From: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
To: Chuck Lever <cel@kernel.org>
Cc: Donald Hunter <donald.hunter@gmail.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>,
Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>, Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>, Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>,
Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com>,
Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>, NeilBrown <neil@brown.name>,
Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev@redhat.com>,
Dai Ngo <Dai.Ngo@oracle.com>, Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
kernel-tls-handshake@lists.linux.dev, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org,
Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v3 00/10] Deliver TLS session tags to upper-layer consumers (NFSD)
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 16:35:52 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261119163552.GZ860048@horms.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261113-tls-session-tags-v3-0-91271964cdb0@kernel.org>
On Fri, Nov 13, 2026 at 02:21:58PM -0500, Chuck Lever wrote:
> NFSD controls remote access to its exports today by IP address and
> hostname. Neither of these are cryptographically secure. For
> instance, a MitM can replace the response to a server's plaintext
> DNS query. As a result, a malicious NFS client can pretend to be a
> client whose hostname matches one that has access to exports it
> would otherwise be denied access to.
>
> So instead, we want access-control decisions to be based on
> cryptographically-vetted objects such as TLS peer-certificates.
> In-kernel x.509 parsing would duplicate work mature userspace
> libraries already do, so let's make tlshd evaluate peer certificates
> in user space.
>
> The certificates are evaluated against admin-defined policy, such
> as whether the certificate's Issuer matches a particular string.
> tlshd then marks NFS TLS sessions with those policy matches. Admins
> also provide a set of policy names on each NFSD export (allow_tags).
> Computing the intersection with these per-export tags is quick and
> completely separate from the details of parsing x.509 certificates.
>
> A yet-to-be-posted patch series introduces tag set support to the
> exportfs command in nfs-utils. tlshd 1.5.0, current as of this
> writing, already implements TLS session tagging.
Hi Chuck, all,
FYI, while looking over this patchset I noticed that CI flags
shadow len variables in ynl generated C code.
I believe this is a bug in ynl-gen and have posted a patch to try to
address it.
- [PATCH net-next] tools: ynl-gen: avoid shadow local variable declarations
https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20261119-ynl-scope-v1-1-d3b0c964d4cb@kernel.org/
...
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-19 16:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-13 19:21 [PATCH net-next v3 00/10] Deliver TLS session tags to upper-layer consumers (NFSD) Chuck Lever
2026-11-13 19:21 ` [PATCH net-next v3 01/10] handshake: Add tags to "done" downcall Chuck Lever
2026-11-14 19:22 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-13 19:22 ` [PATCH net-next v3 02/10] lib: Add a "stringset" data structure Chuck Lever
2026-11-13 19:22 ` [PATCH net-next v3 03/10] lib: Add KUnit tests for the stringset " Chuck Lever
2026-11-13 19:22 ` [PATCH net-next v3 04/10] handshake: Add a session-tags argument to the TLS done callback Chuck Lever
2026-11-13 19:22 ` [PATCH net-next v3 05/10] handshake: Pick up session tags passed during the DONE downcall Chuck Lever
2026-11-13 19:22 ` [PATCH net-next v3 06/10] handshake: Add a kunit test for the completion gate Chuck Lever
2026-11-13 19:22 ` [PATCH net-next v3 07/10] handshake: Advertise the session-tag cap to user space Chuck Lever
2026-11-13 19:22 ` [PATCH net-next v3 08/10] SUNRPC: Copy the TLS session tags when they are available Chuck Lever
2026-11-13 19:22 ` [PATCH net-next v3 09/10] NFSD: Implement export tagging Chuck Lever
2026-11-13 19:22 ` [PATCH net-next v3 10/10] NFSD: Add allow_tags to the netlink export interface Chuck Lever
2026-11-14 19:22 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-19 16:35 ` Simon Horman [this message]
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