From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Hannes Reinecke" <hare@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/9] nvme-keyring: add 'dhchap' key type
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 11:28:16 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <sashiko-outbox-225040@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261120-dhchap-keyring-v4-v4-2-5f8c7d9926ee@kernel.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential
issues to consider:
- [Critical] nvme-keyring: out-of-bounds reads and underflows in
nvme_dhchap_psk_preparse()
- [High] nvme-keyring: uninitialized keylen used in
nvme_dhchap_psk_preparse()
- [Medium] nvme-keyring: unsigned error check and size mismatch in
nvme_dhchap_psk_read()
- [Medium] nvme-keyring: out-of-bounds memcmp() in
nvme_dhchap_psk_match()
--
commit 329ebc74c917187a04d7c54885592dcb5f74d0dd
Author: Hannes Reinecke <hare@kernel.org>
nvme-keyring: add 'dhchap' key type
This commit adds a 'dhchap' key type to store DH-HMAC-CHAP secret keys with
a user-type compatible payload and a read callback that formats keys in their
base64-encoded representation.
> diff --git a/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c b/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c
> index 87cb51e1f5a7f..96561f2dd81b8 100644
> --- a/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c
> +++ b/drivers/nvme/common/keyring.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -253,6 +256,212 @@ key_serial_t nvme_tls_psk_default(struct key *keyring,
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nvme_tls_psk_default);
>
> +static void nvme_dhchap_psk_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
> +{
> + seq_puts(m, key->description);
> + seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen);
> +}
> +
> +static bool nvme_dhchap_psk_match(const struct key *key,
> + const struct key_match_data *match_data)
> +{
> + const char *match_id;
> + size_t match_len;
> +
> + if (!key->description) {
> + pr_debug("%s: no key description\n", __func__);
> + return false;
> + }
> + if (!match_data->raw_data) {
> + pr_debug("%s: no match data\n", __func__);
> + return false;
> + }
> + match_id = match_data->raw_data;
> + match_len = strlen(match_id);
> + pr_debug("%s: match '%s' '%s' len %zd\n",
> + __func__, match_id, key->description, match_len);
> +
> + return !memcmp(key->description, match_id, match_len);
> +}
[Severity: Medium]
Can memcmp() read past the end of key->description here? key_alloc()
allocates strlen(key->description) + 1 bytes, so searching with a match_id
longer than key->description reads out of bounds, while a shorter match_id
matches any key whose description shares that prefix.
[ ... ]
> +static int nvme_dhchap_psk_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
> +{
> + struct user_key_payload *upayload;
> + size_t datalen = prep->datalen, keylen;
> + int ret;
> + u32 crc;
> + u8 version, hmac;
> +
> + if (!prep->data) {
> + pr_debug("%s: Empty data", __func__);
> + prep->payload.data[0] = NULL;
> + prep->quotalen = 0;
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + if (sscanf(prep->data, "DHHC-%01hhu:%02hhu:%*s",
> + &version, &hmac) != 2) {
> + pr_debug("%s: invalid key data '%s'\n", __func__,
> + (char *)prep->data);
> + prep->payload.data[0] = NULL;
> + prep->quotalen = 0;
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + /* skip header and final ':' character */
> + datalen -= 11;
> +
> + /*
> + * payload is < key | version | hmac >
> + * base64 decode will always return less data
> + * than the encoded data, so allocating the size
> + * of the encoded data will be large enough.
> + */
> + upayload = kzalloc(sizeof(*upayload) + datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!upayload) {
> + prep->payload.data[0] = NULL;
> + prep->quotalen = 0;
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + }
> +
> + /* decode the data */
> + prep->quotalen = keylen;
[Severity: High]
Isn't keylen uninitialized when assigned to prep->quotalen?
generic_key_instantiate() passes prep->quotalen to key_payload_reserve(),
corrupting per-user key quota accounting and exposing the lower 16 bits of
the stack value via key->datalen in /proc/keys.
> + prep->payload.data[0] = upayload;
> + ret = base64_decode(prep->data + 10, datalen, upayload->data,
> + true, BASE64_STD);
> + if (ret < 0) {
> + pr_debug("%s: Failed to decode key %s\n",
> + __func__, (char *)prep->data + 10);
> + return ret;
> + }
> + ret -= 4;
> + crc = ~crc32(~0, upayload->data, ret);
[Severity: Critical]
Can malformed or short payloads from add_key() trigger out-of-bounds reads
and integer underflows in nvme_dhchap_psk_preparse()?
add_key() copies plen bytes from userspace into prep->data without appending
a NUL terminator, so sscanf() and the pr_debug() %s calls can read past
prep->data + prep->datalen. Because %*s is assignment-suppressed and
%02hhu matches one or two digits, sscanf() can also return 2 when
prep->datalen < 11 (for example, "DHHC-1:01"), causing datalen -= 11 to
underflow and wrap sizeof(*upayload) + datalen in kzalloc().
Even when prep->datalen >= 11, if base64_decode() returns 0..3 (such as on
an 11-byte payload "DHHC-1:01::"), ret -= 4 becomes negative and wraps to
SIZE_MAX - 3 .. SIZE_MAX when passed as size_t len to crc32(). In addition,
base64_decode() returns -1 on error, which leaks out as -EPERM instead of
-EINVAL, and the decoded key length is never checked against the valid
DH-HMAC-CHAP sizes (32, 48, or 64 bytes).
[ ... ]
> +static long nvme_dhchap_psk_read(const struct key *key,
> + char *buffer, size_t buflen)
> +{
> + const struct user_key_payload *upayload;
> + size_t datalen, keylen;
> + u8 version, hmac;
> + long ret;
> +
> + upayload = user_key_payload_locked(key);
> + /*
> + * Expected output string length:
> + * strlen("DHHC-") +
> + * version (= 1) +
> + * ':' (= 1) +
> + * hmac (= 2) +
> + * ':' (= 1) +
> + * encoded base64 key length +
> + * CRC length (= 4) +
> + * ':' (= 1)
> + */
> + keylen = nvme_dhchap_decoded_key_size(upayload->datalen) + 15;
> + if (keylen < 0 || !buffer || buflen == 0)
> + return keylen;
> +
> + if (buflen < keylen)
> + return -EINVAL;
[Severity: Medium]
Since keylen is an unsigned size_t, is keylen < 0 always false here?
Adding 15 before checking for an error also turns -EINVAL from
nvme_dhchap_decoded_key_size() into -7 (-E2BIG), and double-counts the
4-byte CRC because nvme_dhchap_decoded_key_size() already returns the
encoded length of the key plus CRC (48, 72, or 92 bytes), so the total
formatted length is 4 bytes larger than what nvme_dhchap_psk_read()
actually writes (+ 11).
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20261120-dhchap-keyring-v4-v4-0-5f8c7d9926ee@kernel.org?part=2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-20 11:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-20 11:13 [PATCH v4 0/9] nvme-auth: switch to use the kernel keyring Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 1/9] nvme-auth: modify nvme_auth_transform_key() to return status Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:19 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 2/9] nvme-keyring: add 'dhchap' key type Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:28 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 3/9] nvme-auth: switch to use 'struct key' Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 4/9] nvme: parse dhchap keys during option parsing Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 5/9] nvmet-auth: parse dhchap key from configfs attribute Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 6/9] nvme: allow to pass in key description as dhchap secret Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 7/9] nvme-auth: wait for authentication to finish when changing keys Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:26 ` sashiko-bot
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 8/9] nvme-fabrics: allow to pass in keyring by name Hannes Reinecke
2026-11-20 11:14 ` [PATCH v4 9/9] nvmet: add configfs attribute 'dhchap_keyring' Hannes Reinecke
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