash_setkey(key_tfm, key->key, key->len);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out_free_transformed_key;
+		goto out_free_shash;
 	ret = crypto_shash_init(shash);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out_free_transformed_key;
+		goto out_free_shash;
 	ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, nqn, strlen(nqn));
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out_free_transformed_key;
+		goto out_free_shash;
 	ret = crypto_shash_update(shash, "NVMe-over-Fabrics", 17);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out_free_transformed_key;
-	ret = crypto_shash_final(shash, transformed_key->key);
+		goto out_free_shash;
+	ret = crypto_shash_final(shash, transformed_data);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out_free_transformed_key;
+		goto out_free_shash;
 
 	kfree(shash);
 	crypto_free_shash(key_tfm);
+	*transformed_secret = transformed_data;
 
-	return transformed_key;
+	return transformed_len;
 
-out_free_transformed_key:
-	nvme_auth_free_key(transformed_key);
 out_free_shash:
 	kfree(shash);
-out_free_key:
+out_free_transformed_data:
+	kfree(transformed_data);
+out_free_tfm:
 	crypto_free_shash(key_tfm);
+out_free_data:
+	kfree(key_data);
 
-	return ERR_PTR(ret);
+	return ret;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_auth_transform_key);
 
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
index 6115fef74c1e..4b6dc1dd5f66 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/host/auth.c
@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@ struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context {
 	struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl;
 	struct crypto_shash *shash_tfm;
 	struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm;
-	struct nvme_dhchap_key *transformed_key;
+	u8 *transformed_secret;
+	size_t transformed_len;
 	void *buf;
 	int qid;
 	int error;
@@ -436,21 +437,20 @@ static int nvme_auth_dhchap_setup_host_response(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
 	dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d host response seq %u transaction %d\n",
 		__func__, chap->qid, chap->s1, chap->transaction);
 
-	if (!chap->transformed_key) {
-		chap->transformed_key = nvme_auth_transform_key(ctrl->host_key,
-						ctrl->opts->host->nqn);
-		if (IS_ERR(chap->transformed_key)) {
-			ret = PTR_ERR(chap->transformed_key);
-			chap->transformed_key = NULL;
+	if (!chap->transformed_secret) {
+		ret = nvme_auth_transform_key(ctrl->host_key,
+					      ctrl->opts->host->nqn,
+					      &chap->transformed_secret);
+		if (ret < 0)
 			return ret;
-		}
+		chap->transformed_len = ret;
 	} else {
 		dev_dbg(ctrl->device, "%s: qid %d re-using host response\n",
 			__func__, chap->qid);
 	}
 
 	ret = crypto_shash_setkey(chap->shash_tfm,
-			chap->transformed_key->key, chap->transformed_key->len);
+			chap->transformed_secret, chap->transformed_len);
 	if (ret) {
 		dev_warn(ctrl->device, "qid %d: failed to set key, error %d\n",
 			 chap->qid, ret);
@@ -516,19 +516,20 @@ static int nvme_auth_dhchap_setup_ctrl_response(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
 		struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap)
 {
 	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, chap->shash_tfm);
-	struct nvme_dhchap_key *transformed_key;
+	u8 *transformed_secret;
+	size_t transformed_len;
 	u8 buf[4], *challenge = chap->c2;
 	int ret;
 
-	transformed_key = nvme_auth_transform_key(ctrl->ctrl_key,
-				ctrl->opts->subsysnqn);
-	if (IS_ERR(transformed_key)) {
-		ret = PTR_ERR(transformed_key);
+	ret = nvme_auth_transform_key(ctrl->ctrl_key,
+			ctrl->opts->subsysnqn,
+			&transformed_secret);
+	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
-	}
+	transformed_len = ret;
 
 	ret = crypto_shash_setkey(chap->shash_tfm,
-			transformed_key->key, transformed_key->len);
+			transformed_secret, transformed_len);
 	if (ret) {
 		dev_warn(ctrl->device, "qid %d: failed to set key, error %d\n",
 			 chap->qid, ret);
@@ -594,7 +595,7 @@ static int nvme_auth_dhchap_setup_ctrl_response(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
 out:
 	if (challenge != chap->c2)
 		kfree(challenge);
-	nvme_auth_free_key(transformed_key);
+	kfree(transformed_secret);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -656,8 +657,9 @@ static int nvme_auth_dhchap_exponential(struct nvme_ctrl *ctrl,
 
 static void nvme_auth_reset_dhchap(struct nvme_dhchap_queue_context *chap)
 {
-	nvme_auth_free_key(chap->transformed_key);
-	chap->transformed_key = NULL;
+	kfree(chap->transformed_secret);
+	chap->transformed_secret = NULL;
+	chap->transformed_len = 0;
 	kfree_sensitive(chap->host_key);
 	chap->host_key = NULL;
 	chap->host_key_len = 0;
diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c b/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c
index cef8d77f477b..46a25b76544d 100644
--- a/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c
+++ b/drivers/nvme/target/auth.c
@@ -294,7 +294,8 @@ int nvmet_auth_host_hash(struct nvmet_req *req, u8 *response,
 	struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl = req->sq->ctrl;
 	const char *hash_name;
 	u8 *challenge = req->sq->dhchap_c1;
-	struct nvme_dhchap_key *transformed_key;
+	u8 *transformed_secret;
+	size_t transformed_len;
 	u8 buf[4];
 	int ret;
 
@@ -318,15 +319,14 @@ int nvmet_auth_host_hash(struct nvmet_req *req, u8 *response,
 		goto out_free_tfm;
 	}
 
-	transformed_key = nvme_auth_transform_key(ctrl->host_key,
-						  ctrl->hostnqn);
-	if (IS_ERR(transformed_key)) {
-		ret = PTR_ERR(transformed_key);
+	ret = nvme_auth_transform_key(ctrl->host_key, ctrl->hostnqn,
+				      &transformed_secret);
+	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out_free_tfm;
-	}
 
-	ret = crypto_shash_setkey(shash_tfm, transformed_key->key,
-				  transformed_key->len);
+	transformed_len = ret;
+	ret = crypto_shash_setkey(shash_tfm, transformed_secret,
+				  transformed_len);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out_free_response;
 
@@ -394,7 +394,7 @@ int nvmet_auth_host_hash(struct nvmet_req *req, u8 *response,
 	if (challenge != req->sq->dhchap_c1)
 		kfree(challenge);
 out_free_response:
-	nvme_auth_free_key(transformed_key);
+	kfree(transformed_secret);
 out_free_tfm:
 	crypto_free_shash(shash_tfm);
 	return ret;
@@ -408,7 +408,8 @@ int nvmet_auth_ctrl_hash(struct nvmet_req *req, u8 *response,
 	struct nvmet_ctrl *ctrl = req->sq->ctrl;
 	const char *hash_name;
 	u8 *challenge = req->sq->dhchap_c2;
-	struct nvme_dhchap_key *transformed_key;
+	u8 *transformed_secret;
+	size_t transformed_len;
 	u8 buf[4];
 	int ret;
 
@@ -432,15 +433,14 @@ int nvmet_auth_ctrl_hash(struct nvmet_req *req, u8 *response,
 		goto out_free_tfm;
 	}
 
-	transformed_key = nvme_auth_transform_key(ctrl->ctrl_key,
-						ctrl->subsysnqn);
-	if (IS_ERR(transformed_key)) {
-		ret = PTR_ERR(transformed_key);
+	ret = nvme_auth_transform_key(ctrl->ctrl_key, ctrl->subsysnqn,
+				      &transformed_secret);
+	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out_free_tfm;
-	}
+	transformed_len = ret;
 
-	ret = crypto_shash_setkey(shash_tfm, transformed_key->key,
-				  transformed_key->len);
+	ret = crypto_shash_setkey(shash_tfm, transformed_secret,
+				  transformed_len);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out_free_response;
 
@@ -505,7 +505,7 @@ int nvmet_auth_ctrl_hash(struct nvmet_req *req, u8 *response,
 	if (challenge != req->sq->dhchap_c2)
 		kfree(challenge);
 out_free_response:
-	nvme_auth_free_key(transformed_key);
+	kfree(transformed_secret);
 out_free_tfm:
 	crypto_free_shash(shash_tfm);
 	return ret;
diff --git a/include/linux/nvme-auth.h b/include/linux/nvme-auth.h
index 60e069a6757f..fd43fa042c88 100644
--- a/include/linux/nvme-auth.h
+++ b/include/linux/nvme-auth.h
@@ -29,8 +29,8 @@ struct nvme_dhchap_key *nvme_auth_extract_key(unsigned char *secret,
 					      u8 key_hash);
 void nvme_auth_free_key(struct nvme_dhchap_key *key);
 struct nvme_dhchap_key *nvme_auth_alloc_key(u32 len, u8 hash);
-struct nvme_dhchap_key *nvme_auth_transform_key(
-				struct nvme_dhchap_key *key, char *nqn);
+int nvme_auth_transform_key(struct nvme_dhchap_key *key, char *nqn,
+			    u8 **transformed_secret) ;
 int nvme_auth_generate_key(u8 *secret, struct nvme_dhchap_key **ret_key);
 int nvme_auth_augmented_challenge(u8 hmac_id, u8 *skey, size_t skey_len,
 				  u8 *challenge, u8 *aug, size_t hlen);
-- 
2.35.3



  reply	other threads:[~2025-04-25 11:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-04-25  9:49 [PATCH 00/12] nvme-auth: switch to use the kernel keyring Hannes Reinecke
2025-04-25  9:49 ` Hannes Reinecke [this message]
2025-05-07  7:24   ` [PATCH 01/12] nvme-auth: modify nvme_auth_transform_key() to return status Christoph Hellwig
2025-05-07  7:29     ` Hannes Reinecke
2025-04-25  9:49 ` [PATCH 02/12] nvme-auth: use SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK Hannes Reinecke
2025-05-07  7:28   ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-05-07  7:29     ` Hannes Reinecke
2025-05-07  7:35       ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-04-25  9:49 ` [PATCH 03/12] nvmet-auth: " Hannes Reinecke
2025-04-25  9:49 ` [PATCH 04/12] nvme-auth: do not cache the transformed secret Hannes Reinecke
2025-05-07  7:25   ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-04-25  9:49 ` [PATCH 05/12] nvme-keyring: add 'dhchap' key type Hannes Reinecke
2025-04-25  9:49 ` [PATCH 06/12] nvme-auth: switch to use 'struct key' Hannes Reinecke
2025-04-25  9:49 ` [PATCH 07/12] nvme-auth: drop nvme_dhchap_key structure and unused functions Hannes Reinecke
2025-05-07  7:26   ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-05-07  7:30     ` Hannes Reinecke
2025-04-25  9:49 ` [PATCH 08/12] nvme: parse dhchap keys during option parsing Hannes Reinecke
2025-04-25  9:49 ` [PATCH 09/12] nvmet-auth: parse dhchap key from configfs attribute Hannes Reinecke
2025-04-25  9:49 ` [PATCH 10/12] nvme: allow to pass in key serial number as dhchap secret Hannes Reinecke
2025-04-25  9:49 ` [PATCH 11/12] nvme-auth: wait for authentication to finish when changing keys Hannes Reinecke
2025-04-25  9:49 ` [PATCH 12/12] nvme: Unify Kconfig settings Hannes Reinecke
2025-05-07  7:23   ` Christoph Hellwig
2025-05-07  7:30     ` Hannes Reinecke
2025-05-07  7:19 ` [PATCH 00/12] nvme-auth: switch to use the kernel keyring Christoph Hellwig
2025-05-07  7:42   ` Hannes Reinecke
2025-05-07  7:53 ` Sagi Grimberg

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