Linux-NVME Archive on lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Hannes Reinecke" <hare@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/9] nvme-keyring: add 'dhchap' key type
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 11:28:16 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-225040@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261120-dhchap-keyring-v4-v4-2-5f8c7d9926ee@kernel.org>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential
issues to consider:
- [Critical] nvme-keyring: out-of-bounds reads and underflows in
  nvme_dhchap_psk_preparse()
- [High] nvme-keyring: uninitialized keylen used in
  nvme_dhchap_psk_preparse()
- [Medium] nvme-keyring: unsigned error check and size mismatch in
  nvme_dhchap_psk_read()
- [Medium] nvme-keyring: out-of-bounds memcmp() in
  nvme_dhchap_psk_match()
--

commit 329ebc74c917187a04d7c54885592dcb5f74d0dd
Author: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>

nvme-keyring: add 'dhchap' key type

This commit adds a 'dhchap' key type to store DH-HMAC-CHAP secret keys with
a user-type compatible payload and a read callback that formats keys in their
base64-encoded representation.

> diff --git a/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c b/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c
> index 87cb51e1f5a7f..96561f2dd81b8 100644
> --- a/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c
> +++ b/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -253,6 +256,212 @@ key_serial_t nvme_tls_psk_default(struct key *keyring,
>  }
>  EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_tls_psk_default);
>  
> +static void nvme_dhchap_psk_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
> +{
> +	seq_puts(m, key->description);
> +	seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen);
> +}
> +
> +static bool nvme_dhchap_psk_match(const struct key *key,
> +				  const struct key_match_data *match_data)
> +{
> +	const char *match_id;
> +	size_t match_len;
> +
> +	if (!key->description) {
> +		pr_debug("%s: no key description\n", __func__);
> +		return false;
> +	}
> +	if (!match_data->raw_data) {
> +		pr_debug("%s: no match data\n", __func__);
> +		return false;
> +	}
> +	match_id = match_data->raw_data;
> +	match_len = strlen(match_id);
> +	pr_debug("%s: match '%s' '%s' len %zd\n",
> +		 __func__, match_id, key->description, match_len);
> +
> +	return !memcmp(key->description, match_id, match_len);
> +}

[Severity: Medium]
Can memcmp() read past the end of key->description here?  key_alloc()
allocates strlen(key->description) + 1 bytes, so searching with a match_id
longer than key->description reads out of bounds, while a shorter match_id
matches any key whose description shares that prefix.

[ ... ]

> +static int nvme_dhchap_psk_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> +{
> +	struct user_key_payload *upayload;
> +	size_t datalen = prep->datalen, keylen;
> +	int ret;
> +	u32 crc;
> +	u8 version, hmac;
> +
> +	if (!prep->data) {
> +		pr_debug("%s: Empty data", __func__);
> +		prep->payload.data[0] = NULL;
> +		prep->quotalen = 0;
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (sscanf(prep->data, "DHHC-%01hhu:%02hhu:%*s",
> +		   &version, &hmac) != 2) {
> +		pr_debug("%s: invalid key data '%s'\n", __func__,
> +			 (char *)prep->data);
> +		prep->payload.data[0] = NULL;
> +		prep->quotalen = 0;
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* skip header and final ':' character */
> +	datalen -= 11;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * payload is < key | version | hmac >
> +	 * base64 decode will always return less data
> +	 * than the encoded data, so allocating the size
> +	 * of the encoded data will be large enough.
> +	 */
> +	upayload = kzalloc(sizeof(*upayload) + datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!upayload) {
> +		prep->payload.data[0] = NULL;
> +		prep->quotalen = 0;
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* decode the data */
> +	prep->quotalen = keylen;

[Severity: High]
Isn't keylen uninitialized when assigned to prep->quotalen?
generic_key_instantiate() passes prep->quotalen to key_payload_reserve(),
corrupting per-user key quota accounting and exposing the lower 16 bits of
the stack value via key->datalen in /proc/keys.

> +	prep->payload.data[0] = upayload;
> +	ret = base64_decode(prep->data + 10, datalen, upayload->data,
> +			    true, BASE64_STD);
> +	if (ret < 0) {
> +		pr_debug("%s: Failed to decode key %s\n",
> +			 __func__, (char *)prep->data + 10);
> +		return ret;
> +	}
> +	ret -= 4;
> +	crc = ~crc32(~0, upayload->data, ret);

[Severity: Critical]
Can malformed or short payloads from add_key() trigger out-of-bounds reads
and integer underflows in nvme_dhchap_psk_preparse()?

add_key() copies plen bytes from userspace into prep->data without appending
a NUL terminator, so sscanf() and the pr_debug() %s calls can read past
prep->data + prep->datalen.  Because %*s is assignment-suppressed and
%02hhu matches one or two digits, sscanf() can also return 2 when
prep->datalen < 11 (for example, "DHHC-1:01"), causing datalen -= 11 to
underflow and wrap sizeof(*upayload) + datalen in kzalloc().

Even when prep->datalen >= 11, if base64_decode() returns 0..3 (such as on
an 11-byte payload "DHHC-1:01::"), ret -= 4 becomes negative and wraps to
SIZE_MAX - 3 .. SIZE_MAX when passed as size_t len to crc32().  In addition,
base64_decode() returns -1 on error, which leaks out as -EPERM instead of
-EINVAL, and the decoded key length is never checked against the valid
DH-HMAC-CHAP sizes (32, 48, or 64 bytes).

[ ... ]

> +static long nvme_dhchap_psk_read(const struct key *key,
> +				 char *buffer, size_t buflen)
> +{
> +	const struct user_key_payload *upayload;
> +	size_t datalen, keylen;
> +	u8 version, hmac;
> +	long ret;
> +
> +	upayload = user_key_payload_locked(key);
> +	/*
> +	 * Expected output string length:
> +	 * strlen("DHHC-") +
> +	 * version (= 1) +
> +	 * ':' (= 1) +
> +	 * hmac (= 2) +
> +	 * ':' (= 1) +
> +	 * encoded base64 key length +
> +	 * CRC length (= 4) +
> +	 * ':' (= 1)
> +	 */
> +	keylen = nvme_dhchap_decoded_key_size(upayload->datalen) + 15;
> +	if (keylen < 0 || !buffer || buflen == 0)
> +		return keylen;
> +
> +	if (buflen < keylen)
> +		return -EINVAL;

[Severity: Medium]
Since keylen is an unsigned size_t, is keylen < 0 always false here?
Adding 15 before checking for an error also turns -EINVAL from
nvme_dhchap_decoded_key_size() into -7 (-E2BIG), and double-counts the
4-byte CRC because nvme_dhchap_decoded_key_size() already returns the
encoded length of the key plus CRC (48, 72, or 92 bytes), so the total
formatted length is 4 bytes larger than what nvme_dhchap_psk_read()
actually writes (+ 11).

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261120-dhchap-keyring-v4-v4-0-5f8c7d9926ee@kernel.org?part=2


  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-20 11:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-20 11:13 [PATCH v4 0/9] nvme-auth: switch to use the kernel keyring Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 1/9] nvme-auth: modify nvme_auth_transform_key() to return status Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:19   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 2/9] nvme-keyring: add 'dhchap' key type Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:28   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 3/9] nvme-auth: switch to use 'struct key' Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 4/9] nvme: parse dhchap keys during option parsing Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 5/9] nvmet-auth: parse dhchap key from configfs attribute Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 6/9] nvme: allow to pass in key description as dhchap secret Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 7/9] nvme-auth: wait for authentication to finish when changing keys Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:26   ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 8/9] nvme-fabrics: allow to pass in keyring by name Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 9/9] nvmet: add configfs attribute 'dhchap_keyring' Hannes Reinecke

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=sashiko-outbox-225040@kernel.org \
    --to=sashiko-bot@kernel.org \
    --cc=hare@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox