From: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
To: Shivam Kumar <kumar.shivam43666@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>,
security@kernel.org, hch@lst.de, sagi@grimberg.me,
kch@nvidia.com, linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org,
stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] nvmet-tcp: fix out-of-bounds write when receiving an over-long PDU
Date: Mon, 24 Aug 2026 18:59:14 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aozo4lBg1fhoojdP@kbusch-mbp> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260814194811.1581041-1-kumar.shivam43666@gmail.com>
On Fri, Aug 14, 2026 at 03:48:11PM -0400, Shivam Kumar wrote:
> nvmet_tcp_try_recv_pdu() reads a PDU header into the fixed 128-byte
> queue->pdu union, then computes the remaining payload length as
>
> queue->left = hdr->hlen - queue->offset + hdgst;
>
> and reads that many more bytes into &queue->pdu + queue->offset, without
> ever bounding the result against sizeof(queue->pdu).
>
> A struct nvme_tcp_icreq_pdu is itself 128 bytes, exactly the size of the
> union. Once a header digest has been negotiated (hdgst = 4), a second
> ICReq passes the hlen == nvmet_tcp_pdu_size() check but yields
> queue->left = 128 - 8 + 4 = 124, so bytes 8..132 are written into the
> 128-byte buffer -- 4 bytes past its end, over queue->hdr_digest and
> queue->data_digest. Those bytes are attacker-controlled (an ICReq
> carries no digest), and the duplicate ICReq is only rejected later,
> after the overflow. A remote unauthenticated host can thus corrupt
> kernel memory adjacent to the receive buffer.
>
> Reject any PDU whose declared length would read past the end of
> queue->pdu before the second recv.
Thanks, applied to nvme-7.3.
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-25 0:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <2026081459-handoff-wildly-eeb5@gregkh>
2026-08-14 19:48 ` [PATCH] nvmet-tcp: fix out-of-bounds write when receiving an over-long PDU Shivam Kumar
2026-08-19 16:58 ` Shivam Kumar
2026-08-22 22:48 ` Sagi Grimberg
2026-08-25 0:59 ` Keith Busch [this message]
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